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SUMMARY 
Acquisitive prescription (“prescription”), an original method of acquisition of ownership, is 
regulated by two prescription acts. Prescription is mostly regarded as an unproblematic area 
of South African property law, since its requirements are reasonably clear and legally certain. 
However, the unproblematic nature of this legal rule was recently brought into question by 
the English Pye case. This case concerned an owner in England who lost valuable land 
through adverse possession. After the domestic courts confirmed that the owner had lost 
ownership through adverse possession, the Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg found that this legal institution constituted an uncompensated 
expropriation, which is in conflict with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. This judgment may have 
repercussions for the constitutionality of prescription in South African law, despite the fact 
that the Grand Chamber – on appeal – found that adverse possession actually constitutes a 
mere (constitutional) deprivation of property. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate 
whether prescription is in line with section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
To answer this question, the dissertation investigates the historical roots of prescription in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law, together with its modern requirements in South African law. 
The focus then shifts to how prescription operates in certain foreign systems, namely 
England, the Netherlands, France and Germany. This comparative perspective illustrates that 
the requirements for prescription are stricter in jurisdictions with a positive registration 
system. Furthermore, the civil law countries require possessors to possess property with the 
more strenuous animus domini, as opposed to English law that merely requires possession 
animo possidendi. The justifications for prescription are subsequently analysed in terms of 
the Lockean labour theory, Radin’s personality theory and law and economics theory. These 
theories indicate that sufficient moral and economic reasons exist for retaining prescription in 
countries with a negative registration system. These conclusions are finally used to determine 
whether prescription is in line with the property clause. The FNB methodology indicates that 
prescription constitutes a non-arbitrary deprivation of property. If one adheres to the FNB 
methodology it is equally unlikely that prescription could amount to an uncompensated 
expropriation or even to constructive expropriation. I conclude that prescription is in line with 
the South African property clause, which is analogous to the decision of the Grand Chamber 
in Pye.  
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OPSOMMING 
Verkrygende verjaring (“verjaring”), ‘n oorspronklike wyse van verkryging van eiendomsreg, 
word gereguleer deur twee verjaringswette. Verjaring word grotendeels beskou as ‘n 
onproblematiese aspek van die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg, aangesien die vereistes daarvan 
taamlik duidelik en regseker is. Nietemin is die onproblematiese aard van hierdie 
regsinstelling onlangs deur die Engelse Pye-saak in twyfel getrek. Hierdie saak handel oor ‘n 
eienaar wat waardevolle grond in Engeland deur adverse possession verloor het. Nadat die 
plaaslike howe die verlies van eiendomsreg deur adverse possession bevestig het, het die 
Vierde Kamer van die Europese Hof van Menseregte in Straatsburg bevind dat hierdie 
regsreël neerkom op ‘n ongekompenseerde onteiening, wat inbreuk maak op Artikel 1 van die 
Eerste Protokol tot die Europese Verdrag van die Reg van die Mens 1950. Hierdie uitspraak 
kan implikasies inhou vir die grondwetlikheid van verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ten 
spyte van die Groot Kamer se bevinding – op appèl – dat adverse possession eintlik neerkom 
op ‘n grondwetlik geldige ontneming van eiendom. Derhalwe was dit nodig om te bepaal of 
verjaring bestaanbaar is met artikel 25 van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet. 
 
Vir hierdie doel word die geskiedkundige wortels van verjaring in die Romeinse en Romeins-
Hollandse reg, tesame met die moderne vereistes daarvan in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, 
ondersoek. Daar word ook gekyk na hoe hierdie regsreël in buitelandse regstelsels, naamlik 
Engeland, Nederland, Frankryk en Duitsland, funksioneer. Hierdie regsvergelykende studie 
toon dat verjaring strenger vereistes het in regstelsels met ‘n positiewe registrasiestelsel. 
Verder vereis die sivielregtelike lande dat ‘n besitter die grond animo domini moet besit, wat 
strenger is as die Engelsregtelike animus possidendi-vereiste. Die regverdigingsgronde van 
verjaring word vervolgens geëvalueer ingevolge die Lockeaanse arbeidsteorie, Radin se 
persoonlikheidsteorie en law and economics-teorie. Hierdie teorieë illustreer dat daar 
genoegsame morele en ekonomiese regverdigings vir die bestaan van verjaring is in lande 
met ‘n negatiewe regstrasiestelsel. Hierdie bevindings word ten slotte gebruik om te bepaal of 
verjaring bestaanbaar is met die eiendomsklousule. Die FNB-metodologie toon dat verjaring 
neerkom op ‘n geldige, nie-arbitrêre ontneming volgens artikel 25(1). Indien ‘n mens die 
FNB-metodologie volg is dit eweneens onwaarskynlik dat verjaring op ‘n ongekompenseerde 
onteiening – of selfs op konstruktiewe onteiening – neerkom. Gevolglik strook verjaring wel 
met die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsklousule, welke uitkoms soortgelyk is aan dié van die 
Groot Kamer in die Pye-saak.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Outline of the research problem and hypothesis 
1.1.1 Outline of the research problem 
Acquisitive prescription (“prescription”) is an area of South African property law that is 
generally regarded as both unproblematic and legally certain. The two prescription acts 
regulate this field of law, namely the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 (“1943 Act”) and the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (“1969 Act”). Although these acts do not codify the law of 
prescription,1 they provide that a person acquires ownership in property if such person 
possessed it openly, continuously and “as if owner” for an uninterrupted period of 30 years.2 
It follows that prescription is an original method of acquisition of ownership, since the co-
operation of the legal predecessor is not required to acquire ownership in this manner.3 In 
other words, a possessor acquires ownership ex lege the moment she satisfies all the 
requirements for prescription. 
 
Other jurisdictions, such as Dutch, French and pre-20034 English law, also seem to regard 
prescription or adverse possession as an unproblematic area of the law.5 However, the 
seemingly uncomplicated nature of this legal institution was recently brought into question 
when the constitutionality of adverse possession – the common law equivalent of prescription 
– was challenged before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Pye, a company 
registered in England, lost title to 25 hectares of land to the Grahams through the effects of 
adverse possession. After exhausting its remedies at local level, where the House of Lords 
confirmed the loss of title through adverse possession,6 Pye took its case to the European 
Court of Human Rights. Pye claimed that adverse possession violated its right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (“Article 1”) to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (“the 
Convention”). The Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights upheld Pye’s 
                                                             
1 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 135; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 7. 
2 Section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. These requirements are similar to those set out in section 2(1)-(2) 
of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943, as indicated in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two below. 
3 I extrapolate this from section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 and section 2(1) of the Prescription Act 18 
of 1943. See further section 2.3.1 of chapter two below. 
4 The Land Registration Act, which fundamentally altered English adverse possession law, came into operation 
on 13 October 2003 and is prospective in nature: See Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 and JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
5 See generally sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 for English, Dutch and French law respectively in chapter three below. 
6 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
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claim and found that adverse possession constituted an uncompensated deprivation – or 
expropriation in the South African context – of property, which upset the “fair balance” 
required by the Convention.7 This decision led to an outcry from property law scholars in 
member states of the European Union, since they feared that this decision also invalidated 
their rules pertaining to prescription.8 The United Kingdom government, unsatisfied with the 
judgment of the Fourth Chamber, appealed to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights.9 The Grand Chamber reversed the decision of the Fourth Chamber and 
decided that adverse possession amounts to a regulation of property, as opposed to 
expropriation. This finding led the Grand Chamber to conclude that sufficient reasons do 
exist for having a mechanism such as adverse possession in a modern legal system and, 
consequently, it held that adverse possession strikes a “fair balance” between the interests of 
the individual and the public interest. Accordingly, the Grand Chamber found that adverse 
possession is in line with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. 
 
In light of these decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, especially the judgment 
of the Fourth Chamber, it is clear that the constitutionality of prescription may also be 
challenged in the constitutional setting of South Africa. In this regard the Constitutional 
Court will have to determine whether prescription is in line with section 25, the property 
clause of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (“the Constitution”). The 
possibility that prescription could be in conflict with section 25 is likely to have serious 
repercussions for the rules of property law pertaining to original acquisition of ownership. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate two questions in this dissertation, namely (i) whether 
sufficient justification exists for prescription today and (ii) whether this legal institution 
complies with the property clause. 
 
To answer these questions, it is essential to – firstly – investigate the history of prescription 
and its requirements in modern South African law. Chapter two addresses this issue, since it 
focuses on the reception and requirements of prescription in South African law. This chapter 
                                                             
7 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV). 
8 See, for instance, Caterina R “Some Comparative Remarks on JA Pye (Oxford) v. The United Kingdom” 
(2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 273-279; Sagaert V “Prescription in French and Belgian Property 
Law after the Pye Judgment” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 265-272; Radley-Gardner O “Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd v. United Kingdom: The View from England” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 289-308; 
Milo JM “On the Constitutional Proportionality of Property Law in the Netherlands” (2007) 15 European 
Review of Private Law 255- 263. 
9 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). 
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considers the requirements of the forerunners of prescription in Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law, together with how the prescription acts and case law regulate prescription in South 
Africa today. 
 
The emphasis of chapter three falls on foreign law in order to ascertain how prescription or 
adverse possession operates in other jurisdictions. For this purpose Dutch, French, German 
and especially English law are investigated. This chapter specifically examines the 
requirements for prescription in French and German law, since these two jurisdictions 
represent the two main civil law traditions in Europe. Although South Africa has a mixed 
legal system, South African property law – which includes prescription law – is much closer 
to the civil law tradition than to the English common law tradition. Furthermore, Germany 
(like South Africa) is a jurisdiction with a supreme constitution that also contains a justiciable 
property clause. For this reason German law is ideal for comparative purposes. 
 
Dutch law also forms part of the civil law tradition and has a mixed civil law system, since it 
contains elements of both the French and German legal traditions. Dutch law also shares the 
Roman-Dutch legal heritage with South Africa, which makes a comparative analysis useful in 
this context. A further reason for studying these civil law jurisdictions is because they, 
contrary to South African law, distinguish between bona and mala fide possessors for 
purposes of prescription. This is interesting, since South African prescription law attaches no 
significance to this distinction and simply requires both good and bad faith possessors to 
possess property for 30 years before such possessor can acquire ownership. 
   
Chapter three pays special attention to the English law of adverse possession because the Pye 
case concerned the constitutionality of adverse possession in light of Article 1. It is necessary 
to scrutinise this legal institution both before and after the enactment of the Land Registration 
Act 2002 (“LRA” or “2002 Act”), since the LRA amended the rules pertaining to adverse 
possession by making it more difficult for title holders (or owners) of registered land to lose 
title through adverse possession.10 Nonetheless, the Pye case was lodged before this Act came 
into operation, which also necessitates an inquiry as to how adverse possession operated 
before the 2002 Act came into effect. Furthermore, even though English law does not have a 
written constitution, the Human Rights Act 1998 has the effect that the Convention now 
                                                             
10 See section 3.2.4 of chapter three below. 
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applies to English law. Accordingly, English land law must be in line with Article 1 of the 
First Protocol to the Convention, which is a position similar to South African law where all 
law must comply with the Constitution. Finally, the requirements of adverse possession also 
influenced the requirements for prescription in South African law to a certain extent, which 
further justifies a comparative analysis in this regard. 
 
This dissertation does not investigate the requirements for adverse possession or prescription 
in United States (“US”), Australian or Irish law. It does not examine how prescription 
operates in other African countries either. This is because US and Australian law both belong 
to the common law tradition, which makes a discussion in this context unnecessary in light of 
chapter three’s discussion of English adverse possession law. Irish law is not scrutinised 
because it contains elements of feudal law and has a unique property clause, which would 
complicate a comparative analysis. The reason for not considering other African countries is 
because these systems are mostly either common-law based or founded on French civil law 
principles. Since chapter three covers both, it is unnecessary to examine how prescription 
functions in other African countries. 
 
The justifications for prescription are set out in chapter four. This chapter investigates the 
rationale for prescription in Roman-Dutch, South African, Dutch and French law. Attention is 
then directed at English law for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that the Pye case originated in 
England makes it imperative to focus on the grounds advanced in favour of adverse 
possession. Secondly, the English Law Commission recently concluded that adverse 
possession of registered land is no longer justified if the register provides conclusive proof of 
ownership. This led to the enactment of the LRA, which now prevents loss of title of 
registered land through the mere passage of time. The analysis of the justifications for 
adverse possession in English law is followed by a discussion of three liberal property 
theories to determine whether the “abolishment” of traditional adverse possession by the Law 
Commission was justified and whether prescription still fulfils a useful purpose in other legal 
systems today. These theories are the Lockean labour theory, the personality theory – as 
developed by Radin – and utilitarianism and law and economics theory. I specifically 
consider these three theories because they are analogous to the traditional justifications 
provided for prescription or adverse possession. Taken together, they predict that prescription 
plays an important role in negative registration systems by clearing titles and promoting legal 
certainty, although certain economic and moral factors may even justify maintaining 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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prescription in a positive registration system. Finally, this chapter considers whether the 
distinction between bona and mala fide possessors for purposes of prescription performs any 
useful role and whether this differentiation is truly necessary. 
 
Chapter five focuses on the constitutionality of prescription. For this purpose, the chapter 
employs the methodology set out by Ackermann J in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB”)11 to conduct the section 25 analysis of 
prescription. Firstly, this chapter investigates whether prescription amounts to arbitrary 
deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1). I predict that prescription amounts to a non-
arbitrary deprivation of property, which is in line with section 25(1). For purposes of this 
argument, chapter five considers the moral and economic justifications in favour of 
prescription discussed in chapter four, together with the judgment of the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Pye. The question of whether prescription constitutes 
expropriation in terms of section 25(2) (or even constructive expropriation) is also examined. 
The possibility that prescription amounts to either expropriation or constructive expropriation 
is ruled out through an analysis of expropriation law in terms of the FNB methodology. 
Accordingly, this chapter concludes that the law of prescription is constitutionally compliant. 
 
 
1.1.2 Hypothesis 
My hypothesis is that prescription, which affects the loss of ownership on the side of an 
owner, could amount to an arbitrary deprivation under section 25(1) of the Constitution if 
there is insufficient reason for it. It may perhaps even constitute an uncompensated 
expropriation in terms of section 25(2), a possibility that is similar to the finding of the 
Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the Pye case. Should prescription 
be in conflict with the property clause, it will entail major repercussions for prescription as 
well as the rules of property law pertaining to original acquisition of ownership, such as 
specificatio, accessio and commixtio et confusio. Accordingly, it is imperative to investigate 
how this legal institution operates in both South African law and other jurisdictions, as well 
as the reasons for having such a rule in a modern legal system. 
 
                                                             
11 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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Chapter two indicates that the requirements for prescription in South African law are difficult 
to satisfy, since a possessor must possess the property of another continuously with the 
animus domini12 for an uninterrupted period of 30 years.13 Chapter three illustrates that the 
requirements for prescription in Dutch and French law are similar to those in South African 
law, since both these civil law systems also require a possessor to possess property animo 
domini for a certain period of time.14 German law also requires a possessor to possess 
property with the intention of an owner before she can acquire it through Ersitzung,15 
although it has more strenuous requirements due to the positive nature of the German 
registration system. To the contrary, English law merely requires possessors to possess land 
animo possidendi16 for purposes of acquiring it through adverse possession, a requirement 
that is more easily satisfied than possession animo domini.17 This is an interesting difference 
between prescription and adverse possession, especially if one considers the fact that the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found the “less strenuous” adverse 
possession to be in line with Article 1 of the First Protocol. Nevertheless, the enactment of 
the LRA makes it much harder to acquire title to registered land, since English law – like 
German law – now also employs a positive registration system. 
 
The English Law Commission reasoned that the traditional justifications for adverse 
possession do not hold water when a register provides conclusive proof of ownership, since 
registration – and no longer possession – is then indicative of ownership. These developments 
may seem to hinder prescription from surviving a constitutional challenge under section 25 of 
the Constitution. However, chapter four argues that the Law Commission failed to take 
certain moral and economic factors into account when it decided to amend adverse 
possession law pertaining to registered land. For this purpose the chapter considers the 
traditional justifications that Roman-Dutch, South African, Dutch and French law provide for 
prescription. The justifications for adverse possession in English law and the objections 
raised against them by the Law Commission are also investigated. Against this background, 
the chapter establishes that the Lockean labour theory, Radin’s personality theory, and 
utilitarianism and law and economics theory provide powerful justifications for the existence 
of prescription in a legal system. This is due to the fact that prescription fulfils an important 
                                                             
12 The intention of an owner: See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two below. 
13 See generally section 2.3 of chapter two below for a more detailed discussion in this regard. 
14 See section 3.3.2 for Dutch law and section 3.4.2 for French law in chapter three below. 
15 Ersitzung is the equivalent of acquisitive prescription in South African law. 
16 The intention to possess. 
17 See section 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter three below. 
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corrective function and helps to reallocate resources to higher-valuing possessors in countries 
with a negative registration system, although certain moral justifications for this legal 
institution can possibly even justify its presence in jurisdictions with a positive registration 
system. Nonetheless, this chapter only attempts to justify prescription in the context of a 
negative registration system. 
 
These moral and economic arguments in favour of prescription are then used in chapter five, 
which focuses on the constitutionality of prescription. The main question in this chapter is 
whether prescription constitutes non-arbitrary deprivation of property, as required by section 
25(1). For this purpose, I employ Ackermann’s J methodology for adjudicating section 25 
disputes, as laid down in FNB. In this sense, sufficient reasons must exist for the deprivation 
in question brought about by prescription to be in line with section 25(1).18 In other words, 
there must be a sufficient nexus between prescription and the fact that it results in the loss of 
ownership on the side of an owner in order for the deprivation to be non-arbitrary. Chapter 
five predicts that such a nexus indeed exists between the effects of prescription (loss of 
ownership) and the reasons for such deprivation, namely the moral and economic 
considerations identified in chapter four. It follows that prescription amounts to non-arbitrary 
deprivation, which is in line with the property clause. Finally, I conclude that prescription 
cannot constitute expropriation or even constructive expropriation if one strictly adheres to 
the FNB methodology. Consequently, this dissertation establishes that prescription complies 
with section 25 of the Constitution. 
 
 
1.2 Overview of chapters 
There are four substantive chapters in this dissertation, while the current one forms the 
introduction and chapter six the conclusion. Chapter two discusses how South African law 
received prescription as well as the requirements of this legal institution today. It provides a 
brief historical overview of the Roman and Roman-Dutch roots of prescription, together with 
how prescription operated in these two systems. Following this brief historical perspective, 
the chapter analyses the requirements for prescription in South African law. For this purpose, 
the requirements for prescription according to the 1943 and 1969 acts are scrutinised, since it 
is possible to encounter cases involving long periods of suspension where a possessor may 
                                                             
18 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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still have to satisfy the requirements under the 1943 Act.19 Chapter two relies on case law and 
the academic work of property scholars to examine the requirements for prescription. This 
chapter shows that the requirements under the two prescription acts are remarkably similar, 
since both acts require a person to possess property openly, continuously and as if owner 
(animo domini) for an uninterrupted period of 30 years in order to acquire ownership.20 
 
Chapter three considers prescription or adverse possession in English, Dutch, French and 
German law. This chapter initially investigates English law and scrutinises the requirements 
for adverse possession both before and after the enactment of the LRA for two reasons. 
Firstly, this Act prevents the extinguishment of title through mere adverse possession. 
Secondly, the Fourth and Grand Chambers of the European Court of Human Rights decided 
the Pye case under the “old” rules of adverse possession, which makes it important to 
ascertain how adverse possession worked at this time for purposes of a comparative and 
constitutional analysis. Special attention is paid to the intention a person must have to possess 
land for purposes of adverse possession. Adverse possession law merely requires a person to 
possess property with the animus possidendi (intention to possess), which makes it “easier” to 
succeed with an adverse possession claim when compared to prescription under the civil law 
systems, which requires the intention of an owner (animus domini).21 The requisite intention 
in adverse possession law is the same both before and after the LRA came into effect, since 
this Act merely puts protective mechanisms in place for owners of registered title. 
Accordingly, this Act does not affect the substantive requirements for adverse possession in 
English law. 
 
Chapter three also examines the facts of the Pye case – as well as the reasoning of each of the 
three local courts – to provide a background for the discussion of the decisions by the Fourth 
and Grand Chambers of the European Court of Human Rights in chapter five. As mentioned 
before, the 2002 Act prevents owners of registered land from losing ownership through the 
effects of adverse possession.22 This makes it much harder to acquire title in registered land 
                                                             
19 Although the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 came into operation on 1 December 1970, it is not retrospective in 
nature. This means that prescription periods running up until 30 November 1970 still have to comply with the 
requirements as set out by the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. It follows that the remainder of the prescription 
period after 30 November 1970 then only has to comply with the requirements of the Prescription Act 68 of 
1969. See further the discussion in section 2.3.1 of chapter two below. 
20 See sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two below. 
21 See the discussion in section 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter three below. 
22 See section 96(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002, which disapplies section 15 of the Limitation Act 1980. 
See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.21. 
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through adverse possession today. The reasons for this alteration by the English Law 
Commission are discussed in chapter four. 
 
The requirements for prescription in Dutch and French law demonstrate remarkable 
similarities to those in South African law. The main difference lies in the fact that these two 
Western European systems differentiate between good and bad faith possessors, since these 
jurisdictions require mala fide possessors to possess property for longer periods than their 
bona fide counterparts before they can acquire ownership.23 Both these systems also require a 
possessor to possess property with the animus domini to acquire ownership through 
prescription, just as in South African law.24 
 
German law has a strict prescription regime, since a person can only acquire ownership in 
land through Ersitzung if she possessed the property continuously for 30 years while also 
(erroneously) being registered as the owner in the Grundbuch (register).25 This indeed 
narrows down the possibility to acquire ownership in land through prescription, since it is 
highly unlikely that a person would be wrongly registered as owner in the Grundbuch for a 
period of 30 years. The reason for this strict approach is because the German Civil Code 
(“Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch”) guarantees the correctness of the Grundbuch, which causes 
German law to have a positive registration system.26 In this sense English law is now similar 
to German law, since the LRA also deems the English register to provide conclusive proof of 
ownership.27 This illustrates why the requirements for prescription or adverse possession are 
stricter in jurisdictions with a positive registration system than those with a negative 
registration system. Chapter four focuses on the significance of this phenomenon, together 
with the question whether there is merit in distinguishing between good and bad faith 
possessors for purposes of prescription. 
 
Chapter four examines the justifications behind prescription. In this context the point of 
departure is the justifications Roman-Dutch, South African, Dutch and French law provide 
                                                             
23 For Dutch law, see sections 3.3.2.2.2-3.3.2.2.3 of chapter three below. For the position of French prescription 
law, see section 3.4.2.2 of chapter three below. 
24 For Dutch law, see section 3.3.2.2.1 of chapter three below. For the position of French prescription law, see 
section 3.4.2.1 of chapter three below. 
25 See section 3.5 of chapter three below. 
26 BGB § 891 I. See also Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 891 
RdNr 2, 5. 
27 Section 58(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
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for this legal institution. This chapter omits German law, since it is clear from chapter three 
that prescription no longer fulfils a meaningful purpose in this jurisdiction. From the 
discussion of the four systems mentioned earlier, it becomes clear that they regard 
prescription as a mechanism that affords de iure status to long-existing de facto situations, 
especially in the context of a negative registration system. Another justification advanced in 
favour of prescription is that it encourages owners to use their property or, stated negatively, 
punishes owners for not looking after their property. This justification carries more weight in 
Roman-Dutch and South African law than in Dutch and French law, where it is regarded as 
merely ancillary to the promotion of legal certainty argument.28 
 
Following the discussion of the justifications for prescription in these four systems, the 
chapter shifts its focus to the reasons why the English Law Commission decided to limit the 
effects of adverse possession in relation to registered land. The Commission relied on an 
article by Dockray,29 who criticises the traditional justifications as observed in the four legal 
systems mentioned in the previous paragraph. The Commission accepted the objections of 
Dockray and concluded that it is no longer justified to allow adverse possession in respect of 
registered land when the register provides conclusive proof of title. Nonetheless, this chapter 
argues that the Commission failed to make an informed decision, as it did not take into 
account certain key moral and economic considerations. To fill this gap, chapter four 
considers three liberal property theories, namely the Lockean labour theory, Radin’s 
personality theory, and utilitarianism and law and economics theory. One of the reasons I 
concentrate on these three theories specifically is because they overlap with the traditional 
justifications that South African law provides for prescription. In terms of the labour theory, 
the chapter argues that persons who actively use and invest labour into the neglected property 
of others obtain a labour theory claim to such property if one regards the owner’s neglect of 
such property as constituting quasi-abandonment.30 Furthermore, the labour theory is subject 
to certain internal qualifications that justify granting ownership to a possessor through 
prescription under specific circumstances.31 
 
                                                             
28 See the discussion in section 4.2 of chapter four below. 
29 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284. 
30 I rely on Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 in this regard. See further the discussion in section 
4.4.2 of chapter four below. 
31 See section 4.4.2 of chapter four below. 
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According to the personality theory, Radin regards some forms of property – which she 
classifies as personal property – as being constitutive to one’s personhood. In this context, a 
person who possesses an owner’s (neglected) property will be entitled to stronger protection 
concerning possession of the property if it is closely related to the personhood of the 
possessor.32 This position is analogous to German constitutional law, where it is more 
difficult for the state to regulate the limits of property rights located closer to a person’s 
autonomy – such as a home – than those that are not so related, such as commercial property. 
Furthermore, Radin’s theory is similar to what Singer refers to as the “reliance interest” of 
parties.33 According to this theory, possessors and third parties begin to rely on factual 
situations that owners “allow” to persist for long periods of time. In this sense the absence of 
the owner allows the possessor to become “attached” to the property, which induces third 
parties (and possessors) to believe that the possessor is the true owner of the property and not 
the owner. Another moral theory that is analogous to Radin’s personality theory, and that 
provides a powerful justification for prescription, is Alexander’s social-obligation norm.34 
This theory entails that owners have an inherent obligation to help others in the community to 
foster their capabilities to attain human flourishing. Consequently, an owner that neglects her 
land through “allowing” a possessor to stay on it for a long time will be obliged to “give” that 
land to the squatter if it became essential for such squatter to lead a well-lived life. Since 
prescription involves the acquisition of ownership in land by possessors, chapter four argues 
that the social-obligation norm underlies this legal institution. 
 
The third theory used to justify prescription is utilitarianism and law and economics theory. 
Chapter four discusses these trends together, as both of them aim to maximise the general 
welfare or utility, albeit in different contexts. Utilitarianism attempts to maximise overall 
happiness while law and economics theory aims to structure the law in such a way as to 
optimise economic efficiency. I argue that prescription is justified from a utilitarian 
perspective, since it maximises happiness if prescription awards ownership to a person who 
actively uses property for a sufficient length of time in the absence of a neglecting owner. In 
this context utility is increased by having a legal rule (prescription), in terms of rule-
                                                             
32 See section 4.4.3 of chapter four below. 
33 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751. See further the 
discussion in section 4.4.3 of chapter four below. 
34 Developed by Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell 
Law Review 745-820. This theory is addressed in section 4.4.3 of chapter four below. 
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utilitarianism, which awards ownership to the hardworking labourer instead of the neglectful 
owner after a certain period of time. 
 
Since law and economics theory aims to maximise economic efficiency, it attempts to lower 
transactions costs in circumstances where high transaction costs prevent voluntary exchange 
between parties. Consequently, one can justify prescription if it can be shown that this legal 
institution helps to shift resources to higher-valuing users or possessors in situations where 
the market cannot realise this function due to high transaction costs. The costs in relation to 
four categories are taken into account for purposes of law and economics theory, namely (i) 
owners, (ii) possessors, (iii) third parties and (iv) litigation. With regard to owners, the 
economic analysis of prescription demonstrates that the “pain” – in the form of 
“demoralization costs”35 – an owner suffers when ownership is lost to a possessor through 
prescription is less in a regime with a longer prescription period. This is because owners 
become detached from property the longer they are out of possession, a position that is 
analogous to Radin’s personality theory. It follows that the shorter the period, the higher the 
demoralisation costs, since an owner is then likely to still regard the land as personal 
property. Monitoring costs are also reduced by lengthening the prescription period, since the 
owner won’t have to incur costs to locate possessors who are not readily detectable. The 
decrease in monitoring costs also lowers uncertainty costs, since ownership is more secure if 
the law requires a possessor to remain in possession for a longer time before she can acquire 
ownership through prescription. 
 
As to the possessor, the potential demoralisation costs she suffers increase with the length of 
the prescription period, since the possessor will come to rely – through her “reliance interest” 
– on the fact that the owner “allowed” such possessor to remain on the property. This position 
is again similar to Radin’s predictions under the personality theory. In this context 
prescription maximises economic efficiency through awarding ownership to the possessor 
and taking it away from the owner, who in any event makes no economic use thereof. 
Furthermore, prescription in a negative registration system also lowers costs pertaining to the 
ascertainment of ownership, since third parties can disregard possible errors in the register 
                                                             
35 This concept was developed by Michelman FI “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 1165-1258 1214. The connection of 
using demoralisation costs in the context of prescription was made by Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and 
Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University 
Law Quarterly 723-737 727-728. See further the discussion in section 4.4.4 of chapter four below. 
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that predate the prescription period, which also reduces search costs. In addition, it will be 
safer to merely inspect the property to see who possesses it (thereby incurring inspection 
costs) than to rely on (faulty) information of the register in a negative registration system. 
Another economic justification includes the fact that prescription reduces litigation costs, 
since it avoids protracted litigation concerning ownership. 
 
Finally, chapter four analyses the distinction between bona and mala fide prescription. The 
chapter especially relies on Fennell36 to illustrate that it serves no useful purpose to 
distinguish between these types of possessors, since the “so-called” distinction is flawed 
because of fallacious moral reasoning. These judgments include the presumption that bad 
faith possessors – who possess property knowing that they do not own it – are morally 
reprehensible and that the law should therefore make it more difficult for them to acquire 
ownership through prescription. Fennell indicates that the apparently simple distinction 
between good and bad faith is not as clear-cut as it prima facie seems and emphasises that 
persons are able to choose how to inform themselves of a particular situation. This fact, 
according to Fennell, makes knowledge an unstable criterion to determine whether good faith 
or bad faith is present.37 Fennell further argues that by disentangling the way law and 
morality is conflated in the word “thief”, we are able to discover why bad faith should 
actually be a requirement for acquiring land through prescription. 
 
Peñalver and Katyal38 agree with Fennell that this distinction is based on erroneous moral 
judgments. They emphasise the role these “acquisitive [property] outlaws” play in developing 
property law. In this sense the authors agree with Radin that property is important to persons 
to help gain individual identity, which justifies the acquisition of ownership through bad faith 
prescription if the possessor had real need of the property. Another reason for allowing bad 
faith prescription is because it generates information as to the inefficient distribution of 
property rights in society. In this sense these authors (Fennell, Peñalver and Katyal) agree 
with the economic arguments that prescription should be allowed if it helps to relocate 
resources to higher-valuing users. 
 
                                                             
36 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096. 
37 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1050. 
38 Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-
1186. 
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Chapter five focuses on the constitutionality of prescription in terms of section 25 of the 
South African Constitution. For purposes of the section 25 analysis, this chapter relies on the 
methodology set out by Ackermann J in FNB when dealing with the interpretation and 
application of section 25 disputes. The first substantive question in this context is whether 
prescription complies with section 25(1), which allows for deprivation of property. I establish 
that the two South African prescription acts constitute law of general application, which is the 
first requirement of section 25(1). As to the question of arbitrariness, the chapter argues that 
prescription amounts to non-arbitrary deprivation of property, since it satisfies both the 
procedural and substantive non-arbitrariness legs of the arbitrariness test. The moral and 
economic justifications identified in chapter four are central to this conclusion, especially the 
fact that prescription fulfils a corrective function and lowers transaction costs in jurisdictions 
with a negative registration system. This result finds further support in the judgment of the 
Grand Chamber in the Pye case, where it was found that adverse possession in English law 
constitutes a regulation – or deprivation in South African law – of property, which is in line 
with the third rule of Article 1. The fact that the Grand Chamber found adverse possession – 
with its “easy” animus possidendi requirement – to comply with Article 1 provides further 
support for the constitutionality of prescription, since it has the more strenuous animus 
domini element. 
 
In the wake of the arguments pertaining to section 25(1), the next question is whether 
prescription amounts to uncompensated expropriation in terms of section 25(2), along with 
whether it constitutes constructive expropriation. The fact that prescription could amount to 
uncompensated expropriation is a real possibility, which is analogous to the judgment of the 
Fourth Chamber in Pye. Nonetheless, I argue that prescription cannot amount to 
expropriation, since the two prescription acts do not empower the state to expropriate 
property rights.39 Furthermore, these acts also do not provide for the payment of 
compensation, which further indicates that prescription does not amount to expropriation. In 
addition, the courts in South African law have no common law authority to order 
expropriation, since this power must be expressly or tacitly granted in empowering 
legislation. The fact that the prescription acts in no way empower a court to order 
expropriation is another indication that it cannot amount to expropriation. 
 
                                                             
39 The question of whether prescription amounts to expropriation is addressed in section 5.3.2.6 of chapter five 
below. 
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Finally, chapter five argues that prescription does not amount to constructive expropriation 
either.40 This reasoning is based on the argument that the doctrine of constructive 
expropriation, which treats excessive deprivation as de facto expropriation that requires 
compensation, does not form part of South African law.41 This doctrine is recognised in 
Swiss law, where the constitution provides for this form of expropriation. It is also applied in 
US law (where it is known as regulatory takings), although its application in that context is 
not free from difficulty. German law does not recognise this doctrine and this is likely to be 
the position in South African law as well. According to German constitutional law, an 
excessive deprivation will be unconstitutional for being in conflict with the Basic Law. In this 
context an “unconstitutional” deprivation cannot be saved by treating it as constructive 
expropriation. Furthermore, if one strictly adheres to the methodology set out in FNB, it is 
clear that “unconstitutional” deprivations will be struck down as arbitrary deprivation under 
section 25(1) before one can reach the question as to whether it constitutes constructive 
expropriation under section 25(2). Accordingly, I conclude that prescription does not amount 
to constructive expropriation. Therefore, this chapter concludes that prescription is in line 
with section 25 of the Constitution. 
 
In the final chapter, I conclude that prescription is in line with the property clause, since it 
fulfils an important corrective function in jurisdictions with a negative registration system. 
Chapter six reaches this conclusion by using the arguments made in chapter three (the 
comparative law chapter) concerning prescription in other jurisdictions, together with 
assessing the justifications provided by the three liberal property theories investigated in 
chapter four. This chapter incorporates the conclusions drawn from chapters three and four in 
the FNB methodology to ascertain whether prescription amounts to a non-arbitrary 
deprivation, which constitutional analysis confirms that prescription is in line with section 25. 
 
 
1.3 Qualifications 
This dissertation only focuses on prescription in the context of ownership of land and does 
not investigate the role of prescription pertaining to either movables or servitudes, since the 
justifications – and to a lesser degree also the requirements – differ from those concerning 
ownership of immovable property. For these reasons I do not specifically investigate 
                                                             
40 This question is addressed in section 5.3.2.6 of chapter five below. 
41 Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2. 
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prescription in the context of boundary disputes either. Accordingly, prescription in these 
situations falls outside the scope of this dissertation. In this regard I take cognisance of the 
fact that the Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”) contains a chapter pertaining to 
the prescription of movables, even though it does not allow for the acquisition of land 
through prescription.42 It is worth emphasising that the requirements for acquiring movables 
through prescription under the DCFR are remarkably similar to those in the German law of 
Ersitzung. 
 
Even though chapter two includes and discusses South African cases pertaining to the 
acquisition or loss of servitudes through prescription, this is only done for purposes of 
clarifying the requirements for prescription under the two prescription acts in relation to land. 
This approach is in no way intended to facilitate a discussion as to the acquisition of 
servitudes through prescription in South African law. 
 
It is not my intention to analyse the extinction of debts or obligations through extinctive 
prescription, since the focus of this dissertation only falls on the acquisition of immovables 
through acquisitive prescription. This is because both the requirements and the effects of 
extinctive prescription differ from those of acquisitive prescription, since extinctive 
prescription fulfils a more important role in the context of the law of obligations than in 
property law. Accordingly, since the justifications for extinctive prescription also differ from 
those of acquisitive prescription, they fall outside the scope of my dissertation. 
 
Finally, I do not provide an in-depth historical discussion of prescription in the second 
chapter. The purpose of the historical analysis is merely to illustrate that prescription has its 
roots in Roman and Roman-Dutch law and not to provide a detailed account of the 
requirements of prescription during these two eras. An in-depth study to this effect falls 
outside the scope of this dissertation. 
                                                             
42 Von Bar C et al (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law – Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (2009) Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2: ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION: RECEPTION AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Acquisitive prescription (“prescription”) is one of the oldest existing legal institutions, 
already recognised by the earliest legal code adopted by the Romans.1 This chapter shows 
how prescription developed throughout the Roman law period, as well as how it changed 
under the rule of the emperor Justinian. Following this analysis of the ancient sources, the 
chapter investigates the position of prescription under Roman-Dutch law. Against this 
historical background the focus then shifts to modern South African prescription law. 
Specific emphasis is placed on the content of the requirements set out by the two prescription 
acts,2 with special consideration for the requirements of possessio civilis, adverse user and 
“as if owner”. Regard is also had to the similarities between these two acts. 
 
 
2.2 Historical background 
2.2.1 Introduction 
South African private law, which was greatly influenced by Roman-Dutch law, has its roots 
in Roman law. Accordingly, a brief overview is presented of the origins of prescription, as 
well as how it developed until the time Roman-Dutch law emerged in the provinces of 
Holland. This helps to contextualise the discussion of the modern South African law of 
prescription. This section starts by focusing on the position under the old Roman law,3 
followed by the late republican and classical periods of law,4 the post-classical period5 and 
then the period during the rule of Justinian.6 Afterwards, the acquisition of servitudes through 
prescription in Roman law is briefly investigated, ending off with how prescription developed 
under Roman-Dutch law.  
 
 
                                                             
1 The Twelve Tables. 
2 Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
3 This is the period between the adoption of the Twelve Tables (around 450 BC) until the pre-classical period 
(around 250 BC).  
4 From 250 BC until the classical period, between 27 BC and 250 AD. 
5 From 250 AD until around 500 AD. 
6 From around 520 AD until 540 AD: See Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 
10 for this division. 
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2.2.2 Acquisitive prescription under Roman law   
The earliest known form of prescription is found in the Twelve Tables,7 which most scholars 
agree was adopted by the Romans around 450 BC.8 This legal rule later became known as 
usucapio.9 During this early stage, the Romans did not distinguish between acquisitive and 
extinctive prescription, hence the unqualified use of the term “prescription” in the first 
sentence of this paragraph.10 According to Tabula 6.3, it was possible to acquire both 
movable and immovable objects through prescription.11 The requirements for prescription 
(and later usucapio) were numerous and complicated, but for the purposes of this discussion 
they may be summarised as follows, according to Tabula 6.3: 
 
i) continuous possession or use of another’s property; 
ii) for a certain period of time (two years for immovables and one year for movables).12 
 
These periods applied throughout the republican and classical periods and, regarding 
movables, even up until the time of Justinian.13 If a person satisfied these requirements, he 
became the owner of the property.14 In other words, he acquired dominium or ownership. 
However, this method of acquiring dominium was qualified.15 According to Tabula 3.7,16 
prescription could not run in the favour of peregrini (or foreigners). Stolen things (rei 
                                                             
7 Leges Duodecim Tabularum. 
8 According to Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 82, Tabula 6.3 states: “Usus 
auctoritas fundi biennium esto, ceterarum rerum omnium annuus est usus.” There is a debate over the exact 
meaning of this stipulation, but that is not discussed here. According to Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch 
Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 81, (acquisitive) prescription probably existed even before the adoption of the Twelve 
Tables. 
9 The word usucapio is of such ancient heritage that no one is certain since when it has been used to refer to 
prescription: See Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 81. 
10 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 13. 
11 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 14; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 130; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of 
Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 30. 
12 Gai Inst 2.42; Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 200; Johnston D Roman 
Law in Context (1999) 57; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 14; Kaser M 
Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 130 132; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 
80; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 242; Van 
Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 82; Krause LE “The History and Nature of 
Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law 
Journal 26-41 30; Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 635. 
13 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 82. 
14 Gai Inst 2.41. 
15 The qualifications are found in Tabulae 3.7 and 8.17. 
16 “Adversus hostem aeterna auctoritas (esto).” Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 
1980) 130 translates this provision as follows: “As against an alien the warranty shall last eternally.” See also 
Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 248; Van Oven 
JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 83; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive 
Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 
30-31; Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 635. 
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furtivae) were also excluded from the effects of prescription, which was enhanced by the lex 
Atinia (enacted around the beginning of 200 BC).17 This was the case even if a bona fide18 
third party obtained possession of stolen property.19 Not until the stolen object was returned 
to the hands of the owner did it once more become susceptible to prescription.20 It was not 
necessary that the owner be physically reunited with the stolen thing; all that was required 
was that the owner needed to know the whereabouts of the property, and thus be able to 
reclaim it with his rei vindicatio.21 If these requirements were satisfied, it once more became 
possible to acquire the property through usucapio.22 This exception only applied to movables, 
as it is impossible to steal immovable property.23  
 
The justifications for usucapio during this time were much the same as the traditional ones 
advanced in favour of prescription in most modern-day jurisdictions, namely   
 
i) to legalise the position of a possessor who may not have complied with the formal 
requirements for transfer of dominium (ie transfer by way of traditio of a res 
mancipi instead of through mancipatio); and 
ii) to afford de iure status to a de facto situation.24 
 
During the late republican and classical law periods,25 prescription finally became known as 
usucapio.26 It was important that the possessor exercised legal possession (possessio civilis) 
over the property, as opposed to mere custody (detentio), which was not sufficient for 
                                                             
17 This is found in Tabula 8.17, which was extended by the lex Atinia: “Quod subruptum erit, eius rei aeterna 
auctoritas esto.” Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 131 translates this 
provision as follows: “With regard to that which has been obtained from another (by stealth), the warranty shall 
last eternally.” See also Gai Inst 2.45; Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 203; 
Johnston D Roman Law in Context (1999) 57; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to 
Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 248; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 82; 
Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch 
Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 30. 
18 Good faith.  
19 Gai Inst 2.49; Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 203; Marx FE 
Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 15. 
20 Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 131; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 83. 
21 Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 248. 
22 Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 248. 
23 Gai Inst 2.51; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 83. 
24 Gai Inst 2.41, 2.44; Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4; Johnston D Roman Law in Context (1999) 57; Sonnekus JC & 
Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 309-310; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg (1994) 16-17. The traditional justifications behind prescription are discussed in greater detail in section 4.2 
of chapter four below. 
25 250 BC until 250 AD. 
26 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 17; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 131. 
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usucapio.27 At this time legal possession already comprised the two elements known today in 
South African law, namely the corpus (physical) and animus (mental) elements.28 Corpus 
referred to the physical possession of the property, while the animus required the possessor to 
possess the property with the animus domini, or with the intention of an owner.29 The main 
difference between usucapio and prescription under the Twelve Tables is the fact that 
usucapio required the possessor to possess the thing bona fide30 and iustus titulus.31 These 
new requirements notably restricted the possibility to acquire dominium through usucapio.32 
Initially bona fides and iustus titulus did not exist independently from each other, but 
overlapped to some extent.33 Accordingly, it was feasible to hold property bona fide without 
complying with the iustus titulus requirement, though it was impossible to satisfy the latter 
requirement if you were not also in good faith.34  
 
Bona fides required the possessor to be in good faith at the moment of traditio.35 Since the 
Romans did not define bona fides, it is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of this phrase. 
The majority of authors state that the possessor must have honestly believed – at the moment 
of traditio – that he indeed became owner of the property concerned.36 In this instance bona 
fides differs from the animus domini, which only requires the possessor to hold the thing with 
the intention of an owner. Other sources mention that bona fides may be described as the 
belief that the holder had a right to hold the property as his own.37 Whatever the precise 
definition, bona fides was presumed in favour of the possessor because the law placed the 
                                                             
27 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 200. 
28 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 116-117. 
29 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 117. Van Oven describes animus domini as 
“de wil om te zaak als eigenaar onder zich te hebben.” (“[T]he will to hold the thing as owner.”) Hiemstra VG & 
Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 2006) 157 also translate animus domini as the “intention of being 
owner”. 
30 Gai Inst 2.43. 
31 Just or valid title: See Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Johnston D 
Roman Law in Context (1999) 57; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 131; De 
Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 84; 
Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch 
Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 30. 
32 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 84. 
33 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 84. 
34 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 84. 
35 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 24; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 132; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Buckland WW A Text-Book 
of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 244. 
36 Gai Inst 2.43; Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Van Oven JC 
Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 84-85. A debate exists over whether this principle also 
applied to contracts of sale, and whether the buyer had to be bona fide at the moment of consensus or traditio, or 
both. This interesting topic will, however, not be investigated in this dissertation. 
37 Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 243- 244. 
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burden of proof on the party averring the contrary.38 It was impossible for a mala fide 
possessor to acquire dominium over property by way of usucapio.39  
 
Bona fides was only required when the possessor acquired possession of the property; 
subsequent mala fides did not serve to interrupt usucapio.40 This strict approach was certainly 
enhanced by adding the iustus titulus requirement. Although the Romans never defined the 
latter concept, it may be understood to mean “good reason”,41 or “some fact which is 
ordinarily a basis of acquisition.”42 In my opinion, iustus titulus may simply be understood as 
acquisition under a “just” or “legal” title. According to Van Oven, iustus titulus means that 
the possessor had to acquire possession over the property in accordance with a legally 
recognised ground before usucapio could start running in his favour.43 Although there was no 
numerus clausus of iusti tituli during this time, there were some well established iusti tituli 
possessionis that could give rise to usucapio.44 There was no presumption in favour of iusti 
tituli, and as such it had to be proved by the party that claimed usucapio.45 
 
For a person to acquire property through usucapio, it also had to be res habiles, or property 
capable of begin usucaped.46 As seen above, already under the Twelve Tables some forms of 
property – like stolen property – were excluded from the effects of usucapio. These 
exceptions largely remained in force during the late republican and classical law eras. The lex 
Iulia de vi (from the time of Augustus, between 27 BC and 14 AD) and lex Plautia (enacted 
between 73 BC and 68 BC) equated things taken by force (vi) to stolen things and during the 
                                                             
38 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 202; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 132; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd 
rev ed Stein P, 1963) 245. 
39 Gai Inst 2.49. 
40 C 7.31.1.3: “Mala fides superveniens non nocet.” (“Supervening mala fides does not break [or interrupt] 
prescription.”) See also Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 202; Van Oven JC 
Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 84.  
41 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 85. 
42 Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 246. 
43 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 85. See also De Wet JC Opuscula 
Miscellanea (1979) 80. 
44 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 85. See also Kaser M Roman Private Law 
(trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 131. These authors list them as follows: pro emptore (D 41.4), pro donato 
(D 41.6), pro dote (D 41.9), pro legato (D 41.8), pro derelicto (D 41.7), pro suo (D 41.10), pro soluto (D 41.3 
46) and pro hedere (D 41.5). The content of these iusti tituli possessionis are not important for purposes of this 
dissertation and will, therefore, not be investigated. For a comprehensive discussion on this topic, see Van Oven 
JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 85-87 and Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law 
from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 247.  
45 Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 246. 
46 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 26. 
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Imperial period, property of the fisc or the Emperor was added to this category.47 Sacred 
things – such as temples – and free men could not be acquired through usucapio either.48 The 
initial prescription periods of one year for movables and two years for immovables were 
retained for purposes of usucapio.49 
 
Usurpatio – or interruption of usucapio – could take place in two instances: Either by natural 
interruption, when the possessor merely lost possession of the property for whatever reason, 
or by civil interruption, which occurred when a legal claim was made to recover the 
property.50 Civil interruption was only introduced during the classical period, as this concept 
was unknown under the earlier Roman law.51 It seems that any formal claim under 
Republican law, even short of litigation, amounted to civil interruption.52 Under classical law, 
civil interruption only took place the moment judgment was given against the possessor.53 
There existed two exceptions under classical law pertaining to the loss of possession. In the 
first instance, an heir could continue the usucapio started by his predecessor in title if such 
predecessor received the property under iustus titulus and was bona fide when he took 
possession of the property.54 This was known as successio in usucapionem and mala fides on 
the side of the heir did not interrupt the running of usucapio.55 However, if the predecessor in 
title did not comply with either the iustus titulus or bona fide requirements, interruption took 
place regardless of the fides of the heir.56 The second exception was accessio possessionis, or 
                                                             
47 Gai Inst 2.45; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 131; Buckland WW A 
Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 249; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 83. 
48 Gai Inst 2.48. 
49 Gai Inst 2.42. 
50 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 27; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 132; 
Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 90. 
51 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 90. 
52 Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 243. 
53 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Buckland WW A Text-Book of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 243. 
54 Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 132; Buckland WW A Text-Book of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 242; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch 
Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89. 
55 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 132; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd 
rev ed Stein P, 1963) 242; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89. 
56 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89. 
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what is better known as coniunctio temporum. This exception only applied in late classical 
law and was recognised concerning successors in title to contracts of sale.57  
 
Usucapio – with its short prescription periods – became impractical in the post-classical 
period58 due to socio-political and economic developments, which contributed to the 
disappearance of this legal institution from practice regarding immovables.59 In the 
provinces, this resulted in the introduction of a new form of prescription for immovables 
around 200 AD, namely praescriptio longi temporis.60 The prescription period was 10 years 
if the possessor and owner were domiciled in the same municipality (inter praesentes) and if 
not, 20 years (inter absentes).61 Movables could still be acquired through usucapio, but a 
period of three years now applied.62 Regarding these new forms of prescription, most of the 
rules under usucapio, such as bona fides and iustus titulus, were still in force.63 Another 
institution developed later on, either under Constantine or his sons, which initially had a 40-
year period.64 This period was later reduced to 30 years and from 449 AD this institution 
became imbedded in the law of the day.65 
 
The Eastern Roman Empire no longer recognised usucapio as a method of prescription 
during this time.66 Under the rule of the emperor Constantine, praescriptio longi temporis 
was a well-established form of prescription, and this institution required iustus titulus and 
                                                             
57 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 28; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 132. 
58 250 AD until 500 AD. 
59 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 32; Krause LE “The History and Nature 
of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law 
Journal 26-41 31.  
60 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 87-88. 
61 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Buckland WW A Text-Book 
of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 250; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch 
Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 88; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation 
of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 31; Wessels JW History of the 
Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 635. 
62 De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription 
and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 31. 
63 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea 
(1979) 80; Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 635. 
64 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 32-33; Buckland WW A Text-Book of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 251. 
65 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 32-33; Buckland WW A Text-Book of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 251. 
66 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 33-34.  
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probably also bona fides.67 At this stage the distinction between iustus titulus and bona fides 
became clearer.68 The periods of 10 years inter praesentes and 20 years inter absentes also 
applied, and both movables and immovables could be acquired through praescriptio longi 
temporis.69 Between 326 and 333 AD, Constantine introduced another form of prescription 
with a period of 40 years, which is mentioned above.70 This form of prescription merely 
required possession.71 Although the old requirements of iustus titulus and bona fides were 
dropped, this vacuum was filled by considerably lengthening the prescription period. It seems 
that this form of prescription became the forerunner of praescriptio longissimi temporis, 
which was later introduced under Justinian.72 If a possessor satisfied the requirements of 
praescriptio longi temporis, he could also acquire dominium under this method of 
Constantinian prescription.73 However, it seems that praescriptio longi temporis no longer 
played any role after Constantine’s reign.74 The forerunner of praescriptio longissimi 
temporis, with its 40-year prescription period, was reduced to 30 years, and iustus titulus was 
in all probability still not required.75 Even at this time there was very little differentiation 
between acquisitive and extinctive prescription.76 
 
When the emperor Justinian came to power in 527 AD, his great ambition was to revive the 
glory of the Roman Empire of old. In order to achieve this goal, he realised that his new 
Empire would have to be governed by an up-to-date legal system. He therefore commissioned 
the best legal scholars of the day to produce a legal code that later became known as the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis.77 This code was a compilation of the works of the five most 
authoritative Roman law jurists, namely Gaius, Ulpian, Modestinus, Paulus and Papinian, and 
                                                             
67 Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 88. 
68 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 87. 
69 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 34; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman 
Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 250. 
70 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 34; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133. 
71 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd 
rev ed Stein P, 1963) 251; Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 636. 
72 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204. 
73 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 34. 
74 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 35; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133. 
75 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 35; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133. 
76 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 35. 
77 Justinian’s code – consisting of the Digest, Institutes, Codex and Novellae – did not have an official name; the 
name “Corpus Iuris Civilis” was coined by Gothofredus in 1583: See Thomas PhJ, Van der Merwe CG & Stoop 
BC Historiese Grondslae van die Suid-Afrikaanse Privaatreg (2000) 49. 
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formed the precursor for today’s civil codes in most civil law countries. These efforts of 
Justinian had profound effects on the development of the law of prescription, which consisted 
of a reintroduction of a varied form of usucapio for movables, the reinstatement of 
praescriptio longi temporis and the creation of a new type of prescription, namely 
praescriptio longissimi temporis.78  
 
Justinian attempted to create a uniform prescription law.79 Concerning immovable property, 
he fused the old institutions of usucapio (with its short periods) with praescriptio longi 
temporis (with its longer period), and thus required a longer period of possession before the 
possessor could acquire dominium.80 Usucapio now only applied to movables, for which 
possession of three years was required, together with the requirements of bona fides and 
iustus titulus from the classical period.81 As to immovables, the new fused form of 
praescriptio longi temporis required a possessor to possess the property for 10 years inter 
praesentes, or 20 years inter absentes, together with bona fides and iustus titulus.82 Under 
Justinian, the distinction between iustus titulus and bona fides finally crystallised.83 Justinian 
also made it clear that usucapio and praescriptio longi temporis were forms of acquisitive 
prescription, which he distinguished from extinctive prescription.84 Iustus titulus now applied 
to both usucapio and praescriptio longi temporis.85 Although usucapio and praescriptio longi 
                                                             
78 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 36. 
79 Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133. 
80 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 36; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; 
Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 251; Lee RW 
An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 140; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive 
Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 
31. 
81 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 200 204; Kaser M Roman Private Law 
(trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Buckland WW A Text-
Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 251; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and 
of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 31. 
82 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 200, 204; Marx FE Verkrygende 
Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 36-37; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd 
ed 1980) 133; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from 
Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 250; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 
1953) 140-141; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in 
Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 31. Inter praesentes and absentes in this 
instance no longer referred to the municipality of domicile of the owner and possessor, but to whether these 
parties were now domiciled within the same province or not: See Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law 
from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 250. 
83 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 87. 
84 Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 88. 
85 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 37; Wessels JW History of the Roman-
Dutch Law (1908) 636. 
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temporis were part of Justinian’s acquisitive prescription law, their effects differed. As such, 
usucapio was a derivative method of acquisition of ownership, while praescriptio longi 
temporis was an original method of acquisition of ownership.86 Pertaining to the position of 
accessio possessionis, Justinian revised the law by ensuring that this doctrine applied to all 
types of successors in title, be it under either praescriptio longi temporis or usucapio.87 This 
was a significant departure from the position under the classical law, as discussed above. 
 
Even under Justinian, some forms of property were still regarded as res inhabiles, which 
could not be acquired through prescription.88 The old res habiles requirement was even 
extended in that prescription could not run against the state.89 It seems that this was the first 
time in history that the acquisition of state property through acquisitive prescription was 
prohibited. 
 
Justinian also introduced a new type of prescription, namely praescriptio longissimi temporis. 
It required a period of 30 years and in some cases 40 years.90 Through this form of 
prescription all manner of rights could be acquired, which included movable or immovable 
property, and even mere rights of action (like servitudes).91 Iustus titulus was no longer 
required, although it seems that bona fides was initially still considered a requirement.92 In 
this instance, bona fides was also presumed in favour of the possessor, but could be 
disproved.93 Bona fides was still only required at the moment of acquisition of possession; 
                                                             
86 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 37. 
87 Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 242-243, 
250; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89. 
88 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 37; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd 
rev ed Stein P, 1963) 250. 
89 C 7.38: “Contra principem non currit praescriptio.” (“Against the principate [or state], prescription does not 
run.”) See also Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 37.  
90 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 39; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and 
of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 32. 
91 Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 636. 
92 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 204; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 39; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133; De 
Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Buckland WW A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to 
Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 251; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 141; Van 
Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89; Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law 
(1908) 636-637. 
93 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89; Krause LE “The History and Nature of 
Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law 
Journal 26-41 32. 
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subsequent mala fides did not prevent the running of praescriptio longissimi temporis.94 Later 
sources omit bona fides as a requirement, with the effect that even rei furtivae could then be 
acquired through this legal institution.95 However, the harsh effects of this development were 
tempered by the fact that the nec vi (without violence) requirement was introduced as one of 
the requirements of praescriptio longissimi temporis, which required that the possessor must 
have acquired possession peaceably and not through violence.96 In this context it is worth 
emphasising that Canon law reintroduced bona fides. Indeed, not only did the acquisition of 
possession need to be bona fide under Canon law, the possessor had to be bona fide 
throughout the whole prescription period.97 
 
Justinian also formalised the postponement and interruption of prescription law. 
Postponement had the effect that the completion of the prescription period was postponed due 
to a certain factor. A famous example in this regard is the fact that from the earliest times, 
prescription did not run against those who were incapable of managing their own affairs, like 
minors.98 Interruption occurred when a certain event took place that ended the running of 
prescription, which resulted that the prescription period had to begin running de novo. Under 
praescriptio longi temporis, interruption occurred at the moment of litis contestatio.99 
However, this was not the case under usucapio. Here the possessor could become owner of 
the property even after litis contestatio.100 Cases were decided tempore litis contestatio, 
which meant that the possessor could be ordered to give the property back to the original 
owner, even after he (the possessor) became owner of it through prescription.101 
 
                                                             
94 Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch 
Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 32.  
95 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 39; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans 
by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 133. 
96 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 39. 
97 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.3; Kaser M Roman Private Law (trans by Dannenbring R, 3rd ed 1980) 132; De Wet JC 
Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of 
Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 32; Wessels JW 
History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 642. 
98 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 90. 
99 Borkowski A & Du Plessis P Textbook on Roman Law (3rd ed 2005) 201; Buckland WW A Text-Book of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd rev ed Stein P, 1963) 250; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch 
Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 90. 
100 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 40. 
101 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 90. 
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It seems as though it was possible to acquire servitudes through prescription under the old 
Roman law, although this was largely prohibited by the lex Scribonia from around 50 BC.102 
Nonetheless, this lex did not abolish the acquisition of the urban servitudes of altius tollendi, 
officiendi luminibus vicini and stillicidii non avertendi (building higher, obscuring light and 
diverting rain water) through prescription.103 Van Oven mentions that during the classical era, 
servitudes were viewed as rei incorporales, which could not be legally possessed and that 
could thus not be acquired through prescription.104 However, it seems that it was possible to 
acquire the servitude of aquaeductus through long-term use (diuturnus usus), which use also 
had to be nec vi, nec clam and nec precario.105 Under the reign of Justinian, the rules relating 
to the lex Scribonia and the ban on acquisition of servitudes through prescription were 
abolished and henceforth, rei incorporales (like servitudes) could be acquired through 
praescriptio longi temporis.106 Yet, prescription as relating to servitudes needs to be 
distinguished from that relating to corporeal property. As seen above, the latter required both 
bona fides and iustus titulus. For servitudes the requirements were merely:  
 
i) possession or use for the duration of the prescription period (quasi possessio 
regarding res incorporales); 
ii) exercise of the servitude as of right; and  
iii) exercise of the right vis-à-vis the owner of the property nec vi (without violence), 
nec clam (openly) and nec precario (as of right and not by the owner’s leave and 
license).107  
 
 
2.2.3 Acquisitive prescription under Roman-Dutch law 
                                                             
102 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 40; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 148; Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and 
of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 33. 
103 Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-
Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 33. 
104 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 148. See also Marx FE Verkrygende 
Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 40-41. 
105 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 41; Van Oven JC Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 151-152. 
106 C 7.33.12.4: “Eodem observando et si non soli sint, sed incorporales, quae in iure consistunt, veluti 
ususfructus et ceterae servitudes.” Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of 
Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 34 translates this 
provision as follows: “The same rules as to usucapion in 10 or 20 years must be observed even if the property is 
not land, but is incorporeal and consists of rights, like usufruct and the other servitudes.” See also Van Oven JC 
Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 89, 151. 
107 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 41; Krause LE “The History and Nature 
of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law 
Journal 26-41 32-34. 
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Lee describes the difficulty of studying Roman-Dutch prescription law: 
 
“In the Netherlands the whole subject of prescription was involved in the greatest uncertainty, 
according as local practice approached to or receded from the Roman Law. The situation was 
further complicated by the presence of two new terms of prescription, a shorter period of a year 
and a day ... and a longer period of a third of a century ...”108 
 
Despite the distinction Justinian drew between acquisitive and extinctive prescription, it 
seems that Roman-Dutch lawyers did not clearly distinguish between these concepts, which 
once more resulted in confusion.109 Nonetheless, it is clear that prescription during this time 
required neither bona fides nor iustus titulus.110 According to some authors, the only 
requirements were uninterrupted possession for 30 years (or a third of a century)111 that 
needed to commence nec vi, nec clam and nec precario.112 Although this is an 
oversimplification, as will be seen, these requirements formed the crux of prescription during 
this period. Interestingly, it appears that Roman-Dutch prescription law adopted the same 
requirements for acquisition of incorporeal property (ie servitudes) under Roman law, namely 
possession nec vi, nec clam and nec precario.  
 
Usucapio, with its periods of three, 10 and 20 years, was no longer in force under Roman-
Dutch law.113 Nonetheless, most rules incidental to usucapio – according to Voet – also 
applied to prescription in Roman-Dutch law.114 This included the rules, inter alia, relating to 
who could acquire property though prescription,115 what kind of property could be 
acquired116 as well as the rules pertaining to stolen and pledged property.117 In the 
Netherlands the usual period for prescription was 30 years, but the province of Holland 
                                                             
108 Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 141 (footnotes omitted). In this regard, see also 
Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.5 – 2.7.7. 
109 Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 634. 
110 Voet 44.3.9; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 142. Unfortunately, Grotius’s 
discussion on long prescription in Inleidinge is silent on this matter. This could be construed as implying that 
bona fides and iustus titulus were no longer required. 
111 A third of a century, according to Voet 44.3.8 and Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 
1953) 141. 
112 Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 142; Krause LE “The History and Nature of 
Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law 
Journal 26-41 32. The position regarding acquisitive prescription under Roman-Dutch law is not crystal clear, 
however, and the presence of local enactments regulating prescription makes it difficult to ascertain how 
prescription operated during this time in the Netherlands: See De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 81.  
113 Voet 44.3.7. 
114 Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-
Dutch Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 32-33. 
115 Voet 41.3.2. 
116 Voet 41.3.11. 
117 Voet 41.3.14. 
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adopted a period of 30 years for movables and a third of a century for immovables.118 The 
province of Zeeland took over the prescription rules relating to inter praesentes and absentes, 
although it extended the periods by requiring 20 years inter praesentes and 30 years inter 
absentes.119 In this sense, iustus titulus and bona fides were also not required.120 As to the 
precise periods of prescription, one is struck by the variety of different rules that prevailed in 
the different Dutch towns.121 It is clear that the law of Holland recognised many prescription 
institutions, each with its own requirements.122 Some of these existed long before Roman law 
was introduced in Holland.123 Others came from Germanic law, such as the year and a day 
rule, while the influence of Canon law, as well as the reception of Roman law, also had 
profound effects on the development of prescription law during this time.124  
 
The Germanic year and a day rule already existed before the 12th century and was also known 
as rechte gewere or Verschweigung.125 The word “gewere” refers to actual control over an 
object and rechte gewere is gewere that was protected by law.126 A person could qualify for 
rechte gewere if he acquired control (gewere) over the object by way of a legally (rechte) 
recognised method.127 The prescription period only began to run after such a person obtained 
gewere by way of a legally recognised method, like a public announcement or delivery in 
accordance with the law of that place.128 Rechte gewere was obtained when a person had 
gewere over property for a year and a day, without interference from the owner.129 Although 
the possessor did not acquire ownership over the property concerned, he could plead this new 
                                                             
118 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.8; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 141-142; Wessels JW 
History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 638. There is a debate over whether the period of a third of a century 
only applied to immovable property and whether it also applied to movables. For purposes of this dissertation it 
can be assumed that – in the province of Holland – a period of 30 years applied to movables and a third of a 
century for immovables: See Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 640-641. 
119 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.8; Voet 44.3.9; Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 638. 
120 Voet 44.3.9. 
121 Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 638. 
122 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 51. 
123 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 51. 
124 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 51. 
125 Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 8-9; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1994) 52. See also Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.7. 
126 Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 8-9; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1994) 52. 
127 Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 9-10; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg (1994) 52. 
128 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.7; Voet 44.3.8. To the contrary is Van Apeldoorn LJ Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche 
Rechts-geleerdheid Beschreven bij Hugo de Groot (4th ed 1939) 130, where he states that a public 
announcement was not a requirement in every Dutch town. This is yet another illustration of how prescription 
law differed from province to province and town to town, which further complicates the study of this field of 
law. 
129 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.7; Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 9-10; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 52. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 31
right to defeat the owner’s rei vindicatio.130 In other words, the possessor obtained an 
unassailable right over the property in this manner.131 In my opinion, prescription of a year 
and a day constitutes a sui generis form of prescription, since it has characteristics common 
to both acquisitive and extinctive prescription.132 This is because through rechte gewere the 
possessor obtained an unassailable right to the property after possessing it for a year and a 
day and by satisfying all the requirements of this legal institution.133 Thus, the owner lost his 
rei vindicatio to reclaim possession (an element of “extinctive” prescription), while the 
possessor acquired an unassailable right to the property through rechte gewere (an element of 
“acquisitive” prescription).134 Voet thinks that this form of prescription applied in the 
provinces of Holland and Utrecht, and that the possessor must have obtained possession of 
the property by way of a just cause (iustus titulus), together with peaceful (nec vi) possession 
and good faith (bona fides).135 However, this form of prescription largely fell into disuse by 
the end of the seventeenth century.136 Despite this, the year and a day rule survived in a very 
unique form, not regarding the acquisition of ownership, but pertaining to encroachments.137 
Grotius examines this phenomenon under his discussion of the acquisition of servitudes: 
 
“Maer een ghetimmert dat jaer ende dag onbeklaegt heeft ghestaen is daer mede genoegt 
verjaert, behoudens den beschadigde redelicke vergoedinge.”138 
 
This unique form of prescription only applied to buildings or structures that encroached onto 
the land of another and entailed that the encroaching owner could become owner of that part 
                                                             
130 Van Apeldoorn LJ Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid Beschreven bij Hugo de Groot (4th ed 
1939) 127. 
131 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.7; Van Apeldoorn LJ Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid Beschreven bij 
Hugo de Groot (4th ed 1939) 127-133. 
132 Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 11 is of the opinion that rechte gewere cannot be classified as 
being either acquisitive or extinctive prescription, while Van Apeldoorn LJ Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche 
Rechts-geleerdheid Beschreven bij Hugo de Groot (4th ed 1939) 130-131 mentions that the effect of this 
institution is both extinctive and acquisitive at the same time. Nonetheless, the precise categorisation of this 
interesting notion falls outside the scope of this dissertation and will, therefore, not be discussed here. 
133 Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 9-10; Van Apeldoorn LJ Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
geleerdheid Beschreven bij Hugo de Groot (4th ed 1939) 131. 
134 Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 9-10; Van Apeldoorn LJ Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
geleerdheid Beschreven bij Hugo de Groot (4th ed 1939) 131. 
135 Voet 44.3.8. 
136 Voet 44.3.8; Hijmans IH De Verjaringsinstituten (1892) 11-12; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 53; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 141; Wessels JW 
History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 638. Voet discusses this form of prescription under the heading 
“Prescription in Holland and Utrecht of a year and a day on quite possession with just cause no longer in force”: 
See Voet 44.3.8. 
137 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 53.  
138 Grotius Inleidinge 2.36.5. (“An encroachment that has stood for a year and a day without protestation [by the 
owner] is through this method regarded as prescribed, subject to reasonable compensation to the owner.”) Voet 
8.4.6 also examines this form of prescription under his discussion of the acquisition of praedial servitudes 
through prescription. 
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of the neighbour’s property, but in such a case the “encroacher” had a duty to reasonably 
compensate the loss of the other owner.139 However, according to Van Apeldoorn, the Hoge 
Raad (the Supreme Court of the Netherlands) rejected this rule in January 1720. The Court 
reasoned that it only applied in certain Dutch towns and that Grotius erroneously regarded it 
as law of general application (ius generale), which – according to the Court – was not the 
case.140 Van Bijnkershoek discusses the impact of this decision as follows: 
 
“Doctrina Grotii ex statutis quarundam urbium originem traxit, ut notat Groenew. ad Grot, 
quibus abuti non convenit ad statuendum jus generale, quod tamen Grotio perquam familiare 
est.”141  
 
Voet also refers to this form of prescription and states that it only applied in cases concerning 
encroachment by buildings or structures.142 He describes the rule in cases where a neighbour 
builds something into a communal wall, which then constitutes an encroachment: 
 
“An exception would be when local custom directs that no one is forced to demolish if he has 
had the work there for more than a year and a day, though it was done quite wrongfully and to 
the damaging of the neighbour; but that he is released by paying out the damages.”143 (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Accordingly, it has to be determined whether this type of prescription forms part of modern 
South African prescription law. One of the few cases dealing specifically with this issue is 
Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander (“Rand Waterraad”)144 where the Court, after an 
extensive analysis of the old sources, found that the year and a day rule was not a rule of 
general application under Roman-Dutch law and was, therefore, not received into South 
African law.145 The Court refers to much the same Roman-Dutch sources discussed above. 
Support for this argument is even found in writings by contemporary South African authors 
                                                             
139 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 54. 
140 Van Apeldoorn LJ Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid Beschreven bij Hugo de Groot (4th ed 
1939) 205, who relies on Van Bijnkershoek Obs Tum II 1695. 
141 Van Bijnkershoek Obs Tum II 1695. (“The doctrine of Grotius originates from the statutes of certain cities, as 
Groenewegen notes on Grotius, from which one cannot deduce that it constituted law of general application, 
because perhaps only Grotius was familiar with it.”) 
142 Voet 8.4.6. 
143 Voet 8.2.17. Voet refers to it as “local custom”, which is yet another indication that this rule was not of 
general application. See also Cilliers JB & Van der Merwe CG “The ‘Year and a Day Rule’ in South African 
Law: Do our Courts have a Discretion to Order Damages Instead of Removal in the Case of Structural 
Encroachments on Neighbouring Land?” (1994) 57 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 587-595 
589. 
144 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). For a general source on this case, see Temmers Z Building Encroachments and 
Compulsory Transfer of Ownership (LLD Thesis Stellenbosch University 2010). 
145 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130. There are other cases where the year and a 
day rule was discussed, but in none of them did the Court actually decide whether it applied in South African 
law or not. For instance, see Naude v Bredenkamp 1956 (2) SA 448 (O) 451 and Cape Town Municipality v 
Fletcher and Carthwrights Ltd 1936 OPD 347 352.  
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before the Rand Waterraad case was decided.146 In the light of this decision, as well as the 
discussion of the developments surrounding this rule above, one can safely conclude that it 
was not of universal application in Roman-Dutch law and could, therefore, never have 
formed part of South African prescription law. There can be no doubt that Hattingh J in Rand 
Waterraad was correct to arrive at this conclusion. The correctness of this case is put beyond 
doubt by the decision of the Hoge Raad on 19 and 20 January 1720, where it found the rule 
not to be of general application in the Netherlands.147 
 
Vetustas, or immemorial use, also applied in Roman-Dutch law, but was only relevant 
regarding the acquisition of servitudes through prescription.148 As in modern South African 
law, there was not always a clear distinction in this context. Despite the presence of these 
many forms of prescription under Roman-Dutch law, for present purposes it is only necessary 
to focus on the type of prescription that was received into South African law, namely 
prescription of 30 years. The problem, again, with studying this form of prescription is the 
fact that many of the towns and cities in the Netherlands during this time had their own 
adaptations of this institution.149 Accordingly, one must be careful not to regard all rules used 
by some towns concerning prescription as being of universal application.150  
 
Henceforth, I simply refer to prescription of a third of a century as “prescription”. It is not 
known when precisely this institution originated.151 Be that as it may, by the seventeenth 
century prescription was regarded as binding law in Holland.152 The law required a person to 
possess property before he could acquire ownership in this manner.153 Grotius states that one 
must distinguish between bezit (possession) and bezitrecht (right of possession). According to 
him, bezitrecht is that which flows forth from bezit.154 He describes bezit as “the immediate 
holding of a thing with the intention of holding it for ourselves and not for others.”155 From 
                                                             
146 Cilliers JB & Van der Merwe CG “The ‘Year and a Day Rule’ in South African Law: Do our Courts have a 
Discretion to Order Damages Instead of Removal in the Case of Structural Encroachments on Neighbouring 
Land?” (1994) 57 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 587-595 588-589, 591.  
147 Van Bijnkershoek Obs Tum II 1695. 
148 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 56. 
149 Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 638. 
150 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 56-57. 
151 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 57. 
152 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 58. 
153 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.1; Voet 44.3.9. 
154 Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.1. 
155 Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.2: “Bezit is dadelyke behouding van een zaak, met wille om die te behouden voor ons 
en niet voor een ander.” (Possession is the immediate holding of a thing with the intention of holding it for 
ourselves and not for others.”) 
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this quotation it is clear that possession consisted of two elements, namely a corpus 
(physical) element and an animus (intention) element. Although Grotius does not further 
describe these two concepts, he states that lessees, borrowers and persons to whom things are 
entrusted cannot be said to possess property.156 This qualification made it impossible for such 
persons to acquire property through prescription, as they did not have the necessary 
possession. It was possible to possess property through an agent, for instance when a lessor 
possessed leased property through a lessee.157 Voet requires that the possession must be 
peaceful and continuous and that the possessor must hold the property with the intention of 
keeping it for himself without acknowledging the rights of the true owner.158 In this instance 
the animus and corpus elements of possession are again distinguishable. Interestingly, the 
animus required of the possessor at this time did not oblige such possessor to hold the 
property with the belief that he was the owner of it (animus domini).159 It was merely 
required that the possessor possesses the property animo sibi habendi, which literally 
translates as the intention of keeping the thing for yourself.160 Consequently, all that was 
necessary was that the possessor possessed the property with the intention of holding it for 
himself without acknowledging the rights of the true owner.  
 
At this time the period for prescription was a third of a century and it applied to both 
movables and immovables, as well as actions and servitudes.161 A servitude had to be 
exercised nec precario.162 As mentioned, iustus titulus and bona fides no longer formed part 
of prescription at this stage.163 The requirements for prescription may be summarised as 
follows: 
 
i) possession of the property with the intention of keeping it for oneself (animus rem 
sibi habendi); 
                                                             
156 Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.3. 
157 Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.4. 
158 Voet 44.3.9.  
159 This anomaly is pointed out in Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 62. 
160 Voet 44.3.9. The original Latin text of Voet refers to the “animo sibi habendi”, which Gane translates as “the 
intention of keeping [the property] for himself”. Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 
2006) 157-158 also translate “animus sibi habendi” as the “intention of holding something for oneself”.  
161 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.8, 2.36.4; Voet 44.3.8. Some sources state that a third of a century only applied to 
immovables, while 30 years applied to movables: See Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 
1953) 141 142. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the period of a third of a century applied to 
both movables and immovables during this time.  
162 Grotius Inleidinge 2.36.4. 
163 Voet 44.3.9. 
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ii) possession (for corporeal things) or quasi-possession (for incorporeal things, like 
servitudes) needed to be continuous and peaceful (nec vi);   
iii) possession without any disturbance by the owner throughout the prescription 
period; and 
iv) the possessor must in no way have acknowledged the rights of the owner.164  
 
The principle of coniunctio temporum, as seen during the time of Justinian, also applied in 
Roman-Dutch law.165 The acquisition of servitudes under Roman-Dutch law largely 
conforms to what was required under Roman law. According to Grotius, to acquire a 
servitude through prescription, a person needed to make use of a servitude for a third of a 
century and such use must have been nec precario, or without the owner’s consent.166 Voet 
also mentions that servitudes can be acquired through prescription over a period of a third of 
a century.167 Nec vi (without violence) and nec clam (openly) also formed part of the 
requirements to acquire servitudes at this time.168 As to bona fides and iustus titulus, the 
common view is that they were not required concerning servitudes either.169 As to 
prescription against the state, prescription could run against alienable state property, but not 
with regard to inalienable state property, such as property for the public benefit.170  
 
The position surrounding suspension under Roman-Dutch law is unclear. It seems that 
prescription did not run against minors or people incapable of administrating their own 
affairs.171 In other words, prescription did not run against those who were incapable of 
performing juridical acts.172 Consequently, it is clear that the rule of contra non valentem non 
currere praescriptionem did apply in Roman-Dutch law, although the precise ambit of the 
                                                             
164 Voet 44.3.9. See also Grotius Inleidinge 2.36.4 and Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 
1953) 142. 
165 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 63; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-
Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 143. 
166 Grotius Inleidinge 2.36.4. 
167 Voet 8.4.6. 
168 Voet 8.4.4; Grotius Inleidinge 2.36.4 – 2.36.6. 
169 Grotius Inleidinge 2.36.4; Voet 8.4.4. Although Voet requires bona fides for acquiring servitudes through 
prescription, this view was not common among the other Roman-Dutch legal authors. Grotius, for instance, does 
not put bona fides as a requirement for prescription. 
170 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 70; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-
Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 143. 
171 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.8; Voet 44.3.11; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 
70; Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 143. 
172 For examples in this regard, see Voet 44.3.11 and Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 
1953) 143. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 36
rule was uncertain.173 Interruption fulfilled much the same role as under Roman law, with the 
division between natural and civil interruption still forming part of Roman-Dutch law.174  
 
 
2.3 South African prescription law since 1943 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Acquisitive prescription (verkrygende verjaring in Afrikaans) is one of the original methods 
of acquisition of ownership in South African law,175 which was received when the Dutch East 
India Company brought Roman-Dutch law to the Cape in 1652. Property obtained through 
this method of acquisition is acquired free from any previous encumbrance, such as limited 
real rights and mortgages.176 Furthermore, original acquisition of ownership entails that a 
person acquires ownership without the assistance or permission of the previous owner.  
 
South African prescription law was formalised for the first time by the Prescription Act 18 of 
1943 (“1943 Act”),177 later followed by the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (“1969 Act”).178 
Although the 1969 Act repealed the earlier 1943 Act, it did not do so with retrospective 
effect.179 Accordingly, all prescription periods running up until 30 November 1970 (the 1969 
Act came into operation on 1 December 1970) have to comply with the requirements as set 
out by the 1943 Act, with the remainder of the period having to comply with the requirements 
of the 1969 Act. This means that the two acts ran in tandem until 30 November 2000. After 
this date, most periods will only have to comply with the requirements set out by the 1969 
                                                             
173 Scholtens JE “Praescriptio – Jus Possidendi and Rei Vindicatio” (1972) 89 South African Law Journal 383-
395 386-387. 
174 Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th ed 1953) 142. 
175 Section 2(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See also 
Sonnekus JC “Die Rei Vindicatio en Verjaring – Of Nie” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 576-
590 576; Sonnekus JC “Sub Hasta-veilings en die Onderskeid tussen Afgeleide en Oorspronklike Wyses van 
Regsverkryging” 2008 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 696-727 699; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 309; Marx FE “Eiendomsverkryging deur Verjaring en Beperkte Saaklike Regte” 
(1994) 15 Obiter 161-171 167, 170-171; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes 
(1993) para 149; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 268 
176 Sonnekus JC “Sub Hasta-veilings en die Onderskeid tussen Afgeleide en Oorspronklike Wyses van 
Regsverkryging” 2008 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 696-727 699; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 309; Marx FE “Eiendomsverkryging deur Verjaring en Beperkte Saaklike Regte” 
(1994) 15 Obiter 161-171 170-171. There exists a debate over whether acquisitive prescription truly 
extinguishes existing limited real rights and mortgages regarding prescribed properties. For purposes of this 
dissertation it is assumed that property acquired through acquisitive prescription is received free from previous 
limited real rights and/or mortgages registered over that property. 
177 This Act came into operation on the 19th of April 1943, with the Afrikaans text signed by the Officer 
Administering the Government.  
178 This Act came into operation on the 1st of December 1970, with the English text signed by the State 
President. For a background discussion to this Act, see De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 77-144. 
179 Section 5 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
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Act. However, this does not imply that all prescription cases brought to court after 30 
November 2000 only have to comply with this Act, as situations involving extreme cases of 
postponement can still be encountered.180 In such a scenario, a part of the prescription period 
may still have to comply with the requirements of the 1943 Act. For this reason, both acts are 
discussed in this chapter, with particular focus on the similarities between them. Another 
reason for this approach is the fact that most of the case law decided under the 1943 Act still 
applies to contemporary prescription law. A brief introduction to the two prescription acts 
regarding prescription ensues, followed by a discussion of their requirements. 
 
According to section 2(1) of the 1943 Act, acquisitive prescription (“prescription”) is the 
acquisition of ownership through the possession of another person’s movable or immovable 
property,181 or the use of a servitude182 in respect of immovable property, continuously for 30 
years nec vi, nec clam, nec precario.183 As seen from the historical analysis, these words have 
– through the development of case law – come to be understood as meaning without force 
(nec vi), openly (nec clam) and without the owner’s consent (nec precario).184 Prescription 
does not only run against natural persons, but also against public corporations, municipal 
councils and the state.185 The possessor or user ipso iure186 becomes the owner of the 
property or servitude concerned once the 30-year prescription period expires.187 Since the 
possessor acquires full ownership, the South African law of prescription is truly “acquisitive” 
in nature. Should the owner aver absence of negligence on his side, this will be of no avail to 
him, as negligence on the part of the owner is not a requirement for prescription in South 
African law.188  
 
                                                             
180 See the discussion of postponement in section 2.3.4 below. 
181 In this sense property also includes incorporeal property, such as shares. See, for instance, the cases of 
Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) and Albert and Others v Ragaven 1966 (2) SA 454 (D), 
which dealt with the prescription of shares in immovable property. 
182 As mentioned in chapter one, this dissertation does not purport to discuss the acquisition and extinction of 
servitudes through prescription. The aim is to only focus on the requirements for the acquisition of servitudes 
through prescription to the extent that they overlap with and help clarify the requirements for acquiring real 
rights through prescription. The Court in Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 
1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468 found that the requirements for the acquisition of property and servitudes through 
prescription are basically the same. 
183 Section 2(1) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. 
184 These requirements are discussed in sections 2.3.2.2-2.3.2.4 below. 
185 Hall CG Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Volume II – The Law of Property (10th ed 1976) 80. 
Regarding prescription against the state, see the discussion in section 2.3.6 below. 
186 Through operation of law. 
187 Section 2(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. 
188 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 138 139. For a more complete discussion in this regard, see section 4.2 
of chapter four below. 
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Although not explicitly mentioned in the 1943 Act, the adverse user189 requirement has come 
to be accepted – through case law – as a supplementary requirement for prescription.190 In 
this sense it is not possible for a person to acquire prescriptive title to property already 
owned.191 Regarding the doctrine of notice, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that it does 
not apply to rights acquired through prescription, since prescription is one of the original 
methods of acquisition of ownership.192  
 
The 1943 Act did not codify South African prescription law, a fact clearly illustrated by a 
strong body of case law.193 This position is confirmed by the fact that the 1943 Act provides 
that it only repeals common law rules that are inconsistent with it.194 Common law rules that 
are consistent with the Act thus remain in force. Although the 1969 Act is silent on this issue, 
the courts have held that the position remains the same.195  
 
According to section 1 of the 1969 Prescription Act, a person acquires ownership over 
property that has been 
 
“possessed openly and as if he were the owner thereof for an uninterrupted period of thirty 
years or for a period which, together with any periods for which such thing was so possessed 
by his predecessors in title, constitutes an uninterrupted period of thirty years.” 
 
Regarding acquisitive prescription specifically, the similarities between the two prescription 
acts are indeed remarkable.196 The 1969 Act also states that servitudes can be acquired 
through prescription if the person making use of the servitude has done so openly and as 
                                                             
189 Also referred to as adverse possession. This must not be confused with what is referred to in English law as 
adverse possession, which is what South African law knows as acquisitive prescription. For a discussion of 
adverse possession in English law, see section 3.2.2.3 of chapter three below. 
190 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574. See further section 2.3.2.4 below. 
191 Ploughmann NO v Pauw and Another 2006 (6) SA 334 (C) para 39; Ex Parte Puppli 1975 (3) SA 461 (D) 
463. 
192 See Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 13 and Ex Parte Puppli 1975 (3) SA 461 (D) 464, 
where it was found that the acquisition of real rights through prescription does not depend on registration in the 
deeds office. See also Marx FE “Eiendomsverkryging deur Verjaring en Beperkte Saaklike Regte” (1994) 15 
Obiter 161-171 162. 
193 See Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 135; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 7; Morkels Transport 
(Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467; Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 47 and Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 604, where this position is 
confirmed. In its preamble, the Act mentions that it aims only to amend and consolidate the laws relating to 
prescription, thus not resulting in a codification of prescription law. 
194 Section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. See also Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods 
(Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467. 
195 I extrapolate this from the cases mentioned in footnote 193 above. See also Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 309. 
196 This fact was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) 
para 8. 
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though he were entitled to do so.197 The greatest difference, it would seem, is the omission of 
the nec vi and nec precario requirements from the 1969 Act.198 Unlike the 1943 Act, the 1969 
Act specifically regulates coniunctio temporum. Despite this, it was already held in 
Stephenson v Lamsley199 that coniunctio temporum was possible under the 1943 Act, since 
this was not regarded as one of the cases where the legislator intended to depart from the 
common law.200 That decision was followed ever since.201 This phenomenon, also known as 
successio in possessionem or accessio possessionis, came to us from Roman-Dutch law and 
entails that possession – for the purposes of prescription – need not have been held by one 
person only.202 It allows the aggregation of periods of possession by successors in title in 
order to meet the 30-year requirement.203 A derivative link must exist between the 
predecessor and successor in title, and the circumstances of either succession or contract are 
applicable.204 Furthermore, each possessor in the chain of legal predecessors and successors 
should have had the correct mental attitude regarding the possession of the property.205 If one 
of the legal predecessors or successors did not satisfy all the requirements for prescription, the 
running of prescription would be interrupted.206 Furthermore, the two prescription acts 
specifically state that courts may not mero motu take notice of prescription; it must be pleaded 
by the parties.207 
 
In addition, the 1969 Act specifically regulates interruption and postponement of 
prescription,208 while the 1943 Act is silent on this issue. Under the 1943 Act, resort had to be 
had to the common law concerning these issues. If one sets out the requirements for 
prescription under the two prescription acts, the following similarities are discernable:  
                                                             
197 Section 6 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
198 These requirements are discussed in sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.4 respectively below. 
199 1948 (4) SA 794 (W) 796 797. 
200 Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 574; Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) 
SA 164 (C) 172; Stephenson v Lamsley 1948 (4) SA 794 (W) 796-797. 
201 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467; Van Wyk and 
Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 172. 
202 Voet 44.3.9; Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 172; Stephenson v Lamsley 
1948 (4) SA 794 (W) 796. 
203 Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 2006) 149. 
204 Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th 
ed 2007) 405-665 514; Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 178; Sonnekus JC & Neels 
JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 312; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 90. 
205 Forellendam Bpk v Jacobsbaai Coastal Farms (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 138 (C) 140. See also Carey Miller DL 
& Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 178; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 282. 
206 For a discussion on the difficulties of proving coniunctio temporum, see Robertson S “The Difficulty of 
Proving the Essentials of Acquisitive Prescription” (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
158-161 161. 
207 Section 14 of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 17 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
208 Sections 2-4 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.  
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i) possession (or use, in the case of acquiring limited real rights); 
ii) openness (nec clam); 
iii) possession as if owner (this clearly corresponds to the animus domini element of 
possessio civilis, together with a mixture of the earlier nec precario and adverse 
user requirements);209 and 
iv) continuous possession for 30 years.210 
 
 
2.3.2 The requirements for acquisitive prescription in modern South African law 
2.3.2.1  Possession  
The type of possession required for prescription is not defined in the 1943 Act.211 The 1969 
Act is slightly clearer in this regard, stipulating that the possessor needs to possess “openly 
and as if he were the owner”.212 The answer regarding possession, therefore, has to be found 
in the common law. In this context the South African courts have consistently held that the 
required form of possession is that mentioned by Voet, namely possessio civilis or civil 
possession.213 The courts have also held that the successive prescription acts in no way alter 
this position, as this was not a case where the common law is inconsistent with the acts.214 
                                                             
209 The animus domini requirement is discussed in section 2.3.2.1.1 below. The “as if owner”, nec precario and 
adverse user requirements are discussed together in section 2.3.2.4 below, where it is shown that these 
requirements all inherently form part of the animus domini element of possessio civilis. 
210 See Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 160, where a similar breakdown is 
followed.  
211 See Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 710, where it was held that the 1943 Act did not alter 
the common law position regarding the type of possession required for prescription.   
212 Section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. The “as if owner” requirement clearly corresponds to the 
animus domini element of possessio civilis.  
213 Also known as full juristic possession: See Voet 41.2.1, 41.2.3. This is confirmed in case law: See Sapphire 
Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) paras 8-9; 
Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 8; Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 
222 (C) para 28; Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 134; Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 
(2) SA 692 (N) 697; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8; Barker NO v Chadwick and Others 1974 (1) SA 
461 (D) 465; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 (C) 281; Morkels Transport 
(Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City 
Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 677; Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) Ltd v Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 48; Hayes v 
Harding Town Board and Another 1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 
701 712. See further Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 311; Van der Merwe CG 
Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 275; Hall CG Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Volume II – The Law of 
Property (10th ed 1976) 77. 
214 Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) 
para 9; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 574-575; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town 
Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 (C) 281; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 710-711. 
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Therefore, the position regarding the type of possession required for prescription before and 
after 1970 is the same.215  
 
Possessio civilis consists of two elements, namely the animus domini (mental) and corpus 
(physical) elements.216 Both the mental state and the physical act of detention must coincide 
for possession to qualify as possessio civilis.217  
 
 
2.3.2.1.1 The animus domini requirement 
The animus domini element218 entails that a possessor needs to possess the property with the 
intention of an owner, or, in the words of the 1969 Act, “as if [he were] owner.”219 The courts 
have made it clear that anything less than animus domini, ie the limited possessio naturalis220 
of a lessee or usufructuary, detentio,221 commodatarium222 or exercising a servitude over a 
servient tenement, is ineffective and does not satisfy this requirement, since all of these fall 
short of the intention of possessing the property as owner.223 However, this does not entail 
                                                             
215 Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) 
para 9; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 574-575; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town 
Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 (C) 281. See also Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 280. 
216 Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 160-161. 
217 Voet 41.2.10; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 (C) 281; Morkels 
Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Welgemoed v Coetzer 
and Others 1946 TPD 701 712. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 162. 
218 Also referred to as the animus sibi habendi or the intention of possession for oneself: Voet 44.3.9; Wood v 
Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 701; Hayes v Harding Town Board and Another 1958 
(2) SA 297 (N) 299; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 712-713. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar 
JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 162 footnote 254. Some of the 
older cases refer to the animus domini as the “as of right” requirement, see for instance Morkels Transport (Pty) 
Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 476.  
219 Section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See further Voet 44.3.9; Wood v Baynesfield Board of 
Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 701; Hayes v Harding Town Board and another 1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299; 
Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 712-713. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 162 and Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 
1989) 275. In Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 5, Jansen JA describes animus domini as the intention to 
act adversely to the owner’s rights. Regarding the similarities between animus domini and the adverse user 
requirement, see the discussion in section 2.3.2.4 below. 
220 “Mere or natural possession”, according to Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 
2006) 256-257. 
221 “Detention of a thing”, according to Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 2006) 
177. 
222 “One to whom something is entrusted”, according to Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary 
(3rd ed 2006) 165. 
223 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 30; Wood v Baynesfield Board of 
Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 702; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 
(C) 281; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Hayes 
v Harding Town Board and Another 1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 
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that the possessor needs to possess with the belief that he is the owner; all that is required is 
that the possessor intends to keep the property as if he is the owner.224 Therefore, the 
necessary animus is present in scenarios where the possessor mistakenly believes that he is 
the owner (bona fide) and even in situations where he knows (mala fide) that he is not the 
owner.225 In this sense it has been decided that even in cases where the plaintiff, or his 
predecessors in title, realise that they are in fact not owners of the property, this will not 
negate the “adverse user” of the property.226 This is because the Roman law requirements of 
bona fides227 and iustus titulus228 no longer form part of South African prescription law.229 
Therefore, it is possible for mala fides to co-exist with the necessary animus domini.230 
Strictly speaking, it is even possible for a thief to possess (movable) property with the animus 
domini, although it is unlikely that he will succeed in practice with a case based on 
prescription, as the thief might be unable to satisfy the openness requirement.231  
 
If the possessor recognises the rights of the owner, for instance by asking him whether he (the 
possessor) may lease or buy the property, possession will immediately cease to be animo 
domini.232 This will be the case even if such an acknowledgment is not followed by any 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
701 712-713. This position is in line with Roman-Dutch law as described by Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.3: See 
section 2.2.3 above. 
224 Ploughmann NO v Pauw and Another 2006 (6) SA 334 (C) para 36; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 
571 (NC) 577; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 9 7, 10; Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137; 
Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Campbell v 
Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. See also Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 265 and Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (5th ed 2006) 162. 
225 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Campbell v 
Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 160-161. 
226 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 701; Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City 
Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. In this sense I agree with the Campbell decision by equating “adverse user” 
to possessio civilis, and thus to the animus domini: See the discussion in this regard in section 2.3.2.4 below. 
227 Good faith. 
228 Just title. 
229 Voet 44.3.3–44.3.9 
230 Voet 41.2.3; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 577; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose 
Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 711. 
See also Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 268 and Van der Merwe CG 
Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 275. As to the desirability of this position, see Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins 
(2009) 173-174. Section 4.5 of chapter four below specifically focuses the anomaly of the mala fide possessor. 
231 Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 577; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) 
Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474. See also Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F 
(ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th ed 2007) 405-665 512; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert 
H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 165; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 
275. For examples of scenarios involving animus domini, see Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods 
(Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 475. 
232 Voet 44.3.9; Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 
February 2009) para 9; Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 (2) SA 944 (A) 945; Wood v Baynesfield 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 43
permission (precarium), expressed or implied, from the side of the owner.233 Uncertainty 
exists surrounding the question of which acts by the possessor amount to an acknowledgment 
of the owner’s rights in the property.234 According to an obiter dictum by Broome JP in Payn 
v Estate Rennie and Another,235 the mere mental recognition or acknowledgment by the 
claimant does not suffice to terminate the animus domini.236 According to the judge, it only 
operates as a bar if the state of mind is accompanied by some overt act.237 This approach is 
founded on sound principles, as it is impossible to determine the mental attitude or intention 
with which a person possesses property if there is no outward manifestation of such 
intention.238 Thus, the courts look at all the surrounding circumstances and evidence to 
determine whether a possessor is holding property animo domini.239 In this regard Miller J – 
in Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council240 – said that “it is safer, by far, to rely on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 698; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467, 477; Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680; 
Pratt v Lourens 1954 (4) SA 281 (N) 282; Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562. In this regard, see 
Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 162, 
where the authors state that “an acknowledgment of the owner’s right and a willingness to give up possession if 
the owner should enforce his or her right before the period of prescription has been completed, should not per se 
be inconsistent with the animus domini requirement.” It is doubtful whether this statement is correct, as it is 
clear from the main text, as well as from the authorities quoted, that an acknowledgment of the owner’s rights 
will negate the animus domini. Nevertheless, this area of South African law is not free from uncertainty or 
difficulty.  
233 Pratt v Lourens 1954 (4) SA 281 (N) 282. For a more detailed discussion regarding precarium, see section 
2.3.2.4 below. 
234 See Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 37, where the Court preferred 
to leave this question open. De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 93-94 is of the opinion that a mere 
informal (“verbygaande”) acknowledgment of the owner’s rights should not suffice in terminating the running 
of prescription. However, he qualifies this by stating that if the informal acknowledgment should be followed by 
a factual situation where the possessor no longer possess “as owner”, such as a lessee, then the running of 
prescription will be terminated. To much the same effect is Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 281 and 
Van der Merwe CG “Original Acquisition of Ownership” in Zimmermann R & Visser D (eds) Southern Cross – 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 701-717 713, where he mentions that a mere 
acknowledgment of the owner’s rights will not succeed to terminate the running of prescription. According to 
him at 281, this will only happen if the acknowledgment is followed by a “duidelik waarneembare berusting” or 
a clearly discernable acceptance of the owner’s rights. Henckert HG “Die Animus Domini-vereiste by Verjaring” 
(1986) 5 Responsa Meridiana 138-142 is also of this view.  
235 1960 (4) SA 261 (N). 
236 Payn v Estate Rennie and Another 1960 (4) SA 261 (N) 262-263. 
237 Payn v Estate Rennie and Another 1960 (4) SA 261 (N) 262-263. 
238 Here I am of the same mind as Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 281, who argues that the mere 
acknowledgment of the owner’s rights, which does not constitute clear outward acknowledgment, will not 
negate the animus domini. See also Henckert HG “Die Animus Domini-vereiste by Verjaring” (1986) 5 
Responsa Meridiana 138-142 139. 
239 Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) 
para 9. 
240 1966 (2) SA 674 (N). 
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external manifestations of [the possessor’s] state of mind than on his own clumsy attempts at 
verbal reconstruction of his state of mind many years ago.”241  
 
Unfortunately, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court242 – as it then was – 
unnecessarily complicated matters with its decision in Minister of Landbou v 
Sonnendecker.243 In an obiter dictum by Rumpff CJ, the Court mentioned the possibility that 
a possessor could possess property “as if owner”, even though he knew it belonged to another 
person and was willing to return possession to the owner, should such owner arrive and claim 
the property.244 This part of the decision attracted criticism, and rightly so.245 According to 
Marx, the animus domini requirement is not satisfied if one holds property with the intention 
of becoming owner.246 As seen above, it is possible to hold property with the necessary 
animus domini247 even if a person realises that he is not owner. Yet, the animus domini will 
probably be terminated should a possessor be willing to hand over the property once the 
owner arrives at the scene. In this regard the willingness of the possessor to hand over the 
property must be clearly discernable from his conduct.248 Nonetheless, Rumpff CJ preferred 
not to answer this question, since it was not relevant to the case and thus the matter remains 
open.249 As mentioned, the possessor’s mental attitude must be deduced from physical 
manifestations, as it is impossible to look into the mind of another. Thus, the possessor’s state 
of mind depends on the circumstances.250 As to the question whether the animus domini will 
                                                             
241 Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 679. See also Wood v Baynesfield Board of 
Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 701 and Smith and Others v Martin’s Executor Dative (1899) 16 SC 148 
148-151. 
242 Since 1996 known as the Supreme Court of Appeal: See section 166(b) of the Constitution. 
243 1979 (2) SA 944 (A). 
244 Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 (2) SA 944 (A) 947. 
245 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 162-
163 contend that this obiter dictum by Rumpff CJ is correct. However, Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 
1989) 281 and Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 237 differ, since they think 
that this state of affairs is unacceptable. Of the same view is Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South 
Africa (2000) 174. I agree with Van der Merwe, Marx, Carey Miller and Pope, should it be possible to clearly 
discern the possessor’s state of mind from his conduct.  
246 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 237. See also Van der Merwe CG 
“Original Acquisition of Ownership” in Zimmermann R & Visser D (eds) Southern Cross – Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 701-717 715. 
247 Here I equate “as if owner” with the animus domini requirement. This topic is further discussed in section 
2.3.2.4 below. 
248 As stated by Miller J in Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 679: “[I]t is safer, by 
far, to rely on the external manifestations of [the possessor’s] state of mind than on his own clumsy attempts at 
verbal reconstruction of his state of mind many years ago.” 
249 Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 (2) SA 944 (A) 947. 
250 For an interesting instance in this regard, see the discussion of Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk 
and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) in the next paragraph. 
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be terminated through recognition vis-à-vis the owner or vis-à-vis his representative, South 
African law is unclear.251  
 
An interesting argument regarding the animus domini arose in Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK 
v De Klerk and Others,252 where the third respondent claimed to have acquired certain 
property through prescription. The plaintiff objected and stated that the third respondent 
acknowledged the rights of the owner. The third respondent replied that he only recognised 
the owner’s rights after the 30-year period had already expired, since he was unaware of the 
fact that he had already acquired the property through prescription. The Court rejected this 
argument:  
 
“Die probleem hiermee is egter dat die derde respondent se optrede ná verloop van die termyn 
onteenseglik dui op die gesindheid waarmee hy tot dan toe sy besit op daardie stadium 
uitgeoefen het. Sy optrede strook bloot eenvoudig net met ‘n erkenning van die oorledene [the 
owner] se eiendomsreg op die eiendom en dit alleen is fataal vir sy aanspraak op verkrygende 
verjaring.”253 
 
 
2.3.2.1.2 The corpus requirement 
One has to carefully scrutinise whether the possessor’s actions satisfy the corpus 
requirement,254 which actions must be judged objectively with specific regard to the 
circumstances.255 An example of conduct that is prima facie construed as the necessary 
corpus is when the possessor makes permanent improvements to the claimed property, such 
as by building on land or fencing it.256 Then again, it has been decided that the paying of rates 
concerning certain immovable property serves merely as an indication of the possessor’s 
mental attitude toward the property and does not in itself amount to a physical holding or 
                                                             
251 Payn v Estate Rennie and Another 1960 (4) SA 261 (N) 263. 
252 (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009). 
253 Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) 
para 9. (“The problem with this is that the third respondent’s actions, after the expiration of the prescription 
period, undeniably illustrate the mental attitude with which he possessed the property up until that stage. His 
actions simply boil down to an acknowledgment of the ownership of the deceased [owner] over the property and 
that alone is fatal for his allegation of acquisitive prescription.”) 
254 The physical requirement. 
255 Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 161. 
256 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 31; Van Wyk and Another v Louw 
and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 170. See also Hall CG Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Volume II 
– The Law of Property (10th ed 1976) 78. See further Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 
(4) SA 276 (C), where the Court held that the building of a stoep that protrudes onto a public road is sufficient to 
amount to adverse user, which also constitutes the necessary animus domini and corpus. For a discussion 
concerning the similarities between adverse user and animus domini, see section 2.3.2.4 below. 
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detention of the property.257 In some cases, grazing on its own may constitute the necessary 
corpus, but one will have to look at the specific land as well as the degree of grazing to 
establish this.258 Consequently, regard must be had to the context to determine whether the 
plaintiff’s actions necessarily constitute corpus.  
 
It is not required that every part or area of the property be occupied or used to constitute 
corpus, as this is sometimes simply impractical.259 The test is “whether there was such use of 
a part or parts of the ground as amounts, for practical purposes, to possession of the 
whole.”260 In this regard much depends on the nature of the property and the type of use or 
possession to which it is put.261 In other words, the possessor must use the property to a 
certain degree to meet the required physical possession. Total and exclusive physical 
possession is, therefore, not required. In Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another,262 
the Court held that the mere fact that the owner and/or his employees had occasional access 
to the property concerned did not, in itself, detract from the possessor’s effective control of it, 
nor did it serve to interrupt prescription.263 Clearly, there is not a numerus clausus of forms of 
physical possession that may constitute the necessary corpus.  
 
Corbett J made the following remark concerning the question of satisfying the corpus 
requirement through an agent: 
 
                                                             
257 Hayes v Harding Town Board and Another 1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299; Minister van Lande v Swart en Andere 
1957 (3) SA 508 (C) 511. See also Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 172. 
258 See, for instance, Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C). See also Minister van 
Lande v Swart en Andere 1957 (3) SA 508 (C) 511, where the Court held that mere grazing was not enough to 
constitute corpus. According to Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (5th ed 2006) 163, the acts of the possessor must be in accordance with his animus domini before he 
will succeed in a claim based on prescription. If only the necessary intention is present, without sufficient 
corpus from which to deduce the intention, the possessor will not be able to succeed with his claim. However, 
the possessor may still be able to acquire something less than ownership, such as a grazing servitude, depending 
on the circumstances and the form of physical possession. 
259 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467; Van Wyk and 
Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 170; Minister of Forestry v Michaux 1957 (2) SA 32 (N) 39; 
Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 720; Smith and Others v Martin’s Executor Dative (1899) 16 
SC 148-151. See also Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 162; Sonnekus JC & Neels 
JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 311. 
260 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468. See also 
Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 720. 
261 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468; Mocke v 
Beaufort West Municipality 1939 CPD 135 142; Boshoff and Another v Reinhold and Co 1920 AD 29 33. 
262 2007 (5) SA 222 (C). The part of this decision that dealt with the question of prescription was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Kruger v Joles Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (3) SA 5 (SCA) para 
13. 
263 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 29. 
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“Where a person erects or acquires a building which wholly or partially encroaches upon the 
land of another, then, in my opinion, he legally possesses the land taken up by the encroachment 
irrespective of whether he occupies the building himself or whether he lets it to someone else. 
The soundness of this proposition is clearly demonstrated by the case where the encroachment 
is not a stoep, as in the present instance, but a room forming part of the building. Could it ever 
be said that the owner of the building did not exercise legal possession of the land upon which 
the room was built merely because the building as a whole was let to the tenant?”264 
 
This argument illustrates that it is possible to satisfy the corpus requirement by possessing 
property through another, ie through an agent, such as when a landlord exercises possession 
through his tenant.265 In such a case one has to comply with the requirements laid down by 
the law of agency, which may be summarised as follows: 
 
i) the agent’s intention must be to acquire possession not for himself but on behalf of 
the possessor (principal);  
ii) the possessor (principal) must have the intention of acquiring possession over the 
property concerned; and 
iii) a juridical relation must exist between the possessor (principal) and the agent, ie 
there must be an order or a commission that precedes the acquisition.266 
 
Prescription only commences in favour of the principal from the moment he becomes aware 
that the agent has indeed taken control of the property.267 If the agent should acknowledge the 
rights of the owner, the animus domini will also be terminated.268 However, in such a case 
one has to determine whether the agent acted within the scope of his authority.269  
 
The onus rests on the person that claims prescription to prove uninterrupted possession, as 
well as the other requirements.270 Although the courts will carefully scrutinise the evidence 
                                                             
264 Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 (C) 282. 
265 Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.4; Voet 41.2.12; Forellendam Bpk v Jacobsbaai Coastal Farms (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 
138 (C) 140-142; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 (C) 282; Van Wyk and 
Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 171. 
266 Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 714.  
267 Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 714. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 163. 
268 Pratt v Lourens 1954 (4) SA 281 (N) 282. In this case the Court referred to the termination of the adverse 
possession. This case is included in this discussion for practical purposes, since I argue that there are few 
material differences between the concepts of adverse user and possessio civilis. This topic is discussed in section 
2.3.2.4 below. 
269 For an example of this sort, see Pratt v Lourens 1954 (4) SA 281 (N). 
270 Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 575; Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 
(2) SA 692 (N) 698; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 6 9; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods 
(Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 469; Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) SA 
501 (O) 503; City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 326; Welgemoed v Coetzer and 
Others 1946 TPD 701 720; Smith and Others v Martin’s Executor Dative (1899) 16 SC 148 148-151. 
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before depriving a person of property due to the effects of prescription, the burden of proof is 
still that of a civil case, namely on a balance of probabilities.271  
 
It is, of course, also possible to satisfy the corpus requirement by possessing the property as 
co-possessor. Yet, what should happen if one possessor doesn’t meet all the requirements for 
prescription, while the other possessor does? The answer is that the failure of one co-
possessor to successfully assert ownership of property through prescription does not in itself 
result in the failure of a claim for prescription by the other co-possessor.272 
 
In pleadings it must be averred that the claimant’s possession was possessio civilis, as mere 
assertion of possession will not be sufficient to find a case for prescription.273 This is because 
the term “possession”, used without qualification, has a wide connotation, which can mean 
anything from possessio civilis to mere detentio, and – therefore – it must be qualified.274 In 
cases concerning co-owners, it is also possible for one co-owner to acquire the joint property 
through prescription.275 Under these circumstances the claimant has to prove that he 
appropriated the whole property and enjoyed the exclusive use of it adversely to the other co-
owner(s) before he can satisfy the corpus requirement.276 
 
It is worth emphasising that in some cases the argument was put forward that prescription 
could be presumed on the basis of vetustas.277 Vetustas can be understood as a presumption 
based on immemorial use.278 The difference between prescription and vetustas is as follows: 
when prescription is proved, it creates a legal situation, as opposed to vetustas, which only 
raises a rebuttable presumption.279 Vetustas merely creates a rebuttable presumption in favour 
                                                             
271 Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) SA 501 (O) 503; Minister of Forestry v Michaux 
1957 (2) SA 32 (N) 39; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 720. 
272 Ploughmann NO v Pauw and Another 2006 (6) SA 334 (C) para 72; Barker NO v Chadwick and Others 1974 
(1) SA 461 (D) 465. 
273 Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) Ltd v Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 48. 
274 Jansen J in Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) Ltd v Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 48. 
275 Albert and Others v Ragaven 1966 (2) SA 454 (D); Payn v Estate Rennie and Another 1960 (4) SA 261 (N). 
276 Albert and Others v Ragaven 1966 (2) SA 454 (D) 455; Payn v Estate Rennie and Another 1960 (4) SA 261 
(N) 262. 
277 Forellendam Bpk v Jacobsbaai Coastal Farms (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 138 (C); Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) 
SA 1 (A); De Beer v Van der Merwe 1923 AD 378. 
278 Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 2006) 305. 
279 De Beer v Van der Merwe 1923 AD 378 383.  
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of the existence of public rights.280 As this is the difference, it has been held that it is not 
possible to support a claim for prescription on the basis of vetustas.281 
 
The possession of the property must be uninterrupted for the full 30-year period. This does 
not mean that absolute continuity of occupation is required, as long as there is no substantial 
interruption during the prescription period.282 It will be sufficient if the right is exercised 
from time to time as occasion requires and with reasonable continuity.283 The requirement of 
continuity must relate not only to the possessor’s animus domini and his corpus, but also to 
the other elements required for prescription, for example the nec vi, nec clam and nec 
precario requirements of the 1943 Act.284 To constitute a cause of action, it is important that 
the plaintiff’s cause of action must exist at the time the proceedings begin, or, in other words, 
the 30 years must already have elapsed when summons was issued or served.285 If the 
possessor satisfies all the requirements for prescription, he becomes owner of the property the 
moment the 30-year period expires.286 In the case of immovable property, the rights in the 
land pass to the possessor even without registration, after which he may demand that the land 
be registered in his name.287  
 
 
2.3.2.2  Nec vi  
The nec vi requirement obliges the possessor to possess the property without force, or 
“peaceably”.288 This requirement does, however, not entail that the acquisition of possession 
needs to be without force; it only requires that the continued possession of the property must 
                                                             
280 Forellendam Bpk v Jacobsbaai Coastal Farms (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 138 (C) 143. See also Van der Merwe 
CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 547. 
281 Forellendam Bpk v Jacobsbaai Coastal Farms (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 138 (C) 143-144; Bisschop v Stafford 
1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 4; De Beer v Van der Merwe 1923 AD 378 383-384. 
282 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468; Minister of 
Forestry v Michaux 1957 (2) SA 32 (N) 39; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 720. See also 
Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 176. 
283 Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 170; Minister of Forestry v Michaux 1957 
(2) SA 32 (N) 39; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 720 
284 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 169. 
285 Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 169. 
286 Section 2(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
287 See Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) SA 501 (O). See also Sonnekus JC “Die Rei 
Vindicatio en Verjaring – Of Nie” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 576-590 578; Sonnekus JC “Sub 
Hasta-veilings en die Onderskeid tussen Afgeleide en Oorspronklike Wyses van Regsverkryging” 2008 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 696-727 698. 
288 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 
(A) 8; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468. 
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be without force.289 The 1969 Act omits nec vi, which may seem to imply that property 
retained by force can now also be acquired through prescription. However, many authors290 
state that the omission of the nec vi requirement is of little practical relevance, since forceful 
possession of property is unlikely to be consistent with the animus domini requirement.291 
Furthermore, the fact that the possessor has to possess the property continuously for 30 years 
also eliminates the possibility of acquiring ownership through forceful possession, as it is 
highly unlikely that someone will be able to forcefully maintain possession over property for 
the entire 30-year period.292 
 
As regards illegal possession, one needs to distinguish between two scenarios, namely (i) 
where the possessor’s possession is illegal simply because it is without the owner’s consent 
(ie unlawful possession), and (ii) where it is illegal irrespective of such consent due to 
statutory restrictions (ie in contravention of the law).293 If property is held without the 
consent of the owner, such possession is nec precario.294 The act of possession is then merely 
unlawful, since there is no entitlement to possession.295 Concerning the second instance, if the 
law forbids even the owner to use the property in the way used by the possessor, then a case 
for prescription cannot succeed.296 Yet, if the possessor exercises rights of a wider scope than 
those forbidden by law, then he is able to acquire those rights through prescription. There 
may also be cases in which the possession relied on, though attended by illegal acts, can be 
regarded as separable from the illegality for purposes of prescription.297 Thus, an owner must 
                                                             
289 Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 312; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 
275. 
290 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 165; 
Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 168; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 312-313; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 275-276. 
291 Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 168; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 
275. 
292 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 165; 
Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 
275-276; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 87. 
293 Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 604-605. 
294 Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 681. 
295 Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 681. See also Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The 
Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 181. 
296 Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 605. For a good example, see Swanepoel v Crown Mines 
Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A), where legislation effectively took away control of the ground from the owner and 
vested it in the mining authorities. The claimant was not able to possess the property adversely vis-à-vis the 
owner due to the illegality of his possession and, thus, his claim for prescription failed. See also Mostert H & 
Pope A (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 181. 
297 Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 605. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 166. 
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have the right to prevent the possessor from possessing the property.298 It follows that if an 
owner is unable to prevent the possessor from occupying the property, then prescription 
cannot run in favour of such possessor.299 
 
 
2.3.2.3  Nec clam 
The nec clam requirement entails that possession be “open”300 and was retained as one of the 
requirements for prescription in the 1969 Act.301 Carey Miller and Pope describe the rationale 
behind this requirement as follows: 
 
“There are two reasons why possession must be open rather than secret or clandestine. First, in 
that prescription is justified by the impression created by outward appearances, in the world at 
large, it stands to reason that the exercise of rights must be patent: without this the element of 
publicity could not be satisfied. Secondly, from the owner’s point of view, the security of 
ownership entitles an owner to leave his or her property and it would be unfair to expect him or 
her to take steps to recover possession maintained secretly by another.”302 
 
Occupation is open even without actual knowledge on the part of the owner, as long as the 
possession is open for all to see who want to see, including the owner.303 Stated differently, 
the possession must be open vis-à-vis the general public, as well as vis-à-vis the owner.304 The 
possession must be so open that an owner, exercising reasonable care, would have observed 
it.305 To determine openness is a matter of considering the evidence before the Court. As with 
the nec vi requirement, nec clam does not require that possession of property must have been 
                                                             
298 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 26; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 
1 All SA 571 (NC) 577; Barker NO v Chadwick and Others 1974 (1) SA 461 (D) 466; Morkels Transport (Pty) 
Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 479; Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) 
SA 596 (A) 606.  
299 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 26. 
300 Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8; Ex Parte Puppli 1975 (3) SA 461 (D) 463. 
301 De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 86-87. 
302 Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 164, quoted with approval in Ploughmann NO 
v Pauw and Another 2006 (6) SA 334 (C) para 59. 
303 Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 7; Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 
170; Minister of Forestry v Michaux 1957 (2) SA 32 (N) 39; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 
720. 
304 Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 723; De Beer v 
Van der Merwe 1923 AD 378; Smith and Others v Martin’s Executor Dative (1899) 16 SC 148 148-151. See 
also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 
165. Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 277 and Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du 
Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th ed 2007) 405-665 512 differ from this approach and 
states that the possession need only be open vis-à-vis the public. There is merit in this argument, as it is clear 
that actual knowledge of the possessor’s actions on the part of the owner is not required for purposes of 
prescription. 
305 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697; Ex Parte Puppli 1975 (3) SA 461 (D) 
463; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 721; Smith and 
Others v Martin’s Executor Dative (1899) 16 SC 148 148-151. 
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obtained openly; only the continued possession needs to be open.306 Van der Merwe questions 
whether the nec clam requirement is in fact not inherently part of the required form of 
possession (possessio civilis) and, therefore, redundant.307 This is indeed the case in Dutch 
and French law, where openness is regarded as an inherent element of possession.308    
 
 
2.3.2.4  Nec precario, adverse user and “as if owner” 
There has been quite a significant development surrounding the nec precario requirement in 
South African prescription law. Therefore, a brief discussion of the historical development 
concerning the ambit of this requirement is necessary to obtain clarity. Until 1923 the South 
African courts have interpreted the nec precario widely, in such a way that it “included” the 
concept of adverse user.309 In De Beer v Van der Merwe,310 the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court held as follows in the context of prescription: “[T]he right must have been 
non precario or as it is alleged in our modern pleadings, the right must have been exercised 
adversely and as of right.”311 The Court elaborated on the previous by finding that “[w]hen 
the owner of the dominant tenement is also lessee of the servient tenement, the former has 
not, by diverting the water on to the latter tenement, done so adversely and as of right, but 
precario”.312 By equating a lease contract to a precarium, it follows that adverse user was 
once regarded by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as “forming part” of the nec 
precario requirement.313 I argue that this wide interpretation of nec precario is legally 
unsound, since a precarium is not an overarching concept that includes contracts such as a 
lease.314 I return to this issue in the next few paragraphs. Nonetheless, this wide interpretation 
was abandoned in Malan v Nabygelegen Estates,315 where the same Appellate Division of the 
                                                             
306 Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 164; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 
277. 
307 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 277. See also Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 180. To the contrary are Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 
166 and De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 86-87. 
308 See section 3.3.2.2.1 for Dutch law and section 3.4.2.1 for French law in chapter three below. 
309 De Beer v Van der Merwe 1923 AD 378 384. This chapter argues that adverse user was wrongly incorporated 
into South African prescription law, as it merely constitutes part of the possessio civilis requirement. Hence me 
placing “included” in inverted commas. This issue is discussed in the next few paragraphs. 
310 1923 AD 378. 
311 De Beer v Van der Merwe 1923 AD 378 384. 
312 De Beer v Van der Merwe 1923 AD 378 384. 
313 Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 183 supports this view. Adverse user is 
discussed in the next few paragraphs. 
314 Reinsma M “‘Adverse User’ of ‘Adverse Possession’” (1969) 32 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 293-298 295. Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 278 opines that the wide interpretation 
of nec precario renders this requirement unusable (“onbruikbaar”). 
315 1946 AD 562. 
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Supreme Court opted for the narrow interpretation of nec precario, an approach followed in 
subsequent cases.316 In this decision, Watermeyer CJ described nec precario as follows: 
 
“[A] precarium is the legal relationship which exists between parties when one party has the use 
or occupation of property belonging to the other on sufferance, by the leave and licence of the 
other. Its essential characteristic is that the permission to use or occupy is revocable at the will 
of the person granting it.”317  
 
This obiter dictum establishes that a precarium is a bilateral legal relationship,318 where the 
grantor agrees (consents) that the grantee may exercise possession over the property 
concerned, which consent is revocable at the will of the grantor. While the grantee enjoys the 
precarium from the grantor, he has the ius possidendi to control the property, and through 
this he (continuously) acknowledges the ownership of the grantor.319 Thus, a precarium is 
something of which the use is granted at the request of the grantee for as long as the grantor 
is willing to allow him to have it.320 Nec precario, therefore, postulates the absence of such a 
grant or request.321 Nec precario may also be understood as meaning “not by virtue of a 
precarious consent”, “not by virtue of a revocable permission” or “not on sufferance”.322 The 
onus rests on the person claiming prescription to prove that neither he nor his predecessors in 
title held the property precario, or (in other words) that they held it nec precario throughout 
the prescription period.323 
 
Concerning the nature of a precarium, as seen above, a person holds something precariously 
when he holds it on sufferance or by virtue of permission that is revocable at the will of the 
grantor.324 A precarium may be of two kinds, namely: 
 
                                                             
316 See for instance Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8 and Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 
1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697, where this departure is confirmed.   
317 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 573. 
318 City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 327; Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 
1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 681. 
319 Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313. 
320 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697. See also Van der Merwe CG Sakereg 
(2nd ed 1989) 278. 
321 Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8. 
322 Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) SA 501 (O) 503; Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 48; Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574. 
323 Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 8; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd 
and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 470. Robertson S “The Difficulty of Proving the Essentials of Acquisitive 
Prescription” (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 158-161 underlines the difficulty of 
proving the absence of a precarium.  
324 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 
(A) 8; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 470; Malan v 
Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 573. 
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i) in the nature of the concession of a servitude; or 
ii) it may be a precarium proper, described by the authorities as tot wederzeggens 
toe.325  
 
If a precarium is present, the possessor’s claim for prescription will fail.326 For possession to 
be precario, it is essential that some sort of permission should have been given to the 
possessor by the owner, as mere acquiescence by the owner will not suffice.327 The 
permission (precarium) may be granted either expressly or tacitly.328  
 
City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate329 dealt with the question whether a precarium given 
to one person would automatically attach to the possession of his successors in title. 
According to this case, the mere fact that a person occupied property by virtue of a precarium 
does not in itself mean that his predecessors in title also hold the property precariously.330 
The nature and scope of the precarious right depends on the intention of the parties when the 
precarium was granted, which has to be decided on the evidence.331 As mentioned above, a 
precarium may be granted either expressly or tacitly.332 Normally, a personal concession 
terminates at the grantee’s death, and his legal successors only occupy precario if there was a 
tacit re-grant of the concession to them.333 Such tacit re-grant, being a bilateral relationship, 
only arises if both parties had knowledge of the situation; the position would then be that the 
grantor tacitly intended and the occupier tacitly recognised that continuous occupation would 
be precario.334 Interestingly enough, the Court in Abelsohn held in an obiter dictum that it 
may be possible to presume the tacit extension of precarium – in the circumstances of certain 
                                                             
325 “Tot wederzeggens toe” may be understood as “until I revoke or until I say differently”: See City of Cape 
Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 326; Texas Co (SA) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1926 AD 
467 499.  
326 Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) 
para 6. 
327 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 576-577; Pratt v Lourens 1954 (4) SA 281 (N) 282. See also 
Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 278. 
328 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 
(A) 8; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 470; Malan v 
Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 573. 
329 1947 (3) SA 315 (C). 
330 City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 326. 
331 Voet 8.4.18; City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 326. 
332 Voet 43.26.1; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8; City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 
315 (C) 327. See also Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 278. 
333 City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 327. 
334 City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 327-328; Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City 
Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 681. For an extensive discussion of the nec precario requirement, see City of Cape 
Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C). 
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types of precario – when there is an absence of evidence for the party averring 
prescription.335 
 
It must be emphasised that a contract, such as one allowing someone to lease property or to 
exercise a servitude, does not constitute revocable permission granted by one person to 
another.336 For instance, if a possessor exercises rights in property in terms of a contract, he 
exercises those rights “as of right” and not by virtue of “consent” in the sense of revocable 
permission (precarium).337 The reason why prescription does not run in favour of the 
possessor in this context is because the possessor – due to the presence of the contract – does 
not possess the property animo domini. Such possession merely amounts to the limited 
possessio naturalis,338 which falls short of the intention of possessing as owner.339 This is 
why the wide approach adopted in De Beer v Van der Merwe,340 where the Court held that 
rights performed in terms of a contract are exercised precariously, is legally unsound. 
However, the fact that possession originated in contract does not necessarily preclude the 
acquisition of property through prescription.341 For instance, if the possessor exercises rights 
pertaining to the property that falls outside those granted by the contract – such as drawing 
water from a fountain in the context of a lease contract not permitting such drawing of water 
– it is possible to acquire such right as a servitude through prescription.342 If the possessor 
had no right to take water from a fountain on the property in terms of the lease contract, such 
                                                             
335 City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 328-329: “It may be that, in the circumstances 
of certain types of precario, the absence of evidence by the person, who claims a prescriptive title as to the 
terms under which he occupies, the tacit extension of the precarium to cover his occupation may be presumed.” 
336 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 576-577; Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) 
SA 501 (O) 504. 
337 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 576-577; Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) 
SA 501 (O) 504. 
338 “Mere or natural possession”, according to Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 
2006) 256-257. 
339 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 30; Wood v Baynesfield Board of 
Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 702; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 
(C) 281; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Hayes 
v Harding Town Board and Another 1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 
701 712-713. See also Reinsma M “‘Adverse User’ of ‘Adverse Possession’” (1969) 32 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 293-298 295. This was also the position in Roman-Dutch law as 
described by Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.3: See section 2.2.3 above. 
340 1923 AD 378. 
341 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574; Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) SA 
501 (O) 504. 
342 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574; Du Toit and Others v Furstenberg and Others 1957 (1) SA 
501 (O) 504. The example of drawing water from a fountain is based on the facts of Malan v Nabygelegen 
Estates 1946 AD 562. 
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an act will – in the absence of a grant or precarium to that effect – be performed nec 
precario.343 
 
The nec precario requirement has, like the nec vi requirement, also been omitted from the 
1969 Act. Even so, the fact that the type of possession required for prescription is possessio 
civilis probably makes this requirement superfluous, since holding property precariously is 
clearly inconsistent with the animus domini.344 This position is strengthened by the fact that 
the 1969 Act merely requires the possessor to possess the property openly and “as if he were 
the owner”, the latter requirement clearly being similar to the animus domini element of 
possessio civilis.345 Furthermore, the Court in Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council346 
held that “[if] the court is satisfied that possession was nec precario ... it will also have been 
civilis possessio [and thus animus domini].”347  
 
Although adverse user does not appear as a requirement in either the 1943 or 1969 Act, it has 
been viewed as constituting a supplementary requirement for prescription since the decision 
of Pratt v Lourens348 in 1954.349 One observes this position from the authoritative decision of 
Malan v Nabygelegen Estates,350 where the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held as 
follows: 
 
“In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be pointed out here that mere occupation of 
property ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’ for a period of thirty years does not necessarily vest in 
the occupier a prescriptive title to the ownership of that property. In order to create a 
prescriptive title, such occupation must be a user adverse to the true owner and not occupation 
                                                             
343 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 577. 
344 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 166; 
Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 169; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 276-277; 
Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 278. To the same effect is Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 
1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. 
345 Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 180-181; Badenhorst 
PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 162; Carey Miller 
DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 164-165, 169-170; Robertson S “The Difficulty of Proving the 
Essentials of Acquisitive Prescription” (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 158-
161 158; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 311; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 
1989) 280; Henckert HG “Die Animus Domini-vereiste by Verjaring” (1986) 5 Responsa Meridiana 138-
142 138. This point is discussed in greater detail in the next few paragraphs. 
346 1966 (2) SA 674 (N). 
347 Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. See also Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) 
SA 1 (A) 8-9, where the Court held that the requirements of nec precario, adverse user and possessio civilis are 
synonymous.  
348 1954 (4) SA 281 (N). 
349 Pratt v Lourens 1954 (4) SA 281 (N) 282. See also Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 279. 
350 1946 AD 562. 
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by virtue of some contract or legal relationship such as lease or usufruct which recognises the 
ownership of another.”351 
 
This position has subsequently been followed in many cases regarding prescription.352 As 
seen from the above quotation, the essence of “adverse user” is that the possessor must use or 
possess the property without recognising the rights of the owner.353 Accordingly, one can 
regard adverse user as meaning “the use and enjoyment of a thing without molestation by, 
and in conflict with the rights of, the owner thereof”.354 Therefore, the possessor must possess 
the property adversely vis-à-vis the owner, as possessing the property adversely toward a 
non-owner does not suffice.355 In this light, Sonnekus and Neels describe adverse user as a 
strydige daad.356 Recognition occurs when the possessor has a legal relationship with the 
owner, such as a lease, where the possessor implicitly acknowledges the ownership of the 
owner. In this context the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Swanepoel v Crown 
Mines Ltd357 confirmed that adverse user precludes lessees and usufructuaries from acquiring 
property through prescription.358 According to the Court, it is inconceivable that the Act 
could have intended that these persons should become owner after possessing the property 
continuously for 30 years.359 Although this conclusion is legally sound, it is doubtful whether 
the additional requirement of adverse user is at all necessary to achieve this purpose in South 
African law. This is because lessees, usufructuaries, detentors and persons who exercise 
servitudes are in any event precluded from acquiring ownership through prescription, since 
they – by having mere possessio naturalis – lack the requisite animus domini.360 
                                                             
351 Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574. This approach was followed in Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 47 and Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 604. 
352 See for instance Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697; Barker NO v 
Chadwick and Others 1974 (1) SA 461 (D) 465; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467; Hayes v Harding Town Board and Another 1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299; 
Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 604; City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 
315 (C) 326; Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574. 
353 This is also a feature of the animus domini requirement: See the discussion in section 2.3.2.1.1 above. 
354 Payn v Estate Rennie and Another 1960 (4) SA 261 (N) 262. See similarly Wood v Baynesfield Board of 
Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 
1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 480. 
355 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 702-703; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v 
Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 477; Hayes v Harding Town Board and Another 
1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299. 
356 Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313. (“An act that is in conflict with the rights 
of the owner.”) 
357 1954 (4) SA 596 (A). 
358 Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 604. 
359 Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A) 604. 
360 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 30; Wood v Baynesfield Board of 
Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 702; Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 
(C) 281; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474; Hayes 
v Harding Town Board and Another 1958 (2) SA 297 (N) 299; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 58
Consequently, a debate exists over whether adverse user indeed constitutes an independent 
requirement for prescription or whether it simply forms part of possessio civilis.361 It is 
mostly accepted – before and after 1954 – that adverse user is not an additional requirement, 
but merely an element of possessio civilis.362 This view finds support in Campbell v 
Pietermaritzburg City Council,363 where the Court held adverse user and possessio civilis to 
be synonymous.364  Scholtens is of the opinion that to add adverse user to the “as if owner” 
requirement as an additional requirement only leads to confusion.365 In any event, it is 
doubtful whether the concept of adverse user should ever have entered South African 
prescription law, as it contains elements of the English law rule of adverse possession, which 
greatly differs from acquisitive prescription.366 Be that as it may, this issue is largely made 
redundant by the “as if owner” requirement of the 1969 Act.367 Nonetheless, Van der Merwe 
is of the opinion that adverse user can still be a useful factor to determine whether a person 
had the requisite animus domini, even though it does not constitute an independent 
requirement.368 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
701 712-713. This position is in line with Roman-Dutch law as described by Grotius Inleidinge 2.2.3: See 
section 2.2.3 above. 
361 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 172 footnote 7; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 193, 275; 
Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 279-280; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 85 and cases 
cited. See also Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 165-166, where adverse user is 
regarded as correlative to the animus domini requirement.  
362 Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8-9; Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) Ltd v Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 48 
(per Jansen J); Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574. See also Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title 
in South Africa (2000) 165-166; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313-314; Van der 
Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 279-280; Henckert HG “Die Animus Domini-vereiste by Verjaring” (1986) 5 
Responsa Meridiana 138-142 138; Scholtens JE “Praescriptio – Jus Possidendi and Rei Vindicatio” (1972) 89 
South African Law Journal 383-395 384; Reinsma M “‘Adverse User’ of ‘Adverse Possession’” (1969) 32 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 293-298 295. To the same effect is Marx FE Verkrygende 
Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 193, 197, 273-275. 
363 1966 (2) SA 674 (N). 
364 Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. See also Wicks and Others v Place NO 
1967 (1) SA 561 (E) 567. The Court held in Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8-9 that nec precario, 
adverse user and possessio civilis are synonymous. 
365 Scholtens JE “Praescriptio – Jus Possidendi and Rei Vindicatio” (1972) 89 South African Law Journal 383-
395 384. De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 86 and Reinsma M “‘Adverse User’ of ‘Adverse 
Possession’” (1969) 32 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 293-298 298 are to the same effect. 
Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 314 think that adverse user is embodied in the “as 
if owner” requirement. 
366 Of the same opinion are Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 275; De Wet JC 
Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 86 and Reinsma M “‘Adverse User’ of ‘Adverse Possession’” (1969) 32 Tydskrif 
vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 293-298 294-295. Adverse possession in English law is discussed in 
section 3.2.2.3 of chapter three below. 
367 I address this issue in the next few paragraphs. 
368 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 280. Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 
165 and Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 275 are of the same mind. 
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The “as if owner” requirement was introduced for the first time by the 1969 Act, on 
suggestion from De Wet, the so-called “father” of this Act.369 This requirement bears a 
striking resemblance to the animus domini element and, thus, to possessio civilis. Indeed, the 
“as if owner” requirement does not in any way differ from possessio civilis,370 a view 
confirmed in case law.371 The post-30 November 2000 prescription cases illustrate an 
interesting trend in this context. These cases tend to discuss the 1969 Act requirements for 
prescription with reference to the terminology introduced under the previous Act.372 In most 
of these cases, the courts still discuss and use the nec precario and adverse user requirements 
to determine whether the possessor complied with the “as if owner” requirement.373 This 
approach is in line with the view that some of the “older” requirements, such as adverse user, 
can still play a useful role to establish whether a person holds property animo domini.374 
 
As indicated above, the nec precario requirement is rendered superfluous by requiring a 
person to possess property possessio civilis for purposes of prescription.375 As to adverse 
user, it has been shown that also this requirement is made redundant by the possessio civilis 
                                                             
369 See section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 and De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 85-86. With 
regard to the acquisition of servitudes, section 6 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 requires the user to exercise 
his use “openly and as though he were entitled to do so.” Clearly, there is no material difference between the 
requirements for the acquisition of property or servitudes through acquisitive prescription. 
370 Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 180-181; Badenhorst 
PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 162; Carey Miller 
DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 164-165, 169-170; Robertson S “The Difficulty of Proving the 
Essentials of Acquisitive Prescription” (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 158-
161 158; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 311; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 
1989) 280; Henckert HG “Die Animus Domini-vereiste by Verjaring” (1986) 5 Responsa Meridiana 138-142 
138. 
371 Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 8; Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others 
(693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) paras 7, 9; Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 
2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 28; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 574-575. 
372 Prescription Act 18 of 1943. See especially Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others 
(693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009); Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA); Joles 
Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C); Ploughmann NO v Pauw and Another 2006 (6) 
SA 334 (C); Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC).  
373 See the cases referred to in the previous footnote.  
374 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 280; Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 
165-166; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 275. 
375 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 166; 
Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 169; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 276-277; 
Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 278-279. To the same effect is Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City 
Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 278-279 is of the opinion that the 
nec precario requirement is redundant, since it can be seen as simply forming part of the animus domini and “as 
if owner” requirements. 
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requirement.376 In this context it is illuminating to quote the following passage from 
Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council:377 
 
“[I]f the Court is sati[s]fied that there was possessio civilis ... it is superfluous to inquire further 
whether there was adverse user and that if, on the other hand, the Court is satisfied that 
possession was nec precario and adverse to the owner's rights, it will also have been civilis 
possessio.”378 
 
Since the “as if owner” requirement is the same as possessio civilis, it can be safely deduced 
that the “as if owner” requirement encapsulates both the nec precario and adverse user 
requirements. 
 
 
2.3.3 Interruption of acquisitive prescription  
Concerning interruption it is necessary to distinguish once more between the law as it stood 
prior to and after 30 November 1970. The 1943 Act does not specifically regulate 
interruption, which means that one must rely on the common law in this regard. Interruption 
of prescription ensues when a specific event occurs that terminates the running of the 
prescription, causing the 30-year period to start running de novo.379 A distinction is drawn 
between two types of interruption, namely (i) natural interruption and (ii) civil interruption.380 
Natural interruption entails that the possessor loses possession of the property either by 
giving it up voluntarily or by having it taken from him forcibly, namely by the owner, another 
person or by vis maior.381 Mere protest by the owner is not enough; the possessor’s 
possession must be terminated.382  
                                                             
376 Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8-9; Albert Falls Power Co (Pty) Ltd v Goge 1960 (2) SA 46 (N) 48 
(per Jansen J); Malan v Nabygelegen Estates 1946 AD 562 574. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert 
H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 167; Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in 
South Africa (2000) 165-166; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 313-314; Van der 
Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 279-280; Henckert HG “Die Animus Domini-vereiste by Verjaring” (1986) 5 
Responsa Meridiana 138-142 138; Scholtens JE “Praescriptio – Jus Possidendi and Rei Vindicatio” (1972) 89 
South African Law Journal 383-395 384; Reinsma M “‘Adverse User’ of ‘Adverse Possession’” (1969) 32 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 293-298 295. To the same effect is Marx FE Verkrygende 
Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 193, 197, 273-275. 
377 1966 (2) SA 674 (N). 
378 Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 680. See also Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) 
SA 1 (A) 8-9 and Wicks and Others v Place NO 1967 (1) SA 561 (E) 567. 
379 Voet 41.3.17; Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law (9th ed 2007) 405-665 514. 
380 Voet 41.3.17. 
381 Such as war or flooding: See Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law (9th ed 2007) 405-665 514-515; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 282-
283. 
382 Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th 
ed 2007) 405-665 515; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 283. 
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Civil interruption occurs by the serving of a process (warrant, notice of motion, interdict) in 
which the owner’s claim to ownership is clearly stated to the possessor.383 Thus, a mere claim 
for rent or compensation because of unlawful occupation does not suffice. The prescription 
period is also interrupted if the possessor acknowledges the rights of the owner.384 This is in 
line with the adverse user requirement, which requires the possessor to possess the property 
in conflict with the rights of the owner of the property.385 In Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v 
Kruger and Another,386 the Court found that if the owner and/or his employees had 
occasional access to the property, this did not interrupt prescription.387 
 
The 1969 Act, as opposed to its 1943 counterpart, expressly regulates interruption.388 
According to the 1969 Act, the running of prescription is judicially (civilly) interrupted by 
the service of a process389 on the possessor, whereby the owner claims ownership of the 
property.390 However, any interruption in terms of section 4(1) shall lapse – and the running 
of prescription be deemed to not have been interrupted – if the person claiming ownership 
does not successfully prosecute the claim under the process in question to final judgment, or 
if he does prosecute the claim but abandons the judgment or if the judgment is set aside.391 
Should prescription be interrupted,392 a new period of prescription shall commence to run – if 
at all – only on the day on which final judgment is given.393 In accordance with the advice of 
De Wet,394 the legislator included an exception to the normal working of interruption by 
providing that the running of prescription shall not be interrupted by involuntary loss of 
                                                             
383 Section 4(1)-(4) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See also Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel 
(2nd ed 1994) 314. 
384 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 37. For a discussion regarding 
which acts by the possessor amounts to an acknowledgment, see the discussion under the animus domini 
element in section 2.3.2.1.1 above. 
385 Wood v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 697; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v 
Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 480; Payn v Estate Rennie and Another 1960 (4) SA 
261 (N) 262. The adverse user requirement is discussed in section 2.3.2.4 above. 
386 2007 (5) SA 222 (C). 
387 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger and Another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C) para 29. 
388 Section 4 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
389 According to section 4(4), this includes a petition, notice of motion, rule nisi and any document whereby 
legal proceedings are commenced. See for instance Ploughmann NO v Pauw and Another 2006 (6) SA 334 (C) 
para 40, where the Court confirmed that the running of prescription is interrupted by the service of a notice of 
motion for evicting the possessor. 
390 Section 4(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
391 Section 4(2) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
392 As contemplated in section 4(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
393 Section 4(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
394 De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 88-89. 
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possession,395 should possession be regained at any time through legal proceedings instituted 
within six months after the loss for the purpose of regaining possession, or if possession is 
regained in any other lawful way within one year of the loss of possession.396 This approach 
is similar to the position in Dutch prescription law.397 As with the 1943 Act, voluntary loss of 
possession also interrupts prescription under the 1969 Act.  
 
 
2.3.4 Postponement of acquisitive prescription398  
As with interruption, the 1943 Act does not provide for the postponement of prescription 
either. Accordingly, one must again rely on the common law in this context.399 Postponement 
is based on the principle of contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio,400 which 
entails that prescription does not run against persons without the capacity to act. According to 
the common law, this group includes: 
 
i) minors;  
ii) insane persons;  
iii) persons under curatorship;  
iv) persons who were absent due to service to the state or by reason of war; 
v) married women subject to their husbands’ marital power;  
vi) fideicommisarii pending the fulfilment of the condition of the fideicommissum, 
where the fideicommissary property was alienated by a fiduciarius who did not 
have the power to do so; and  
vii) generally those who were prevented from enforcing their rights.401  
 
As soon as the impending situation or event falls away, the running of prescription continues 
for the remainder of the 30-year period.402 For instance, if a person possessed immovable 
                                                             
395 Such as war or flooding. 
396 Section 2 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
397 See sections 3.3.2.3.1-3.3.2.3.2 of chapter three below. 
398 Also known as suspension or delay. 
399 This position was confirmed in Estate Dambuza v Estate Mcikwa 1946 NPD 94 98. 
400 “Prescription does not run against a party who cannot take action.”: See Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL 
Trilingual Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 2006) 169. See also Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd 
and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 479. 
401 Voet 44.3.9; Estate Dambuza v Estate Mcikwa 1946 NPD 94 98. See also Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) 
“Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th ed 2007) 405-665 515; Badenhorst PJ, 
Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 171; Sonnekus JC & 
Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 316. 
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property for 20 years and the owner then suddenly became insane, prescription would not run 
against him. In other words, the running of prescription is postponed until he regains the 
capacity to act. Only then will the running of prescription continue for the remainder of the 
30-year period.  
 
The 1969 Act altered the common law position by specifically regulating the issue of 
postponement.403 In this regard the 1969 Act refers to two specific groups of people, the first 
being those against whom prescription is running404 and the second being those in favour of 
whom prescription is running.405 The former group includes persons who are minors, insane, 
under curatorship or are prevented by vis maior406 from interrupting the running of 
prescription.407 The second group includes persons who are outside the Republic of South 
Africa, married to the person against whom prescription is running or are members of the 
governing body of a juristic person against whom prescription is running.408 The 1969 Act 
provides for a unique chain of events, should a person fall into one of the mentioned groups. 
Should the prescription period have been completed, but for the impediment mentioned 
above, before or on, or within three years after the day on which the relevant impediment has 
fallen away, the prescription period shall not be completed before the expiration of three 
years after the postponing impediment has fallen away.409 An example will clarify this 
situation: In the case of prescription running against a minor, if the prescription period would 
have been completed before or on the day the minor came of age, the prescription period 
shall have to run for an additional three years after the minor come of age before it is 
completed. Furthermore, should the prescription period have been completed within three 
years following the termination of the impediment (the day the minor comes of age), the 
completion will also be postponed for three years from the date the impediment fell away.410 
In this sense the 1969 Act provides that the period of prescription in relation to 
fideicommissary property shall not be completed against a fideicommissarius before the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
402 Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 316; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 
285-286. 
403 Section 3 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 91-92 for a 
general discussion in this regard. 
404 Section 3(1)(a) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
405 Section 3(1)(b) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
406 Superior force. 
407 Section 3(1)(a) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
408 Section 3(1)(b) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
409 Section 3(1)(c) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
410 See Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 185-191 for a more complete discussion in 
this regard. 
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expiration of a period of three years after the day on which the right of the fideicommissarius 
to the property has vested in him.411  
 
 
2.3.5 Rationale for acquisitive prescription 
Chapter four discusses the rationale for prescription, since it specifically focuses on this 
aspect.  
 
 
2.3.6 Prescription against the state 
During the discussion of Roman-Dutch law, it was seen that under certain circumstances it 
was possible to acquire alienable state property through prescription.412 Since the 
commencement of the 1943 Act, as well as the 1969 Act, this matter has been regulated by 
statute. The 1943 Act explicitly states that it binds the state and that prescription shall not run 
against the state unless the property in question is capable of being alienated by the state and 
of being owned by a private person.413 The 1969 Act is to the same effect, explicitly stating 
that it binds the state and that its provisions shall not affect the provision of any law that 
prohibits the acquisition of land or any right in land by prescription.414 At first glance these 
sections might seem to be in conflict, but a better interpretation is probably that the 1969 Act 
binds the state in so far as the state has not enacted legislation that prohibits the acquisition of 
property through prescription.415 For instance, the State Land Disposal Act 48 of 1961 
prohibits the acquisition of state land through prescription since it came into operation in 
1971.416 However, persons are still able to acquire state property through prescription that 
does not fall under the definition of “immovable property”, such as movable state property, 
for instance. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
                                                             
411 Section 3(2) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
412 See Voet 41.3.12. Prescription under Roman-Dutch law is discussed in section 2.2.3 above. 
413 Section 13(1) and (3) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. 
414 Sections 18-19 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
415 See the argument in favour of this approach in Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 173. 
416 Section 3 of Act 48 of 1961. 
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It is clear that prescription is of ancient heritage and came to South African law through its 
Roman-Dutch legal heritage. Through the ages it has undergone many changes and 
developments, which in South African law culminated in the enactment of the two 
prescription acts. Despite uncertainty concerning some of the requirements for prescription, 
this legal institution is mostly regarded as legally certain and unproblematic in modern-day 
South African law. Much of the confusion pertaining to the requirements for prescription can 
be overcome if one views the nec precario and adverse user requirements as forming part of 
the animus domini element of possessio civilis. Such a conclusion is strengthened by the 1969 
Act, which merely requires a possessor to possess property openly and “as if owner”. 
 
Although prescription may appear to be a harsh rule, it still serves the legitimate purpose of 
promoting legal certainty by affording de iure status to long-existing de facto situations. 
Although not entirely free of uncertainty and potential problems, as mentioned, it was seen 
that the requirements under the two acts are indeed similar and mainly unproblematic. The 
biggest difficulty seems to be in the reconciliation of the fact that both bona and mala fide 
possessors can profit from prescription. In the next chapter, the focus shifts to modern 
English, Dutch, French and German law to show how prescription operates in those legal 
systems. Specific attention is paid to the similarities of the requirements for prescription in 
the civil law systems mentioned, together with how English law regulates prescription or 
adverse possession today. Chapter three also emphasises how these systems solve the 
problem of the mala fide possessor. 
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CHAPTER 3: ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the South African law of acquisitive prescription 
(“prescription”) – discussed in chapter two – with the legal institutions that fulfil the same 
purpose in English, Dutch, French and German law. English and Dutch law are thoroughly 
investigated, with special reference to the Pye case1 in the discussion of English adverse 
possession law.2 The reason for specifically focusing on English law is because the 
constitutionality of English adverse possession law was recently challenged under Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1 (“Article 1”) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (“the Convention”) in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United 
Kingdom.3 This necessitates an investigation as to how adverse possession operated at the 
time it was challenged under Article 1. The chapter also scrutinises Dutch prescription law, as 
it shares the Roman-Dutch legal heritage with South Africa and demonstrates notable 
similarities with South African prescription law. However, Dutch prescription law attaches 
different consequences to good and bad faith prescription by having different prescription 
periods in this regard. This phenomenon deserves attention, since South African prescription 
law sets a period of 30 years for both bona and mala fide possessors.  
 
The analysis of English adverse possession law reveals that adverse possession requires a 
different type of intention to obtain ownership than its civil-law counterparts. In this sense 
adverse possession requires mere animus possidendi (intention to possess),4 while 
prescription in the civil law jurisdictions under discussion requires the more strenuous animus 
domini (intention of an owner).5 As a result, it is “easier” to have possession for purposes of 
adverse possession than in the context of prescription. Consequently, a possessor is more 
likely to acquire title through adverse possession than to succeed with a case based on 
prescription in the civil-law sense. The Pye case illustrates this fact, where the adverse 
possessors succeeded in acquiring title despite their willingness to rent the land from the 
owner. Such willingness would have negated the animus domini, as was illustrated during the 
                                                             
1 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2001] Ch 804; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
2 See section 3.2.3 below. 
3 (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV). The decision by the Grand Chamber is reported as JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United 
Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC).  
4 See section 3.2.2.3.2.3 below. 
5 See section 3.3.2.2.1 for Dutch law, section 3.4.2.1 for French law and section 3.5 for German law below.  
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discussion of South African prescription law.6 Nonetheless, English adverse possession law 
underwent fundamental alterations with the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 
(“LRA” or “2002 Act”), which now prevents the extinguishment of title in registered land 
through mere adverse possession.7 Accordingly, the LRA now offers better protection to 
owners of registered land than at the time of Pye. However, the LRA does not affect the 
substantive requirements of adverse possession, as it merely creates procedural safeguards 
that prevent owners of registered land from losing title through adverse possession.  
 
German and English law (after the enactment of the LRA) have strict requirements in the 
context of prescription and adverse possession. Since both these systems currently have a 
positive registration system, guaranteeing the correctness of the register,8 people now look to 
the register instead of possession to ascertain ownership. Consequently, the traditional 
justifications for prescription and adverse possession – such as that it affords de iure status to 
long-existing de facto situations – no longer carry weight in these systems. Chapter four 
expands this line of reasoning and investigates the justifications for prescription and adverse 
possession.  
 
Dutch and French prescription law, with their negative registration systems, do not have the 
same protective mechanisms as found in German and post-LRA English law. However, this 
chapter indicates that the prescription regimes of these systems do protect the interests of 
owners indirectly by requiring possession to be animo domini, coupled with longer 
prescription periods for mala fide possessors. 
 
 
3.2 English law 
3.2.1 Introduction 
English land law, unlike most civil law systems, does not have a rule similar to prescription 
relating to land. The nearest concept is adverse possession, which is wholly a creature of 
statute and not an original method of acquisition of ownership.9 This is because adverse 
                                                             
6 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. For the position in Dutch, French and German law, see sections 
3.3.2.2.1, 3.4.2.1 and 3.5 respectively below. 
7 The amendments by the Land Registration Act 2002 are discussed in section 3.2.4 below. 
8 See section 3.2.4 for English law and section 3.5 for German law below. 
9 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 20 per Mummery LJ. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.3; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 79. 
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possession – as opposed to prescription – only extinguishes the owner’s title in land and not 
the interests of third parties pertaining to that title.10  
 
Although English law recognises prescriptive acquisition for purposes of the acquisition of 
easements (or servitudes), this is not the same as adverse possession.11 Nourse LJ neatly 
summed up the difference between these two legal institutions in one of the most 
authoritative decisions12 on adverse possession in English law: 
 
“The essential difference between prescription and [adverse possession] is that in the former 
case title can be acquired only by possession as of right [possession nec vi, nec clam, nec 
precario]. That is the antithesis of what is required for [adverse possession], which perhaps can 
be described as possession as of wrong. It can readily be understood that with prescription the 
intention of the true owner may be of decisive importance, it being impossible to presume a 
grant by someone whose intention is shown to have been against it. But with [adverse 
possession] it is the intention of the squatter which is decisive. He must intend to possess the 
land to the exclusion of all the world, including the true owner, while the intention of the latter 
is, with one exception, entirely beside the point.”13 
 
It is worth emphasising at this point that the law of adverse possession recently underwent 
fundamental changes with the enactment of the LRA. The recommendations from the English 
Law Commission resulted in its enactment, as the Commission established that the traditional 
justifications for adverse possession – such as that it promotes legal certainty – were no 
longer valid in cases that involve registered land when the register provides conclusive proof 
of title.14  
 
The Pye case,15 decided before the LRA came into operation, is a classic illustration of the 
reasons why the Law Commission advised the legislature to amend the rules of adverse 
                                                             
10 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.3; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 79. 
11 This dissertation does not discuss the acquisition of easements (servitudes) by prescriptive acquisition in 
English law. What is interesting, though, is that the period required for prescriptive acquisition of easements is 
set at 20 years, while the much more odious adverse possession (before the Land Registration Act 2002) 
required only 12 years.  
12 The authoritative position established in Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623, together 
with Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, was confirmed by the House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 432 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
13 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 644. 
14 See especially the two reports by the English Law Commission, namely Land Registration for the Twenty-
First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) and Land Registration for the Twenty-
First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998). I discuss these reasons more fully in 
section 4.3 of chapter four below, which chapter specifically focuses on the justifications behind prescription 
and adverse possession. 
15 Although there were five decisions in total, the first three decided in the United Kingdom and last two decided 
by the European Court of Human Rights, this case is referred to in the singular form (for instance “Pye case” as 
opposed to “Pye cases”). The decisions are as follows: JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another 
[2000] Ch 676; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419; 
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possession pertaining to registered land. In essence, the LRA makes it much more difficult to 
obtain an estate in land (or ownership, to put it simply) than it traditionally was under the law 
preceding its enactment. However, it does not go so far as to abolish adverse possession in its 
entirety, since the amendments did not alter the substantive requirements that a person has to 
satisfy in order to succeed with a case based on adverse possession. The 2002 Act merely 
provides additional requirements (or safeguards) that the possessor, or squatter, now has to 
satisfy. However, the LRA does not amend pre-200316 adverse possession law regarding 
unregistered land in any sense.  
 
This section discusses adverse possession law by firstly referring to the law in force 
immediately prior to the commencement of the 2002 Act. To achieve this end, the section 
examines case law and developments that occurred prior to the enactment of the LRA. 
Secondly, I evaluate the first three Pye decisions17 with specific emphasis on the reasons 
given by each court as to the animus possidendi requirement, together with how they differed 
in this respect. The discussion of the decisions by the Fourth18 and Grand Chambers19 of the 
European Court of Human Rights appears in chapter five, as these decisions focus on the 
constitutionality of adverse possession under Article 1 of the Convention.20 The reason for 
only discussing the two Pye decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in chapter five 
is that they do not affect the substantive law requirements for adverse possession – as laid 
down by the House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham21 – in any way. Thirdly, the 
section analyses the alterations introduced by the LRA and illustrates how cases similar to 
Pye are unlikely to occur in future. The aim of this discussion is not to provide a doctrinal 
analysis of English land law, but rather to illustrate how adverse possession operates in that 
system today for purposes of a comparative analysis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV); JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 
46 EHRR 45 (GC). The United Kingdom decisions are discussed in section 3.2.3 below, while the decisions by 
the European Court of Human Rights form part of the discussion in section 5.3.2.4.2 of chapter five below. 
16 The Land Registration Act 2002, which fundamentally altered English adverse possession law, only came into 
operation on 13 October 2003 and is prospective in nature: See Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 and JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
17 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2001] Ch 804; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
18 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV). 
19 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). 
20 The decisions by the Fourth and Grand Chambers of the European Court of Human Rights are discussed in 
section 5.3.2.4.2 of chapter five below. Chapter five specifically focuses on the constitutionality of prescription 
or adverse possession. 
21 [2003] 1 AC 419. 
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3.2.2 Adverse possession prior to the Land Registration Act 200222  
3.2.2.1  Introduction and relevant statutory provisions 
Before embarking on this discussion, it is worth emphasising that a person who holds an 
estate in fee simple in registered or unregistered land (which one may equate, more or less, to 
ownership in the civil-law sense) is simply referred to as “the owner” in this chapter.23 
Adverse possession – which forms part of the law of limitation of actions – is a creature of 
statute, since it never existed as a common law rule.24 The Limitation Act 1980 (“LA” or 
“1980 Act”), which was the primary source on limitation law before the LRA came into 
force, lays down three limitation periods. Of these three, only the 12-year period for the 
recovery of land25 is relevant for the present discussion.26 Section 15(1) of the LA27 provides 
as follows:  
 
“No action shall be brought by any person [the owner] to recover any land after the expiration 
of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to 
some person through whom he claims, to that person.”  
 
The essence of this provision is that an owner of land will be unable to reclaim possession 
thereof after a period of 12 years has expired from the day that the owner, or the person 
through whom she claims, obtained the right to reclaim possession of that land. Section 38(1) 
of the 1980 Act – the interpretation section – defines “action” as including  “any proceedings 
in a court of law, including an ecclesiastical court ...” The courts have held that an originating 
summons amounts to an “action”, although it does not seem to extend to an application to the 
Land Registry.28  
 
                                                             
22 This act only came into operation on 13 October 2003. 
23 Although one cannot regard the common law estate in fee simple as being the same as civilian ownership on a 
theoretical level, one can regard the two as similar on a practical level. Interestingly, some authors argue that 
after the commencement of the Land Registration Act 2002 (which obliges all land in the United Kingdom to be 
registered), a “new conceptualism of ownership or dominium” has emerged in English land law: See Gray K & 
Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.20. 
24 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 20 per Mummery LJ. 
25 Land in this sense includes any legal or equitable interest in land: See section 38(1) of the Limitation Act 
1980.  
26 The Land Registration Act 2002 reduced the limitation period for registered land to 10 years, but the 12-year 
period is still applicable to unregistered land. This dissertation does not investigate the longer periods of 
limitation in so-called “special cases”, which require a 30-year limitation period for crown lands and 
corporations sole (60 years under Schedule 6, paragraph 13 of the Land Registration Act 2002): See Schedule 1, 
paragraph 10 of the Limitation Act 1980.   
27 This Act has been in force since 1 May 1981.  
28 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 699. 
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Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the LA contains the provisions used to determine the date of accrual 
of the right of action to recover land.29 It is headed “Accrual of Rights of Action to Recover 
Land” and provides as follows: 
 
“1 Where the person bringing an action to recover land, or some person through whom he 
claims, has been in possession of the land, and has while entitled to the land been dispossessed 
or discontinued his possession, the right of action shall be treated as having accrued on the date 
of the dispossession or discontinuance.”30  
 
It is plain that the right of action (to reclaim possession) accrues to the owner on the date on 
which she discontinues possession or has been dispossessed of it. Under the 1980 Act, persons 
that claim title through adverse possession must prove either (i) discontinuance by the owner 
followed by possession, or (ii) dispossession of that owner.31 Therefore, it is necessary to 
distinguish between these two concepts.  
 
The accrual of the action for recovering possession is further qualified in Part 1 of Schedule 1 
to the LA. This qualification is headed “Right of action not to accrue or continue unless there 
is adverse possession” and provides as follows:  
 
“8(1) No right of action to recover land shall be treated as accruing unless the land is in the 
possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run (referred to below in 
this paragraph as ‘adverse possession’); and where under the preceding provisions of this 
Schedule any such right of action is treated as accruing on a certain date and no person is in 
adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall not be treated as accruing unless and 
until adverse possession is taken of the land.” 
 
 “8(2) Where a right of action to recover land has accrued and after its accrual, before the right 
is barred, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, the right of action shall no longer be 
treated as having accrued and no fresh right of action shall be treated as accruing unless and 
until the land is again taken into adverse possession.”32 
 
It follows that the right of action will not accrue before the land is in the possession of a 
person in whose favour the limitation period can run, which possession is known as adverse 
possession. Limitation – or adverse possession – in cases regarding unregistered land 
extinguishes the title of the owner the moment the limitation period expires.33 However, the 
expiration of the limitation period does not extinguish the title of the owner of registered land, 
                                                             
29 Section 15(6) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
30 Schedule 1, paragraph 1 of the Limitation Act 1980. 
31 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 635 per Slade LJ; Treloar v Nute [1976] 1 WLR 
1295 1300. 
32 Schedule 1, paragraph 8 of the Limitation Act 1980. 
33 Section 17 of the Limitation Act 1980. 
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since the law then deems the registered owner to hold the land in trust for the squatter.34 The 
adverse possessor may then apply to be registered as the owner of that land.35 As mentioned 
above, the LRA fundamentally altered this position of adverse possession pertaining to 
registered land.36 
 
It is clear from these provisions that limitation (or adverse possession) only commences when:  
 
i) the owner has been dispossessed, or has discontinued her possession; and 
ii) the squatter has taken adverse possession of the land.37 
 
Although it may seem simple to distinguish between these requirements on a theoretical level, 
for practical purposes they tend to overlap to a certain extent. The crucial question in this 
regard is whether the possessor was in adverse possession for the entire duration of the 
limitation period. Just as in South African law, negligence or ignorance on the part of the 
owner is irrelevant for purposes of adverse possession.38 Accordingly, it is immaterial – unless 
there is concealed fraud – whether an owner is ignorant of the dispossession.39  
 
 
3.2.2.2  Distinguishing between discontinuance and dispossession 
Although the 1980 Act differentiates between these two concepts, parties in the majority of 
cases agree to decide a case based on adverse possession in terms of “dispossession”.40 
Nevertheless, it remains necessary to discuss both concepts.  
 
The courts have held that the words “possess” and “dispossess” – or expressions such as 
“discontinuance” – must be afforded their ordinary legal meaning in terms of the LA.41 Fry J 
described the difference between dispossession and discontinuance as follows: 
                                                             
34 Section 75(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925. 
35 Section 75(2) of the Land Registration Act 1925. See also Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn 
[2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 8 per Clarke LJ. 
36 These alterations are discussed in section 3.2.4 below. 
37 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 431 per Lord Brown-Wilkinson; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and 
Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 687, 689; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 
623 636 per Slade LJ and per Nourse LJ at 644; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 481. See also 
Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-015. 
38 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 480; Rains v Buxton (1880) 14 Ch D 537 540-541. See also Gray 
K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.35. 
39 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 480. 
40 See, for instance, JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 432 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; 
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & 
CR 452 468. 
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“[T]he difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be 
expressed in this way – the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from 
possession, the other case is where the person in possession goes out and is followed into 
possession by other persons.”42 
 
Since the law no longer requires a squatter to physically remove or “oust” the owner from 
possession, dispossession now occurs when the squatter obtains possession of the land.43 The 
courts describe dispossession as the “taking of possession in such sense from another without 
the other’s licence or consent”.44 A squatter can only dispossess an owner for purposes of 
adverse possession if she performs sufficient physical acts on the land and has the requisite 
animus possidendi.45 Therefore, to dispossess the owner, the squatter must satisfy the two 
elements of possession, namely factual possession (factum possessionis) coupled with the 
intention to possess (animus possidendi).46  
 
Discontinuance, on the other hand, occurs when the owner goes out of possession or abandons 
it and the squatter then takes up possession.47 Due to this fine distinction, some sources state 
that the intention of the owner may be important in this regard.48 This approach is incorrect, 
since the mere intention of the owner cannot prevent a person from having adverse 
possession.49 According to the courts, an owner can prevent a discontinuance of possession by 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
41 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Wretham v Ross [2005] 
EWHC 1259 Ch para 16; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 637 per Slade LJ. 
42 Rains v Buxton (1880) 14 Ch D 537 539-540, quoted with approval in Buckinghamshire County Council v 
Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ and referred to by Nourse LJ at 644. 
43 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434-435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and per Lord Hope of 
Craighead at 445; Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 32 per Mummery LJ; Wretham v Ross 
[2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 16. For an example in this regard, see Lambeth London Borough Council v 
Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 paras 44-46, where Clarke LJ held that by breaking the padlock to a flat and 
replacing it with his own, the squatter dispossessed the owner of his possession over the flat. The word “ouster” 
– which is derived from pre-1833 adverse possession law and “has overtones of confrontational, knowing 
removal of the true owner from possession” – no longer applies in English law: See JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434-435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 
70-71 and Dockray M “Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 256-264. 
44 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 469, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419 433 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and in Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 16. In 
this instance “dispossession” is similar to adverse possession, which also has to be without licence or consent 
from the owner: See section 3.2.2.3.2 below. 
45 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 644 per Nourse LJ. 
46 Possession, with its two elements of factual possession and the intention to possess, is discussed in section 
3.2.2.3.2 below. 
47 See generally JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 694; Buckinghamshire 
County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 644 per Nourse LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 468. 
See also Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-
015. 
48 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 644 per Nourse LJ. 
49 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Buckinghamshire County 
Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 645 per Nourse LJ. 
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the slightest acts of ownership – even by none at all – if such owner intends to use the land for 
a specific purpose in the future.50 Although this position is correct, it merely indicates that a 
squatter must dispossess the owner before she can obtain adverse possession.51  
 
The factual possession and animus possidendi required for dispossession are similar to what is 
required for discontinuance, since there is “no practical distinction between what is necessary 
to exclude all the world in a case where the true owner has retained possession and in one 
where he has discontinued it.”52 Against this background, it seems that the distinction between 
discontinuance and dispossession has indeed become more of a theoretical than practical 
reality. Therefore, it is questionable whether a material distinction exists between 
dispossession and discontinuance of possession for purposes of adverse possession.53 It seems 
that the deciding factor should rather be whether the squatter has dispossessed the owner 
through obtaining possession – without her consent – of the land for the duration of the 
limitation period.54 It follows that the taking or continuation of possession by the squatter with 
the owner’s consent does not constitute dispossession or (adverse) possession.55  
 
In cases pertaining to dispossession, the limitation period commences on the date that the 
squatter dispossesses the owner.56 As to discontinuance, the period commences on the date 
that the possessor obtains possession.57 This again highlights the fact that the distinction 
between these two concepts is immaterial.  
 
 
3.2.2.3  Adverse possession 
                                                             
50 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 19 per Clarke LJ; 
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 644 per Nourse LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P 
& CR 452 468, 472. See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.40. 
51 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 644 per Nourse LJ. 
52 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 644-645 per Nourse LJ. 
53 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 645 per Nourse LJ. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.36; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 71; Harpum C, Bridge S 
& Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-016; Jourdan S Adverse 
Possession (2003) paras 5-18–5-20. 
54 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Wretham v Ross [2005] 
EWHC 1259 Ch para 16; Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 39 per Parker LJ. 
55 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434-435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Wretham v Ross 
[2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 16. 
56 Schedule 1, paragraph 1 of the Limitation Act 1980. 
57 Schedule 1, paragraphs 1 and 8(1) of the Limitation Act 1980.  
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3.2.2.3.1 The meaning of “adverse” in adverse possession58 
It is important to clarify the meaning of the word “adverse” and its place in adverse 
possession law before discussing the substantive requirements of this legal institution. This is 
by no means a simple feat, since the concepts of “adverse” possession, factual possession and 
animus possidendi sometimes tend to overlap to a certain extent, which makes it difficult to 
distinguish them clearly. Therefore, the discussion necessitates a brief historical overview of 
the “adverse” concept, introduced through the notion of “non-adverse possession”, which 
formed part of English limitation law prior to 1833.59  
 
In essence, adverse possession before 1833 denoted “an ouster and use of the land by the 
squatter of a kind which was clearly inconsistent with the paper title.”60 Such inconsistent use 
was known as “adverse possession”.61 It is unnecessary, however, to discuss the content and 
ambit of that type of adverse possession here,62 since the Real Property Limitation Act 
abolished the doctrine of non-adverse possession in 1833.63 It has since been incorrect to use 
these old notions – namely “adverse possession” or “ouster from possession” – in judicial 
decisions.64 Nonetheless, “adverse possession” again made its appearance in the 1939 and 
1980 Limitation Acts. Despite this reoccurrence, references to adverse possession in these 
acts do not reintroduce the old notions of adverse possession from before 1833.65  
 
The 1980 Act defines adverse possession as being present where “land is in the possession of 
some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run.”66 The courts decided that 
adverse possession in this context does not relate to the nature of the possession, but rather to 
                                                             
58 For an extensive analysis of the concept “adverse” in adverse possession, see Jourdan S Adverse Possession 
(2003) paras 6-01–6-35.  
59 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 433 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Dockray M 
“Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 256-264 260. 
60 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 433 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Dockray M 
“Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 256-264 260.  
61 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 433 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Dockray M 
“Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 256-264 260. 
62 See JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 433-434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson for a detailed 
discussion. See generally Dockray M “Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 256-264. 
63 Later followed by the Real Property Limitation Act 1874. 
64 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 433-434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See generally 
Paradise Beach Co Ltd v Price-Robinson [1968] AC 1072; Culley v Taylerson (1840) 11 A & E 1008; Nepean v 
Doe (1837) 2 M & W 894. See also Dockray M “Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 
256-264 260.  
65 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Dockray M 
“Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 256-264 260. 
66 Schedule 1, paragraph 8(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
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the capacity of the squatter.67 Accordingly, references to adverse possession under the 1980 
Act do not reintroduce the old notions of pre-1833 limitation law.68 According to Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, the question surrounding adverse possession today should rather be 
whether the squatter has “dispossessed the paper owner by going into ordinary possession of 
the land for the requisite period without the consent of the owner.”69 This section proceeds to 
illustrate the content of “adverse” possession against this background. 
 
Prima facie the word “adverse” seems to indicate that it requires possession to be hostile or 
aggressive. It was seen above that this is not the case, since the use of the term adverse 
possession is now merely meant to indicate that the possession is adverse to the interests of 
the owner.70 Possession cannot be adverse if it is enjoyed under a lawful title from the owner, 
since it is – both semantically and legally – impossible to be in adverse possession with an 
owner’s consent.71 If a person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner and that licence 
has not been properly determined, such person cannot be in adverse possession.72 
Consequently, adverse possession requires the squatter to show that her possession was “not 
pursuant to a licence, a tenancy, or some other grant, whether express or implied, from the 
owner.”73 This position is similar to that in South African prescription law, where the 
presence of such a grant or licence also prevents the running of prescription.74 If a squatter 
occupies land with permission from the owner, it is clear that the squatter – and not the owner 
– then enjoys possession, although such possession cannot be adverse as long as the licence is 
                                                             
67 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, subsequently followed in 
Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 31 per Mummery LJ and Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1369 paras 39, 71 per Parker LJ. 
68 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Dockray M 
“Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” 1982 Conveyancer 256-264 260. 
69 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Dockray M 
“Adverse Possession and Intention Part I” (1982) Conveyancer 256-264 260. 
70 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 445 per Lord Hope of Craighead. See also Roberts v 
Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 30 per Mummery LJ; Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA 
Civ 1369 para 40 per Parker LJ; Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 18 
per Clarke LJ. 
71 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 33 per Mummery LJ; Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 
1259 Ch para 41; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693; 
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & 
CR 452 469. See also Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 
2008) para 35-016 
72 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693; Buckinghamshire County 
Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 469. 
73 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 694. See generally Hayward v 
Chaloner [1968] 1 QB 107. 
74 See sections 2.3.2.1.1 and 2.3.2.4 of chapter two above. 
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in force.75 However, if the squatter remains in occupation after the expiration of the licence, 
such possession can then become adverse.76 Although authors disagree on this point, it 
appears that the necessary intention to possess will be absent if the squatter believes that 
possession is still held with permission from the owner, even though it was terminated.77 Yet, 
it is plain that one must be able to discern such a belief from the possessor’s conduct. 
Jourdan, in his authoritative book on adverse possession, describes adverse possession as 
“wrongful” possession.78 
 
 
3.2.2.3.2 Elements of adverse possession: Factual possession and intention to 
possess 
3.2.2.3.2.1  Introduction 
Since the 1980 Act defines neither “possession” nor “dispossession”, one has to use English 
common law to ascertain the meaning of these terms.79 The squatter obtains possession (and 
such possession is “adverse”) only if she satisfies both elements of possession, namely:  
 
i) sufficient physical control (factum possessionis); coupled with 
ii) the intention to possess the land (animus possidendi).80  
                                                             
75 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 694-695. 
76 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 695. 
77 Clowes Developments (UK) Ltd v Walters [2006] 1 P & CR 1 13-16. See also Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 
2009) 74. To the contrary is Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 40 and Gray K & Gray SF Elements 
of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.48. 
78 Jourdan S Adverse Possession (2003) para 6-06. See also Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] 
Ch 623 644 per Nourse LJ. 
79 This is similar to the position under the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and Prescription Act 68 of 1969 in South 
African law, which also do not define “possession”. For a discussion in this regard, see sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of 
chapter two above. 
80 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 para 67 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419 432-433, 435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and per Lord Hope of Craighead at 445-446; 
Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 29 per Mummery LJ; Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 
Ch  paras 16-17; Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 paras 37-38 per Parker LJ; Lambeth 
London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 12 per Clarke LJ; Buckinghamshire County 
Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 469. See also 
Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.43; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 72. 
United States (“US”) adverse possession law seems also to require mere animus possidendi, although some 
authors refer to this intention as the “intent to maintain dominion”: See Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse 
Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2423-2432. The requirement of an intention to 
possess (animus possidendi) is lower than what is required by most civil-law based jurisdictions, namely South 
African (discussed in section 2.3.2.1.1 in chapter two above), Dutch (discussed in section 3.3.2.2.1 below), 
French (discussed in section 3.4.2.1 below) and German (discussed in section 3.5 below) law, all of which 
require the possessor to have the intention of an owner (animus domini). Even Italian and Belgian law require a 
person to possess property with the animus domini before such person can qualify as a possessor: See Caterina R 
“Some Comparative Remarks on JA Pye (Oxford) v. The United Kingdom” (2007) 15 European Review of 
Private Law 273-279 273 and Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. 
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Neither the occupation of land itself, nor the mere intention to possess without physical 
detention, will suffice.81 These requirements (occupation and intention) are complementary 
and must coincide for the entire limitation period before a person can be in possession.82 A 
person who claims to have “dispossessed” an owner must likewise fulfil both these 
requirements.83 Consequently, if a squatter dispossesses the owner by taking possession of the 
land without the owner’s consent, such dispossession constitutes adverse possession for 
purposes of the 1980 Act.84 This confirms that factual possession of land coupled with the 
necessary animus possidendi by the squatter (to exclude everyone else) constitutes adverse 
possession.85 This state of affairs, namely adverse possession, must exist for the whole 
duration of the limitation period.86 Should possession cease to be adverse, it will revert to the 
owner and the limitation period will only commence de novo once the squatter regains adverse 
possession.87 
 
Possession is normally single and exclusive, the exception being in cases concerning joint 
possessors,88 since only one person can be in possession of land at any given time.89 The 
owner therefore ceases to enjoy possession the moment the squatter obtains it.90 A squatter 
dispossesses an owner if the owner was in possession of the land at one stage, but the 
squatter’s subsequent occupation then constitutes possession.91 The question whether the 
squatter possessed the land (factum possessionis) with the requisite intention (animus 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Een Aanzet tot het Debat over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1582-1597 1587. I am 
indebted to Prof Sagaert for bringing his article under my attention. 
81 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 446 per Lord Hope of Craighead; Topplan Estates Ltd v 
Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 40 per Parker LJ. 
82 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P 
& CR 452 469. See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.43. 
83 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P 
& CR 452 469. 
84 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 469, although this case dealt with the Limitation Act 1939. 
85 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, followed in Roberts v 
Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 paras 32, 88 per Mummery LJ.  
86 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 33 per Mummery LJ; Lambeth London Borough Council 
v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 29 per Clarke LJ. See also Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 77.  
87 Schedule 1, paragraph 8(2) of the Limitation Act 1980. See further Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] 
Ch 439 para 33 per Mummery LJ. 
88 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and per Lord Hope of 
Craighead at 445; Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 33 per Mummery LJ. In the Roberts 
case, Mummery LJ stated that joint tenants count as one person. See further Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 40 per Parker LJ. 
89 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 445 per Lord Hope of Craighead; Roberts v Swangrove 
Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 33 per Mummery LJ. 
90 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 695. 
91 Schedule 1, paragraph 1 of the Limitation Act 1980. See also JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 
435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Treloar v Nute [1976] 1 WLR 1295 1300. 
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possidendi) depends on whether the owner has discontinued possession or was dispossessed 
by the squatter.92 In both instances, the crucial question is whether the squatter was in 
possession of the land.  
 
The law deems the owner – in the absence of evidence indicating otherwise – as being in 
possession of the land.93 It follows that the law requires clear evidence that the squatter had 
both factual possession and held it animo possidendi before the courts will recognise such 
squatter as being in adverse possession.94  
 
 
3.2.2.3.2.2  Factual possession (factum possessionis)95 
Slade J, as he then was, defined factual possession as follows: 
 
“Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and 
[exclusive] possession  ... Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his 
consent cannot both be in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts 
constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in 
particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used 
or enjoyed.”96  
 
It has also been described as “[a] sufficient degree of physical custody and control.”97 This 
description of factum possessionis largely corresponds with what is required to constitute 
corpus in South African law.98 A squatter does not have to have complete physical control 
over every piece of the occupied land to satisfy the factum possessionis requirement, since this 
is simply impractical.99 Consequently, factum possessionis must be determined with reference 
                                                             
92 See generally JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 431 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
93 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 470; Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 33 per 
Mummery LJ; Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 13 per Clarke LJ. 
See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.40. 
94 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 470-472. See also Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn 
[2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 36 per Clarke LJ, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 
AC 419 448 per Lord Hutton and approved by Lord Hope of Craighead at 446. See generally Wretham v Ross 
[2005] EWHC 1259 Ch paras 15, 20. 
95 For an extensive analysis of factual possession, see Jourdan S Adverse Possession (2003) paras 8-01–8-25. 
96 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 470-471, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419 436 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 18; 
Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 14 per Clarke LJ; JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 689; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] 
Ch 623 641 per Slade LJ. 
97 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
98 See section 2.3.2.1.2 of chapter two above. 
99 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471. See also Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 
para 78 per Mummery LJ. See further Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.52. 
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to an objective standard, which is related to the nature and situation of the land involved.100 
Consequently, acts of possession exercised on parts of the land can constitute possession of 
the whole, although this depends on the type of land and the degree of use.101 A helpful test to 
determine factual possession is whether “the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land 
in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one 
else has done so.”102  
 
The question of factum possessionis is related to the animus possidendi, since one deduces 
this intention from physical acts of the squatter.103 A person does not obtain possession until 
she has exclusive enjoyment of the land.104 The question of what amounts to such exclusive 
enjoyment depends on the nature of the property as well as the manner in which land of that 
nature is commonly used or enjoyed.105 For instance, fishing could – in the way it has done – 
constitute factual possession.106 A lack of fencing by the squatter is indicative that she did not 
have factual possession, although this fact (by itself) is not conclusive.107 Furthermore, factual 
possession must also be peaceable and open.108  
 
 
3.2.2.3.2.3  Intention to possess (animus possidendi)109 
A squatter must have the intention to possess – together with the factum possessionis – before 
she can obtain possession over land. Powell v McFarlane110 provides the definition for animus 
possidendi: 
                                                             
100 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471. 
101 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 78 per Mummery LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P 
& CR 452 471. See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.52. 
102 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v 
Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 689. See also Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 78 per 
Mummery LJ; Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 15 per Clarke LJ. 
103 See especially Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 36 per Clarke LJ, 
quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 448 per Lord Hutton and approved by 
Lord Hope of Craighead at 446. See also generally Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch paras 15, 20. 
104 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 paras 33, 75 per Mummery LJ. 
105 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 paras 33, 75 per Mummery LJ. 
106 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 75 per Mummery LJ. 
107 Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 47. 
108 Browne v Perry [1991] 1 WLR 1297 1302 per Lord Templeman. See also Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 
1259 Ch para 16; Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 86 per Parker LJ; Lambeth 
London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 18 per Clarke LJ. This corresponds with the 
South African prescription requirements that possession must be open and nec vi (without violence), see section 
2.3.2.2 of chapter two above. 
109 For an extensive discussion regarding the animus possidendi requirement, see Jourdan S Adverse Possession 
(2003) paras 9-01–9-99. 
110 (1979) 38 P & CR 452. 
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“[T]he animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to 
exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the 
possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the process of the law will allow.”111 
 
It is not the nature of the squatter’s physical control alone, but also the intention with which 
these physical acts are performed that determines whether such squatter has possession.112 
However, one can only deduce a person’s mental attitude from her physical acts.113 It follows 
that factum possessionis offers the best evidence to establish whether the animus possidendi is 
present.114 It is helpful to restate that the law deems an owner – or another person with the 
right to possession of the land – to have possession as the point of departure, unless and until 
someone presents evidence to the contrary.115  
 
The animus possidendi entails an intention to possess the land and not an intention to 
appropriate, own or even to become owner of it.116 The necessary intention is “the intent to 
exercise exclusive control over the thing for oneself”.117 However, it is not required that the 
squatter must intend to exclude the owner in all future circumstances.118 This position greatly 
differs from South African prescription law, which requires the animus domini (intention of an 
owner) to satisfy the possessio civilis requirement for acquisitive prescription.119 Interestingly, 
even a squatter who mistakenly believes that she is the owner of the disputed land is able to 
                                                             
111 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471-472, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419 437 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and per Lord Hutton at 488. See also Roberts v Swangrove 
Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 79 per Mummery LJ; Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch paras 19, 25; 
Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 43 per Parker LJ; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another 
v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 689; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 641 per 
Slade LJ. 
112 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 436 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
113 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 446 per Lord Hope of Craighead; Topplan Estates Ltd v 
Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 40 per Parker LJ. 
114 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 446 per Lord Hope of Craighead; Topplan Estates Ltd v 
Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 40 per Parker LJ. See also Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 
20. 
115 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 472; Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] 
EWCA Civ 912 para 19 per Clarke LJ. 
116 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 436-437 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Wretham v Ross 
[2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 19; Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 44 per Parker LJ; 
Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 16 per Clarke LJ and per Judge LJ 
at para 60; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 689-690; Buckinghamshire 
County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 643 per Slade LJ and per Nourse LJ at 646. Butler-Sloss agreed with 
both Slade LJ and Nourse at 647. See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.53; 
Jourdan S Adverse Possession (2003) para 9-07. 
117 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 446 per Lord Hope of Craighead, quoted with approval in 
Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 20. 
118 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 27 per Clarke LJ, expressly 
disapproving on this point of Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623, which is to the 
contrary. 
119 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
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hold it animo possidendi.120 Although such a belief will also not terminate the requisite 
intention for prescription in South African law, which must be animo domini, it is worth 
emphasising that English law merely requires an intention to possess.121 Nonetheless, even a 
person who knows that the land belongs to another can obtain it through adverse possession, 
since the fides of the squatter is irrelevant for purposes of establishing the animus 
possidendi.122 The fides of the possessor is also irrelevant in the context of animus domini in 
South African prescription law, which has only one prescription period for both good and bad 
faith possessors.123 
 
According to case law, equivocal acts by the squatter are unlikely to satisfy the animus 
possidendi requirement.124 Therefore, the courts will not treat a squatter as possessing animo 
possidendi if her acts are open to more than one interpretation.125 It must be unequivocal from 
the squatter’s acts that she intended to exclude the owner as far as possible.126 Unfortunately, 
few acts exist that are prima facie able to demonstrate the animus possidendi. Acts of this 
nature include enclosures, as – according to Cockburn CJ – “[e]nclosure is the strongest 
possible evidence of adverse possession.”127 To the same effect is Russell LJ, who stated that 
“[o]rdinarily, of course, enclosure is the most cogent evidence of adverse possession and of 
dispossession of the paper owner.”128 However, not even enclosure (on its own) will always 
be conclusive.129 
                                                             
120 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 87 per Mummery LJ. See also generally Hughes v Cork 
[1994] EGCS 25. 
121 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above for the position in South African law. 
122 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2008] Ch 439 para 87 per Mummery LJ. 
123 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
124 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 447 per Lord Hutton; Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 
Ch para 21; Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 41 per Parker LJ; Lambeth London 
Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 20 per Clarke LJ; Buckinghamshire County Council 
v Moran [1990] Ch 623 642 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 472; Tecbild Ltd v 
Chamberlain (1969) 20 P & CR 633 642 per Sachs LJ. 
125 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 447 per Lord Hutton; Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1369 para 41 per Parker LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 472; Lambeth London 
Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 paras 19-20 per Clarke LJ. 
126 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 20 per Clarke LJ; Powell v 
McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471-472 per Slade J. See also Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 73. 
127 Seddon v Smith (1877) 36 LT 168 169, quoted with approval in both Buckinghamshire County Council v 
Moran [1990] Ch 623 641 per Slade LJ and in Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 478. See also 
Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 paras 23-25 per Clarke LJ; Marshall v 
Taylor [1895] 1 Ch 641 645 per Lord Halsbury. 
128 George Wimpey & Co Ltd v Sohn [1967] Ch 487 511, quoted with approval in Lambeth London Borough 
Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 25 per Clarke LJ and in Buckinghamshire County Council v 
Moran [1990] Ch 623 641 per Slade LJ. See also Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 71. 
129 Seddon v Smith (1877) 36 LT 168 169 per Cockburn CJ. See also generally Littledale v Liverpool College 
[1900] 1 Ch 19; George Wimpey & Co Ltd v Sohn [1967] Ch 487. See further Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M 
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To plough up and cultivate agricultural land is also likely to satisfy the animus possidendi 
requirement.130 To place a new lock and chain on the gate, for example, also unequivocally 
points to the possessor’s intention to possess the land.131 A similar example is a possessor that 
breaks the lock of a flat, replaces it with her own and then lives in the flat.132 To put up a 
notice on the land that warns intruders to keep out – together with actual enforcement of such 
a notice – is another act that can establish animus possidendi.133  
 
It is worth repeating that the squatter’s acts must only be open to one interpretation, namely 
that she has – through her conduct – made it clear that she intends to exclude the owner as far 
as possible.134 The squatter must also make her intentions sufficiently clear or open so that an 
owner, who exercises reasonable care, would have discovered such a squatter.135 This 
corresponds to the nec clam (openness) requirement for prescription in South African law.136 
 
The reason why the possessor must only exclude the owner as far as “reasonably practicable” 
is because – until such possessor obtains ownership through adverse possession – she is not 
able to use legal means to exclude the owner.137 Therefore, it will be sufficient if the possessor 
intends to keep the owner out until the owner evicts her.138  
 
A court is unlikely to find – in the absence of sufficient evidence – that the squatter intended 
to assert a right to the possession of the land.139 This again emphasises the fact that factum 
possessionis and animus possidendi are closely entwined and that it is indeed “difficult to find 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-018; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 
71. 
130 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 478. See also Seddon v Smith (1877) 36 LT 168. 
131 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 642 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P 
& CR 452 478. See also Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 25 per 
Clarke LJ. 
132 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 26 per Clarke LJ. See similarly 
Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 35. 
133 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 478. 
134 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 472, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419 447 per Lord Hutton. See also Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 24; Topplan 
Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 73 per Parker LJ; Lambeth London Borough Council v 
Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 19 per Clarke LJ. See also Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 73. 
135 Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 29; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 480. 
136 See section 2.3.2.3 of chapter two above. 
137 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 16 per Clarke LJ; Powell v 
McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471-472. See also Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 73. 
138 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 17 per Clarke LJ. 
139 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 640 per Slade LJ. 
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a case in which there has been a clear finding of factual possession in which the claim to 
adverse possession has failed for lack of intention.”140 The intention to possess does not 
require an intention to exclude the owner.141  
 
Before the enactment of the 1980 Act, certain court cases seemed to establish a general 
doctrine for one special type of case, namely where the acts of the squatter were not 
inconsistent with the intentions of the owner pertaining to the future use of the land. 
Consequently, the law would then imply a licence – without sufficient justifying reasons – in 
favour of the would-be adverse possessor that “permitted” her to commit the acts of 
possession performed on the land.142 This doctrine, also known as the “special rule” or 
“implied licence theory”, only applied in one special type of case, namely where the acts of 
the squatter did not “substantially interfere with the plans the owners might have for the future 
use of undeveloped land.”143 In such a scenario, the effect of the implied licence would be to 
prevent the squatter from possessing animo possidendi. However, paragraph 8(4) of Schedule 
1 to the 1980 Act finally laid this debate to rest: 
 
“For the purpose of determining whether a person occupying any land is in adverse possession 
of the land it shall not be assumed by implication of law that his occupation is by permission of 
the person entitled to the land merely by virtue of the fact that his occupation is not inconsistent 
with the latter’s present or future enjoyment of the land. This provision shall not be taken as 
prejudicing a finding to the effect that a person’s occupation of any land is by implied 
permission of the person entitled to the land in any case where such a finding is justified on the 
actual facts of the case.” 
 
This provision abolishes the assumption that a squatter’s possession was by implied licence if 
it fell within this special type of case. However, it does not affect situations that justify such a 
finding on the facts before the Court. It follows that the intention of the owner regarding the 
                                                             
140 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 36 per Clarke LJ, quoted with 
approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 448 per Lord Hutton and approved by Lord Hope 
of Craighead at 446. See also generally Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch paras 15, 20.  
141 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 446 per Lord Hope of Craighead, quoted with approval in 
Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch paras 20, 25 and in Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 
1369 para 40 per Parker LJ. 
142 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 637 per Slade LJ. See also Wallis’s Cayton Bay 
Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex & BP Ltd [1975] QB 94. For a discussion on the conceptual difficulties raised by 
this doctrine, see especially Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 484 per Slade LJ. See further Smith RJ 
Property Law (6th ed 2009) 75. 
143 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 637 per Slade LJ. As to the content of this 
doctrine, see generally Treloar v Nute [1976] 1 WLR 1295; Wallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex 
& BP Ltd [1975] QB 94 and Leigh v Jack (1879) 5 Ex D 264. See also Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 
452 484. 
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land today is still not wholly irrelevant.144 In this sense, Slade LJ in Buckinghamshire County 
Council v Moran145 said the following: 
 
“If in any given case the land in dispute is unbuilt land and the squatter is aware that the owner, 
while having no present use for it, has a purpose in mind for its use in the future, the court is 
likely to require very clear evidence before it can be satisfied that the squatter who claims a 
possessory title has not only established factual possession of the land, but also the requisite 
intention to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title, so far as is 
reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow. In the absence of clear 
evidence of this nature, the court is likely to infer that the squatter neither had had nor had 
claimed any intention of asserting a right to the possession of the land.”146 
 
The two preconditions for the application of Slade LJ’s observations are that:  
 
i) the owner has a purpose in mind for the future use of the land, although she has 
no present use for the land; and  
ii) that the squatter has knowledge of this.147  
 
Yet, even if a factual situation complies with both (i) and (ii), this may merely provide support 
for a finding that the squatter did not intend to possess the land but only intended to occupy it 
until needed by the owner.148 Lord Browne-Wilkinson thinks that there will be few scenarios 
where one can draw such an inference if the owner is excluded from the land.149 As to whether 
the squatter’s acts must be inconsistent with the intentions of the owner today, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson answered as follows: 
 
“The suggestion that the sufficiency of the possession can depend on the intention not of the 
squatter but of the true owner is heretical and wrong. It reflects an attempt to revive the pre-
1833 concept of adverse possession requiring inconsistent user.”150                                    
 
As Nourse LJ is of much the same opinion in Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran,151 
one can safely conclude that the intention of the owner has mostly become irrelevant in 
                                                             
144 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 691. See also Harpum C, Bridge S & 
Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-019. 
145 [1990] Ch 623. 
146 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 639-640, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 691. 
147 Hounslow London Borough Council v Minchinton (1997) 74 P & CR 221 229 per Millett LJ. 
148 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
149 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, followed in Topplan 
Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 45. See further Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 73-75, 
where it is said that “[s]imply taking possession of [the owner’s] land will not justify implying a licence.” 
150 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, quoted with approval in 
Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley [2004] EWCA Civ 1369 para 45 per Parker LJ. 
151 [1990] Ch 623. 
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practice, although it may possibly still have some influence in theory.152 It follows that “there 
is now no reason why the words ‘possess’ and ‘dispossess’ or similar expressions should not 
be given their ordinary legal meaning in the context of the Act of 1980.”153 Accordingly, one 
must deduce the intention to possess from the possessor’s factum possessionis, since the law 
requires unequivocal evidence before a possessor can establish the animus possidendi in the 
context of the special type of case. Thus, the question simply boils down to whether the 
possessor was in adverse possession.  
 
In the recent decision of Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer,154 Strauss QC attempted to 
reintroduce the implied licence theory from before the 1980 Act.155 This approach is 
unattractive, not only because it is in conflict with the decision of the House of Lords in JA 
Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham,156 but also because it affords different meanings to adverse 
possession in different contexts.157 After the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights found adverse possession to be compatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom,158 it is safer to simply regard Beaulane 
as being of no more than historical value. 
 
The last controversial aspect of the animus possidendi concerns the scenario where the 
squatter may be willing or prepared to pay rent or take a tenancy – should an owner request it. 
This crucial issue was one of the main questions in the Pye decisions decided in the United 
Kingdom. Lord Diplock provides the answer as follows: 
 
                                                             
152 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 645 per Nourse LJ. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.5; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 75; Harpum C, Bridge S & 
Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-019; Jourdan S Adverse 
Possession (2003) para 9-78. To the contrary is Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer [2006] Ch 79 140 per Strauss 
QC. See Dixon M “Adverse Possession and Human Rights” 2005 Conveyancer 345-351 for a discussion of the 
Beaulane case. 
153 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 637 per Slade LJ. To the same effect is 
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 639-640 per Slade LJ and per Nourse LJ at 646. See 
also Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 16. 
154 Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer [2006] Ch 79.  
155 Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer [2006] Ch 79 140. For a discussion of this case, see Radley-Gardner O 
“Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. United Kingdom: The View from England” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 
289-308 292-294; Dixon M “Adverse Possession and Human Rights” 2005 Conveyancer 345-351; Cloherty A 
“Heresies and Human Rights” (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 558-560. 
156 It being described as a “heresy”: See [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
157 Radley-Gardner O “Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. United Kingdom: The View from England” (2007) 15 European 
Review of Private Law 289-308 294; Dixon M “Adverse Possession and Human Rights” 2005 Conveyancer 345-
351 350; Cloherty A “Heresies and Human Rights” (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 558-560.  
158 (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). 
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“Their lordships do not consider that an admission of this kind [willingness to pay rent or take a 
tenancy], which any candid squatter hoping in due course to acquire a possessory title would be 
almost bound to make, indicates an absence of the animus possidendi necessary to constitute 
adverse possession.”159 
 
It is now trite law that a willingness of this kind, even where the squatter regards herself as a 
tenant, will not negate the animus possidendi.160 This is because the animus possidendi 
encompasses an intention to exclude everyone from the land, including the owner, but only as 
far as it is possible for her to do so.161 Consequently, although an offer by the squatter to pay 
rent or to take a tenancy amounts an acknowledgement of the owner’s title, such acts are not 
inconsistent with possessing land animo possidendi.162 Indeed, Neuberger J states that “[t]he 
mere recognition of the owner’s ability, if he chooses to exercise it, to reclaim possession is 
not an acknowledgement that the owner actually has possession.”163 The position is wholly the 
opposite in South African law. Should the squatter acknowledge the ownership of the owner 
in South African prescription law in any way, such as by being prepared to pay rent if so 
requested, she will no longer possess animo domini, since the intention will then simply be to 
hold the land as a detentor and not of possessing it as owner.164 Yet, such a willingness must 
be clearly discernable from the possessor’s actions before it will terminate the animus domini 
in South African law, since it is impossible to look into the mind of another.165   
 
However, should the squatter request the owner to keep out other people, such request results 
in an acknowledgement that the owner – rather than the squatter – is in possession, which will 
                                                             
159 Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Lord Diplock, quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and referred to with approval by Lord Hutton 
at 448. Also quoted with approval in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 
692 and in Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 34 per Clarke LJ and by 
Judge LJ at para 60. 
160 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, quoted with approval in 
Wretham v Ross [2005] EWHC 1259 Ch para 42. See also Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn 
[2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 34 per Clarke LJ; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] 
Ch 676 692; Lodge v Wakefield Metropolitan City Council [1995] 2 EGLR 124 126; Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder 
[1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Lord Diplock. See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 
9.1.48. 
161 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and 
Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693. See also Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] 
Ch 623; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452. 
162 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and 
Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693. 
163 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693. 
164 Voet 44.3.9. See especially Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] 
ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) para 9; Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 (2) SA 944 (A) 945; Wood 
v Baynesfield Board of Administration 1975 (2) SA 692 (N) 698; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods 
(Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467 477. See further section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
165 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
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negate the animus possidendi.166 By contrast, an offer to pay rent is an offer to change the 
basis upon which the squatter maintains possession; she still has possession and the animus 
possidendi will be consistent with it.167 Consequently, the mere preparedness of a squatter to 
take a licence or tenancy from the owner will not prevent such squatter from possessing animo 
possidendi.168 This is because the informed squatter knows that she cannot lawfully exclude 
the owner.169 However, it is possible for a squatter to express an offer in such a way that may 
be able to terminate the animus possidendi.170 To summarise, if a squatter communicates a 
preparedness to lease the land from the owner, this alone does not prevent the squatter from 
possessing animo possidendi.171 However, this preparedness may impede the squatter’s ability 
to prove that she possessed the land animo possidendi.172 
 
When a squatter declares that she possessed the land animo possidendi, the law attaches little 
evidentiary value to such oral evidence.173 This is because such evidence is capable of being 
merely self-serving, while being difficult for an owner to refute.174 Thus, one must infer the 
intention to possess from the squatter’s (unequivocal) actions,175 which is also the position in 
South African prescription law to determine the presence of the animus domini.176 
 
                                                             
166 Pavledes v Ryesbridge Properties Ltd (1989) 58 P & CR 459 481, followed in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and 
Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693. 
167 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693. 
168 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 34 per Clarke LJ; JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 695; Lodge v Wakefield Metropolitan City 
Council [1995] 2 EGLR 124 126; Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Lord Diplock. 
169 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697; Lodge v Wakefield 
Metropolitan City Council [1995] 2 EGLR 124 126; Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Lord 
Diplock. See also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.48. 
170 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 34 per Clarke LJ; JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697. 
171 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.48. 
172 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 33 per Clarke LJ; JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697; Lodge v Wakefield Metropolitan City 
Council [1995] 2 EGLR 124 126; Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Lord Diplock. See also 
Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.48. 
173 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 21 per Clarke LJ; JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 691; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 
452 476-477. 
174 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 para 21 per Clarke LJ; JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 691; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 
452 476-477. 
175 Lambeth London Borough Council v Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912 paras 21, 46 per Clarke LJ; 
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 642 per Slade LJ; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & 
CR 452 476-477; Tecbild Ltd v Chamberlain (1969) 20 P & CR 633 643 per Sachs LJ. See also Gray K & Gray 
SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.55. 
176 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
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3.2.2.3.3 Postponement (suspension) and interruption of the running of 
limitation  
Postponement or extension of the limitation period, as opposed to interruption, occurs when 
some impediment suspends the completion of the limitation period in the normal 12-year 
period while said postponing impediment exists. One or more of the following grounds can 
postpone the running of limitation in English law: disability, fraud, concealment or 
mistake.177 Interruption, by contrast, ensues when a certain event stops the running of 
limitation, after which it has to commence de novo. 
 
Disability entails the situation where a person is a minor or lacks capacity to conduct legal 
proceedings.178 If an owner suffers from a disability when the right of action accrues, she is 
allowed an alternative period of six years to reclaim the property from the time when she 
ceases to be under the disability or dies (whichever occurred first), irrespective of whether the 
limitation period has expired.179 However, no possessor may bring an action for the recovery 
of land after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to 
the person who suffers from the disability or some person through whom she claims.180 It 
follows that if a squatter takes possession of an owner’s land when that owner is a mental 
patient, such owner then has 12 years from the date of the dispossession or six years from her 
recovery to reclaim possession, whichever is longer.181 However, as mentioned above, the 
owner cannot reclaim possession of land after the expiration of a period of 30 years from the 
date of dispossession. An owner’s disability only postpones the running of limitation if it 
existed before or on the date when the right of action accrued.182 Postponement will not take 
place if the owner’s disability arose after the date of accrual.183 
 
A further ground for postponement is fraud or deliberate concealment.184 The limitation 
period will not begin to run where 
                                                             
177 Sections 28 and 32 of the Limitation Act 1980.   
178 Section 38(2) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
179 Section 28(1) of the Limitation Act 1980.  
180 Section 28(4) of the Limitation Act 1980. See Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law 
of Real Property (7th ed 2008) paras 35-045–35-047 for a more complete discussion in this regard. 
181 Example taken from Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 
2008) para 35-045. 
182 Section 28(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
183 Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-046. 
184 Section 32(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
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i) the action is based on the fraud of the squatter; or  
ii) any fact relevant to the owner’s right of action has been deliberately concealed 
from her by the squatter.185  
 
Under these circumstances, the limitation period will not commence until the owner has 
discovered the fraud or concealment, or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.186 
Similar provisions apply to an action for relief from the consequences of a mistake.187 
According to Harpum, Bridge and Dixon, “[t]his rule has a narrow scope, and applies only 
where the mistake is the gist of the action, i.e. where it is the mistake itself that gives a right to 
apply to the court for relief.”188  
 
The LA provides as follows concerning the interruption or fresh accrual of limitation periods: 
 
“If the person in possession of the land ... acknowledges the title of the person to whom     
      the right of action has accrued – 
(a) the right shall be treated as having accrued on and not before the date of the 
acknowledgment ...”189  
 
An acknowledgement of the owner’s title or ownership interrupts the running of the limitation 
period, which causes the period to commence de novo. To institute a claim against the squatter 
for repossession also interrupts the running of limitation, but only once final judgment is 
given.190  
 
An owner’s right to reclaim possession cannot be revived through an acknowledgement by the 
squatter once it has been barred under the LA.191 Consequently, it is necessary to obtain 
                                                             
185 Section 32(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. See Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law 
of Real Property (7th ed 2008) paras 35-048–35-050 for a more complete discussion in this regard.  
186 Section 32(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
187 Section 32(1)(c) and 32(3)-(4) of the Limitation Act 1980.  
188 Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-050. 
See Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-050 
for a more complete discussion in this regard. 
189 Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
190 BP Properties Ltd v Buckler (1987) 55 P & CR 337 344 per Dillon LJ. See also Smith RJ Property Law – 
Cases and Materials (4th ed 2009) 90-91. 
191 Section 29(7) of the Limitation Act 1980, read with section 15(1): See Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 
para 69 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. See also Smith RJ Property Law – Cases and Materials (4th ed 
2009) 90-91. In Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 
February 2009), the Court held (in the context of South African law) that an acknowledgment of the owner’s 
title after the 30-year prescription period has elapsed merely illustrates the mental state with which that property 
was possessed during the running of prescription, which will be less than the requisite animus domini. See 
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clarity as to what acts constitute an acknowledgment. Section 30(1) of the LA provides that 
“[t]o be effective ... an acknowledgement must be in writing and signed by the person making 
it.” It seems that a written offer to purchase the land from the owner or to take a tenancy from 
her constitutes such an acknowledgement.192 However, mere oral offers to purchase the land 
from the owner or to request a licence to use the land are insufficient to constitute an 
acknowledgment.193 An application by the squatter for some entry in the owner’s register of 
title will also not be sufficient in this regard.194 Although these actions do not amount to an 
acknowledgment, they may assist the contention that the squatter did not have the intention to 
possess.195 Yet, the investigation as to whether there is sufficient animus possidendi “is quite a 
separate question from [whether] there is an acknowledgement such as to start time running 
afresh.”196 In South African law, it is uncertain which acts by the squatter constitute an 
acknowledgment as well as whether it will be sufficient when made to the owner’s agent.197 
 
An offer to purchase an interest – even if made expressly “subject to contract” – also amounts 
to an acknowledgment of the owner’s title.198 Furthermore, an admission of title in the 
defence199 and an offer in a letter can both amount to acknowledgments.200 However, if 
defence was served more than 12 years before proceedings were brought, it will not be 
regarded as an acknowledgement, since it does not amount to a continuing 
acknowledgment.201 The effect of section 15 of the LA is that one cannot rely on a formal 
record – such as a conveyance or entry in the register – after the expiration of 12 years of 
adverse possession.202 Furthermore, an action that refers to the future – such as a payment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Sapphire Dawn Trading 42 BK v De Klerk and Others (693/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 11 (12 February 2009) para 
9, together with the discussion in section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
192 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 696. See also generally Edginton v 
Clark [1964] 1 QB 367.  
193 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 696-697. See also Gray K & Gray 
SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.49. 
194 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.49. 
195 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.49. 
196 Pavledes v Ryesbridge Properties Ltd (1989) 58 P & CR 459 480. See also JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another 
v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 696. 
197 See the discussion of the animus domini requirement in section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
198 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 para 76 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, relying on Edginton v Clark 
[1964] 1 QB 367. 
199 This includes a statement in a pleading or statement of case or any other court document: See Ofulue v 
Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 para 79 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
200 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 para 77 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
201 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 para 80 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
202 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 para 81 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
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rent in advance – only stops time running up to the date it occurs.203 If the squatter 
acknowledges the owner’s title in a document headed “without prejudice”, such document 
does not amount to an acknowledgement of title, since it will normally be excluded from 
evidence.204 
 
 
3.2.2.3.4 Adverse possession in relation to leasehold land 
Adverse possession in the case of leasehold land has been refined in English law, which 
necessitates a brief discussion of this topic.205 There are three main categories in this context, 
namely adverse possession   
 
i) by the tenant against her landlord;  
ii) by the tenant against a third party; or  
iii) against the tenant herself.206  
 
It is trite law that the tenant’s possession of the leased premises cannot be adverse as long as 
the lease persists, since the tenant occupies the premises with the consent of the landlord.207 
When a tenant encroaches on land of a third party, which falls in the second category, the law 
regards her adverse possession as operating in favour of the landlord “in reversioner”.208 
Therefore, the tenant – under these circumstances – acquires title on behalf of the landlord.209 
As to the final category, a person that claims to have obtained title to freehold land subject to 
a lease must prove adverse possession for the requisite period against both the tenant and the 
landlord.210  
 
 
                                                             
203 See Schedule 1, paragraph 5(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 and Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 para 81 
per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
204 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 paras 91, 101 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
205 As this forms an entire subcategory to the law of adverse possession that is not relevant for purposes of this 
dissertation, the discussion in this regard will be brief. For a more detailed discussion, see Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) paras 9.1.58–9.1.71. 
206 See generally Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) paras 9.1.58-9.1.71. 
207 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.60. It is possible for a landlord to adversely 
possess against her own tenant: See Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.60. 
208 Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v Barrett [2006] 1 P & CR 9 paras 26-30, 90 per Neuberger LJ. See 
also Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.62; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 
82. 
209 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.62. 
210 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.63. 
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3.2.2.3.5 Aggregation of periods of adverse possession (coniunctio 
temporum)211 
Immediately consecutive periods of possession may be aggregated to establish title through 
adverse possession, as long as the period of adverse possession is continuous.212 This is also 
the position in South African law.213 Yet, successive possessors can only aggregate their 
periods of possession if the periods of adverse possession were strictly continuous.214 If a 
second squatter takes adverse possession of land initially abandoned by a previous adverse 
possessor, the second squatter cannot “add” to her own possession the period established by 
the first adverse possessor.215 It speaks for itself that to aggregate successive periods of 
adverse possession, consecutive squatters must satisfy all the requirements for adverse 
possession. If this is not the case, the break in adverse possession will restore the owner’s title 
to its “pristine force”.216 A first squatter may also transfer her possession to a second squatter 
through delivery, who will then continue the period of limitation.217 It seems that this may 
even be the case in situations where the second squatter dispossesses the first squatter, 
although English law is not clear in this regard.218 
 
 
3.2.3 The Pye case: The three United Kingdom decisions 
3.2.3.1  Introduction 
Since the substantive requirements for English adverse possession law prior to the enactment 
of the LRA were already discussed, this section focuses on one of the most recent and 
controversial cases regarding adverse possession, namely the Pye case.219 As this case was 
taken on appeal twice, with each court taking a different view on especially the animus 
                                                             
211 For an extensive discussion in this regard, see Jourdan S Adverse Possession (2003) paras 6-36–6-46. 
212 Allen v Matthews [2007] 2 P & CR 21 para 85 per Lawrence Collins LJ. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.4; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 77. 
213 See section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
214 Allen v Matthews [2007] 2 P & CR 21 para 85 per Lawrence Collins LJ. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.4; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 77-78. 
215 Schedule 1, paragraph 8(2) of the Limitation Act 1980. See further Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law 
(5th ed 2009) para 9.1.4; Jourdan S Adverse Possession (2003) para 6-37.  
216 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.4. 
217 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.4; Jourdan S Adverse Possession (2003) para 
6-37.  
218 Jourdan S Adverse Possession (2003) para 6-40. 
219 The three decisions are JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676, JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. The two further 
decisions decided by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg are reported as JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). 
These two decisions by the European Court of Human Rights are discussed in section 5.3.2.4.2 of chapter five 
below. 
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possidendi requirement, it is preferable to discuss each decision on its own. This discussion 
does not include the judgments by the Fourth and Grand Chambers of the European Court of 
Human Rights, as indicated earlier, since these decisions do not affect the substantive 
requirements for adverse possession in English law.220 These two judgments are dealt with in 
chapter five, which specifically focuses on the constitutional aspects of prescription or 
adverse possession. 
 
 
3.2.3.2  The facts 
Because the facts were not in dispute, one can divide the period of occupation by the Grahams 
into different stages. This aids the discussion as to how the different courts dealt with the 
question of adverse possession and specifically the animus possidendi.  
 
JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd (“Pye”) was the registered owner of land (the “disputed land”) that – 
until 31 December 1983 – the Grahams, who owned property adjacent to the disputed land, 
occupied under a grazing agreement. Pye had fully enclosed the disputed land with hedges 
and it was only accessible, except by foot, through a gate kept padlocked by the Grahams. 
They also had the keys in their possession. On 30 December 1983, Pye instructed the 
Grahams to vacate the land, as the grazing agreement was about to expire. This was the first 
stage.  
 
Pye expressly refused to renew the grazing agreement for 1984, as it did not want anyone to 
graze the land while it applied for planning permission. Despite this refusal, the Grahams 
remained in occupation and continued to use the land. In June 1984, Pye agreed to sell to them 
the standing crop of grass on the land, which cut was completed by 31 August 1984. This was 
the second stage.  
 
Further requests from the Grahams in December 1984 and again in May 1985 to renew the 
grazing agreement or to take cuts of grass went unanswered. The Grahams continued to 
occupy and maintain the land, which they from then on farmed as a unit with their adjoining 
property. After these requests, the Grahams did not attempt to make contact with Pye again 
and intended to use the land until requested not to do so. They did this with the hope that a 
                                                             
220 See section 3.2.2.3 above. 
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further agreement would be forthcoming later. Therefore, from 1 September 1984 until 1998, 
the Grahams continued to use the whole of the disputed land for farming without Pye’s 
consent. Pye performed no acts on the disputed land during that time. Indeed, nothing was 
done by or on behalf of Pye on the land from 1 January 1984 onwards. In 1997, Mr Graham 
registered cautions at the Land Registry against Pye’s title on the basis that he obtained title 
through adverse possession. Pye sought cancellation of the cautions in the High Court by 
April 1998 and issued proceedings, brought in January 1999, seeking repossession of the land. 
This period – from September 1984 to January 1999 – constitutes the third stage.  
 
The Grahams contested the claims under the 1980 Act, which, as seen from the discussion 
above, bars action to recovery of land after 12 years of adverse possession. The Grahams also 
relied on the Land Registration Act 1925, which provides that after the expiry of the 12-year 
limitation period, the registered owner is deemed to hold the land in trust for the squatter until 
that squatter is registered as owner at the Land Registry.  
 
At first instance in the High Court, JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and 
Another,221 Neuberger J found that the Grahams satisfied all the requirements for adverse 
possession and gave judgment in their favour. Nevertheless, he lamented the “injustice” 
caused in this instance by the application of the law (as it then stood) of adverse possession 
regarding registered land.222  
 
In the Court of Appeal, JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham,223 Mummery LJ, with Keene and Sir 
Martin Nourse LJJ concurring, found that the Grahams did not have the necessary animus 
possidendi and overturned the decision of the High Court. The matter then went to the House 
of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham,224 where Lord Browne-Wilkinson – who gave 
judgment on behalf of the majority – found that the Grahams did have the requisite intention 
to possess and, as a result,  overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision and so restored the High 
Court’s judgment. However, the House of Lords also emphasised its lack of enthusiasm for 
arriving at this “apparent unjust result”.225 As the animus possidendi requirement was the 
                                                             
221 [2000] Ch 676. 
222 See JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709-710.  
223 [2001] Ch 804. 
224 [2003] 1 AC 419. 
225 See JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
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main point of contention throughout the three decisions, the focus now falls on how these 
courts differed in their approach regarding this requirement.  
 
 
3.2.3.3  The three Pye decisions: Different approaches to animus possidendi 
3.2.3.3.1 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another226 (High 
Court decision) 
The High Court identified three central issues for purposes of its decision:  
 
i) Did the Grahams enjoy adverse possession of the disputed land between 1 
January 1984 and 20 January 1999?  
ii) If so, when did the period of adverse possession commence?  
iii) When did the period of adverse possession end?227   
 
Of these three questions, only the first two are relevant to the discussion. Nonetheless, this 
section addresses each of these questions individually. 
 
The High Court held that a squatter who claims adverse possession must show that he 
satisfied each of the following requirements for the whole duration of the 12 year period, 
namely that:  
 
i) the squatter was in factual possession of the land; 
ii) that he had the intention to possess the land (animus possidendi); and 
iii) that his possession of the land was “adverse” in terms of the LA.228 
 
The question regarding factual possession was whether the Grahams “ha[ve] been dealing 
with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and 
that no one else has done so.”229 Since the Grahams farmed the disputed land as a unit with 
their own property (Manor farm), the Court found that the Grahams did enjoy factual 
                                                             
226 [2000] Ch 676. 
227 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 687.  
228 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 689, following Buckinghamshire 
County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 636 per Slade LJ. 
229 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471, applied in Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran 
[1990] Ch 623 641 per Slade LJ and followed in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another 
[2000] Ch 676 703. 
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possession of the land.230 This was because the Grahams went beyond what the old grazing 
agreement allowed them to do on it, together with the fact that the Grahams controlled all 
vehicular access and egress to and from the land by having the keys to the gates. 
 
Before discussing the reasoning behind the animus possidendi requirement, I briefly address 
the issue of “adverse” possession. As to the “adverse” element of adverse possession, it 
“merely requires [the squatter] to show that his possession was not pursuant to a licence, a 
tenancy, or some other grant from the owner, whether express or implied.”231  
 
The Court relied on the following dictum by Slade J to ascertain the meaning of animus 
possidendi:  
 
“What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in 
one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner 
with the paper title ... so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law 
will allow.”232 
 
Neuberger J identified four issues that related to the content of this intention before he 
decided the animus possidendi question. The first was what precisely the squatter’s intention 
needs to reflect. The Court relied on the authoritative case of Buckinghamshire County 
Council v Moran233 to answer this question, where Slade LJ held that the required intention 
entails “an intention for the time being to possess the land to the exclusion of all persons, 
including the owner with the paper title.”234 
 
The second question pertained to the weight attached to the intention of the owner concerning 
the disputed land.235 The Court referred to the abrogation of the implied licence theory,236 as 
well as to the disapproval of it in Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran.237 Although the 
                                                             
230 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 703-704. 
231 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 694. This is in line with the meaning 
of “adverse”, as discussed in section 3.2.2.3.1 above. 
232 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471-472. 
233 [1990] Ch 623. 
234 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 643 per Slade LJ, followed in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 690. 
235 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 690. 
236 Schedule 1, paragraph 8(4) of the Limitation Act 1980. 
237 [1990] Ch 623 639 per Slade LJ and per Nourse LJ at 645. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
Court agreed that the implied licence theory was no longer in force, it stressed the fact that 
this did not imply that the intention of the owner regarding the land was now irrelevant.238  
 
The third question concerned the value of statements, as opposed to actions, by the squatter. 
Neuberger J accepted that declarations by the squatter as to his past and present intentions 
may provide evidence of the absence of the animus possidendi, while he emphasised the fact 
that such declarations were of little evidential value and that “[i]n general, intent has to be 
inferred from the acts themselves.”239 The deciding factor, therefore, is whether one could 
positively discern the animus possidendi from the squatter’s actions. 
 
The fourth question considered the effect of the squatter being prepared or keen to pay rent or 
to take a tenancy, if the owner requested it.240 The Court relied on Ocean Estates Ltd v 
Pinder,241 where the Privy Council said that it “[did] not consider that an admission of this 
kind ... indicates an absence of the animus possidendi necessary to constitute adverse 
possession.”242 Neuberger J also cited Lodge v Wakefield Metropolitan City Council243 to 
strengthen this point, where the Court of Appeal held that even if the squatter “believed 
himself still to be paying rent ... such a belief ... would have no relevance.”244 According to 
Neuberger J, this approach is consistent with the legal position and he distinguished the case 
before him from the decision in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex parte 
Davies.245 In that case Neill LJ decided that if the squatter declared that he was prepared to 
pay rent, such declaration would prevent the squatter from possessing animo possidendi.246 
Neuberger J found that if that case was not distinguishable it must be incorrect, as it did not 
refer to the Ocean Estates case247 mentioned above, which was a Privy Council decision.248 In 
                                                             
238 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 691, following Buckinghamshire 
County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 639-640 per Slade LJ. 
239 Tecbild Ltd v Chamberlain (1969) 20 P & CR 633 643 per Sachs LJ, followed in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and 
Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 691-692. See also Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 
476-477. 
240 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 692. 
241 [1969] 2 AC 19. 
242 [1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Lord Diplock, quoted in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another 
[2000] Ch 676 692. 
243 [1995] 2 EGLR 124. 
244 [1995] 2 EGLR 124 126 per Balcombe LJ, with whom Pill LJ and Sir Roger Parker LJ agreed. This is 
followed in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 692. 
245 (1990) 61 P & CR 487. Distinguished in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 
676 692. 
246 (1990) 61 P & CR 487 496 per Neill LJ.  
247 [1969] 2 AC 19. 
248 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693. 
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light of this reasoning, Neuberger J concluded that an offer to the owner by the squatter to 
pay rent or take a tenancy is not inconsistent with the animus possidendi.249 Furthermore, the 
Court held that if a squatter orally communicates this preparedness to the owner it would not 
– on its own – prevent time from running in the occupier’s favour.250 However, Neuberger J 
emphasised that the owner may invoke this state of affairs to assist a contention that the 
squatter did not possess animo possidendi.251 
 
The Court relied on seven factors when it had to determine whether the Grahams possessed 
the disputed land animo possidendi:252  
 
i) Actual activities carried out by the squatter during the limitation period. It is 
plain that the Grahams put the disputed land to use after the expiration of the 
grazing agreement, which qualified as factual possession.253  
ii) The nature and history of the land concerned. Although the Grahams used the 
disputed land in the past, they used it in a much wider sense than for mere grazing 
after the expiration of the grazing agreement.254  
iii) The question of enclosure and access. Although the Grahams did not enclose the 
land themselves, the Court held that this fact did not count against them.255 The 
main factor was that it was the Grahams, and not Pye, that controlled all vehicular 
access to and egress from the land.256  
iv) The attitude which the squatter manifests to the land more generally. The 
Grahams did not merely benefit from the land on a short-term basis, they looked 
after it and used it as one would have expected of an owner who occupied it.257  
v) The circumstances under which the squatter allegedly began adversely possessing 
the land. Neuberger J found that for the duration of the grazing and hay-cutting 
agreements, the Grahams could not have possessed the land animo possidendi, 
nor would their possession have been adverse.258 However, in January 1984 Pye 
                                                             
249 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 693. 
250 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697. 
251 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697. 
252 For a more detailed discussion, see JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 
704-710. 
253 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 704. 
254 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 704-705. 
255 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 705. 
256 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 705. 
257 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 705-706. 
258 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 706. 
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refused to grant another grazing licence. The Court held that this express refusal, 
as well as the later requests by the Grahams to renew the agreement – which Pye 
ignored – clearly negates any argument that the Grahams would use the land 
under an implied licence from that moment.259 Neuberger J found that the 
Grahams had the animus possidendi from then onwards, especially since they 
intended to carry on using the land for grazing until requested not to do so.260 
Although the hay-cutting agreement would have negated this intention, the Court 
decided that after the expiration of that “isolated grant to take a cut of hay” by the 
end of August 1984, the Grahams definitively possessed the land animo 
possidendi.261  
vi) The intentions of the owner of the land in so far as the squatter was aware of 
them. Although the Grahams knew that Pye had no immediate use for the land 
and that they hoped to obtain planning permission in the future, Neuberger J held 
that the law does not require the Grahams to realise that their use of the land was 
not inconsistent with Pye’s intentions.262 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
future intentions of Pye regarding the disputed land, as far as they were expressly 
or impliedly communicated to the Grahams, did not assist Pye’s case.263  
vii) The expressed and unexpressed intentions of the squatter, as far as they are 
invoked to assist the squatter, are of very limited assistance. Mr Graham said in 
his draft witness statement that he hoped a further grazing licence would be 
forthcoming in 1984 and after receiving no replies to his 1985 inquiries “gave up 
trying” and wanted to see if the plaintiffs contacted him.264 In the light of the 
Ocean Estates case265 discussed earlier, the Court concluded that these 
communications were not inconsistent with the Grahams having the intention to 
possess and, therefore, from 31 August 1984 they had the animus possidendi.266 
 
The focus now briefly shifts to the question of when the period of adverse possession 
commenced, since it was not contested throughout the other cases. It was clear that the 
Grahams’ possession could not have been adverse during the duration of the grazing and hay-
                                                             
259 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709. 
260 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 683, 706. 
261 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 706, 709. 
262 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 706-707. 
263 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 707. 
264 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 708. 
265 [1969] 2 AC 19. 
266 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 708. 
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cutting agreements, as these licences prevented their possession from being adverse.267 
Although it was not clear when precisely the hay-cutting agreement expired (between the end 
of June and 20 September 1984), the Court accepted that the correct date from which time 
began to run in favour of the Grahams was 1 September 1984.268 
 
The High Court gave considerable attention to the question of when the period of adverse 
possession ended.269 In the light of this issue becoming moot in the Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords decisions, this chapter assumes – for the sake of simplicity – that time 
stopped running when Pye instituted proceedings for reclaiming possession on 20 January 
1999.270  
 
According to Neuberger J, the findings under each of the above seven points constituted clear 
evidence that the Grahams had the animus possidendi.271 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
Grahams satisfied all the requirements for adverse possession and were therefore entitled to 
be registered as the owners of the disputed land in the Land Registry.272 Despite this 
conclusion, Neuberger J ended his judgment by stating that this was a conclusion at which he 
arrived “with no enthusiasm.”273 
 
 
3.2.3.3.2 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham274 (Court of Appeal decision) 
The Court of Appeal divided the issues on appeal into two categories, namely:  
 
i) whether the Grahams possessed the disputed land animo possidendi; and  
ii) the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998.  
 
The focus of this inquiry falls only on the first category for purposes of the current discussion, 
as the second issue is addressed in chapter five.275  
                                                             
267 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 697-699. 
268 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 698, 709. 
269 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 699-703. 
270 If the limitation period commenced on 31 August 1984, it would already have expired by 1997. See also JA 
Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 430 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
Graham [2001] Ch 804 810 per Mummery LJ. 
271 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 708. 
272 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 708. 
273 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709.  
274 [2001] Ch 804. 
275 See section 5.3.2.4.2 of chapter five below. 
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Pye did not appeal against the High Court’s findings of primary fact pertaining to the 
Grahams’ actual use of the disputed land. The appeal concerned the interpretation (by that 
court) of the facts that related to the question of animus possidendi.276 The Court of Appeal 
was of much the same mind as the High Court concerning the “adverse” possession 
requirement and stated that possession is never adverse if it is enjoyed under a lawful title or 
licence.277 
 
The Court of Appeal relied on the same definition for animus possidendi as quoted above and 
emphasised that the law does not require a squatter to establish “an intention to own or even 
an intention to acquire ownership” of the land.278 However, after this the Court diverged from 
the reasoning adopted by the High Court by identifying three factors relating to the intention 
to possess that were especially relevant, namely:  
 
i) the owner’s intentions;  
ii) the statements of intention; and  
iii) oral offers of the squatter.279  
 
Regarding (i), the Court of Appeal acknowledged that – for purposes of adverse possession – 
one has to look to the intention of the squatter, but emphasised the fact that the intentions of 
the owner were not irrelevant.280 In terms of (ii), Mummery LJ held that declarations by the 
squatter as to his intentions may provide “compelling evidence” that he did not possess animo 
possidendi, though he also said that such declarations are of little evidentiary value when they 
relate to the squatter’s apparent exclusive possession.281 Concerning (iii), the “[e]vidence that 
the squatter is willing to pay rent to the paper title owner during the relevant period, or to take 
a tenancy from him, may be relevant to ascertainment of the squatter’s intention to possess 
                                                             
276 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 813 per Mummery LJ. 
277 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 813 per Mummery LJ. 
278 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 812 per Mummery LJ, following Buckinghamshire County 
Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 643 per Slade LJ. 
279 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 812 per Mummery LJ. 
280 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 812 per Mummery LJ, following Slade LJ in Buckinghamshire 
County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 639-640. In my view, this overemphasises the importance of the 
owner’s intention. 
281 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 812 per Mummery LJ, following Powell v McFarlane (1979) 
38 P & CR 452 476 and Tecbild Ltd v Chamberlain (1969) 20 P & CR 633 643 per Sachs LJ. 
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the land; but the squatter’s statements to that effect do not necessarily constitute admission by 
him that he lacked the requisite intention to possess ...”282  
 
The Court of Appeal attached considerable weight to the grazing agreement of 1 February 
1983, which it described as “an important document” and as constituting a “contemporaneous 
and irrefutable record of the common intention of Pye and the Grahams regarding possession 
of the disputed land.”283 Consequently, it created a personal licence for the Grahams to go 
onto and use the disputed land for the specified purposes, since Pye was anxious to avoid 
giving possession of it to the Grahams.284 The parties “plainly did not intend that the Grahams 
should have exclusive possession of the disputed land.”285 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal 
held that “[t]his point is relevant to the ascertainment of the probable intentions of the parties 
regarding the continued use of the disputed land after the grazing agreement expired.”286  
 
Mummery’s LJ focus then shifted to the seven factors used in the High Court, which led 
Neuberger J to find that the Grahams did have the intention to possess.287 The Court of 
Appeal criticised this approach, as it “significantly underestimated the importance of 
uncontradicted direct evidence”, which – in the view of Mummery LJ – led to the incorrect 
conclusion that the Grahams had the animus possidendi.288 After rejecting this reasoning by 
the High Court, the Court of Appeal gave eight reasons to justify the conclusion that the 
Grahams did not have the intention to possess the disputed land.289 These reasons may be 
summarised as follows:  
 
i) The question of the Grahams’ intentions at the relevant time is one of fact.290  
                                                             
282 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 812 per Mummery LJ, relying on Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder 
[1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Diplock 24, Lodge v Wakefield Metropolitan City Council [1995] 2 EGLR 124 126 and 
comparing them to R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex parte Davies (1990) 61 P & CR 487 496. 
283 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 814 per Mummery LJ. 
284 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 814 per Mummery LJ. 
285 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 814 per Mummery LJ. 
286 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 815 per Mummery LJ. If one interprets this dictum as meaning 
“exclusive [factual] possession”, it cannot be correct, as factual possession is a question of fact, not intention. 
However, if one reads it as meaning “exclusive [ordinary] possession”, that is likely to be correct, since the 
agreement will clearly negate any intention to possess that the Grahams could have had. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable whether one should attach such weight to an agreement after it expired concerning the parties’ 
intentions regarding the disputed land. This matter was one of the key points of criticism in the decision of the 
House of Lords: See section 3.2.3.3.3 below. 
287 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 816 per Mummery LJ. 
288 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 817 per Mummery LJ. 
289 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 817 per Mummery LJ. Although nine reasons were given, only 
eight of them are relevant for purposes of this discussion. 
290 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 817 per Mummery LJ. 
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ii) Like other facts, a state of mind must be proven.291 The evidence in this instance 
may take different forms, such as oral or written evidence as to the occupation as 
well as the squatter’s use of the land.292  
iii) The Court of Appeal held that the High Court, by finding an intention to possess, 
was wrong in making inferences from circumstantial evidence. According to 
Mummery LJ, it is the unchallenged evidence of the Grahams that counts against 
them.293  
iv) On the expiration of the grazing agreement in December 1983, the Grahams’ use 
of the disputed land was potentially adverse.294 Pye expressly refused to enter into 
another agreement and, therefore, the use of the land by the Grahams ceased to be 
permissive.295 However, according to Mummery LJ this reason alone was not 
enough to constitute dispossession (or ordinary possession). The Court of Appeal 
found that the crucial factor was whether there was “any other relevant change 
affecting the requirements of the 1980 Act and, if so, whether that change 
constituted dispossession of Pye.”296 In other words, the expiration of permission 
alone was not enough to constitute dispossession, even though the Grahams from 
then onwards used the land as an occupying owner would and that Pye could have 
brought proceedings to evict them.297 It is doubtful whether this argument by the 
Court of Appeal holds water, as the only factor that prevented the Grahams from 
being in adverse possession during the grazing licence was the licence itself. 
However, after the expiration of the license, Mummery LJ required a further 
“change” before he could regard the Grahams as having dispossessed Pye. It is 
hard to see how this approach can be in accordance with the law. This approach 
by the Appeal Court was, in my opinion, correctly criticised by the House of 
Lords.298 
v) Nothing changed concerning the actual use of the land, except that the Grahams 
no longer occupied the disputed land with the permission from Pye.299 Mummery 
LJ found that both the nature and extent of the Grahams’ use of the land, “which 
                                                             
291 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 817 per Mummery LJ. 
292 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 817 per Mummery LJ. 
293 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 817-818 per Mummery LJ. 
294 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 818 per Mummery LJ. 
295 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 818 per Mummery LJ. 
296 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 818 per Mummery LJ. 
297 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 818 per Mummery LJ. 
298 See JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442-443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
299 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 818 per Mummery LJ. 
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did not amount to factual possession of it during the period of licence”, remained 
the same.300 The correctness of this finding is also doubtful, as it is clear that the 
only persons in factual possession of the land were the Grahams, since the factum 
possessionis is a purely factual question. Factual possession cannot depend on a 
licence; that can only affect the animus possidendi. Even though nothing changed 
except that the licence came to an end, the fact that the Grahams continued using 
the land must constitute factual possession. The House of Lord also addressed this 
anomaly.301 
vi) Mummery LJ continued this line of argument and held that – as in the case of (v) 
– the Grahams’ intention regarding the land also did not change after the 
expiration of the licence.302 The Court of Appeal did not for one moment consider 
that the Grahams’ possession could, but for the licence, amount to full legal 
possession. It seems as if the Court of Appeal required an intention of an owner, 
instead of the intention to possess, even though it earlier found that this was not 
needed.303 Mummery LJ based this finding on the evidence that Graham was 
using the land until requested not to.304 It was also clear that, had Pye requested 
him, he would happily have paid.305 It appears as if the Court of Appeal 
conveniently attached no value to the evidence produced by Graham, since it 
stated that he “took advantage of the ability to use the land as no one challenged 
[him] ...”306 
vii) Graham’s statement regarding his state of mind, together with the licence and the 
fact that (after the expiration of the licence) they continued to use the land in the 
same way was “not that of a person who is using the land with the intention of 
possessing it to the exclusion of Pye.”307 The Court of Appeal then said the 
following:   
 
“[The Grahams’ state of mind] is that of a person who, having obtained the 
agreement of Pye to the limited use of the land in the past, continues to use 
it for the time being in exactly the same fashion in the hope that in the 
                                                             
300 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 818 per Mummery LJ. 
301 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442-443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
302 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 819 per Mummery LJ. 
303 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 812 per Mummery LJ. 
304 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 819 per Mummery LJ. 
305 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 819 per Mummery LJ. 
306 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 819 per Mummery LJ. 
307 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 819 per Mummery LJ. 
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future Pye will again be willing to accede to his requests to enter an 
agreement authorising him to use it.”308  
 
The crux of this argument is indeed nothing other than an implied licence. 
Mummery LJ held that the Grahams never did anything more than they would 
have been allowed under an implied grazing licence. However, it is clear that the 
owner’s intention alone cannot be truly decisive, even though the Grahams knew 
of Pye’s intention regarding the land.309 In my opinion the Court of Appeal erred 
by placing far too much emphasis on Pye’s intention. Mummery LJ also ignored 
the fact that Pye expressly refused to renew the grazing agreement. This nullifies 
the argument that the Grahams’ intention did not change after the expiration of 
the grazing licence. The House of Lords also voiced criticism in this regard.310  
viii) The Court of Appeal also found that there was no direct evidence that the 
Grahams changed their intentions regarding the use of the land after the end of 
August 1984.311 After the expiration of the licence, the Grahams merely continued 
to use the land in the same fashion, which use was of a limited nature and without 
the animus possidendi.312 Mummery LJ based this finding on the fact that after 31 
August 1984, the Grahams did not do anything on the disputed land that they 
could not have done under the grazing agreement.313 As indicated above, this 
argument is founded on an implied licence, for which there can be no justification 
on the facts. It seems that Mummery LJ attached too much weight to the 
undisputed evidence of the Grahams, while such evidence is supposed to carry the 
least weight when adjudicating an adverse possession case. The House of Lords 
adopted a similar stance against the Court of Appeal in this instance.314 
 
For these reasons, the Court of Appeal found the Grahams not to have had the intention to 
possess the disputed land. 
 
 
                                                             
308 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 819-820 per Mummery LJ. 
309 See JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438, where Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that “[t]he 
suggestion that the sufficiency of the possession can depend on the intention not of the squatter but of the paper 
owner is heretical and wrong ...” 
310 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442-443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
311 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 820 per Mummery LJ. 
312 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 820 per Mummery LJ. 
313 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2001] Ch 804 820 per Mummery LJ. 
314 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442-443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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3.2.3.3.3 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham315 (House of Lords decision) 
The main issue before the House of Lords, as before the Court of Appeal, was whether the 
Grahams had the intention to possess the disputed land. The House of Lords accepted that, as 
long as the Grahams occupied the disputed land with Pye’s consent, they could neither have 
dispossessed Pye nor obtained possession of the land.316 Therefore, adverse possession could 
not commence in favour of the Grahams before the expiration of the hay-cutting agreement 
on or about 31 August 1984.317 Consequently, the key question was whether the Grahams had 
dispossessed Pye after 1 September 1984 for the duration of the 12-year period.318 In other 
words, the issue to be decided was again whether the Grahams had the animus possidendi. 
 
As to the requisite intention, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that “[i]t is hard to see how the 
intentions of the paper title owner (unless known to the squatter) can affect the intention of 
the squatter to possess the land.”319 The House of Lords confirmed that the taking or 
continuation of possession by the squatter with the consent of the owner does not constitute 
dispossession or adverse possession.320 Furthermore, one cannot have possession without the 
requisite intention, which intention must be deduced from the squatter’s acts.321 Thus, it is 
worth reemphasising that factum possessionis and the animus possidendi, although closely 
entwined, remain two separate elements to legal possession.322 In light of these findings, the 
Grahams were “plainly in factual possession before 30 April 1986.”323 
 
The House of Lords identified three main issues concerning the animus possidendi:  
 
i) whether one must intend to own or to possess;  
ii) whether the acts by the squatter must be inconsistent with the intentions of the 
owner; and 
iii) the willingness of the squatter to pay rent or take a tenancy, if asked.  
 
                                                             
315 [2003] 1 AC 419. 
316 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 432 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
317 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 433 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
318 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 432 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
319 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 433 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
320 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 434 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
321 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 435 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
322 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 435-436 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
323 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 436 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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As to the intention to possess or to own, the House of Lords regarded the decision of 
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran324 to be correct, as it found that all that is required 
is an intention to possess and not an intention to own or to acquire ownership.325 Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, like the judges in the two previous courts, also followed the formulation 
by Slade J in Powell v McFarlane326 by requiring an “intention, in one’s own name and on 
one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he 
be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of 
the law will allow.”327  
 
In respect of the second question, the House of Lords held that “[t]he suggestion that the 
sufficiency of the possession can depend on the intention not of the squatter but of the true 
owner is heretical and wrong ... [as] [i]t reflects an attempt to revive the pre-1833 concept of 
adverse possession requiring inconsistent user.”328 Lord Browne-Wilkinson strengthened this 
position by stating that  
 
“[t]he highest it can be put is that, if the squatter is aware of a special purpose for which the 
paper owner uses or intends to use the land and the use made by the squatter does not conflict 
with that use, that may provide some support for a finding as a question of fact that the squatter 
had no intention to possess the land in the ordinary sense but only an intention to occupy it until 
needed by the paper owner.”329  
 
The House of Lords found that there would be few cases where one can draw such an 
inference if the owner is not present on the land, although Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
acknowledged that it remained possible.330 
 
On the subject of the squatter’s willingness to pay rent or take a tenancy if asked, the House 
of Lords approved of the High Court following Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder,331 where it was 
                                                             
324 [1990] Ch 623. 
325 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 643 per Slade LJ, approved in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 436 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
326 (1979) 38 P & CR 452. 
327 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 471-472, approved in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 
AC 419 437 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
328 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, expressly disapproving of 
Bramwell LJ’s “heresy” in Leigh v Jack (1897) 5 Ex D 264. 
329 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
330 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
331 [1969] 2 AC 19. 
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held that such a declaration does not negate the animus possidendi.332 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson criticised the Court of Appeal for not attaching enough weight to that decision, as 
he found that R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex parte Davies333 was wrongly 
decided.334 The law only requires the squatter to possess the land, which means that it is 
possible for the animus possidendi to co-exist with a willingness to pay the owner.335  
 
The House of Lords identified a chain in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, which led 
Mummery LJ to find that the Grahams did not possess the land animo possidendi.336 
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, this chain consists of the following three points:  
 
i) the grazing agreement “plainly” did not give possession to the Grahams;  
ii) after the expiration of the grazing and hay-cutting agreements, the Grahams 
continued to use the land for grazing in the same way, which did not amount to 
factual possession; and finally 
iii) Mr Graham made admissions that negated his intention to possess.337  
 
According to the House of Lords, each of these steps of reasoning is suspect.338 However, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not decide the first step,  merely assuming that the Grahams did 
not have possession during this time, in that “the ... [grazing] agreement [was] inconsistent 
with any clear distinction being drawn by the parties between possession on the one hand and 
occupation without possession on the other.”339  
 
Pye asked the Grahams to vacate the disputed land when the grazing agreement expired. 
Nonetheless, the Grahams did not adhere to this request and continued to use the land from 1 
January 1984 onwards, as well as performing acts of a wider nature than those allowed under 
the old grazing agreement.340 By continuing to use the land in and after 1984, the Grahams 
                                                             
332 Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19 24 per Diplock, followed in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v 
Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 692 and approved in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 
per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
333 (1990) 61 P & CR 487. 
334 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
335 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 438 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
336 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
337 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
338 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
339 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 442 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
340 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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not only occupied the land without Pye’s permission, but they also did so in a way that was 
contrary to the intentions of Pye regarding the future development of the land.341 
 
In respect of the third point, the House of Lords criticised the Court of Appeal for being 
“selective in its choice of the evidence in Michael Graham’s witness statement, relying only 
on such evidence as was contrary to his interest.”342 Instead, one has to look at the whole of 
Mr Graham’s evidence on this subject, which indicates that he indeed treated the disputed 
land as his own.343 When viewed from this angle, it is clear that the Grahams occupied the 
land animo possidendi, even though they were willing to pay rent or take a tenancy.344 
 
Consequently, the House of Lords held the decision by the Court of Appeal to be incorrect. 
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, it would lead to an anomalous state of affairs if one 
accepts the reasons provided by the Court of Appeal. This is because the Court of Appeal 
held that Pye was in possession of the disputed land, despite the fact that the Grahams were 
the only persons who did anything on the land from 1984 to 1999.345 Consequently, the 
House of Lords found that such a conclusion would be “so unrealistic as to be an impossible 
one.”346 On these grounds, the reasoning that the Grahams did not have the animus possidendi 
was, in my view, correctly rejected.347  
 
The House of Lords – for these reasons – restored the decision of the High Court, which 
found that the Grahams did indeed have the animus possidendi.348 However, Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill echoed the misgivings of Neuberger J at first instance for finding in favour of the 
Grahams.349  
 
This decision concluded the Pye saga in the United Kingdom, with the House of Lords opting 
for a friendly interpretation of the animus possidendi requirement.350 Although the case 
proceeded to the European Court of Human Rights, those decisions did not influence the 
                                                             
341 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
342 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
343 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
344 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 443 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
345 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 443-444 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
346 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 444 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
347 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 444 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
348 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 444 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
349 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
350 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 180. 
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finding of substantive law requirements for adverse possession by the House of Lords.351 
Chapter five discusses the latter two decisions, since it focuses on the constitutionality of 
adverse possession or prescription.352 
 
 
3.2.4 Adverse possession under the Land Registration Act 2002 
The enactment of the LRA353 did not so much alter the substantive requirements for adverse 
possession as that it provides procedural safeguards for owners of registered land. It put 
mechanisms in place that protect owners of registered land from simply losing their land 
through the limitation effect of adverse possession. According to Lord Hope of Craighead, “a 
much more rigorous regime has now been enacted in ... the Land Registration Act 2002 ... 
[which makes] it much harder for a squatter who is in possession of registered land to obtain 
title to it against the wishes of the proprietor.”354 The LRA expressly alters the law of adverse 
possession by providing that “[n]o period of limitation under section 15 of the Limitation Act 
1980 ... shall run against any person ... in relation to an estate in land ... the title to which is 
registered.”355 Thus, the 2002 Act creates a regime where the mere lapse of time no longer 
extinguishes the rights of owners in registered land, because section 58(1) of the LRA 
stipulates that the register now provides conclusive proof of registered title.356 Thus, English 
law at present operates with a positive registration system, which guarantees the correctness of 
their register. This section briefly discusses the protective mechanisms introduced by the 
LRA, together with how difficult this Act makes it to acquire registered title through adverse 
possession. It is worth reemphasising that the law of adverse possession regarding 
unregistered land remains mostly the same as it was prior to the enactment of the LRA. 
 
The first major alteration is that the LRA reduced the 12-year limitation period to 10 years in 
respect of registered land.357 The 2002 Act stipulates that when a squatter has been in adverse 
                                                             
351 See section 3.2.2.3 above. 
352 See section 5.3.2.4.2 of chapter five below. 
353 The Act came into force on 13 October 2003 and is prospective in nature: See Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 
16 and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
354 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 446-447 per Lord Hope of Craighead and also per Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill at 426. 
355 Section 96(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002.  
356 Section 58(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002: “If, on the entry of a person in the register as the proprietor 
of a legal estate, the legal estate would not otherwise be vested in him, it shall be deemed to be vested in him as 
a result of the registration.” 
357 Schedule 6, paragraph 1(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002. See also Schedule, 6 paragraph 13(1), which 
determines that the period of adverse possession applicable to foreshore is 60 years. 
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possession of registered land for the requisite 10-year period, she may apply to the registrar at 
the Land Registry to be registered as proprietor of the registered land.358 In this sense it is not 
required that the land must have been registered throughout the entire period of adverse 
possession.359 Since this only applies to registered land, a squatter is under no obligation to 
make such an application if the land is unregistered. When the registrar receives an 
application for registration from the squatter, she must give notice to the owner of the 
registered land.360 In the case of leasehold land, the registrar must give notice to the proprietor 
of any superior registered estate in the land.361 Once the registrar notifies the registered owner 
of the squatter’s application for registration, such owner may object to the application.362 If 
the registered owner objects to the squatter’s application, the squatter may make a further 
application to be registered as the owner of the land after she remained in adverse possession 
for an additional two years.363 If the squatter manages to remain in adverse possession for that 
time, she may be entered in the register as the new owner of the land, irrespective of the 
wishes of the owner.364  
 
However, even if the registered owner objects to the squatter’s application, such squatter is 
still entitled to be registered as the new owner if she can establish a 10-year period of adverse 
possession, together with proving that she falls under one of three specific categories provided 
by the LRA.365 The first category involves situations where it would be unconscionable, due 
to estoppel, for the registered owner to attempt to dispossess the squatter.366 In other words, if 
the squatter satisfies the requirements for proprietary estoppel, the owner is estopped from 
averring her ownership and the squatter is then allowed to be registered as the new owner. The 
second category entails the situation where the squatter is – for some other reason – entitled to 
be registered as the owner of the land.367 According to Harpum, Bridge and Dixon, there are 
no limitations as to what this other reason may be.368 Such a reason could entail the situation 
                                                             
358 Schedule 6, paragraph 1(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002.  
359 Schedule 6, paragraph 1(4) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
360 Schedule 6, paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
361 Schedule 6, paragraph 2(1)(c) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
362 Section 73(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002.  
363 Schedule 6, paragraph 6(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
364 Schedule 6, paragraph 7 of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
365 Schedule 6, paragraph 5(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
366 Schedule 6, paragraph 5(2)(a)-(b) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
367 Schedule 6, paragraph 5(3) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
368 Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-082. 
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where a squatter, after having been in adverse possession for 10 years, can prove that she is 
entitled to the land under the will or intestacy of a deceased owner.369 
 
The third category concerns situations where the disputed land is adjacent to land belonging to 
the squatter and where the exact boundary line between the two erven has not been 
determined.370 The reason for this exception is that the register, although providing conclusive 
proof of title, is normally not conclusive as to boundaries.371 Should the squatter, under these 
circumstances, have reasonably believed that the disputed land belonged to her, she is entitled 
to be registered as the new owner.372 This requirement seems to have imported good faith into 
English adverse possession law, since the requirement of “reasonably believed” is analogous 
to the test for determining the presence of bona fides in some civil law systems.373 
Interestingly, it seems that what is required in this context is possession with the intention of 
an owner (animus domini), which is denoted by requiring the squatter to reasonably believe 
that the adjacent piece of land belongs to her.374 Nonetheless, this good faith requirement is 
confined to adverse possession in the limited instances of boundary disputes. 
 
The Pye case is a clear-cut illustration of the injustices that can occur in a system where the 
requirements for adverse possession are not too difficult to satisfy, as well as where the 
legislature does not afford enough protection to owners. Yet, as I indicate in the next 
chapter,375 the arguments for the abolition of adverse possession concerning registered land 
seem only to apply in systems where the register provides conclusive proof of title. In this 
context, the English land register is now to the same effect – through section 58(1) of the LRA 
– as the German Grundbuch, which also deems the register to provide conclusive proof of title 
or ownership.376 Nonetheless, civil-law based jurisdictions without a positive registration 
                                                             
369 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.29. 
370 Schedule 6, paragraph 5(4)(a)-(b) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
371 See section 58 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: 
The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-083. 
372 Schedule 6, paragraph 4, read with paragraph 5(4)(a)-(c) of the Land Registration Act 2002. Schedule 6, 
paragraph 4(d) determines that the land to which the application relates must have been registered more than one 
year prior to the date of such application. 
373 See especially the discussion of Dutch prescription law in section 3.3.2.2.2 below. I am indebted to Dr 
Waring for discussions that helped me form this opinion. 
374 Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-083. 
To the contrary is Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.30. 
375 Chapter four below. 
376 For the position in German law, see section 3.5 below. 
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system, such as South African,377 Dutch and French law employ other mechanisms that 
protect owners from “easily” losing ownership through prescription. By requiring owners to 
possess land animo domini, coupled with longer prescription periods, the law ensures that 
owners do not lose ownership through mere inattention or by accident.378 However, English 
law affords less protection to landowners in pre-LRA adverse possession law,379 where the 
requisite form of intention is mere animus possidendi, coupled with a reasonably short 12-year 
limitation period. Consequently, the focus now turns to the requirements for prescription in 
Dutch and French law, together with how it operates in German law. 
 
 
3.3 Dutch law 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Dutch law – unlike its South African counterpart – is a codified legal system, which means 
that all law is primarily contained in either the Civil Code (“Burgerlijk Wetboek” or “BW”) or 
in additional legislation. The BW regulates Dutch prescription law, since it codified this field 
of law. This stands in contrast to the two prescription acts in South Africa, which do not 
codify South African prescription law.380   
 
BW 3:99-3:106 regulates acquisitive prescription or verkrijgende verjaring, while BW 3:306-
3:325 pertains to extinctive prescription. Snijders and Rank-Berenschot refer to extinctive 
prescription as being of zwakke werking (weak effect), as it concerns only the extinction of 
claims.381 Since Dutch extinctive prescription is of zwakke werking, it follows that acquisitive 
prescription is of sterke werking (strong effect), as the latter involves the acquisition of 
ownership.382 For this reason acquisitive and extinctive prescription are dealt with in different 
                                                             
377 Although South Africa has a mixed legal system, South African property law is nearer to the civil-law 
tradition than to English common law. 
378 This position in South African prescription law is discussed in section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. For the 
position in Dutch and French law, see sections 3.3.2.2.1 and 3.4.2.1 respectively below. 
379 Since the Land Registration Act 2002 only applies to registered title in land, the protective mechanisms do 
not extend to owners of unregistered land. 
380 For instance, see Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 135 and Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 7. 
This issue is discussed more fully in section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
381 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 247; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) para 424; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 329; Van 
Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 419, 940. 
382 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 248. 
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parts of the BW.383 However, these two concepts can overlap in some instances, as in cases 
regarding the extinction of the owner’s legal claim towards her property after 20 years.384  
 
This discussion focuses on the major aspects of Dutch acquisitive prescription law, while 
some regard is also had to the provisions regarding extinctive prescription. This section pays 
special attention to the distinction between bona and mala fide possessors for purposes of 
prescription, since the fides of the possessor determines the period required for acquiring 
ownership through verkrijgende verjaring.385 This is interesting from a South African 
perspective, because South African prescription law attaches no legal consequences to the 
fides of the possessor, as both good and bad faith possessors are able to acquire ownership in 
land after possessing it possessio civilis for 30 years.386     
 
 
3.3.2 Verkrijgende verjaring (acquisitive prescription) 
3.3.2.1  Introduction 
The main provisions in the Burgerlijk Wetboek relating to acquisitive prescription are BW 
3:99.1 and BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306. BW 3:99.1 reads as follows: 
 
“Rechten op roerende zaken die niet-registergoederen zijn, en rechten aan toonder of order 
worden door een bezitter te goeder trouw verkregen door een onafgebroken bezit van drie jaren, 
andere goederen door een onafgebroken bezit van tien jaren.”387  
 
This provision provides for good faith acquisition of property through acquisitive 
prescription. It sets the period at three years for non-registered movable property, together 
with rights pertaining to bearer or order. The period required for all other property – such as 
immovable property and registered movable property – is 10 years.388 It is only necessary to 
focus on the acquisition of land through verkrijgende verjaring for purposes of this 
discussion. BW 3:105.1 provides for bad faith acquisition of ownership through prescription: 
                                                             
383 Acquisitive prescription is dealt with in Book 3 title 4 (acquisition and loss of things) and extinctive 
prescription in Book 3 title 11 (obligations). 
384 BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306. See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 
2006) para 329. 
385 See BW 3:99.1 for possession in good faith and BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306, for possession in bad 
faith. 
386 See sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
387 “Rights pertaining to movables that are not registered and rights pertaining to bearer or order are acquired by 
a possessor in good faith who possessed the property for an uninterrupted period of three years. For all other 
property the prescription period of possession is 10 years.”  
388 BW 3:99.1 differentiates between unregistered and registered property. Certain movable property can be 
registered under Dutch law: See Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 427.  
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“Hij die een goed bezit op het tijdstip waarop de verjaring van de rechtsvordering strekkende tot 
beëindiging van het bezit wordt voltooid, verkrijgt dat goed, ook al was zijn bezit niet te goeder 
trouw.”389 
 
According to this provision, a possessor – even when in bad faith – acquires property the 
moment the owner’s legal claim towards that property is extinguished.390 BW 3:306 
determines the period required for possession in this context by stating that “[i]f the law does 
not state otherwise, an owner’s legal claim prescribes at the expiration of a period of 20 
years.”391  
 
Mijnssen et al capture the essence of Dutch acquisitive prescription law against this 
background: 
 
“Iemand aan wie een goed niet toebehoort, kan dit goed door verjaring verkrijgen indien hij 
gedurende een door de wet bepaalde tijd bezitter van dat goed is geweest. In beginsel is vereist 
dat het bezit te goeder trouw was. Ook bezit niet te goeder trouw kan echter tot verkrijgen door 
verjaring leiden.”392 
 
A person who possessed property in good faith for the requisite period acquires ownership 
ipso iure393 through verkrijgende verjaring.394 Bad faith prescription – in terms of BW 
3:105.1 – is also effected ipso iure, since authors regard it as being acquisitive in nature.395 It 
follows that the effect of good and bad faith prescription in Dutch law is similar to that of 
                                                             
389 “He who possesses property at the time when the owner’s legal claim towards that property is extinguished, 
obtains that property, even though such person’s possession might not have been in good faith.”  
390 The words “legal claim towards the property” must be interpreted widely, as including all remedies the owner 
has to reclaim possession: See Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 254; 
Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 431; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 344a; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 419. 
391 “Indien de wet niet anders bepaalt, verjaart een rechtsvordering door verloop van twintig jaren.” (“If the law 
does not state otherwise, an owner’s legal claim prescribes at the expiration of a period of 20 years.”) 
392 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 423. (“Someone to whom a res does not belong, 
can obtain that res by way of prescription by possessing the res for a statutorily determined period of time. In 
principle it is required that possession be bona fide. However, mala fide possession can also lead to acquisition 
through prescription.”) See also BW 3:99 and BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306. 
393 By operation of law. 
394 BW 99.1. See also Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 258; Mijnssen FHJ 
et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – 
Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 441; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 
2006) para 347; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) 
Book 3 414-415. 
395 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 441; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 347; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 419. 
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acquisitive prescription under section 2(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 in South 
African law, which is also effected ex lege.396 Consequently, acquisitive prescription in Dutch 
law is an original method of acquisition of ownership and therefore the possessor acquires the 
property free of any encumbrance.397 It is unnecessary for a possessor to plead prescription in 
court because she becomes owner of the property through operation of law.398 
 
The possessor only acquires property through prescription once she satisfies all the 
requirements for prescription.399 Since acquisitive prescription forms part of substantive 
Dutch property law, it is impossible for parties to alter or waive it.400 However, it is possible 
to waive extinctive prescription.401 Interestingly, a Dutch court must also take note of 
acquisitive prescription mero motu, should it be justified on the facts.402 
 
It follows that the requirements for prescription are uninterrupted possession – which may be 
either bona or mala fide – over property for a certain period. All property, namely movables, 
immovables and limited real rights, can be acquired through prescription.403 “Property” also 
includes incorporeal property, such as a usufruct.404 Prescription under the new Burgerlijk 
Wetboek plays a more important role than under the previous Civil Code, as the new 
                                                             
396 “As soon as the period of thirty years has elapsed such possessor or user shall ipso jure become the owner of 
the property ...” 
397 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 256; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) paras 424, 441. 
398 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 258; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) para 441; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 347.  
399 As contained in BW 99.1 or BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306. 
400 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 258; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) paras 424, 441; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 347; Van 
Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 414-415, 419.  
401 BW 3:322.2-3. See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek 
(1981) Book 3 414. 
402 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 258; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp 
AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 347; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 414, 419. This position is different from South African law, where section 
17(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 expressly stipulates that courts shall not mero motu take notice of 
prescription. See further section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
403 BW 3:99.1. See also Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 247; Mijnssen 
FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – 
Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 427; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 
2006) para 329; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) 
Book 3 408.  
404 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 247. 
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prescription periods are notably shorter while persons can now acquire both movable and 
immovable property through prescription.405 
 
The main justification for prescription under Dutch law is – as in South African law – the 
promotion of legal certainty.406 Consequently, it is in the interest of legal certainty to afford 
de iure status to long-existing de facto situations.407 Chapter four discusses this topic in 
greater detail.408 
 
Apart from the two main categories of prescription in BW 3:99.1 and BW 105.1, read with 
BW 3:306, another type of prescription appears in BW 3:106. This latter form of prescription 
regulates the extinction of beperkte rechten (limited real rights).409 Interestingly, verkrijgende 
verjaring does not extinguish limited real rights conferred on property by the possessor while 
she still “clocks up” time.410 Although the possessor is not entitled to burden the property 
with such rights (as she was not the owner at that time), those rights become effective with 
retrospective effect from the moment possession was obtained because Dutch law regards the 
possessor as becoming owner of the property with retrospective effect.411 Therefore, a 
                                                             
405 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 247. The periods required for good and 
bad faith prescription under the previous Civil Code was 20 and 30 years respectively: See BW 2000 (old) and 
BW 2004 (old). Under the previous Civil Code, persons could not acquire movables through prescription. The 
provisions of the new BW regarding prescription only came into operation on 1 January 1993: See Mijnssen FHJ 
et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – 
Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 444. For a discussion pertaining to the law applying to prescription 
periods that commenced before this date, see Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening 
van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 444. This 
latter issue falls outside the scope of this dissertation and is therefore not discussed here. 
406 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 423; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) paras 329, 347; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 136. For the justifications in South African law, see section 4.2.3 of chapter 
four below. 
407 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 249; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) para 423; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 330; Van 
Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 417, 919. This 
point is further investigated in section 4.2.4 of chapter four below. 
408 See section 4.2.4 of chapter four below. 
409 This provision deals specifically with the extinction of servitudes. This section does not discuss the 
acquisition or extinction of servitudes through prescription in Dutch law, since prescription pertaining to 
servitudes falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
410 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 256; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) paras 441-442; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 348; Van 
Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 415. 
411 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 256; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
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mortgage registered over the property by the possessor remains in force after such possessor 
acquired the property through prescription.  
 
 
3.3.2.2  Requirements for acquisitive prescription 
3.3.2.2.1 Bezit (possession)  
A person must possess property for prescription to commence.412 Continuous possession for 
the duration of the set period results in the acquisition of that property through prescription. 
Although the Burgerlijk Wetboek does not expressly mention the fact, the right in property 
that the possessor acquires is, in fact, ownership.413  
 
BW 3:107 defines possession or bezit as follows:  
 
“(1) Bezit is het houden van een goed voor zichzelf.  
(2) Bezit is onmiddellijk, wanneer iemand bezit zonder dat een ander het goed voor hem 
houdt.  
(3) Bezit is middellijk, wanneer iemand bezit door middel van een ander die het goed voor 
hem houdt.  
(4) Houderschap is op overeenkomstige wijze onmiddellijk of middellijk.”414 
 
Possession requires a person to hold (houden) property for herself (zichzelf). Thus, Dutch law 
also recognises that possession comprises two elements, namely factual possession (houden) 
of property, and the necessary intention of holding for zichzelf. One can translate zichzelf as 
meaning “for oneself” and it entails an intention to possess as owner, or animo domini.415 
Therefore, the law requires a possessor to possess the property “as if owner”.416 This is in line 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(15th ed 2006) paras 441-442; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 348; Van 
Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 415. 
412 BW 3:99.1; BW 3:105.1. See also HR 3 May 1996, NJ 1996, 501. See further Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C 
Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen 
Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428. 
413 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) paras 441-442. 
414 “(1) Possession is the holding or detention of a res for oneself.  
(2) Possession is outright or direct when a person possesses a res that is not held for him by another.  
(3) Possession is indirect when a person possesses a res held on his behalf through another.  
(4) Holdership or detention is either direct or indirect.”  
415 This is clear from HR 7 March 1980, NJ 1980, 549. See also Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM 
(ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 124. I am indebted to Dr van Vliet for allowing me to cite his 
draft chapter in my dissertation. 
416 Compare this to section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 of South Africa, which also requires a person to 
possess “as if owner”. The “as if owner” requirement in South African law is discussed in section 2.3.2.4 of 
chapter two above. 
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with the animus domini element that forms part of possessio civilis in South African 
prescription law.417  
 
Whether someone has possession is a factual question and has to be decided on the facts.418 
Factors for determining possession include, inter alia, the nature of the property, the way 
physical control is exercised and the manner in which possession was acquired.419 Once a 
person holds property, such person is deemed as holding it for herself.420 A person obtains 
possession by “taking possession, through transfer or through succession under general 
title.”421  
 
Possession may either be held outright or directly (onmiddellijke bezit),422 or indirectly 
(middellijke bezit), such as through an agent.423 Both types of possession are sufficient for 
purposes of prescription. Parties such as agents, lessees and commodatii424 do not qualify as 
possessors, as their intention is merely to hold on behalf of the principal and not for 
themselves.425 Consequently, they qualify as holders (detentores) and not as possessors.426 
Since the agent possesses on behalf of the principal and not herself, it is the principal who 
acquires the property held by the agent through prescription, as possession is attributed to 
her.427 As long as the agent holds the property on behalf of the principal and not for herself, 
she cannot acquire the property through prescription.428  
 
                                                             
417 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
418 BW 3:108, which provides that to establish whether someone is holding property for herself or for another 
must be determined according to the common opinion (verkeersopvatting), while also taking into account the 
relevant law and facts. See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 466, who translate 
“verkeersopvatting” as “common opinion”. 
419 BW 3:108.  
420 BW 3:109.  
421 BW 3:112: “[I]nbezitneming, door overdracht of door opvolging onder algemene titel.” (“The taking of 
possession occurs through taking possession, through transfer or through succession under general title.”) See 
also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 467. 
422 This is where someone personally possesses a thing, without making use of an agent: See BW 3:107.2.  
423 BW 3:107.3 and 3:107.4. Indirect possession, or middellijke bezit, is when someone possesses a thing through 
another, such as an agent. 
424 Loan for use (bruikleen). 
425 BW 3:107. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428a. 
426 For instance, see HR 18 November 2005, NJ 2006, 150. See also Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM 
(ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 124. 
427 BW 3:111. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428a; Reehuis WHM & 
Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 337. 
428 BW 3:111. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428a; Reehuis WHM & 
Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 337. 
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It is possible for an agent to qualify as possessor once the agency relationship ends.429 
However, it is not possible for the agent to change the intention with which she holds the 
property unilaterally.430 The law requires something more, such as when a lessee denies the 
owner’s right of ownership.431 Prescription only commences in favour of the former agent on 
the day after the one on which the agency relationship ends, namely the day after the former 
agent obtains possession.432 A principal can also transfer possession to her agent if she 
wishes.433 
 
An agent cannot even acquire property with the aid of BW 3:105.1,434 since this provision 
only stipulates that a possessor can acquire property at the expiration of the 20-year period. 
Since the agent is merely a holder, she is unable to obtain possession, unless one of the 
grounds in BW 3:111 is present. Consequently, not even a mala fide agent is able to acquire 
property through BW 3:105.1.435  
 
Under the previous Civil Code, the law required possession to also be openbaar (open) and 
niet dubbelzinnig (unambiguous or unequivocal).436 These requirements were not included in 
the new BW, since the decisive factor is now whether someone was in possession of the 
property for the requisite period.437 The reason for this omission is that these requirements are 
                                                             
429 BW 3:111. 
430 BW 3:111. See also HR 18 November 2005, NJ 2006, 150. 
431 HR 18 November 2005, NJ 2006, 150. 
432 BW 3:101. 
433 BW 3:102. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428b; Reehuis WHM & 
Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
434 This section provides for the extinguishment of the owner’s legal claim towards property. 
435 See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk 
Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428a; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp 
AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 337. If the Pye case was decided in the Netherlands, the Grahams – 
being mala fide because they knew that Pye was the owner – would only have been able to acquire the disputed 
land in terms of BW 3:105, which requires a 20 year period according to BW 3:306. Yet, even under these 
circumstances, it is doubtful whether the Grahams would have been able to comply with the animus domini 
required for possession in Dutch law. For a discussion of whether the Grahams would have succeeded in Dutch 
law, see Milo JM “On the Constitutional Proportionality of Property Law in the Netherlands” (2007) 15 
European Review of Private Law 255-263 261-262. 
436 BW 1992 (old). See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428b. 
437 BW 3:99, read with BW 3:108. BW 3:108 provides that to determine whether a person holds property for 
herself or for another, one must have regard to the common opinion (verkeersopvatting) and the relevant law and 
facts. See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 
3 408. 
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regarded as inherently forming part of possession.438 This is clear from a decision where the 
Dutch Supreme Court found that a claimant could not succeed with a prescription claim 
because his possession was equivocal.439 This approach is interesting from the perspective of 
South African prescription law, where the 1969 Prescription Act expressly requires 
possession to be “open”.440  
 
The previous Civil Code also required possession to be voortdurend (continuous) and 
ongestoord (undisturbed).441 The new Burgerlijk Wetboek omits these requirements, although 
it is trite law that the loss of possession usually interrupts the running of prescription.442 A 
possessor – in this context – can continue the running of prescription if she reclaims the 
property within one year of the loss of possession, unless the person against whom she 
institutes a claim for repossession has a stronger right towards the property.443 Involuntary 
loss of possession does not interrupt prescription either, should the possessor regain 
possession within one year, or if an action instituted within one year of such loss leads to the 
regaining of possession.444 A possessor only loses possession if she knowingly or explicitly445 
parts with it.446 Possession will also be lost if someone else obtains possession over the 
property.447 The law regards possession as being continuous if none of these grounds are 
present.448 
 
The law deems the person in possession to be the owner of the property.449 However, BW 
3:119.2 qualifies this presumption: 
 
“Ten aanzien van registergoederen wijkt dit vermoeden, wanneer komt vast te staan dat de 
wederpartij of diens rechtsvoorganger te eniger tijd rechthebbende was en dat de bezitter zich 
                                                             
438 BW 3:99 and BW 3:108. See Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428b; Van Zeben 
CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 408. 
439 HR 7 March 1980, NJ 1980, 549. 
440 Section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See the discussion in section 2.3.2.3 of chapter two above. 
441 BW 1992 (old). 
442 BW 3:117. See Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 428b; Reehuis WHM & 
Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 342. 
443 BW 3:125.1 and BW 3:125.2. 
444 BW 3:103.  
445 “Kennelijk”. 
446 BW 3:117.1. 
447 BW 3:117.1. 
448 BW 3:117.2. See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek 
(1981) Book 3 442. 
449 BW 3:119.1. See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 468. 
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niet kan beroepen op verkrijging nadien onder bijzondere titel waarvoor inschrijving in de 
registers vereist is.”450 
 
A person takes possession of property through obtaining control over it.451 However, where 
property was in the possession of another, the mere taking of control of that property on its 
own is insufficient to constitute possession.452 BW 3:108 comes into play in this context and 
provides that in order to establish whether a person holds property for herself, regard must be 
had to the common opinion (verkeersopvatting),453 together with the relevant law and facts of 
the case.454 Therefore, even if a non-owner attains control over property, there can only be a 
taking of possession if – according to common opinion – the possession of the owner or 
initial possessor has ended.455 This will only be the case if the owner or initial possessor 
knowingly or explicitly abandons possession, or where another person acquires possession 
from her.456  
 
The law is reluctant to regard a dispossessor as having obtained possession, since 
dispossession of land occurs to the owner’s detriment.457 It will have to be clear that the 
owner no longer has possession and that it now vests in the dispossessor.458 Take the 
example459 where A is the owner of a small field adjacent to her house. Should A’s neighbour 
(B) cut the grass on the field at certain intervals and think that the field forms part of her 
property, this will not cause A to lose possession or for B to obtain it. The cutting of grass is 
insufficient for B to dispossess A, since this act does not unequivocally demonstrate that B 
has possession.460 However, should B fence off the field and lock the gate, causing A not 
have access to the field, common opinion dictates that B has dispossessed A.   
 
                                                             
450 “The presumption is set aside in respect of registered property, where it is established that another party or his 
predecessor was the person who has title at any time and the possessor cannot invoke subsequent acquisition by 
particular title requiring entry in the registers.”: Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 
468. See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 
3 409. 
451 BW 3:113.1. See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 467. 
452 BW 3:113.2. 
453 Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 466 translate “verkeersopvatting” as “common 
opinion”. 
454 See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 466. 
455 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
456 BW 3:117.1 and BW 3:117.2. 
457 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
458 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
459 Example taken from Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
460 As required by HR 7 March 1980, NJ 1980, 549. 
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It is also possible to obtain possession through transfer or delivery (bezitsoverdracht),461 
which entails delivery of the thing to the transferee.462 Registration at the Land Registry is 
required to effect delivery of land, which causes the transferee to obtain possession only after 
registration took place.463 Should delivery be unsuccessful due to some defect – such as 
incapacity on the side of the transferor – the transferee will still obtain possession, despite the 
fact that she was not entitled to it.464 This is due to the requirements in BW 3:84.1, which 
only pertain to the delivery and not the obtaining of possession.465 Possession in this context 
can lead to the acquisition of ownership through BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306. 
 
Prescription starts to run in favour of a possessor on the day after she obtained possession.466 
A person can acquire land after 10 years’ possession in good faith,467 while a possessor in bad 
faith only acquires ownership in land after 20 years.468  
 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Bona fide (good faith) prescription 
BW 3:118 defines good faith as: 
 
“(1)  Een bezitter is te goeder trouw, wanneer hij zich als rechthebbende beschouwt en zich ook 
redelijkerwijze als zodanig mocht beschouwen.  
(2) Is een bezitter eenmaal te goeder trouw, dan wordt hij geacht dit te blijven.  
(3) Goede trouw wordt vermoed aanwezig te zijn; het ontbreken van goede trouw moet worden 
bewezen.”469 
 
A possessor is in good faith if she regards herself as entitled to the property, which belief 
must also be reasonable.470 Bona fides only has to be present the moment a person obtains 
                                                             
461 BW 3:112. 
462 BW 3:84.1, read with BW 3:90.1. 
463 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
464 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
465 BW 3:84.1 provides as follows: “Voor overdracht van een goed wordt vereist een levering krachtens geldige 
titel, verricht door hom die bevoegd is over het goed te beschikken.” (Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the 
Netherlands (2009) 460 translate this provision as follows: “Transfer of property requires delivery pursuant to a 
valid title by the person who has the right to dispose of the property.”) See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp 
AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 335. 
466 BW 3:101. 
467 BW 3:99.1. This includes registered movable and immovable property, as well as proprietary rights. See also 
Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 247; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) para 427; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek 
(1981) Book 3 408.  
468 BW 105.1, read with BW 3:306.  
469 “(1) A possessor is in good faith if he reasonably regards himself as being entitled to the property.  
(2) If a possessor is in good faith, he is deemed as remaining so.  
(3) Good faith is deemed to be present, the absence of good faith must be proven.”  
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possession, 471 since subsequent mala fides does not negate earlier good faith.472 Thus, it is 
possible to acquire property through BW 3:99.1, even if a possessor later discovers that she is 
not entitled to the property.473 Whether a person possessed property in good faith is 
determined at the moment that she obtained possession.474 Accordingly, a thief cannot qualify 
as a possessor in good faith.475 Since the Burgerlijk Wetboek deems the presence of good 
faith, the onus rests on a party averring its absence.   
 
When someone obtains possession through transfer and such transfer was defective for some 
reason,476 the transferee will not hold in good faith if she had known – or should have known 
– of the existence of the defect.477 Accordingly, a transferee obtains possession in good faith 
if she did not know, or ought not to have known, of the defect.478 Possible defects include 
incapacity on the side of the transferor, absence of valid title479 or non-compliance with 
registration for purposes of transferring land.480 Regarding the last-mentioned defect, one has 
to distinguish between an error of law and an error of fact.481 BW 3:89 requires registration in 
cases involving the sale of land. If registration did not occur because the transferee was 
unaware of BW 3:89 (error of law), then she cannot be in good faith.482 However, if the buyer 
(transferee) commissioned an attorney (a notary in Dutch law) to complete the registration 
and the attorney neglects to do this (error of fact), then she can be bona fide.483  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
470 See also BW 3:11. For an application of this criterion, see HR 8 September 2000, NJ 2000, 629.  
471 BW 3:118.2. For example, see HR 8 September 2000, NJ 2000, 629; HR 20 June 1997, NJ 1999, 301.  
472 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338; Van Zeben CJ et al 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 408-410. This is in line with the 
position in Roman law: See section 2.2.2 of chapter two above. 
473 See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338; Van Zeben CJ et al 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 408. 
474 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
475 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
476 By, for instance, not complying with the requirements set out in BW 3:84.1. 
477 BW 3:11. The defect should not have been easily discoverable: See Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
478 BW 3:11; BW 3:118.1. See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
479 HR 30 November 1945, NJ 1946, 49. 
480 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 430; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
481 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 430. 
482 BW 3:11. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 430; Reehuis WHM & 
Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
483 BW 3:11. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 430; Reehuis WHM & 
Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
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As seen above, BW 3:118.2 requires bona fides to be present the moment a person obtains 
possession.484 Should the possessor later realise that someone else is the owner, this 
knowledge will not negate the earlier bona fide possession.485 Consequently, the possessor is 
still able to acquire ownership over the property through good faith prescription under these 
circumstances. It is even possible for a possessor who was not initially in good faith to 
become bona fide.486 The Dutch Supreme Court described this possibility as follows:  
 
“[D]at [is] [niet] uitgesloten dat een bezitter, die op het tijdstip waarop hij het bezit verkreeg 
niet te goeder trouw was, op een later tijdstip ten aanzien van dat bezit alsnog te goeder trouw 
wordt met als gevolg dat vanaf dit laatste tijdstip de gevolgen gelden die de wet aan het bezit te 
goeder trouw verbindt.”487 
 
However, this change of fides does not operate retrospectively, since possession only starts to 
be in good faith once the possessor becomes bona fide.488 In this scenario, the running of 
prescription commences in favour of the possessor on the day after such possessor became 
bona fide.489 One finds an example in situations regarding the transfer of land, where an entry 
into the public register is required before possession can be bona fide.490 Once the possessor 
has completed this registration process, her possession is regarded as bona fide.491 Although 
this example is not fully correct from a legal point of view, it does help to clarify the 
situation.492 
 
                                                             
484 Confirmed in HR 8 September 2000, NJ 2000, 629; HR 20 June 1997, NJ 1999, 301. 
485 BW 3:118.2. For example, see HR 20 June 1997, NJ 1999, 301. See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 408, 410. 
486 HR 20 June 1997, NJ 1999, 301. See also Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) 
para 252; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 430; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 444. 
487  HR 20 June 1997, NJ 1999, 301. (“[I]t [is] [not] excluded that a possessor, who initially obtained 
possession in bad faith, may at a later stage become a good faith possessor. Time will only start to run in his 
favour as a bona fide possessor from the moment he obtained good faith.”) See also HR 8 September 2000, 
NJ 2000, 629. 
488 HR 20 June 1997, NJ 1999, 301. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening 
van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 430; 
Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
489 BW 3:101. 
490 BW 3:89. For example, see HR 8 September 2000, NJ 2000, 629. See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 412. 
491 Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 412. 
492 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 430 criticise this example because possession 
cannot be transferred separately from the right. Since registration is required for the transfer of immovables, 
according to BW 3:89.1, the buyer will not be able to possess the immovable property before the registration is 
completed. Nonetheless, I use this example merely to illustrate the possibility of becoming bona fide at a later 
stage. 
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Knowledge of the actual facts or law negates a possessor’s good faith.493 This is also the case 
when a possessor is unaware of the facts or law, but ought to have been aware of them.494 The 
law, under these circumstances, deems a possessor to have been aware of the facts or the law, 
despite whether it is impossible to ascertain these aspects.495 When a person obtains 
possession by dispossessing the owner, the law is reluctant to deem such a possessor as being 
in good faith.496  
 
When someone obtains possession through general or universal title (under the law of 
succession, for instance), the law attributes the legal predecessor’s fides to the successor 
irrespective of whether the latter was in good or bad faith.497 This is in line with the position 
under Roman law.498 Hence, if the predecessor was in good faith, the successor is able to 
acquire the property through good faith prescription under BW 3:99.1, even though the 
successor may actually be in bad faith. Should the predecessor have been in bad faith, the 
successor is – despite her fides – unable to acquire the property through BW 3:99.1. However, 
it may still be possible for her to acquire the property through the provisions regulating bad 
faith prescription, namely BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306.499  
 
A possessor of land is in bad faith if she – being unaware of the facts – is able to ascertain the 
true state of affairs by investigating the register.500 Such a possessor is, therefore, unlikely to 
acquire land through good faith prescription, since good faith depends on consultation of the 
registers.501 Nonetheless, the law does not automatically regard a possessor as being in bad 
faith in the context of boundary disputes simply because she did not consult the cadastral 
maps.502 The cadastral maps show the exact boundaries as determined by surveyors, 
something that the public register does not do.503 Yet, non-investigation of the cadastral maps 
could still amount to an absence of good faith even in instances where the actual boundaries 
                                                             
493 BW 3:11. 
494 BW 3:11. 
495 BW 3:11. See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 434. 
496 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
497 BW 3:116.  
498 For the position in Roman law, see section 2.2.2 of chapter two above. 
499 The 20-year period is laid down in BW 3:306. 
500 BW 3:23. 
501 The land can still be acquired through BW 3:105 if the possessor is mala fide, although the period of 
prescription will then be 20 years, according to BW 3:306. 
502 HR 20 February 1987, NJ 1987, 1002. See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 
2006) para 338; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) 
Book 3 1095. 
503 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
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are uncertain.504 Scenarios where investigation by the possessor is less essential are contained 
in BW 5:36, which provides the following: 
 
“Dient een muur, hek, heg of greppel, dan wel een niet bevaarbaar stromend water, een sloot, 
gracht of dergelijke watergang als afscheiding van twee erven, dan wordt het midden van deze 
afscheiding vermoed de grens tussen deze erven te zijn. Dit vermoeden geldt niet, indien een 
muur slechts aan één zijde een gebouw of werk steunt.”505 
 
BW 3:100 creates an exception to BW 3:99.1 by disallowing the possibility of acquiring a 
deceased person’s estate through good faith prescription. It is only possible to acquire that 
property after the owner’s legal claim to reclaim possession has expired.506 
 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Mala fide (bad faith) prescription 
According to BW 3:105.1, a possessor is able to acquire property possessed in bad faith once 
the owner’s legal claim towards that property is extinguished through (extinctive) prescription 
after 20 years.507 Consequently, a possessor becomes entitled to the property at the expiration 
of the prescription period.508 A possessor is in bad faith when “the possessor knows that the 
thing in his possession does not belong to him.”509 
 
BW 3:99.1 requires the bona fide possessor to possess land for 10 years before she can 
acquire it through verkrijgende verjaring. BW 3:105.1 does not require a possessor to possess 
property for a certain period, but merely requires that property be possessed at the moment 
the owner’s legal claim is extinguished.510 Mijnssen et al are of the opinion that this type of 
prescription is not acquisitive prescription in the formal sense, but rather a special type of 
prescription.511 Nonetheless, many authors regard this form of prescription as being 
                                                             
504 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 338. 
505 “Where a wall, fence, hedge, trench or non-navigable running water, ditch, canal or similar waterway serves 
as a boundary between properties, the middle of this boundary is presumed to be the dividing line between these 
properties. This presumption is rebutted if a wall supports a building or work only on one side.” (Translation by 
Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 608.) 
506 BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306. 
507 BW 3:306. 
508 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 248; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s 
Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht 
(15th ed 2006) para 431. 
509 HR 8 September 2000, NJ 2000, 629: “[D]e bezitter kennis draagt dat de zaak, welke hij bezit, aan hem niet 
in eigendom toebehoort.” (“[T]he possessor knows that the thing in his possession does not belong to him.”) 
510 See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 344a. 
511 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 431. To the contrary is Van Zeben CJ et al 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 419. 
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acquisitive in nature.512 Thus, although the extinguishment of the owner’s right to reclaim the 
property is an example of extinctive prescription, Dutch law confers full ownership on the 
mala fide possessor the moment that the owner’s legal claim extinguishes.513 This type of 
prescription is reminiscent of the effects of the year-and-a-day rule under Roman-Dutch 
law.514   
 
The prescription of the owner’s legal claim commences on the day after the one on which the 
owner obtained the right to reclaim the property,515 or the day after which a person acquired 
possession over the owner’s property.516 This type of prescription runs regardless of the time 
the property remained in the hands of different possessors.517 In other words, the initial 
possessor may transfer possession to a second possessor in the nineteenth year of the 
prescription period. The new possessor then only has to possess the property for one year to 
acquire ownership. The absence of good faith plays no role here, as no specific period has to 
be satisfied.518 This is because this type of prescription runs against the owner’s legal claim 
and not in favour of the possessor. BW 3:105.1 only applies to the person who possessed the 
property at the time when the owner’s legal claim towards that property is extinguished. If the 
possessor involuntarily loses possession of the property, but regains possession within one 
year or through a legal action instituted within one year of such loss, the law deems her as 
being the possessor for purposes of BW 3:105.1.519 
 
 
3.3.2.2.4 The periods required for prescription 
The possessor must have been in possession of the property for the full duration of the 
prescription period for purposes of BW 3:99.1.520 The type of property determines the length 
                                                             
512 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) paras 248, 254; Reehuis WHM & 
Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 344; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van 
het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 416, 419. 
513 This type of prescription is regarded as acquisitive in nature, which implies that the possessor acquires full 
ownership of the property in question: See the sources cited in the previous footnote above. 
514 See section 2.2.3 of chapter two above. 
515 BW 3:314.1. 
516 BW 3:314.2. 
517 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 431. 
518 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 431. 
519 BW 3:105.2. 
520 BW 3:99.1 requires possession to be uninterrupted. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot 
de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) 
para 432. 
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of the prescription period. Rights to unregistered movable property,521 together with rights 
vesting in the bearer or order of a cheque, can be acquired through prescription in three 
years.522 The prescription period for land, which forms the focus of this dissertation, is 10 
years.523 The three-year period for unregistered movables is analogous to that of usucapio 
under Roman law, which also had a three-year period for movables.524  
 
The reason that Dutch law has a 10-year period for land is because it views this period as 
providing ample time for owners to enforce their rights.525 This position differs from South 
African law, where a 30-year prescription period is required for acquiring ownership in 
land.526 The running of prescription commences on the day after the one on which a person 
obtained possession527 and is completed on the last day of the requisite period at 12 pm.528 
The period for (extinctive) prescription, namely the extinction of the owner’s legal claim, is 
set at 20 years.529 
 
 
3.3.2.2.5 Coniunctio temporum (aggregation of prescription periods) 
As under the 1969 Prescription Act of South Africa,530 the Burgerlijk Wetboek also provides 
for coniunctio temporum: 
 
“Hij die een ander onder algemene titel in het bezit opvolgt, zet een lopende verjaring voort.”531 
  
BW 3:102.1 specifically provides for the aggregation of periods of possession between 
predecessors and successors who succeeded one another under universal or general title. This 
means that the successor is able to succeed the predecessor in her possession for purposes of 
                                                             
521 “Niet-registergoederen”. 
522 BW 3:99.1. 
523 BW 3:99.1. 
524 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 432; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 409. See further section 2.2.2 of chapter two 
above. 
525 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 432; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 409. 
526 See section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
527 BW 3:101. 
528 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 433. 
529 BW 3:306. 
530 See section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
531 BW 3:102.1: “He who succeeds another under general title [under, for instance, succession law] regarding 
possession, continues the running of prescription.” 
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prescription. This type of succession is qualified, though, since a successor under algemene 
titel (general or universal title) succeeds to the predecessor’s right of possession with all its 
characteristics.532 Thus, if the predecessor was mala fide, the successor is deemed as also 
being in bad faith, despite whether the successor may actually have been in good faith.533 It 
follows that if the predecessor possessed in good faith, the successor is then – despite her own 
fides – regarded as continuing possession in good faith.534 This is in accordance with the 
position under Roman law, as seen in the historical overview in the previous chapter.535  
 
BW 3:102.2 also provides for the aggregation of periods of possession:  
 
“Hetzelfde doet de bezitter te goeder trouw die het bezit van een ander anders dan onder 
algemene titel heeft verkregen.”536 
 
One has to distinguish the acquisition of possession under general or universal title (as in the 
law of succession) from that under specific title (as in the context of a sales agreement).537 
The qualification found in BW 3:102.2 stipulates that the transferee can only continue the 
prescription clocked up by the transferor if the transferee was bona fide. Should the transferee 
later become aware of the true state of affairs, this does not negate her good faith.538 Thus, it 
is clear that the fides of the transferor is irrelevant for purposes of BW 3:102.2.  
 
Coniunctio temporum is irrelevant for purposes of BW 3:105.1, since this provision provides 
for the extinction of the owner’s legal claim towards the property. Accordingly, the time that 
the property in question spent in the hands of different possessors is immaterial when it comes 
to the extinction of the owner’s legal claim, as discussed above.539  
 
 
3.3.2.3  Interruption (stuiting) and postponement (verlenging) of prescription 
                                                             
532 BW 3:116. See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 468. 
533 BW 3:102.1, read with BW 3:116. See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 
2006) para 340a. 
534 BW 3:102.1, read with BW 3:116. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening 
van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 434; 
Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 340a. 
535 See section 2.2.2 of chapter two above. 
536 “The same [as in BW 3:102.1] applies to the possessor in good faith, who obtains possession from another 
in cases other than under general title.”  
537 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 435; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 340a. 
538 BW 3:118.2. 
539 See section 3.3.2.2.3 above. 
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3.3.2.3.1 Introduction 
Certain events are capable of interrupting the running of prescription, causing prescription to 
start running de novo.540 Interruption (stuiting) occurs if the owner makes a claim towards the 
property, the possessor loses possession of the property or if the possessor acknowledges the 
rights of the owner.541  
 
Should a postponing impediment (verlengingsgrond) be present during the running of 
prescription, completion of the prescription period is postponed for six months after the 
impediment has fallen away.542 This also applies to situations where prescription would have 
completed within six months after the postponing impediment ceased to exist.543  
Postponement is based on the widely accepted rationale that prescription ought not to run 
against those who are incapable of managing their own affairs.544 The previous Civil Code 
referred to postponement as schorsing (postponement in the true sense), which entailed that 
prescription was postponed from completion as long as the postponing impediment existed.545 
Verlenging (prolonging) replaced schorsing under the new Burgerlijk Wetboek in BW 3:320. 
For ease of reference, I continue to refer to this notion as “postponement”, instead of using the 
correct English translation, namely “prolonging”. BW 3:321, discussed below, contains the 
grounds for postponement.  
 
 
3.3.2.3.2 Interruption (stuiting) of prescription 
Interruption can be either natural or civil.546 Natural interruption occurs when a possessor 
loses possession of the property.547 In cases involving involuntary loss of possession (through, 
for instance, theft or negligence), interruption does not take place under the following 
circumstances: 
 
i) if possession is regained within one year; or 
                                                             
540 BW 3:316-3:319. 
541 BW 3:316.1, BW 3:117.1 and BW 3:318, read with BW 3:104.1.  
542 BW 3:320. 
543 BW 3:320, read with BW 3:104.1. 
544 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 437. 
545 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 437. 
546 BW 3:117; BW 3:316. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) paras 438-439. 
547 BW 3:117. 
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ii) if legal proceedings instituted within one year after the loss of possession leads 
to the recovery of possession over the property.548  
 
Should the possessor transfer possession under specific title to someone other than the owner, 
prescription continues to run in favour of the transferee.549 Natural interruption is only 
applicable to acquisitive prescription and does not apply to extinctive prescription.550 
However, civil interruption may occur in the context of both acquisitive and extinctive 
prescription.551  
 
Civil interruption occurs when the owner asserts a legal claim towards the property, or lodges 
a claim to regain possession of the property.552 It also occurs when the possessor obtains a 
binding opinion and then realises that she is not owner.553 Interruption may also occur by way 
of a letter of demand554 if the letter of demand is followed – within six months – by an act that 
constitutes interruption as mentioned in BW 3:316.555  
 
Should the owner’s claim to regain possession fail for whatever reason, BW 3:316.2  provides 
that prescription will only be interrupted if the owner – within a period of six months after 
judgment was given against her – institutes a new claim that leads to judgment against the 
possessor.556 If the owner abandons her claim, prescription will not be interrupted.557 
Acknowledging the rights of the owner in any way, including conduct by the possessor,558 
                                                             
548 BW 3:103. This position is remarkably similar to current South African prescription law: See section 2.3.3 of 
chapter two above. 
549 BW 3:102.2. 
550 The type of prescription in BW 3:105.1 only provides for the extinction of the owner’s legal claim towards 
the property. Therefore, it does not matter for what length of time a person was in possession, for she acquires 
that property the moment the owner’s legal claim prescribes. Interruption does therefore not play any role in this 
regard. BW 3:105.2 provides that if a person who possessed property in terms of BW 3:105.1 involuntarily loses 
possession and the period of prescription expires, she will be entitled to the property if she regains possession 
within one year of losing it, or if legal action instituted within one year after such loss leads to the regaining of 
possession. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 438; Van Zeben CJ et al 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 932. 
551 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 438. 
552 BW 3:317, read with BW 3:316.1.  
553 BW 3:316.3. See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 514. 
554 BW 3:317.2. 
555 BW 3:317. 
556 BW 3:116.2. Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk 
Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 439; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 934. 
557 BW 3:116.2. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 439. 
558 BW 3:37.1. 
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also interrupts the running of prescription.559 The acknowledgement must be made towards 
the person against whom prescription is running.560 When the running of prescription is 
interrupted due to a legal remedy or action instituted by one of the parties, prescription does 
not commence again before proceedings are terminated.561 The taking of possession from the 
first possessor also interrupts the running of prescription.562 
 
 
3.3.2.3.3 Postponement (verlenging or prolonging) of prescription 
The previous Civil Code used the concept of postponement (schorsing) as understood in the 
Roman-Dutch sense of the word.563 This entailed that prescription would not run against the 
owner at all during the presence of a postponing impediment, with the remainder of the 
prescription period continuing to run only after the impediment has fallen away. This position 
is identical to postponement under the common law position in South African prescription 
law at the time of the 1943 Prescription Act.564 However, as with South Africa,565 the new 
Burgerlijk Wetboek opted for a more equitable approach in BW 3:320.566   
 
Postponement of prescription occurs in a limited number of situations.567 Would the 
prescription period have been completed but for the postponing impediment, it has to run for 
an additional six months after the impediment has fallen away.568 The same happens if the 
running of prescription would have been completed within six months after the impediment 
has fallen away. In this regard, the completion of prescription is postponed for an additional 
six months.569 The rationale behind postponement in Dutch law is similar to that of South 
                                                             
559 BW 3:318. 
560 HR 10 June 1983, NJ 1984, 294. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening 
van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 439. 
561 BW 3:324.2. See also Warendorf H et al The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 516. 
562 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 253; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 412. 
563 Schorsing in the true sense: See BW 2023-2029 (old). See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 937. The Roman-Dutch position is discussed in 
section 2.3.4 of chapter two above. 
564 See section 2.3.4 of chapter two above. 
565 See section 2.3.4 of chapter two above. 
566 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 440; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 937. 
567 BW 3:321. 
568 BW 3:320. 
569 BW 3:320. 
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African law, namely to prevent prescription running against those who are incapable of 
managing their own affairs.570  
 
According to BW 3:321, prescription is postponed in cases where it is running between 
 
i) spouses who are not judicially separated; 
ii) a curator acting on behalf of a person who cannot administer her own affairs; 
iii) an administrator (bewindvoerder) and a principal on whose behalf she is acting, 
regarding claims concerning the agency agreement; 
iv)  a juristic person and its management; 
v) a succession accepted under the benefit of inventory and an heir; 
vi) a creditor and her debtor who intentionally conceals the existence or 
claimability of the debt; and 
vii) registered partners. 
 
The cases of postponement mentioned under (ii) and (iii) continue to be effective until the 
legal relationship between the curator (or administrator) and the incapacitated person (or 
principal) ends.571  These grounds for postponement are, however, not all applicable to the 
postponement of acquisitive prescription.572 For instance, ground (vi) only applies to cases 
involving extinctive prescription, since it refers to “debts”. Prima facie, the same would seem 
to apply to ground (iii), which refers to “claims”. However, ground (iii) may also be 
applicable in cases of acquisitive prescription where the administrator is in charge of property 
of the principal.573 Under these circumstances, it is clear that the administrator is not able to 
acquire the principal’s property through acquisitive prescription as long as the agency 
agreement is in force.574  
 
 
3.4 French law 
3.4.1 Introduction 
                                                             
570 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 440. For the position in South African law, see 
section 2.3.4 of chapter two above. 
571 BW 3:321.2. 
572 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 440. 
573 BW 3:111. See also Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) paras 428a, 440. 
574 BW 3:111.  
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French law also recognises the distinction between ownership and possession, with ownership 
being the legal relationship between a person and property, whereas possession entails factual 
control by a person over property.575 This distinction is not self-evident when the owner is in 
possession of her property. Yet, as soon as ownership and possession separate, it becomes 
possible to acquire ownership through acquisitive prescription. French law knows acquisitive 
prescription as prescription acquisitive or usucapion.576 As in the other systems under 
discussion, French law also has specific requirements for the acquisition of property through 
prescription acquisitive.  
 
Prescription acquisitive is justified in that long periods of possession create a presumption of 
ownership, to which the law affords de iure status if it has continued for a sufficient length of 
time.577 Furthermore, prescription is an original method of acquisition of ownership in French 
law,578 as in South African law.579 The provisions of the French Civil Code (“Code Civil”) 
relating to usucapion were amended in 2008,580 both in form and content.581  
 
 
3.4.2 Prescription acquisitive (acquisitive prescription) and its requirements 
3.4.2.1  Introduction and the role of possession 
Article 2258 of the Code Civil contains the following definition for prescription acquisitive: 
 
“La prescription acquisitive est un moyen d’acquérir un bien ou un droit par l’effet de la 
possession sans que celui qui l’allègue soit obligé d’en rapporter un titre ou qu’on puisse lui 
opposer l’exception déduite de la mauvaise foi.”582 
                                                             
575 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 378; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to 
French Law (2008) 155. 
576 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 378; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to 
French Law (2008) 155-156. 
577 See generally Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 378, 395; Bermann GA & Picard E 
Introduction to French Law (2008) 156, 159; Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 
2008) 277. See also Sagaert V “Prescription in French and Belgian Property Law after the Pye Judgment” 
(2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 265-272 269. The justifications behind prescription are discussed 
more fully in chapter four below. 
578 Articles 2258 and 2219 of the Civil Code. See also Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 
395; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to French Law (2008) 156, 158; Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S 
Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 277. 
579 See section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
580 Law of 17 June 2008. 
581 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 395. The article numbers used in the discussion 
below are the numbers as they appear after the amendment. 
582 “Acquisitive prescription is a way of acquiring a thing or a right through possession without the person 
invoking prescription being required to show a title for the acquisition and without the possibility of opposing to 
him the exception of bad faith.” (Translation by Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune 
Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 97.) 
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In other words, one is able to acquire both property and limited real rights (such as servitudes) 
through prescription acquisitive.  
 
The main requirement for prescription in French law is possession, which Article 2255 
defines as follows: 
 
“La possession est la détention ou la jouissance d’une chose ou d’un droit que nous tenons ou 
que nous exerçons par nous-mêmes, ou par un autre qui la tient ou qui l’exerce en notre 
nom.”583    
 
French law also distinguishes between possession and mere holdership. Possession consists of 
two elements, namely the physical element (corpus) and a mental element, which is the 
intention to hold the thing for oneself (animo domini).584 These two elements are identical to 
those required for possession in South African and Dutch prescription law.585 It is worth 
reiterating that it is “easier” to satisfy the requisite form of intent in English adverse 
possession law, which merely requires a person to intend to possess the property (animus 
possidendi).586 Therefore, a case based on similar facts as that of Pye would not easily have 
succeeded under French prescription law.587 
 
One must not confuse the concepts of animus domini and good faith, since a possessor with 
animus domini acts as if owner, while a possessor in good faith truly believes that she is the 
owner.588 Consequently, it is possible for the animus domini and bad faith to co-exist, since 
the fides of a possessor is irrelevant when determining whether the animus domini is present 
for purposes of prescription acquisitive.589 
                                                             
583“Possession is the holding or the enjoyment of an object or of a right that we have or hold for ourselves, or by 
another who has or holds it for us.” (Translation by Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (eds) Ius 
Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 100.) 
584 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 393; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to 
French Law (2008) 156. See also Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book 
(forthcoming 2012) 100. 
585 See section 2.3.2.1 of chapter two above for the South African position. The Dutch position appears from BW 
3:107 and is discussed in section 3.3.2.2.1 above. 
586 See the discussion in section 3.2.2.3.2.3 above. 
587 For a discussion in this regard, see Sagaert V “Prescription in French and Belgian Property Law after the Pye 
Judgment” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 265-272 and Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van 
Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot het Debat over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig 
Weekblad 1582-1597. Both these articles appeared before the 2008 amendments to the Code Civil. The facts of 
the Pye case are discussed in section 3.2.3.2 above. 
588 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 393; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to 
French Law (2008) 156. 
589 Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to French Law (2008) 156; Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles 
of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 277.  
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A détenteur or holder – unlike a possessor – does not hold property animo domini, as she 
intends to hold the property on behalf of someone else and not for herself.590 Therefore, 
lessees and borrowers are merely holders in French law and are unable to hold the property 
with the animus domini. This position is identical to that in South African and Dutch 
prescription law.591 Once a person obtains possession, it continues even if the possessor 
exercises no acts of factual possession over the property.592 
 
Besides the requisite possession, the possessor also has to satisfy other prescription 
requirements set out in Article 2261 of the Code Civil:  
 
“Pour pouvoir prescrire, il faut une possession continue et non interrompue, paisible, publique, 
non équivoque, et à titre de propriétaire.”593  
 
Since these “requirements” inherently form part of possession, it is incorrect to refer to them 
as “additional” requirements.594 Should one of these requirements be absent, possession is 
“vitiated” and the possessor is then unable to acquire the property through prescription.595 
The requirement that possession must be unequivocal has – as in English law – given rise to 
problems pertaining to its definition.596 It is generally assumed that in a dispute between a 
possessor and an owner regarding ownership, possession by the possessor will be equivocal if 
the possessor and owner have been cohabiting or if they were co-owners.597 Under these 
circumstances, it is clear that the “possessor” will merely qualify as a holder, who is unable to 
acquire the property through prescription acquisitive. The requirement that possession must 
be unequivocal overlaps to some degree with the condition that possession must also be 
                                                             
590 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 393; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to 
French Law (2008) 156; Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 278. 
591 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above for the South African position. The Dutch position is discussed in 
section 3.3.2.2.1 above. 
592 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 103. 
593 “In order to complete the prescription, possession as an owner is required; it has to be continuous and 
uninterrupted, peaceful, publicly visible, unequivocal.” (Translation by Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp 
JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 109.) See also Steiner E French Law – A Comparative 
Approach (2010) 396; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to French Law (2008) 156. See generally Bell J, 
Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 278-279. 
594 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 109. 
595 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
596 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
597 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396; Bermann GA & Picard E Introduction to 
French Law (2008) 156. See also Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book 
(forthcoming 2012) 112. 
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without permission from the owner.598 It is trite law that precarious possession cannot give 
rise to acquisition of ownership through prescription.599 
 
 
3.4.2.2  Periods required for acquisitive prescription 
Article 2272 of the Code Civil sets the periods for prescription as follows: 
 
“Le délai de prescription requis pour acquérir la propriété immobilière est de trente ans. 
Toutefois, celui qui acquiert de bonne foi et par juste titre un immeuble en prescrit la propriété 
par dix ans.” 600 
 
The running of prescription commences when the claimant, or her predecessor in title, obtains 
possession over the property.601 According to Article 2272, the prescription period for land 
possessed in bad faith is 30 years. If the possessor seeks to acquire land in good faith and 
under just title, the prescription period is reduced to 10 years. The law presumes the presence 
of good faith and, as in Dutch law,602 the onus rests on the party alleging bad faith.603 Article 
550 of the Code Civil defines good faith as “where [the possessor] possesses as an owner 
under a title whose defects are not known to him.”604 In other words, bona fides requires the 
possessor to believe that she acquired ownership from the owner.605 A possessor is in good 
faith if she neither knew, nor could have known, that the transferor was unauthorised to 
dispose of the property.606  
 
As to supervening mala fides, Article 550 of the Code Civil provides that “[the possessor] 
ceases to be in good faith from the moment in time when those defects become known to 
him.”607 Therefore, supervening bad faith negates earlier good faith, which is in line with the 
                                                             
598 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 116. This is 
comparable to the “adverse” requirement in English adverse possession law, see section 3.2.2.3.1 above. 
599 Articles 2236 and 2240 of the Code Civil. See also Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius 
Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 116. 
600 “Ownership of immovable property is acquired by prescription following a period of time of 30 years. 
However, a person who acquires an immovable in good faith (bona fides) and under just title (iustus titulus) 
prescribes ownership of it by 10 years.” (Translation by Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach 
(2010) 396.) See also the translation by Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case 
Book (forthcoming 2012) 100. 
601 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 278. 
602 See section 3.3.2.2.2 above. 
603 Article 2274 of the Code Civil. See also Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
604 Translation by Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
605 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 104. 
606 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 104. 
607 Article 550 of the Code Civil. Translation by Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
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position under Canon law.608 This is contrary to the position in Dutch law, where supervening 
bad faith does not negate good faith if the possessor obtained possession bona fide.609  
 
French jurists define “just title” (or valid legal ground) as a title that would have conveyed 
ownership were it not for the transferor’s lack of ownership or power of disposal.610 It follows 
that a “just title” is in fact an imperfect title.611 However, for purposes of prescription 
acquisitive, this imperfect title is “good enough” as long as it is the only defect present.612 Any 
other defect, such as incapacity or non-compliance with formalities, disqualifies title from 
being “just”.613 Van Vliet gives an example of a just title as being “a contract of sale or a 
contract creating a servitude.”614   
 
 
3.4.2.3  Aggregation of prescription periods (coniunctio temporum) 
It is not required that one person should have possessed the property for the entire 10- or 30-
year period to acquire ownership through prescription acquisitive.615 This is due to Article 
2265 of the Code Civil, which provides as follows: 
 
“Pour compléter la prescription, on peut joindre à sa possession celle de son auteur, de quelque 
manière qu'on lui ait succédé, soit à titre universel ou particulier, soit à titre lucratif ou 
onéreux.” 616 
 
The universal successor takes over all qualities attached to the possession of her 
predecessor.617 Subsequently, if the predecessor was in bad faith, the law then deems the 
universal successor also to be in bad faith, even though she may actually be in good faith. On 
the other hand, if the universal successor was bona fide, the successor is deemed to be in good 
faith, regardless of her actual fides. The singular or specific successor, such as a buyer, 
                                                             
608 See section 2.2.2 of chapter two above. 
609  See section 3.3.2.2.2 above. 
610 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. See also Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van 
Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 106. 
611 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
612 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
613 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396-397. 
614 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 100, 106. 
615 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 278; Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in 
Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 122. 
616 “To complete a prescription, one may join to one’s possession that of one’s predecessor, in whatever manner 
one may have succeeded to him, whether by virtue of a universal or specific title, whether for value or 
gratuitously.” (Translation by Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book 
(forthcoming 2012) 122.) 
617 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 122. 
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determines her own fides, since the fides of such a successor does not depend on that of the 
predecessor.618 
 
 
3.4.2.4  Suspension of the prescription period 
Suspension of the running of prescription takes place where the owner is unable to bring 
action.619 Grounds for suspension include where the owner is a minor or where she is 
incapable of managing her own affairs, for instance due to mental incapacity.620 Supervening 
force (vis maior) affecting the owner may suspend the prescription period, but this only 
applies where the event makes it impossible for the owner to prevent the running of 
prescription.621 
 
 
3.5 German law 
German law has an extremely rigorous regime in the context of prescription (Ersitzung) of 
land due to the positive nature of its registration system. Consequently, most cases based on 
Ersitzung are unlikely to succeed. The discussion of German prescription law will therefore 
be brief. 
 
§ 900 of the German Civil Code (“Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch” or “BGB”) regulates Ersitzung 
of land and provides as follows: 
 
“(1) Wer als Eigentümer eines Grundstücks im Grundbuch eingetragen ist, ohne dass er das 
Eigentum erlangt hat, erwirbt das Eigentum, wenn die Eintragung 30 Jahre bestanden und er 
während dieser Zeit das Grundstück im Eigenbesitz gehabt hat. Die dreißigjährige Frist wird in 
derselben Weise berechnet wie die Frist für die Ersitzung einer beweglichen Sache. Der Lauf 
der Frist ist gehemmt, solange ein Widerspruch gegen die Richtigkeit der Eintragung im 
Grundbuch eingetragen ist. 
 
(2) Diese Vorschriften finden entsprechende Anwendung, wenn für jemand ein ihm nicht 
zustehendes anderes Recht im Grundbuch eingetragen ist, das zum Besitz des Grundstücks 
berechtigt oder dessen Ausübung nach den für den Besitz geltenden Vorschriften.”622 
                                                             
618 Van Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 122. 
619 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 278. 
620 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 278. 
621 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 278. 
622 “(1) A person who has been registered in the land registry as owner of a piece of land, without having wanted 
the right of ownership, acquires the right of ownership when the registration has existed for 30 years and he has 
been in possession of the land for his own benefit for that time. The thirty-year period is calculated in the same 
way as the period for prescription of a movable object. The running of the prescription period is interrupted as 
long as an objection to the accuracy of the registration in the Land Register is registered.  
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The main requirement is that the possessor must have been registered as owner in the Land 
Register (Grundbuch) for prescription to run in her favour.623 Furthermore, the possessor 
must possess the property animo domini.624 Possession animo domini need not be in good 
faith, since the intention to possess as owner can co-exist with mala fides.625 The animus 
domini and registration in the Grundbuch must coincide for the full duration of the 30-year 
prescription period.626 Once these requirements are satisfied, the possessor acquires 
ownership by way of original acquisition of ownership.627 Consequently, Ersitzung 
extinguishes any legal claim to the land held by third parties when the possessor acquires 
ownership through prescription.628  
 
The purpose behind BGB § 900 is to afford de iure status to long-existing de facto 
situations.629 Thus, Ersitzung aims to avoid the situation where the ownership of land and the 
reality of possession do not reside in the same person.630 Another purpose of Ersitzung is to 
prevent the probatio diabolica (devil’s burden) when having to prove ownership.631 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(2) These provisions are applicable mutatis mutandis when a right has been registered in the Land Register for a 
person who is not entitled to it, that gives a right to possession or the exercise of which is protected by the 
provisions on possession. The order of registration is decisive for the priority of the right.” (Translation by Van 
Vliet LPW “Creation” in Van Erp JHM (ed) Ius Commune Case Book (forthcoming 2012) 132.) 
623 Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th 
ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 3; Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 900 
RdNr 3. 
624 Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th 
ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 4; Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 900 
RdNr 3. Animus domini is defined in BGB § 872: “Wer eine Sache als ihm gehörend besitzt, ist Eigenbesitzer.” 
(“A person who holds a thing for himself has animus domini.”) I am indebted to Viola Wilke from the 
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg for her assistance in translating the German sources. 
625 Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th 
ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 1, 4; Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 900 
RdNr 3. This is similar to South African prescription law: See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter 2 above.  
626 Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th 
ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 5. 
627 Vieweg K & Werner A Sachenrecht (4th ed 2010) § 6 RdNr 8; Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 6; Palandt O 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 900 RdNr 5. 
628 Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th 
ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 6; Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 900 
RdNr 1. 
629 Vieweg K & Werner A Sachenrecht (4th ed 2010) § 6 RdNr 8; Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 1; Baur F, Baur JF & 
Stürner R Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) § 53 RdNr 85.  
630 Vieweg K & Werner A Sachenrecht (4th ed 2010) § 6 RdNr 8; Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 1; Baur F, Baur JF & 
Stürner R Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) § 53 RdNr 85; Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by 
Bassenge P et al 2004) § 900 RdNr 1. 
631 Baur F, Baur JF & Stürner R Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) § 53 RdNr 85. 
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BGB § 891 I creates the statutory presumption that the Grundbuch provides conclusive proof 
of a registered right.632 Once a right is registered in the Grundbuch, the register is presumed 
to provide conclusive proof of such right.633 The LRA is to the same effect, stipulating that 
the land register in English law now also provides conclusive proof of registered title.634  In 
German law, the possessor is presumed to be the owner of the land as long as she is registered 
in the Grundbuch.635 One can refute this presumption by proving the opposite or by 
registering a refutation in the Grundbuch.636 It is not necessary to prove the facts for this 
presumption to be effective.637 Accordingly, the burden of proof for proving that the 
Grundbuch is incorrect rests on the party averring it.638 This presumption in favour of the 
correctness of the Grundbuch is the reason why German law is classified as a positive 
registration system. 
 
According to Baur, Baur and Stürner, Ersitzung no longer fulfils a meaningful role in German 
law.639 One may deduce this from the small number of judgments concerning Ersitzung in 
German law today.640 This makes sense, since the strict requirements for acquiring ownership 
in land through BGB § 900 are unlikely to be easily satisfied in practice. However, Ersitzung 
does still have a corrective function, such as when one of the requirements for a valid transfer 
of ownership has not been met.641  
 
It follows that the role of prescription in a jurisdiction with a positive registration system is 
extremely limited. Since the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch presumes the correctness of the 
Grundbuch, it is not possible to argue that prescription fulfils a corrective function regarding 
possession of land. As one of the purposes of this dissertation is to investigate the 
contemporary role of prescription in various legal systems, it appears that prescription fulfils 
                                                             
632 BGB § 891 I. See also Vieweg K & Werner A Sachenrecht (4th ed 2010) § 13 RdNr 8; Palandt O 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 891 RdNr 1. 
633 BGB § 891 I. See also Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 891 
RdNr 2, 5. 
634 Section 58(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
635 Vieweg K & Werner A Sachenrecht (4th ed 2010) § 13 RdNr 8; Baur F, Baur JF & Stürner R Sachenrecht 
(18th ed 2009) § 4 RdNr 12; Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 891 
RdNr 5. 
636 Vieweg K & Werner A Sachenrecht (4th ed 2010) § 13 RdNr 8; Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 
(63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 891 RdNr 1, 8. 
637 Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 891 RdNr 1. 
638 Palandt O Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch vol 7 (63rd ed by Bassenge P et al 2004) § 900 RdNr 4. 
639 Baur F, Baur JF & Stürner R Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) § 6 RdNr 9, § 53 RdNr 86. 
640 Baur F, Baur JF & Stürner R Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) § 53 RdNr 86.  
641 Vieweg K & Werner A Sachenrecht (4th ed 2010) § 6 RdNr 1; Baur F, Baur JF & Stürner R Sachenrecht (18th 
ed 2009) § 6 RdNr 9. 
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a less important function in jurisdictions with positive registration systems, such as German 
and English law. In this sense, a positive registration system provides greater protection to 
owners, especially in English law where it was “easier” – as seen in the Pye case – to acquire 
title in land through adverse possession. This stands in contrast to prescription in civil-law 
countries, where a case with facts similar to those of Pye is unlikely to succeed due to the 
animus domini requirement. For this reason, it was essential to examine how adverse 
possession operates before and after the 2002 Act. Since these recent developments are 
unique to English law, it is unnecessary to examine German prescription law in further detail. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The English law of adverse possession before the enactment of the LRA was by far the most 
“lenient” system when it came to the extinguishment of title through the limitation of actions. 
Due to a friendly interpretation of the animus possidendi requirement, it is even possible for 
squatters offering to pay rent or to give up the property to qualify as possessors. This, coupled 
with the irrelevance of bad faith and a short 12-year limitation period, offers little protection 
to owners in English law. However, the enactment of the 2002 Act has placed England – 
together with Germany – at the forefront of jurisdictions that protect registered owners from 
losing registered land through limitation or prescription. However, since the LRA only 
applies to registered land, it is still possible to acquire title in unregistered land under the rules 
of adverse possession as it stood at the time of Pye. The amendments made to English law 
came as a result of the traditional justifications for adverse possession, such as that it 
promotes legal certainty, no longer applying to registered land when the identity of the 
proprietor can be ascertained by simply perusing the register. This is because the 2002 Act 
now deems the register as providing conclusive proof of title. Chapter four elaborates on the 
reasons why adverse possession or prescription fulfils a more useful role in systems where the 
correctness of the register is not guaranteed. 
 
Although the civil law systems (which include South African, Dutch and French prescription 
law) do not have the same special protection for registered owners as in England, they have a 
much more rigorous animus domini element, which must be met before a person may qualify 
for possession for purposes of prescription. The periods under these systems are also 
considerably longer in the context of mala fide possessors, since Dutch and French law then 
require 20- and 30-year periods respectively. Furthermore, all these legal systems have 
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negative registration systems, which causes prescription to have a corrective function by 
affording de iure status to long-existing de facto realities. Consequently, through more 
stringent requirements, owners in these systems are also protected from the possible injustices 
of prescription, at least when compared to the position of the unregistered owner in English 
law. Nonetheless, this level of protection is not the same as that afforded in German law or to 
registered owners under the LRA.  
 
Prescription of land in South African, Dutch and French law is therefore still possible, 
although longer periods have to be satisfied in the latter two countries involving mala fide 
possessors. Justifying bona fide prescription in these contexts is not at issue, since the 
difficulty seemingly lies with justifying situations where mala fide possessors “steal” 
ownership through prescription. In chapter four, I indicate that the distinction between good 
and bad faith possessors is fallacious in nature and that it serves no useful purpose to 
distinguish between these types of possessors for purposes of prescription. 
 
As it was found that adverse possession or prescription plays a more limited role in countries 
with positive registration systems, the justifications behind this notion need to be scrutinised. 
This is done in chapter four, which specifically focuses on the rationale for prescription 
today.   
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CHAPTER 4: JUSTIFYING ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION – RATIONALE AND 
JURISPRUDENCE  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the traditional justifications behind acquisitive prescription 
(“prescription”), as formulated in each of the jurisdictions under consideration. The 
substantive requirements for prescription or adverse possession in these systems were already 
discussed and are, therefore, not repeated here.1 Instead, the focus of this chapter falls on the 
grounds for justifying prescription in Roman-Dutch, South African, Dutch and French law, 
together with an investigation as to how the justifications for adverse possession were 
recently re-evaluated in English law. It was seen in chapter three that prescription no longer 
fulfils a meaningful role in German law because of the characteristics of its positive 
registration system.2 For this reason, the justifications for prescription in German law are not 
addressed. Following the analysis of the rationale for prescription in the legal systems 
mentioned above, the chapter evaluates the justifications (both those in favour and against) 
for prescription in accordance with three strains of liberal property theory. These theories are 
the labour theory, the personality theory – as developed by Radin – and finally utilitarianism 
and law and economics theory.  
 
This chapter argues that the traditional justifications provided for prescription in the Roman-
Dutch, South African, Dutch and French systems are unsatisfactory. Although the rationale 
for adverse possession has been more extensively analysed (and criticised) in English law in 
light of the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 (“LRA” or “2002 Act”), I find that 
even this approach is lacking in that it fails to incorporate certain moral and economic factors. 
Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the three liberal property theories mentioned above to 
properly investigate the raison d’être behind prescription or adverse possession. Through 
addressing how each of these theories specifically relate to prescription, it is shown that 
prescription or adverse possession concerning land – including registered land – is justified in 
a negative registration system. 
 
                                                             
1 The requirements for prescription or adverse possession are discussed in section 2.3.2 of chapter two (South 
African law) and sections 3.2-3.5 for English, Dutch, French and German law respectively in chapter three 
above. 
2 See the discussion of German prescription law in section 3.5 of chapter three above. 
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The focus finally falls on the acquisition of ownership through bad faith prescription. This 
phenomenon seems to “reward” persons who intentionally occupy property by awarding 
ownership to them, which complicates attempts to justify this manner of acquiring 
ownership.3 Nonetheless, this chapter concludes that the traditional objections against mala 
fide prescription – namely that it should either be impermissible or have longer prescription 
periods than instances involving bona fide possessors – are flawed in certain respects. 
Chapter four illustrates that even “bad faith” prescription is justified in modern legal systems 
if one has regard to the fallacies in these arguments.  
 
 
4.2 The traditional justifications for acquisitive prescription in Roman-Dutch, South 
African, Dutch and French law 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This section only focuses on the justifications for prescription in Roman-Dutch, South 
African, Dutch and French law, since the substantive requirements for prescription in these 
systems were already discussed in the previous two chapters.4 Nonetheless, I briefly restate 
the main requirements for prescription in South African law, namely open and continuous 
possession (possessio civilis)5 of property for 30 years.6 In South African prescription law, 
both bona and mala fides can co-exist with the animus domini-requirement of possessio 
civilis,7 which allows for good and bad faith acquisition of ownership through prescription 
after 30 years. This phenomenon requires further analysis and is addressed below.8 
 
 
4.2.2 Roman-Dutch law 
                                                             
3 See, for instance, Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1095-1186 1097-1098; Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” 
(2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1037-1040. 
4 The substantive requirements of prescription in these systems are discussed in sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.2 of 
chapter two (Roman-Dutch and South African law) and sections 3.3-3.4 of chapter three (Dutch and French law) 
above. 
5 According to Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 160-161, possessio civilis consists 
of factual possession coupled with the animus domini, the intention of holding property as owner. See also 
section 2.3.2.1. of chapter two above. 
6 Section 2(1)-(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See also 
section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
7 Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 8-9; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 474. See also Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 174 and section 
2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
8 See section 4.5 below. 
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Voet – one of the most influential Roman-Dutch authors – denounces Roman law usucapio as 
“embrac[ing] in itself some unfairness.”9 Although the provinces of Holland never received 
usucapio, which caused it not to become part of Roman-Dutch10 or South African law, this 
observation by Voet remains relevant for purposes of discussing the rationale of prescription. 
Most of the rules Voet regards as incidental to usucapio still apply to Roman-Dutch 
prescription law.11 It follows that if the rules of usucapio are incidental to Roman-Dutch 
prescription law, then perhaps the justifications for usucapio are also applicable. 
Consequently, these justifications contribute to a jurisprudential discussion,12 even though 
Voet bases his discussion of the “unfairness” of usucapio on moral and not legal grounds.13  
 
Voet views the “unfairness” of usucapio14 as originating from the fact that Roman law 
usucapio15 only came to be viewed as a “wicked protection” the moment praescriptio longi 
temporis replaced it.16 One can, therefore, argue that Voet regards the period required to 
obtain ownership through usucapio as essential in determining whether it is justifiable or not. 
Accordingly, the current South African form of prescription – with a 30-year period for 
immovables – seems to be even less “wicked” than usucapio or even praescriptio longi 
temporis, since the latter legal institution had 10- and 20-year periods for immovable 
property.17  
 
                                                             
9 Voet 41.3.1. See similarly Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3. Despite the fact that Voet’s discussion 
regarding the justification of usucapio is based on moral and not legal grounds, it proves helpful to investigate 
these grounds to obtain a full view of the important justifications for prescription. For a caveat not to regard 
these “moral” justifications as legal norms, see Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137 and Holmes OW “The 
Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478. However, some authors are of the opinion that 
morals should be taken into account when discussing legal norms. See, for instance, Winfield PH “Ethics in 
English Case Law” (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 112-135 118, where he states that “escape from the moral 
element in law is impossible.” 
10 Voet 44.3.7. 
11 Krause LE “The History and Nature of Acquisitive Prescription and of Limitation of Actions in Roman-Dutch 
Law” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 26-41 32. 
12 The door to which was opened by Grosskopf JA in Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 135. 
13 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137. 
14 Since this chapter only focuses on the justifications behind prescription and not the differences of the 
requirements between modern prescription and Roman law usucapio, “usucapio” can – for purposes of this 
discussion – be read as meaning “prescription”. See similarly Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 136-137. 
15 With a one-year period for movables and a two-year period for immovables: See section 2.2.2 of chapter two 
above. 
16 Voet 41.3.1; Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 136. Under praescriptio longi temporis, immovables could 
be acquired after a period of 10 years inter praesentes or 20 years inter absentes: See section 2.2.2 of chapter 
two above. 
17 Grosskopf JA in Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 138 is of much the same opinion. Regarding the 
requirements of praescriptio longi temporis, see section 2.2.2 of chapter two above. 
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Nonetheless, the content Voet gives to this “unfairness” is not confined to the relevant period, 
but also includes the fact that it is possible for a bad faith possessor to acquire property 
through prescription.18 Voet regards mala fide acquisition through usucapio as the greatest 
unfairness in the framework of prescription.19 In this context bona fides was only required 
when the possessor obtained possession of the property; subsequent mala fides did not 
interrupt usucapio.20 Indeed, it seems difficult to justify bad faith prescription even in modern 
legal systems, as observed in Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and 
Another.21 Yet, despite Voet’s opposition to this unfairness, he tolerates mala fide usucapio 
because it is “for the benefit of the public welfare, and at the same time [serves] as a penalty 
for a person who neglects what is his own, and shows contempt by his negligence.”22 
Although Voet does not define “public welfare”, it can be seen as synonymous with the 
argument that prescription promotes legal certainty.23 However, in a paragraph headed “Voet 
justifies usucapion in general”, Voet states that usucapio accompanied by good faith 
throughout the required period is a permissible method of acquiring ownership “in the courts 
of both heaven and earth.”24 According to Voet, in this scenario it is justified to “punish” a 
careless owner who – by neglecting his property – causes uncertainty as to ownership.25 It 
follows that Voet advances two main justifications for usucapio, namely that it promotes 
legal certainty and that it punishes neglectful owners. The question of how prescription can 
be justified concerning the mala fide possessor is discussed later, as this scenario has been 
difficult to justify at least since Roman-Dutch times.26  
 
Grotius is of the same view as Voet in the context of justifying the acquisition of ownership 
through mala fide prescription.27 Grotius – who wrote against a background of Christian 
morals28 – thinks that prescription will ruin an owner who loses property, while the possessor 
                                                             
18 Voet 41.3.1.  
19 Voet 41.3.1. See also Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.3 and the criticism in Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem 
Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3.  
20 Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 84. See also C 7.31.1.3: “Mala fides 
superveniens non nocet.” (“Supervening mala fides does not break [or interrupt] prescription.”)  
21 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468. The objection to mala fide prescription in this case is discussed in section 4.2.3 
below. 
22 Voet 41.3.1. This passage is quoted in Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 136. 
23 Grosskopf JA in Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 136 is of the same opinion. 
24 Voet 41.3.1. See also Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.3; Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 642. 
25 Voet 41.3.1. See generally Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4. 
26 See the discussion in section 4.5 below.  
27 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.3. The reason I use the word “prescription” here instead of usucapio is because of 
Grotius’s use of the word “verjaring” (“prescription”) in his heading at Inleidinge 2.7.  
28 In this regard, see also Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137. 
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is rewarded for the illegal possession that he knowingly commits.29 In this sense Grotius, like 
Voet, supports prescription that requires good faith throughout the whole prescription 
period.30 Yet, despite his criticism of mala fide prescription, Grotius acknowledges that the 
law requires a middel or medium “[to] place the property in certainty and to end all 
disputes.”31 Prescription is identified as this middel and, accordingly, the two justifications 
identified by Voet are once more distinguishable. Schorer, in his commentary on Grotius, 
identifies the reason the Roman Catholic Church required good faith throughout the entire 
prescription period as “to liberate people’s souls from injustice.”32 Although this justification 
may be laudable from a background of Christian morals, it is unlikely to qualify as a rationale 
from a legal point of view. Yet, Schorer criticises this justification and states that it defeats 
the true purpose behind prescription, namely to put an end to disputes regarding ownership 
and to promote legal certainty.33 He mentions that “[t]he purpose of prescription, which may 
be advanced, is to bring an end to disputes that would otherwise continue into perpetuity and 
so disrupt the peace of humanity.”34 As illustrated in the next section, the legal certainty and 
punishment justifications from Roman-Dutch law were received into South African 
prescription law. 
 
 
4.2.3 South African law 
South African law has two main justifications for prescription due to the reception of Roman-
Dutch law.35 The first is captured in the following passage: 
 
“Prescription is based upon the principle that penalties should be imposed on those who, 
through their negligence and carelessness about their own affairs and property, do an injury to 
                                                             
29 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.3.  
30 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.3. 
31 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4: “[Om] de eigendommen te stellen in verzeeckerheid ende alle gheschillen af te 
snijden ...” (“[To] place the property in certainty and to end all disputes.”) 
32 Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3: “[O]m de zielen der menschen van onrechtveerdigheid te 
bevrijden.” (“[T]o liberate people’s souls from injustice.”) 
33 Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3.  
34 Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3: “Het doelwit der verjaaringe, die alléén is ingevoerd, om een 
einde van geschillen te maaken, welke andersins tot in het oneindige zouden voortduren, en de rust des 
menschdoms stooren.” (“The purpose of prescription, which may be advanced, is to bring an end to disputes that 
would otherwise continue into perpetuity and so disrupt the peace of humanity.”) 
35 Voet 41.3.1; Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 160-161; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 
256; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 149; Van der Merwe 
CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 268. See also generally Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A). 
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the State by introducing an uncertainty as to the ownership and an endless multiplicity of 
lawsuits …”36 
 
One can refer to this justification as the “punishment” justification, since it argues that the 
owner should be “punished” for neglecting his property by losing ownership through 
prescription.37 Since prescription in South African law is an original method of acquisition of 
ownership,38 the loss of ownership occurs without the permission or co-operation of the 
owner. In this context Schorer argues that the purpose of prescription is not to reward the 
illegal possessor, but to encourage owners to be more attentive towards their property.39 In 
other words, prescription can be conceived to serve as an incentive for owners not to neglect 
their property.40 Interestingly, this justification can also be used to justify mala fide 
prescription,41 since the fides of a possessor is irrelevant if the aim of prescription is to punish 
neglectful owners for not looking after their property. 
 
                                                             
36 Hall CG Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Volume II – The Law of Property (10th ed 1976) 76, 
which is based on Voet 41.3.1, Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4 and Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, 
over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3. See also 
Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 477-478; Welgemoed 
v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 711-712, 721; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 161; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1994) 240; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 149; Van der 
Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 268. 
37 Voet 41.3.1; Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes 
(1993) para 149; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 268. See also Ex Parte Puppli 1975 (3) SA 461 (D) 
463; Barker NO v Chadwick and Others 1974 (1) SA 461 (D) 466; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose 
Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468, 477-478; Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 
1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 682; Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 170; City of Cape 
Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 325; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 711-
712, 721; Van der Merwe v Minister of Defence 1916 OPD 47 50; Smith and Others v Martin’s Executor Dative 
(1899) 16 SC 148 151. To the same effect is Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137-139. 
38 Section 2(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See also 
Sonnekus JC “Die Rei Vindicatio en Verjaring – Of Nie” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 576-
590 576; Sonnekus JC “Sub Hasta-veilings en die Onderskeid tussen Afgeleide en Oorspronklike Wyses van 
Regsverkryging” 2008 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 696-727 699; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 309; Marx FE “Eiendomsverkryging deur Verjaring en Beperkte Saaklike Regte” 
(1994) 15 Obiter 161-171 167, 170-171; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes 
(1993) para 149; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 268. See further section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
39 Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3. This argument is analogous to one of the justifications for 
adverse possession in English law, namely that it encourages owners not to sleep on their rights. This 
justification is discussed in section 4.3.2 below. 
40 Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3: “[O]m den ontachtsamen en slordigen eigenaar voor zijn goed 
to beter to doen zorgen.” (“In order that the inattentive and negligent owner may better look after his property.”) 
This passage was quoted with approval in Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 712. For criticism of 
this argument in English law, see section 4.3.2 below. 
41 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 174. This issue is discussed in section 4.5 below. 
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However, despite the fact that the owner’s negligence is advanced as a justification for 
prescription, negligence does not constitute one of the requirements of this legal institution.42 
Indeed, a person claiming ownership through prescription need not at all show that the owner 
neglected his property.43 Consequently, an owner can lose property through prescription even 
if he acted as a reasonable person throughout the entire prescription period.44 This state of 
affairs highlights an inconsistency in the punishment justification, since one can hardly argue 
that one of the purposes of prescription is to punish the neglectful owner if negligence does 
not form part of its requirements. This anomaly is further addressed in the discussion of 
English law.45 The punishment justification has at least once been addressed by the then 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Pienaar v Rabie:46 
 
“[D]ie nalatigheid van ‘n eienaar wat sy eiendom deur verjaring verloor word wel in ons bronne 
erken as een van die regverdigings vir verkrygende verjaring. Dit is egter nie die enigste of selfs 
vernaamste grondslag van verkrygende verjaring nie ...”47 
 
Although the High Court48 – together with Voet49 – regards this rationale as one of the 
justifications for prescription, some authors voiced their disapproval in this regard. Van der 
Merwe, for example, provides the most direct criticism: 
 
“Dit staan die eienaar immers vry om na geliewe met sy saak te handel, met inagneming van 
publiek- en privaatregtelike beperkings. Hy kan, indien hy dit verkies, selfs sy saak 
verwaarloos.”50 
                                                             
42 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 138-139; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 575, 577; 
Hollmann and Another v Estate Latre 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 647. This approach was recently confirmed in De 
Friedland Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Pretorius and Another (20744/2008) [2010] ZAGPPHC 95 (5 August 2010) 
para 17. 
43 See the cases referred to in the previous footnote above. See also Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins 
(2009) 174-175; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th 
ed 2006) 161; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 310; Marx FE Verkrygende 
Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 240; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and 
Servitudes (1993) para 149; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 269. 
44 For criticism of this position in English law, see section 4.3.2 below. 
45 See section 4.3.2 below. 
46 1983 (3) SA 126 (A). 
47 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 138. (“The negligence of an owner who loses property through prescription is indeed 
acknowledged in our sources as constituting one of the justifications for acquisitive prescription. However, it is 
not the only or even the most important basis for acquisitive prescription ...”) 
48 Ex Parte Puppli 1975 (3) SA 461 (D) 463; Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468, 478; Campbell v Pietermaritzburg City Council 1966 (2) SA 674 (N) 676; 
Van Wyk and Another v Louw and Another 1958 (2) SA 164 (C) 170; City of Cape Town v Abelsohn’s Estate 
1947 (3) SA 315 (C) 325; Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 723; Smith and Others v Martin’s 
Executor Dative (1899) 16 SC 148 151.  
49 Voet 41.3.1. 
50 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 268-269. (“The owner is free to use his property as he sees fit, as 
long as it is in accordance with public and private law limitations. He can, if he so wishes, even neglect his 
property.”) See similarly Sonnekus JC “Die Rei Vindicatio en Verjaring – Of Nie” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 576-590 577; Sonnekus JC “Samehang van Billikheid, Skulderkenning, Afstanddoening en 
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As the ius abutendi constitutes one of the instances of ownership, Van der Merwe argues that 
it is unacceptable to base prescription on the very ground that allows owners to neglect their 
property. This reasoning is founded on the idea that ownership is the most absolute right, 
which formed a central part of South African property law prior to the constitutional era.51 
Although this approach towards the ius abutendi is correct from a legal point of view, namely 
that it entitles owners to neglect their property, it will be necessary to re-evaluate the content 
of this entitlement in light of the new values enshrined by the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (“the Constitution”). It must be kept in mind that although section 25 of 
the Constitution provides a negative property guarantee,52 this section also contains South 
Africa’s commitment to land reform.53 The long-term neglect by owners who “allow” others 
to possess their property could – possibly – serve as a justification for prescription, especially 
if possessors were precluded from acquiring ownership in land under the previous 
dispensation.54 Indeed, the dire need of homeless people in present-day South Africa can 
undermine an entitlement to neglect land (by “allowing” people to live on it) in particular, 
which can serve as an additional justification for prescription.55 However, it is worth 
emphasising that an owner does not lose ownership in property through prescription by 
merely exercising the ius abutendi. Ownership can only be lost if an owner exercises the ius 
abutendi and by doing so “allows” another person to possess his property for the duration of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Stuiting van Verjaring” 2006 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 342-356 342; Carey Miller DL & Pope A 
Land Title in South Africa (2000) 157-158; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 310; 
Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 256; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ 
The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 149; Marx FE “Die Grondslag van Verkrygende Verjaring in 
Suid-Afrika” (1979) 1 Obiter 11-17 14-16.  
51 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 105: “Ownership is in 
principle a most comprehensive right embracing not only the power to use, to enjoy the fruits and to consume 
the thing, but also the power to possess, to dispose of, to reclaim the thing from anyone who wrongfully 
withholds it or to resist any unlawful invasion of the thing.” (Footnotes omitted.)  
52 Section 25(1) – 25(3) of the Constitution; Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 72; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 12-13. 
53 Section 25(4) – 25(9) of the Constitution; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 13. 
54 See Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 
(9th ed 2007) 405-665 510 and sources cited. This argument is also made in favour of the bad faith possessor, 
see section 4.5 below. 
55 Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th 
ed 2007) 405-665 510 and sources cited. See also Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 176, 
together with the discussions concerning the personality theory, utilitarianism and law and economics theory 
and the anomaly of the bad faith possessor in sections 4.4.3-4.4.4 and 4.5 respectively below. 
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the prescription period.56 I return to the punishment justification in the discussion of English 
law and the developments that led to the enactment of the LRA below.57  
 
The second ground for justifying prescription in South African law – which is mostly 
regarded as the main justification – is based on the principle that it is in the interests of legal 
certainty, as well as the public interest, that de iure status be afforded to long-existing de 
facto realities.58 This justification is referred to as the “legal certainty” justification, for 
authors argue that prescription promotes legal certainty by preventing parties from 
unnecessarily litigating about ownership.59 Long-term possession of property can also create 
an impression of ownership that is able to mislead third parties, which is analogous to 
estoppel. In this context – so it is argued – it is best to grant de iure status to de facto 
scenarios that have existed for some time.60 Phrased differently, the owner does not lose 
ownership by neglecting the property, but rather because he “allowed” a certain state of 
affairs – which does not accord with the legal reality – to persist for a long period of time.61 
Unlike the punishment justification, which was criticised by some authors, one is struck by 
the lack of criticism or analysis of the second justification. It would seem that most authors 
                                                             
56 I am indebted to Prof Sagaert for discussions that helped me to form my arguments in this regard. 
57 See section 4.3.2 below.   
58 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137-138; Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) 577; 
Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 179; Sonnekus JC “Die 
Rei Vindicatio en Verjaring – Of Nie” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 576-590; Van der Walt AJ 
Property in the Margins (2009) 181; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 161; Sonnekus JC “Samehang van Billikheid, Skulderkenning, Afstanddoening en 
Stuiting van Verjaring” 2006 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 342-356 342; Carey Miller DL & Pope A 
Land Title in South Africa (2000) 157; Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 309-310; 
Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 239, 254-259; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg 
(2nd ed 1989) 269; Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche 
Rechts-Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3. See also Voet 41.3.1; Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4; De 
Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 78; Marx FE “Die Grondslag van Verkrygende Verjaring in Suid-Afrika” 
(1979) 1 Obiter 11-17 13-17; Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 82-83; Wessels 
JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 634. Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4 is of the opinion that one of the 
justifications for prescription is “[om] de eigendommen te stellen in verzeeckerheid ...” (“[To] place the 
property in certainty.”)  
59 Compare Hall CG Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Volume II – The Law of Property (10th ed 
1976) 76, which is based on Voet 41.3.1, Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4 and Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr 
Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3. 
60 Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 179; Sonnekus JC 
“Samehang van Billikheid, Skulderkenning, Afstanddoening en Stuiting van Verjaring” 2006 Tydskrif vir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 342-356 342; Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 157; Sonnekus 
JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 309-310; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 256-257; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) 
para 149; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 269; De Wet JC Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 80-98; Marx 
FE “Die Grondslag van Verkrygende Verjaring in Suid-Afrika” (1979) 1 Obiter 11-17 13-17. See also the 
sources mentioned in the previous footnote above. 
61 Welgemoed v Coetzer and Others 1946 TPD 701 711-712; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 161; Marx FE Verkrygende Verjaring in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1994) 257; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 269-270. 
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and court decisions are ad idem regarding this ground and that they merely accept it as still 
being relevant. Nevertheless, this ground, together with the punishment justification, has been 
put into question in the following obiter dictum: 
 
“The justification [for acquisitive prescription] is said to have been a need or desire to penalise 
neglectful owners. There may have been some social justification for that approach in a village 
society where it was easy for an owner to supervise and inspect his property, though even there 
one might question the equity of favouring the cynical usurper at the expense of one whose fault 
was no more than idleness or negligence. In a modern society, where unimproved property is 
frequently held for long periods by owners who live far away, and sometimes even abroad, the 
social desirability of [acquisitive prescription] may be questioned.”62 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Although not directly aimed at the legal certainty justification,63 this seems to be the only 
criticism – albeit indirect – that has to date been raised against the promotion of legal 
certainty argument. As will be seen,64 this justification was recently re-evaluated in 
developments that occurred in the English law of adverse possession. These developments 
are likely to have implications for how prescription is justified in South African law and are 
discussed in greater detail below.65  
 
The legal certainty justification, like the punishment justification, can also be used to justify 
situations where mala fide possessors acquire ownership through prescription.66 This is 
because the fides of the possessor is irrelevant for purposes of promoting legal certainty 
through prescription. In other words, this aim of prescription is achieved regardless of 
whether the possessor possessed the property in good or bad faith. 
 
Another justification advanced in favour of prescription, which I view as a sub-category of 
the legal certainty justification, is the fact that prescription simplifies the process of proving 
ownership.67 In this sense prescription prevents the so-called probatio diabolica68 one faces if 
                                                             
62 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468. It is worth 
emphasising that this case was decided long before the dawn of constitutionalism in South Africa, which makes 
this passage worthy of note. To the same effect as the Morkels case are Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 
138 and Sonnekus JC & Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed 1994) 210. 
63 Since the first sentence in this passage refers to “a need or desire to penalise neglectful owners”, it is clear that 
this critique by Colman J is aimed only at the punishment justification. Nonetheless, the legal certainty 
argument is analogous to this justification and therefore this passage can be read as pertaining to both 
justifications.    
64 See section 4.3.2 below. 
65 See section 4.3.2 below. 
66 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 174. See also the arguments to this effect in section 4.5 
below. 
67 Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4; Schorer W Aanteekeningen van mr Willem Schorer, over de Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid, van mr Hugo de Groot (1784) 2.7.3; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The 
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it would be impossible to acquire property over time through prescription.69 Here prescription 
seems to operate more as a rule of the law of evidence than as a notion of property law. 
However, this argument seems to carry more weight where land is not surveyed and also 
where it is hard to determine who the “true owner”70 of land is in the absence of a formal 
Land Registry that guarantees the correctness of the register. Consequently, this argument 
must also be re-evaluated.71 
 
A third justification can be deduced from the following obiter dictum in Pienaar v Rabie:72 
 
“Onder hierdie omstandighede kan daar skaars sprake wees van een enkele samehangende 
filosofiese grondslag wat onderliggend aan die regsfiguur van verkrygende verjaring in al sy 
gestaltes is. Wat ‘n mens eerder vind by juriste is dat bepaalde regsreëls verduidelik of 
geregverdig word deur morele of filosofiese argumente.”73 (Emphasis added.) 
 
According to Grosskopf JA, there is no single philosophical justification for prescription and 
it has to be justified through moral and philosophical arguments. This opens the door for a 
jurisprudential discussion of the justifications behind prescription. This approach is to be 
applauded, since it widens the spectrum of arguments one can use to justify prescription in 
South African law. Unfortunately, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court did not 
expand on what the content of these moral or philosophical arguments may be. Against this 
background it is helpful to investigate how prescription can be justified by using the labour 
theory, Radin’s personality theory and utilitarianism and law and economics theory.74 
Interestingly, these theories are analogous to the traditional justifications for prescription in 
South African law. The next section focuses on the justifications for prescription in modern-
day Dutch and French law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 149; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 270; Wessels JW 
History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 634. Grotius Inleidinge 2.7.4 states that one of the justifications for 
prescription is “[om] de eigendommen te stellen in verzeeckerheid ...” (“[To] place the property in certainty.”) 
To the same effect is Van Oven JC Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd ed 1948) 90, since he opines that 
without prescription the “eigendomsbewijs een probatio diabolica zou wezen.” (“[P]roof of ownership would be 
a devil’s burden.”)  
68 Devil’s burden. 
69 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 270. See also the sources cited in footnote 67 above. 
70 This term is derived from Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 
Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1125. 
71 This justification is analogous to the justification in English law that defendants should be protected from 
stale claims: See section 4.3.2 below.   
72 1983 (3) SA 126 (A). 
73 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 135. (“Under these circumstances, one can hardly speak of a single 
encompassing philosophical foundation that underlies the legal institution of acquisitive prescription in all its 
forms. Instead, one finds that jurists explain and justify certain legal rules with regard to moral or philosophical 
arguments.”) 
74 These three trends are discussed in section 4.4 below. 
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4.2.4 Dutch and French law 
In modern Dutch law verkrijgende verjaring is also justified on the premise that it is 
“undesirable for a factual situation regarding property not to be in line with the judicial 
reality.”75 In the words of Mijnssen et al, “[p]rescription is an institution that primarily exists 
for the sake of the public order.”76 This complies with the Roman-Dutch and South African 
justification that prescription is in the public interest because it promotes legal certainty.77 In 
this sense it is also argued that prescription simplifies the process of proving ownership 
because it eliminates the probatio diabolica.78 However, it seems that Dutch prescription law 
does not regard the punishment justification as an important rationale, but rather views it as a 
result that is ancillary to the effects of prescription. Furthermore, Reehuis and Heisterkamp 
state that verkrijgende verjaring is not aimed at “rewarding” the bad faith possessor with 
ownership:79  
 
“De bezitter, die op grond van art. 3:119 lid 1 wordt vermoed de rechthebbende te zijn, verwerft 
op den duur die status wanneer dat aanvankelijk niet het geval was. Daarbij staat niet de 
bevoordeling van de bezitter voorop, maar het algemeen belang en in het bijzonder de 
                                                             
75 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 423: “[H]et [is] onwenslijk dat een feitlijke 
toestand niet overeenstemt met de rechtstoestand van een goed.” (“[I]t [is] undesirable for a factual situation 
regarding property not to be in line with the judicial reality.”) See also Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB 
Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 249; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 
329; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 417. 
According to Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot het 
Debat over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1582-1597 1585, this justification is also 
applicable to Belgian prescription law.  
76 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 423: “Verjaring is een rechtsfiguur die in de 
eerste plaats bestaat ter wille van de maatschappelijke orde.” (“Prescription is an institution that primarily exists 
for the sake of the public order.”) See also Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) 
para 249; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 329. 
77 See the discussions in this regard in sections 4.2.2-4.2.3 above. See also Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB 
Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 249; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 423; Reehuis 
WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 330; Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 417. 
78 Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Goederenrecht – Algemeen Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 423; Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB 
Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 249; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 
331. This justification is also found in Belgian law: See Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende 
Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot het Debat over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 
1582-1597 1586-1587. 
79 See also Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 
417. 
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rechtzekerheid die met duidelijke goederenrechtelijke verhoudingen is gediend. Medelijden met 
de oorspronklijk rechthebbende voelt de wetgewer niet. ”80 (Original emphasis.) 
 
It is clear that the primary justification for verkrijgende verjaring is to promote legal 
certainty, even though it occurs at the expense of the owner who loses ownership through 
prescription.81 The punishment justification – advanced to justify prescription in Roman-
Dutch and South African law – is thus regarded as no more than a secondary result of 
prescription in Dutch law. Verkrijgende verjaring also has a corrective function in cases 
where all the formalities for transfer of ownership by way of derivative acquisition of 
ownership have not been complied with, for example when someone who did not have the 
capacity to act attempted to transfer ownership to another person.82 Snijders and Rank-
Berenschot admit that “[p]rescription is not primarily based on motives of reasonableness and 
equity. In this sense it is possible for a wrong to be converted into a right after a certain 
period of time.”83 I argue that this approach – namely that the traditional justifications for 
prescription are still accepted without question – needs to be re-examined. The time is ripe 
for re-evaluating the rationale behind this legal institution to determine whether it is still 
relevant in modern society. Finally, it is worth emphasising that in Dutch law immovables 
possessed in good faith can be acquired after 10 years,84 while immovables held in bad faith 
can only be acquired after 20 years.85 
 
The rationale for prescription acquisitive in French law is that a person who has taken care of 
another’s property “should be confirmed in his possessory situation without the risk of being 
                                                             
80 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 329. (“The possessor, who according 
to BW 3:119.1, is presumed to be the person entitled to the property, acquires that status through time which 
initially was not the case. Consequently, the benefit the possessor obtains is not the most important aspect here, 
but rather the public interest and especially legal certainty that is achieved through property law relationships 
that are certain. The legislature is not sympathetic towards the original owner.”) See also Van Zeben CJ et al 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 417. 
81 Van Zeben CJ et al Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (1981) Book 3 417: “Het 
gaat hier niet om een sanctioneren van der kwade trouw, doch om het beginsel, dat na een zeker tijdsverloop het 
recht zich bij de feiten dient aan te sluiten.” (“It is not about promoting bad faith, but rather to achieve the 
purpose of bringing the factual situation in line with legal reality after a certain period of time has elapsed.”) See 
also Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 249; Mijnssen FHJ et al Mr C 
Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Goederenrecht – Algemeen 
Goederenrecht (15th ed 2006) para 423; Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 
329. 
82 Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) para 330. 
83 Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) para 249: “Verjaring word niet primair 
ingegeven door motieven van redelijheid en billijkheid. Zo kan het gebeuren dat onrecht door tijdsverloop toch 
recht wordt.” (“Prescription is not primarily based on motives of reasonableness and equity. In this sense it is 
possible for a wrong to be converted into a right after a certain period of time.”)  
84 BW 3:99.1.  
85 BW 3:105.1, read with BW 3:306. See also Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT Goederenrecht (12th ed 
2006) para 329 and the discussions in sections 3.3.2.2.2-3.3.2.2.3 of chapter three above. 
159 
evicted” after a certain period of time has elapsed.86 According to Steiner, the “harshness” of 
this approach is justified because it serves as an incentive to owners to look after their 
property.87 Prescription acquisitive is, thus, also regarded as promoting legal certainty,88 
while the fact that it “punishes” the neglectful owner is considered as being ancillary to the 
legal certainty argument. In French prescription law, a person can acquire immovable 
property held in bad faith after 30 years, whereas only 10 years are required for immovable 
property possessed in good faith and under just title.89 Yet, Bell, Boyron and Whittaker voice 
their concern about this justification in the modern era where immovable property is 
registered: 
 
“Obviously these days registration of title to land and in relation to some chattels offers an 
alternative and better method of determining who is the owner of the property.”90 
 
Despite this concern, Bell, Boyron and Whittaker state in the very next sentence that 
prescription acquisitive can be useful in dealing with some cases of long-standing 
possession.91 Unfortunately, these authors do not elaborate in this regard.  
 
It is clear that prescription is primarily justified on two grounds in Roman-Dutch and modern 
South African law, whereas Dutch and French law generally accept one justification for this 
legal institution. In the case of both Roman-Dutch and South African law, the first ground is 
that owners who neglect their property should be punished by losing ownership, with the 
second ground advocating the promotion of legal certainty. However, Dutch and French law 
only regard the latter rationale as the main justification for prescription.92 Both these 
justifications stem from a time that was different from the present. Against this background – 
and especially since the dawning of the constitutional era in South Africa – it is important 
that these justifications be re-evaluated and placed under scrutiny to determine whether they 
still hold water. Special regard must also be had to the scenario where a mala fide possessor 
                                                             
86 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 395. 
87 Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 395. 
88 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 277, where the authors state that “[i]f 
a person has held the property for a long period then that has become part of social organization and should not 
be disturbed.” 
89 Article 2272 of the Code Civil, translated by Steiner E French Law – A Comparative Approach (2010) 396. 
90 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 277. See especially the discussion of 
adverse possession and the developments that led to the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 below in 
section 4.3.2, where this was one of the main arguments against having adverse possession in relation to 
registered land when the register provides conclusive proof of ownership. 
91 Bell J, Boyron S & Whittaker S Principles of French Law (2nd ed 2008) 277. 
92 The fact that prescription serves as an aid to prove ownership can be seen as correlative to the justification of 
promoting legal certainty.   
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acquires ownership through prescription, as it prima facie seems unjust to reward such a 
“cynical usurper”93 with ownership.94  
 
 
4.3 The grounds for justifying adverse possession in English law and the 
developments that led to the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 
4.3.1 Introduction – identifying the root of the problem 
The systems discussed above illustrate a lack of critical analysis pertaining to the grounds for 
justifying prescription.95 It seems as if the legal certainty argument runs like a golden thread 
through each of those jurisdictions, but that the authors never consider whether it is still valid 
today. English law stands in contrast to these systems concerning the rationale for adverse 
possession.96 This is because English law has recently undergone far-reaching developments 
in adverse possession law, which culminated in the enactment of the 2002 Act.97 This Act – 
together with developments that led to its enactment – are important for the way South 
African law justifies prescription and therefore needs to be analysed. 
 
The point of departure is JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another,98 as it 
highlighted some of the modern-day problems of adverse possession. This case was decided 
before the enactment of the LRA, when the “old” rules of adverse possession still applied to 
both registered and unregistered land. The facts of this case, together with its implications 
regarding the substantive requirements for adverse possession, were already discussed in the 
previous chapter and are not repeated here.99 The focus now falls on Neuberger’s J criticism 
of adverse possession, which sketches the background for this discussion. According to 
Neuberger J, his conclusion in this decision was one that he “arrive[d] at with no 
enthusiasm.”100 He bases this observation on the fact that the result “does not accord with 
                                                             
93 Morkels Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 468. 
94 This issue is discussed in section 4.5 below. 
95 One can also observe this fact in Australian law: See Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition 
of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114. 
96 Adverse possession is the common law equivalent of acquisitive prescription. 
97 This act came into effect on 13 October 2003 and is prospective in nature: See Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 
16; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
98 [2000] Ch 676. 
99 See section 3.2.3 of chapter three above. 
100 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709. See similarly JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham.  
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justice and [that it] cannot be justified by practical considerations.”101 He confirms that the 
traditional justification for adverse possession was to prevent uncertainties in relation to the 
ownership of land.102 He also emphasises that these uncertainties are – but for a few 
exceptions – unlikely to arise in the context of registered land, since owners of registered land 
can be identified by simply inspecting the land register.103 Neuberger J further acknowledges 
that adverse possession played an important role by preventing uncertainties and unnecessary 
litigation during the days when land was still unregistered.104  
 
Another justification referred to is that people should not be able to sit or sleep on their rights 
indefinitely.105 Neuberger J criticises this rationale and states that it is difficult to see why an 
adverse possessor should be able to acquire land from an owner merely because such owner 
had no immediate use for it and was “content” to let such adverse possessor trespass on the 
land.106 To conclude that an owner who slept on his rights should lose ownership appears to 
Neuberger J to be “illogical and disproportionate”.107 He views this state of affairs as illogical 
because “the only reason that the owner can be said to have sat on his rights is because of the 
existence of the 12-year limitation period in the first place; if no limitation period existed the 
owner would be entitled to claim possession whenever he actually wanted the land.”108 
Neuberger J said the following concerning the disproportionate effect of adverse possession:  
 
“[I]n a climate of increasing awareness of human rights including the right to enjoy one’s own 
property, it does seem draconian to the owner and a windfall for the squatter that, just because 
the owner has taken no steps to evict a squatter for 12 years, the owner should lose 25 hectares 
of land to the squatter with no compensation whatsoever.”109 
 
                                                             
101 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709.  
102 As seen in sections 4.2.2-4.2.4 above, this is regarded as an important justification in Roman-Dutch, South 
African, Dutch and French law. See further the discussion in section 4.3.2 below.  
103 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham. See also the position in French law discussed in section 4.2.4 above. 
104 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709-710; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham.  
105 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710.  
106 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham.  
107 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710.  
108 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710. 
109 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710. Although adverse possession – 
as it stood prior to the enactment of the LRA – was found to be in line with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United 
Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC), this does not necessarily mean that prescription will survive a 
constitutional challenge in the Constitutional Court of South Africa. This issue is discussed in chapter five, 
which specifically focuses on the question whether prescription is justifiable in the constitutional setting of 
South Africa. 
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These objections to adverse possession are more intense in comparison to those found in the 
jurisdictions discussed earlier, which are characterised by a lack of critical reflection in this 
regard. Neuberger’s J criticism of adverse possession was echoed by the House of Lords in 
JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham.110 In that decision, Lord Bingham commented on adverse 
possession as follows: 
 
“In the case of unregistered land, and in the days before registration became the norm, such a 
result could no doubt be justified as avoiding protracted uncertainty where the title of land lay. 
But where land is registered it is difficult to see any justification for a legal rule which compels 
such an apparently unjust result, and even harder to see why the party gaining title should not be 
required to pay some compensation at least to the party losing it. It is reassuring to learn that the 
Land Registration Act 2002 has addressed the risk that a registered owner may lose his title 
through inadvertence.”111 (Emphasis added.) 
 
It is plain that English law also justifies adverse possession on the grounds that it promotes 
legal certainty and avoids unnecessary litigation concerning ownership of land. However, as I 
illustrate below,112 these justifications only seem to hold water in situations where land is 
unregistered or where the Land Register does not provide conclusive proof of ownership. As 
soon as land is registered and one is able to determine who the owner is by investigating the 
register, it becomes “hard to see what principle of justice entitles the [adverse possessor] to 
acquire the land.”113  
 
One of the most influential works pertaining to the justifications for adverse possession in 
English law is an article by Dockray from 1985.114 This article, which the English Law 
Commission relied on in their Reports115 regarding possible reforms concerning adverse 
possession law, provides an evaluation of adverse possession and the rationale for having 
such a rule in a legal system. This article – being the primary source – serves as the point of 
departure for this discussion, together with the Law Commission’s findings. Use is also made 
of other sources concerning the justifications of adverse possession. I conclude this section 
with a brief exposition of how the 2002 Act regulates adverse possession today.  
 
 
                                                             
110 [2003] 1 AC 419. 
111 [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham. See similarly Lord Hope at 446-447.  
112 See section 4.3.2 below.  
113 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709-710; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham.  
114 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284.  
115 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001); 
Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998). 
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4.3.2 Criticism of the traditional justifications for adverse possession 
Dockray is sceptical about adverse possession’s role in English law, which concern is 
captured as follows:  
 
“How, it might be asked, could there be any rational explanation for depriving an owner of 
property, simply because of the long continued possession of another. And why should the law 
seem to ignore the demerits of a trespasser? Why should it protect a wrongdoer – a person 
whose conduct might be tantamount to theft – but whom the law may nevertheless aid even 
against an innocent owner, that is, a person who did not know and could not have discovered 
that time had begun to run[?] Why should the long suffering of injury bar the remedy?”116 
(Original emphasis.) 
 
Adverse possession does not require good faith, which means that mala fide squatters – just 
as in South African law – are also able to obtain ownership.117 Indeed, one of the problems of 
adverse possession is that it seems to “reward” mala fide squatters with ownership.118 
Ballantine describes this state of affairs as “an anomalous instance of maturing a wrong into a 
right contrary to one of the most fundamental axioms of the law.”119 Dockray identifies three 
justifications attributed to the law of adverse possession against this background, namely 
 
i) to protect long-term possessors from stale claims (also referred to as the “quieting 
of title”);120  
                                                             
116 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 272. See similarly Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 
10.5; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another 
v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 643 per 
Slade LJ. 
117 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 436-437 per Lord Brown-Wilkinson. 
118 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 236-237; Dixon M “The Reform of Property Law and 
the Land Registration Act 2002: A Risk Assessment” 2003 Conveyancer 136-156 151; Irving DK “Should the 
Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 
112-119 113-114; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 
Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1125; Ballantine HW “Title by Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 
Harvard Law Review 135-159 135. I am indebted to Dr Dixon for bringing the article of Cobb and Fox under 
my attention. 
119 Ballantine HW “Title by Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 135-159 135. See further 
Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1037, who also refers to this result as “an anomalous figure in the law.”   
120 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 272; Land Registration for 
the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) paras 2.71, 14.54.1; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 
10.6; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 426 per Lord Bingham; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another 
v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709; A’Court v Cross (1825) 3 Bing 329 332-333; Cholmondeley v 
Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1 139-140; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.8; Smith 
RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 63; Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real 
Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-001; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban 
Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 240. See also Caterina R 
“Some Comparative Remarks on JA Pye (Oxford) v. The United Kingdom” (2007) 15 European Review of 
Private Law 273-279 274; Fox D “Relativity of Title at Law and in Equity” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 
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ii) to encourage owners not to sleep on their rights;121 and 
iii) to ensure that a possessor can feel confident that his right cannot be called into 
question after a certain period of time has elapsed.122 
 
One can equate the first justification with the one found in South African law, namely that 
adverse possession prevents a “multiplicity of lawsuits”123 where evidence pertaining to 
ownership has been lost.124 This ground is premised on the reasoning that it could be difficult 
for parties to prove either claims or defences in situations where the events complained of 
occurred long ago, which can cause litigation to become too great a risk.125 This mode of 
thought is described by Best CJ, who states that “[l]ong dormant claims often have more of 
cruelty than of justice in them.”126 In this context adverse possession operates as a 
“conclusive presumption” against potential claims after a certain period of time has 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
330-365 338-339; Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” 
(1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1128; Ballantine HW “Title by 
Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 135-159 135, 143-144; Holmes OW “The Path of the 
Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 476. 
121 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 272-274; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) paras 2.71, 
14.54.1; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 
1998) para 10.6; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710; Gray K & Gray 
SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.11; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 63-64. See also 
Caterina R “Some Comparative Remarks on JA Pye (Oxford) v. The United Kingdom” (2007) 15 European 
Review of Private Law 273-279 274; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 
Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2434-2435; Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of 
Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114; Merrill TW “Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 
1130; Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 476. To the contrary is 
Ballantine HW “Title by Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 135-159 135, who thinks that 
this does not form one of the justifications for adverse possession. 
122 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 272; Land Registration for 
the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 14.54.2; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 
10.7; Cholmondeley v Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1 139-140; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 
2009) para 9.1.9; Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) 
para 35-001. See also Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” 
(1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1131-1132.  
123 Hall CG Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Volume II – The Law of Property (10th ed 1976) 76.  
124 See the discussion of South African law in section 4.2.2 above. See also Dockray M “Why do we Need 
Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 272-273; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 
426 per Lord Bingham; Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 
2008) para 35-001.  
125 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 273; Cholmondeley v 
Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1 139-140; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.8; Smith 
RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 63; Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real 
Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-001. See also Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by 
Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114; Merrill TW “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1128. 
126 A’Court v Cross (1825) 3 Bing 329 332-333. 
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elapsed.127 This justification also has a second element, namely the quieting of titles. This 
rationale encompasses the fact that adverse possession helps to “quiet titles” when all the 
formalities for transfer of ownership – such as registration in the case of immovables – have 
not been complied with. Under these circumstances adverse possession serves as a 
mechanism to confirm the ownership of the transferee, which would otherwise be impossible 
if adverse possession did not exist to “cure” defects of this nature. The quieting of titles 
rationale is analogous to the prevention of the probatio diabolica discussed above.128 
 
Although Dockray acknowledges that adverse possession can usefully avoid the dangers of 
adjudicating on stale claims, he states that this ground can provide no more than a “partial 
explanation” for adverse possession.129 He bases this observation on two reasons. Firstly, it is 
assumed that an owner is generally aware that a right to reclaim possession accrued in his 
favour.130 In this context it would be justified for adverse possession to prevent the owner 
from reclaiming possession if such owner knew or ought to have known of the accrual of the 
right, but still did not do anything to rectify the situation. In such a scenario it is 
understandable why the owner should be “punished” for neglecting the property. 
Nonetheless, adverse possession also operates in situations where the owner was unaware of 
the accrual of this right.131 Here it is more difficult to justify adverse possession, especially if 
the owner did not know – or could not have known – that it was possible to reclaim 
possession. Under these circumstances one can rightly ask whether such a position “accord[s] 
                                                             
127 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1128. 
128 Both South African and Dutch law recognise this justification, see sections 4.2.3-4.2.4 above. 
129 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 273. To the same effect are 
Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 
14.54.1; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 
1998) para 10.6; Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” 
(1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114. Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1128 partially agrees with this 
argument, although he states that caution must be had because “[r]ecorded deeds may contain defects or 
omissions; the court house or title plant may burn down [or] surveying errors may ... result[.] in misplaced 
Boundary markers.” 
130 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 273; Irving DK “Should 
the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 
112-119 114. 
131 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 273; Land Registration for 
the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 2.71; Land Registration 
for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 10.6; Powell v 
McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 480; Cholmondeley v Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1 139-140; Rains v Buxton 
(1880) 14 Ch D 537 540-541; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 64. See also Irving DK “Should the Law 
Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 
114. 
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with justice and [whether it is] justified by practical considerations.”132 Secondly, adverse 
possession prevents the recovery of possession, even if the facts are undisputed and 
possession was wrongful (mala fide) throughout the limitation period.133 The second reason is 
a valid objection to adverse possession, especially in situations where evidence is either 
available for the owner to prove his case or where the squatter acknowledges that he has no 
entitlement to the property. This argument carries even more weight in situations where land 
is registered and legislation guarantees the correctness of the register.134 From this reasoning 
Dockray argues that staleness, though an important consideration, cannot on its own properly 
justify adverse possession.135 Yet, despite Dockray’s persuasive arguments in this context, 
these objections can be overcome by treating adverse possession as a mechanical entitlement 
determination rule – as Merrill suggests.136 This possibility is discussed in section 4.4.4 
below, which specifically focuses on the economic justifications behind adverse possession. 
 
The second justification is that adverse possession encourages owners not to sleep on their 
rights.137 Thus, adverse possession serves as an incentive for owners to look after their 
property that – if phrased negatively – implies that the law should punish owners for 
neglecting their property, which is similar to the punishment justification in Roman-Dutch 
                                                             
132 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 709. To the same effect is Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 14.54.1. 
133 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 272-273; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 
10.6. See also Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 
Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114. 
134 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) 
paras 14.2-14.3; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 
(September 1998) paras 10.9-10.11; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 63.  
135 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 272-273; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) paras 2.71, 
14.54.1; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 
1998) para 10.6. See also Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse 
Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114; Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” 
(1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 476. To the contrary is Clarke A “Use, Time, and Entitlement” (2004) 
57 Current Legal Problems 239-275 250-254, who points out that this argument – even in relation to registered 
land – is an oversimplification. 
136 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137-1145. 
137 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 274; Land Registration for 
the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 14.54.1; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 
10.6; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710; Gray K & Gray SF Elements 
of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.11; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 63-64. See also Irving DK “Should 
the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 
112-119 114; Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 476. 
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and South African law.138 This justification is based on the assumption that owners who sleep 
on their rights should not be able to enforce them years later, as it can be unjust to allow old 
claims to be asserted.139 If they were to be allowed, Smith argues that it can lead to “criticism 
and even violence”.140 However, Dockray states that adverse possession can only encourage 
an owner not to sleep on his rights if such owner knows (or ought to have known) that time 
has started to run.141 Nonetheless, adverse possession can bar an owner from recovering 
possession even if he is blameless, since adverse possession operates despite whether the 
owner was negligent or not.142 It may be fair to say that owners who knowingly143 sleep on 
their rights should be punished by losing ownership, but knowledge (actual or constructive) 
of the accrual of the right is not a requirement for purposes of adverse possession.144 
Therefore, this justification may lead to injustice when the reasonable owner could not have 
known of the accrual of the right, which can occur in situations where the owner’s estates are 
large or numerous.145 Dockray concludes that the “encouragement” argument can thus not be 
                                                             
138 See sections 4.2.2-4.2.3 respectively above. See also Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1130; Holmes OW “The Path 
of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 476. 
139 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 274; Land Registration for 
the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 14.54.1; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 
10.6; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676 710; Cholmondeley v Clinton 
(1820) 2 Jac & W 1 139-140; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.11; Smith RJ 
Property Law (6th ed 2009) 63-64; Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real 
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140 Cholmondeley v Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1 139-140; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 64; Harpum C, 
Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-001. To the same 
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University Law Review 1122-1154 1131. See also Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law 
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141 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 274; Irving DK “Should 
the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 
112-119 114. 
142 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 273; Land Registration for 
the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 2.71; Land Registration 
for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 10.6; Powell v 
McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 480; Rains v Buxton (1880) 14 Ch D 537 540-541; Cholmondeley v Clinton 
(1820) 2 Jac & W 1 139-140; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.35; Smith RJ 
Property Law (6th ed 2009) 64. See also Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by 
Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 114.  
143 Either intentionally or negligently. 
144 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 273-274; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 
10.6; Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 480; Rains v Buxton (1880) 14 Ch D 537 540-541; Gray K & 
Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.35; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 64. 
145 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) 
para 10.6 and sources there cited, together with Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A 
Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 2.71, where it is stated that this state of affairs is also 
likely to occur in situations concerning public bodies owning multiple properties.  
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regarded as a major justification for adverse possession.146 Cobb and Fox criticise this 
conclusion because no distinction is drawn between owners who cannot and those who do not 
supervise their properties, while the Law Commission merely assumes the moral 
blameworthiness of squatters together with the blamelessness of owners.147 Such a distinction 
is important, since the blameworthiness of the owner can play an important role when it 
needs to be determined whether the loss of ownership through adverse possession is 
justified.148 Nonetheless, the Law Commission accepted Dockray’s objection,149 one of the 
reasons being that by denying owners the right to reclaim their property imposes a positive 
duty on them to “police” their land, which can involve expensive monitoring costs.150 
Nonetheless, this ground for justifying adverse possession is justifiable in terms of law and 
economics theory, since transaction costs are kept low if such an affirmative obligation is 
placed on owners.151 The reason for this is that owners are then readily identifiable, which 
ensures that the land remains marketable.152  
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the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 2.71; Land Registration 
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Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119114. 
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The third justification Dockray identifies is that adverse possession ensures that a possessor 
can feel confident – after a certain time – that “an incident which might have led to a claim 
against him is finally closed.”153 Dockray supplies two reasons why the law may wish to 
encourage such confidence by denying owners to repossess their land, namely  
 
i) to avoid hardship;154 and  
ii) to ensure that land does not become sterile and unmarketable.155  
 
The first reason applies to cases where land is unregistered and where the squatter may – for 
example – be an innocent (bona fide) trespasser who initially entered the land as the result of 
a reasonable mistake concerning the boundary of the property.156 Hardship also encompasses 
the situation where the squatter invested labour – such as time or money – in improving or 
developing the land.157 Consequently, such a squatter will suffer hardship if he incurred 
expenses under the mistaken belief of ownership, should the owner suddenly appear and 
reclaim the land.158 Thus, as was also seen from Voet and Grotius,159 the problem with 
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section 4.4.2 below. 
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adverse possession does not necessarily reside in cases involving the bona fide possessor. It is 
therefore clear that English law does not wish to impede the bona fide possessor from 
acquiring ownership under certain justified circumstances either. However, the dilemma 
arises when the mala fide possessor acquires land through adverse possession, which some 
authors describe as “land theft”.160  
 
Dockray concedes that adverse possession can prevent hardship on the side of the squatter, 
but fears that it may also work great hardship for an owner who loses ownership through 
adverse possession.161 As mentioned, adverse possession even operates in cases where the 
owner did not know that time was running against him.162 Dockray criticises this state of 
affairs because adverse possession makes no attempt to balance the hardship of the owner 
against the hardship of the squatter.163 This position is clear from the following obiter dictum 
in Cholmondeley v Clinton:164  
 
“The individual hardship will, upon the whole, be less, by withholding from one who has slept 
upon his right, and never yet possessed it, than to take away from the other what he has long 
been allowed to consider as his own, and on the faith of which, the plans in life, habits and 
expences of himself and his family may have been ... unalterably formed and established.”165 
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It seems that this justification is built on the assumption that it is always the squatter who 
suffers the greater hardship and that the owner should, therefore, not be able to reclaim 
possession after the expiration of the limitation period. Dockray questions whether the 
balance of hardship normally favours the squatter after 12 years and also whether adverse 
possession must necessarily adopt an “automatic and imperative form”, without the 
possibility of judicial discretion to determine which party truly suffers hardship.166 Dockray 
also criticises the relatively short limitation period,167 which is even more relevant in 
situations where the land is registered and the parties are able to determine the owner’s 
identity through investigating the register.168 As a result, Dockray concludes that hardship 
cannot adequately justify adverse possession.169 Yet, if one has regard to the moral and 
utilitarian justifications addressed below,170 together with employing adverse possession as a 
mechanical entitlement determination rule,171 it is clear that ample grounds exist for retaining 
adverse possession in a modern jurisdiction with a negative registration system. 
 
The second reason advanced under this justification is based on economic considerations, 
namely that adverse possession encourages the “use, maintenance and improvement of 
natural resources”.172 Adverse possession is seen to be in the public interest because it 
rewards the purposeful labourer who makes constructive use of available land.173 The 
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squatter – in the absence of the owner – can start to invest in the land and come to regard it as 
his own after many years of possession.174 This ground is – apparently – strengthened if the 
squatter occupied the land with the (bona fide) belief that he owned it.175 Nevertheless, this 
argument remains valid even if the squatter is aware (mala fide) that he is not the owner, 
since possessors will not invest in land if the owner suddenly appears and then simply 
reclaims the property.176 For this reason the law wishes to encourage effective land use, 
especially if the land would otherwise lie abandoned by the owner.177 Therefore, adverse 
possession encourages owners to develop their land, since it is in the public interest to 
promote the use of limited resources.178  
 
The second leg of this justification is that adverse possession prevents land from becoming 
unmarketable. This can happen in situations where the ownership of land and the reality of 
possession are “out of kilter”, which causes land to become unmarketable if there is no 
mechanism available to align long-term possession with ownership or to quiet titles.179 This 
situation can occur in cases where 
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i) the owner has disappeared and the squatter – in the owner’s absence – has been in 
possession of the land for a substantial period of time;180 or 
ii) there were dealings with registered land “off the register”, causing uncertainty as to 
who truly owns the land.181 
 
Though this ground constitutes a valid justification for adverse possession, Dockray states 
that it “seems only rarely to have influenced judicial opinion” in cases involving adverse 
possession.182 Still, the Law Commission views this justification as playing an important role, 
even in situations concerning registered land or where the squatter is mala fide, since adverse 
possession ensures that land – even under these circumstances – remains in commerce and is 
not rendered sterile.183 The Law Commission’s findings in this regard overlap with the 
economic grounds advanced for adverse possession below.184 Although even an important 
consideration in the context of registered land, Dockray finds that this reason cannot 
adequately justify adverse possession, since it is not limited to cases of “long and peaceable 
possession” of neglected property.185  
 
To summarise, Dockray provides the following three reasons to justify adverse possession: 
 
i) it promotes legal certainty by protecting long-term possessors from stale claims 
(through quieting titles); 
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ii) it encourages owners not to sleep on their rights; and 
iii) it ensures that a possessor can feel confident that his right cannot be called into 
question after a certain period of time has elapsed. 
 
As discussed above, the third justification is premised on two reasons, namely (i) that adverse 
possession prevents hardship and (ii) that it encourages effective land use and ensures that 
land remains in commerce. Nonetheless, the Law Commission concludes that these three 
justifications are unable to justify adverse possession, especially concerning registered land 
where the register is conclusive as to the ownership of land.186  
 
Dockray also identifies a fourth justification for adverse possession, namely that it helps to 
ascertain ownership in unregistered land.187 In many ways this ground can be equated to the 
“promotion of legal certainty” justification in South African law.188 Although this objective 
“seems to have slipped from the general legal consciousness”,189 Dockray argues that it 
constitutes one of the main justifications for adverse possession by making the investigation 
of unregistered title both safer and cheaper.190 The Law Commission took cognisance of 
Dockray’s argument and it stated that “[t]his fourth reason is undoubtedly the strongest 
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justification for adverse possession.”191 Two reasons are advanced as to why adverse 
possession facilitates conveyancing in the case of unregistered land, namely that  
 
i) it diminishes litigation;192 and  
ii) it saves expenses on the alienation of land and cheapens the investigation of title.193  
 
Dockray expands on these two reasons and emphasises that this justification indeed qualifies 
as the fourth and main ground for justifying adverse possession.194 The Law Commission 
accepted it, especially in the context of the second reason Dockray provides.195 Nonetheless, 
the Law Commission established that this justification is only relevant regarding unregistered 
land, since title to unregistered land is relative and, thus, depends on possession.196 The Law 
Commission reasoned that this justification does not take into account the significance of 
registration of title.197 It argued that any uncertainty pertaining to the status of title is removed 
                                                             
191 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) 
paras 2.73, 14.54; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 
(September 1998) para 10.10. See also Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by 
Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 115; Ballantine HW “Title by 
Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 135-159 135, 143-144. 
192 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 278-279; Cholmondeley v 
Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1 140.  
193 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 278-279; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 14.2; 
Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) 
para 10.9; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.10; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 
2009) 64-65. See also Fox D “Relativity of Title at Law and in Equity” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 330-
365 338; Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 
Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 115. 
194 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284 280-284; Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) paras 2.73, 
14.54; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 
1998) paras 10.9-10.10. 
195 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) 
paras 2.73, 14.2; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 
(September 1998) para 10.9. 
196 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) 
paras 2.73, 14.2-14.3, 14.54; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – 
Number 254 (September 1998) paras 10.9-10.10; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) paras 
9.1.10, 9.1.12, 9.1.14; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 65; Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and 
Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th ed 2008) para 35-001; Nield S “Adverse Possession and Estoppel” 2004 
Conveyancer 123-136 128. See also Caterina R “Some Comparative Remarks on JA Pye (Oxford) v. The United 
Kingdom” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 273-279 274; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse 
Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2441-2442; Irving DK “Should the Law Recognise 
the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 112-119 115; 
Goodman MJ “Adverse Possession of Land – Morality and Motive” (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 281-288 
282-283, 288; Ballantine HW “Title by Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 135-159 137, 143-
144. 
197 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) 
paras 2.70, 14.3, 14.54; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 
254 (September 1998) paras 10.9-10.10; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) paras 9.1.10, 
9.1.14; Smith RJ Property Law (6th ed 2009) 65. See also Caterina R “Some Comparative Remarks on JA Pye 
176 
once it is registered and the register provides conclusive proof of ownership of land.198 To 
allow adverse possession in such a framework would be inconsistent with the principle that 
the register is conclusive concerning the ownership of land.199 In other words, possession 
forms the basis of title when land is unregistered, whereas the register performs this function 
in cases involving registered land.200 Consequently, registration of title under the LRA in 
English law today fulfils the same role as the Grundbuch in German law, where the register 
also provides conclusive proof of the ownership of land.201 This means that the English 
registration system – like the German Grundbuch – is now also positive in nature. It follows 
that adverse possession fulfils a greater role in a negative registration system where the 
correctness of the register is not guaranteed. 
 
Through this evaluation of the traditional justifications for adverse possession, the operation 
of unqualified adverse possession regarding registered land suddenly seemed to some to 
“endorse” a form of “land theft”.202 The disappearance of the conveyancing justification led 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(Oxford) v. The United Kingdom” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 273-279 274; Irving DK “Should 
the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?” (1985) 2 Australian Property Law Journal 
112-119 115; Ballantine HW “Title by Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 135-159 143-144. 
198 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) 
paras 2.73, 14.3, 14.6, 14.10, 14.54; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document 
– Number 254 (September 1998) paras 10.10-10.11; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another 
[2000] Ch 676 710; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) paras 9.1.10, 9.1.14; Smith RJ 
Property Law (6th ed 2009) 65; Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property 
(7th ed 2008) paras 35-001, 35-071; Dixon M “The Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 
2002: A Risk Assessment” 2003 Conveyancer 136-156 137. See also Goymour A “The Acquisition of Rights in 
Property by the Effluxion of Time” in Cooke E (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law 4 (2007) 169-196 193; 
Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2441-
2442; Ballantine HW “Title by Adverse Possession” (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 135-159 143-144.  
199 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) 
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200 See Fox D “Relativity of Title at Law and in Equity” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 330-365 for a 
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the Law Commission to conclude that it can no longer be justified to have adverse possession 
in relation to registered land.203 Therefore, the Law Commission found that the doctrine of 
adverse possession “runs counter to the fundamental concept of indefeasibility of title that is 
a feature of registered title.”204 Only in a few instances where the register is not conclusive – 
as is the case in relation to boundaries – would the conveyancing justification still hold 
water.205 The Law Commission decided that adverse possession concerning registered land 
should no longer extinguish ownership, since in only a limited number of situations will the 
conveyancing justification regarding registered land be the same as it is in relation to 
unregistered land.206 Gray and Gray capture the effects of this alteration to English law as 
follows: 
 
“With the drive towards comprehensive registration of title there has emerged a new 
conceptualism of ownership or dominium. The common law principle of relativity of title [and 
by implication also adverse possession] now operates only marginally within the statutory 
scheme of registered land.”207 (Original emphasis.) 
 
Yet, some authors state that the position is not this simple, claiming that there still exist valid 
reasons for having adverse possession in relation to registered land that were not taken into 
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207 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5th ed 2009) para 9.1.20. See also Cobb N & Fox L “Living 
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consideration by the Law Commission.208 Nonetheless, the LRA now severely restricts 
adverse possession concerning registered land. As appears from the discussion of the LRA in 
the previous chapter,209 the enactment of this Act did not so much alter the substantive 
requirements for adverse possession as that it provides compelling procedural safeguards for 
registered owners by putting mechanisms in place that protect owners of registered land from 
losing their land through the limitation effect of adverse possession.210 Lord Hope describes 
these amendments by stating that “a much more rigorous regime has now been enacted in ... 
the Land Registration Act 2002 ... [which makes] it much harder for a squatter who is in 
possession of registered land to obtain title to it against the wishes of the proprietor.”211 The 
LRA expressly alters the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 by providing that no 
limitation period can “run against any person ... in relation to an estate in land ... the title to 
which is registered.”212  
 
These developments in England were followed by an extensive discussion surrounding the 
compatibility of adverse possession with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (“Article 1”) to the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (“the Convention”) 
at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This debate pertained to adverse 
possession as it operated prior to the enactment of the LRA, when the “old” rules of adverse 
possession still applied to both registered and unregistered land. Although this issue was 
settled in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom,213 where the Grand Chamber held pre-LRA 
adverse possession law to be compatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol, I return to this 
                                                             
208 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 236-240; Dixon MJ “Adverse Possession in Three 
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issue in the next chapter. Chapter five specifically focuses on whether prescription is 
justifiable in the constitutional setting of South Africa.  
 
 
4.3.3 Conclusion – the death of traditional adverse possession in English law 
In light of the new regime introduced by the 2002 Act, it may not be too bold to state that 
adverse possession in its traditional sense is dead, as it is no longer possible in English law to 
acquire registered land through adverse possession alone. This is because the LRA now 
prevents the extinguishment of registered title through the mere passage of time. The findings 
of the Law Commission that the justifications for adverse possession involving unregistered 
land do not extend to registered land affected this departure from the traditional position. 
Two of the main points of criticism in this context are that it cannot be said that adverse 
possession promotes legal certainty or that it encourages owners not to sleep on their rights, 
since registered landowners can now be identified through investigating the register. Yet, I 
argue that this criticism only applies to legal systems where the register provides conclusive 
proof of ownership, such as German law.214  
 
These developments necessitate a re-evaluation of the justifications advanced for prescription 
in South African law. The reason for this re-evaluation is because many of the reasons 
provided for justifying adverse possession in English law are the same as those found in 
South African law, most notably the fact that both adverse possession and prescription 
promote legal certainty. Therefore, it has to be determined whether Dockray’s criticism 
against these justifications also applies to the justifications for prescription in South African 
law. This question is addressed in the next section, which focuses on three liberal property 
theories that provide reasons for retaining adverse possession or prescription in a legal 
system.  
  
 
4.4 Three liberal theories for justifying acquisitive prescription 
4.4.1 Background  
                                                             
214 German law is discussed in section 3.5 of chapter three above. 
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This section analyses the justifications for adverse possession or prescription215 against the 
background of three liberal property theories, namely the labour theory of Locke, the 
personality theory, as developed by Radin, together with utilitarianism and law and 
economics theory. The reason I chose these three theories is because they cover the 
justifications provided for prescription in South African law. Attention is also paid to 
situations involving the mala fide possessor, as these cases are the most difficult to justify.216 
This is due to the fact that prescription – especially in cases involving mala fide possessors – 
prima facie seems to undermine the security and exclusivity of ownership.217 In United States 
(“US”) law these possessors have been described as “acquisitive [property] outlaws”218 to 
illustrate that they are consciously (ab)using the law of adverse possession to “steal” property 
from owners.219 Van der Walt emphasises the problem with bad faith adverse possession: 
 
“Considering the social importance attached to the sanctity and security of property ownership 
in the rights paradigm, allowing bad faith unlawful possessors to acquire ownership through 
acquisitive possession represents a significant qualification of the paradigm.”220 
 
Since mala fide possessors pose a threat to the security of ownership, it is understandable 
why judges and commentators are unwilling to award ownership to such persons simply 
because they satisfied the requirements for adverse possession.221 Nonetheless, arguments 
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System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 
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218 This term was coined by Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186. 
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have been voiced in support of prescription, even in the context of bad faith possessors.222 
The issue of bad faith prescription is addressed in section 4.5 below.  
 
It was seen above that adverse possession law in England was recently reformed with the 
enactment of the LRA, which prevents the extinguishment of ownership of registered land 
through the mere passage of time.223 Yet, some authors criticise the Law Commission for 
failing to incorporate certain moral and economic reasons into its arguments when it decided 
to “abolish” adverse possession.224 They argue that the position adopted by the Law 
Commission oversimplifies matters because it simply distinguishes between good faith and 
bad faith squatters, the former being morally acceptable whereas the latter – being labelled as 
“immoral” – ought to be prevented from stealing land from “blameless” owners.225 It seems 
as if the Law Commission, without much in-depth reasoning, merely accepted that 
“registration is right and ‘land theft’ wrong”,226 without providing sufficient reasons as to 
why it reached such a conclusion. Dixon said the following when commenting on the reforms 
suggested by the Law Commission: 
 
“[M]odern expositions of the law on adverse possession appear to have favoured the rights of 
possessors over the rights of paper owners and the existence of an off-register mechanism for 
destroying titles seems to make a mockery of the state guarantee of title. On the other hand, the 
social and economic justifications for principles of adverse possession have been well 
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documented and instead of ‘land theft’, adverse possession can be seen as encouraging 
‘productive land use’. Again, there is nothing inherently contradictory in having principles of 
adverse possession operate in registered land, at least if those principles are seen positively as 
a method of transferring title from one person to another instead of a method of unfairly 
snatching it from them.”227 (Emphasis added.) 
 
The Law Commission’s failure to incorporate these moral and economic grounds into its 
reports necessitates an investigation of these factors. This is achieved through employing the 
three liberal property theories mentioned to emphasise the fallacy in the reasoning of the Law 
Commission concerning the “abolition” of traditional adverse possession.   
 
 
4.4.2 The labour theory 
According to Locke’s labour theory, God gave the world to mankind in common for its 
preservation.228 It is from this commons that man – who has property in his own person – is 
able to appropriate property through “the labour of his body, and the work of his hands.”229 
Property is awarded to those who mix labour with it, namely the “industrious and rational”, 
as opposed to those who do not, whose non-laborious acts Locke describes as “the fancy or 
covetousness of the quarrelsom[e] and contentious.”230 Locke rejects the idea that prior 
consent is required from the rest of mankind to acquire ownership in property.231 
Consequently, a person acquires ownership over a thing by taking it out of the commons and 
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that Locke’s theory is not able to adequately answer this question. Nonetheless, there is something to be said for 
a labour theory claim when a person invests labour into land by occupying and working it. 
230 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 34. See also Cobb N & Fox L “Living 
Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 
Legal Studies 236-260 249; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago 
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theory of first possession, which she uses to justify adverse possession. For another take on the role of the rule 
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231 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 28. See also Rose CM “Possession as the 
Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 74 and the sources cited there. 
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through mixing his labour with it.232 Since labour belongs to the person performing it, once 
labour is mixed with a thing it becomes the property of the labourer and no one else is then 
able to obtain a right in it.233 Locke’s theory concerns situations of first acquisition of 
ownership, which means that it will be of no use to mix labour with the property of another, 
as that property has already been appropriated from the commons and can thus not be 
acquired by mixing labour with it ex post.234 It follows that one of the characteristics of the 
Lockean theory is that it prohibits non-contractual redistribution of ownership.235 This poses 
a problem for acquiring property through adverse possession, as the labour theory seems to 
be inconsistent with such a method of acquisition of ownership.236 Nonetheless, this problem 
can be overcome by treating the owner’s neglect of his land as a form of “quasi-
abandonment”,237 which diminishes the owner’s claim towards the property.238 In this context 
Cobb and Fox think that merit is to be found in a possible labour theory claim in cases 
involving urban squatters who occupy empty property and invest time and energy to improve 
it.239 Still, owners sometimes let their properties lie vacant because of future development 
plans or because the owner wishes to keep it as an investment or to sell it at a later stage. 
Although non-use constitutes one of the entitlements of ownership (the ius abutendi), it is 
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more difficult to justify the existence of such an entitlement when one’s property is possessed 
by others for long periods of time, especially in societies characterised by housing shortage 
problems such as South Africa.240 However, it is worth emphasising that prescription does 
not limit an owner’s right to neglect his property, since owners are entitled to let their land 
remain unused even for a 100 years if they so desire. Ownership can only be lost through 
prescription if the owner – through exercising the ius abutendi – does not assert his 
ownership by “allowing” a possessor to possess the land for the duration of the prescription 
period. In this regard Rose states that one of the purposes of adverse possession is “to require 
the owner to assert her right publicly.”241 Consequently, an owner does not lose property 
through mere non-use alone but because another person has taken possession of it in the 
owner’s absence, which possessor is then able to acquire the property through prescription.  
 
The quasi-abandonment argument of Cobb and Fox is strengthened by the fact that Locke 
qualifies his theory by stating that it will only be a valid method for acquiring property “at 
least where there is enough, and is good left in common for others.”242 This implies that the 
labour theory only suffices as long as there remain enough unowned things in the commons 
for other people to appropriate. Such an approach can also be used to justify urban squatters 
acquiring ownership over abandoned houses or premises. Indeed, Locke wrote during an era 
when “there [was] land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants”,243 which now 
is no longer the case. This supports the argument that prescription should be allowed in the 
Lockean framework. Thus, the abovementioned qualification can warrant the use of the 
labour theory to justify the acquisition of things through law (prescription) where property is 
already owned (but not used by the owner) and possessed by another person in situations 
where there no longer remains enough land in the commons for people to appropriate.244  
 
                                                             
240 Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Property” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th 
ed 2007) 405-665 510 and cases cited: See section 4.2.3 above. See also Van der Walt AJ Property in the 
Margins (2009) 176; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after 
the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260. For an argument in this regard, see Merrill 
TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 
1122-1154 1130-1131; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law 
Review 73-88 81-82. This issue is addressed in section 4.5 below. 
241 Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 79. 
242 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) §§ 27, 33. See also Epstein RA “Possession 
as the Root of Title” (1979) 13 Georgia Law Review 1221-1243 1228 in this regard. 
243 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 36. 
244 To the same effect is Green K “Citizens and Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law” in Bright S & 
Dewar JK (eds) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (1998) 229-256 243. 
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However, prescription is not only confined to cases involving urban squatters and thus one 
also has to consider whether the labour theory can be used to justify prescription when 
squatters invest time and labour in rural land. In § 31, Locke states that no person is free to 
appropriate from the commons as much as he desires, since a person may not take more from 
the commons than he is able to enjoy.245 Should a person appropriate more than his share or 
what he is able to use, such things will spoil, causing it to “belong to others”.246 The 
justification for this approach is that “[n]othing was made by God for man to spoil or 
destroy.”247 Although this particular paragraph248 only pertains to acorns or other fruit of the 
Earth, which are by their nature perishable things, through analogy one can read this 
qualification as also applying to land that is not used by owners, who thereby “spoil” it.249 
Such an argument is justified through the use of the word “nothing” in this context,250 which 
is indicative of all kinds of property, including land. Although Locke does not directly state 
what happens to things that spoil, other than it “will belong to others”, it seems as if these 
things remain in or at least revert to the commons from where other persons are then able to 
appropriate them. In § 32, Locke mentions that land is acquired in the same way as fruits of 
the Earth described in § 31, which implies that land is subject to the same qualification 
mentioned in § 31. In the context of land it is stated that “[a]s much land as a man tills, 
plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.”251 The latter 
paragraph entails that an owner who does not use his property is “spoiling” it, which opens 
the door for allowing prescription in the Lockean framework.252 The spoiling of land by an 
owner can be said to have “offended against the common Law of Nature, and [such owner is] 
                                                             
245 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 31. 
246 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) §§ 31, 46.  
247 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 31. See also Green K “Citizens and 
Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law” in Bright S & Dewar JK (eds) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives 
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Law” in Bright S & Dewar JK (eds) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (1998) 229-256 241, 243. 
250 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 31: “Nothing was made by God for man to 
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251 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 32. 
252 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) §§ 31-32. For an argument along similar 
lines, see Green K “Citizens and Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law” in Bright S & Dewar JK (eds) 
Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (1998) 229-256 241, 243; Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van 
Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot het Debat over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig 
Weekblad 1582-1597 1585. 
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liable to be punished; [for] he invaded his neighbour’s share.”253 This logic provides further 
accommodation for prescription in the labour theory, especially if one considers that one of 
its justifications is to “punish” the neglectful owner and to reward the “industrious and 
rational”.254 This argument is similar to the justification found in the jurisdictions discussed 
above, namely that prescription encourages owners to make use of their property.255 Indeed, 
Locke declares that whatever is beyond the enjoyment or use of a person before it spoils may 
not be appropriated as property, as it will be “more than his share” and will then belong to 
others.256 Although one may encounter problems with the word “spoil” in the context of land, 
I argue that spoilage entails letting land lie unused or abandoned for long periods of time.257 
The following statement advances the possibility of such an interpretation: 
 
“But if either the grass of his [e]nclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting 
perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his 
[e]nclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other.”258 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
If the non-use of land by an owner constitutes “waste”, causing it to “be the possession of any 
other”, it follows that the land then resides in or reverts to the commons, from where it can be 
acquired through prescription. The arguments by Cobb and Fox in the context of urban 
squatters strengthen the possibility of such an interpretation.259  
 
An interesting element of the labour theory is found in the last paragraph of Locke’s chapter 
on property. According to § 51, a person has a right to all things in which he can invest 
                                                             
253 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 37, read with § 38. The latter paragraph 
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257 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) §§ 37-38. 
258 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 38. 
259 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260. See also Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for 
‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096. 
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labour, causing no temptation to labour for more than such person can make use of. The 
result of this is captured as follows: 
 
“This left no room for controvers[y] about the title, nor for [e]ncroachment on the rights of 
others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless as well as 
dishonest to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed.”260 (Emphasis added.) 
 
According to this paragraph it seems to be a waste (“useless”) if owners have too much 
property or more than they need. This is analogous to situations where people own more land 
than they are able or willing to use or look after, which serves as an additional justification 
for allowing prescription in this context.  
 
One cannot ignore the role that time fulfils in theories such as the labour theory, since Epstein 
states that “[a]ll human interactions, and hence all legal rules, have a temporal dimension.”261 
Although time plays an important role in the personality theory262 as well as in utilitarian and 
law and economics theory,263 it seems that the temporal dimension has no relevance in 
Locke’s theory.264 The reason why the temporal dimension is irrelevant in the labour theory 
is because it only focuses on the moment entitlements are created.265 A person acquires 
ownership – or entitlements – in property the moment he takes something from the commons 
and mixes labour with it. According to Epstein, the labour theory entails that entitlements are 
created through first possession of a thing, which entitlements are then fixed “forever”.266 
Thus, time is only relevant to Locke the moment property is appropriated from the commons. 
It follows that the temporal dimension before and after this defining moment, when 
ownership is acquired, is irrelevant for the labour theory. This approach towards time is 
problematic for justifying adverse possession, since it is impossible to acquire ownership in 
property if the original owner’s entitlement toward it is forever recognised.267 Nonetheless, 
                                                             
260 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) § 51. 
261 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 667. 
262 This theory is discussed in section 4.4.3 below. 
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264 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 739-
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740; Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 669-670, 674. 
266 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 669-670, 674; Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 
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one overcomes this problem by employing Epstein’s doctrine of relative title, which 
recognises the importance of the temporal dimension in the context of competing claims.268 
Since time eradicates evidence pertaining to ownership, this doctrine entails that adverse 
possession is able to resolve conflicting claims to ownership by awarding title not to the first 
possessor (owner), but to the prior possessor (squatter).269 Accordingly, the doctrine of 
relative title “has the same virtues that the doctrine of first possession [or labour theory] has 
with respect to land originally unowned.”270 Consequently, it is possible to accommodate 
adverse possession in the labour theory if one follows Epstein’s proposition by incorporating 
a time element into Locke’s theory. 
 
Prima facie it seems as if the labour theory is unable to accommodate adverse possession, 
since this legal institution entails the acquisition of property that is already owned. However, 
the labour theory can justify prescription if an owner’s neglect – or non-use – of urban or 
rural property is recognised as constituting quasi-abandonment or “waste”. In this context the 
purposeful squatter who makes use of neglected land indeed provides support for including 
prescription in this theory. Furthermore, the labour theory is also subject to certain internal 
qualifications. For instance, Locke states that the acquisition of ownership through his theory 
will only be warranted as long as there remain enough unowned things in the commons for 
others to appropriate. Moreover, Locke forbids persons to take more from the commons than 
they are able to use and enjoy. These conditions open the possibility to allow prescription in 
the Lockean framework. Although the absence of a temporal dimension in the labour theory 
is another factor that counts against accommodating prescription, Epstein’s doctrine of 
relative title can overcome this problem. I predict that these factors, when taken together, 
offer enough support for concluding that the labour theory can justify prescription.  
 
The last issue warranting attention is how the labour theory reacts to mala fide adverse 
possession. In this sense it seems that the labour theory accommodates both good and bad 
faith prescription. The reason for this is because the subjective intent of the purposeful 
labourer is irrelevant for Locke; he merely requires a person to mix his labour with an object 
                                                             
268 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 675. 
269 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
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to acquire ownership. Consequently, the subjective mindset of a person is unimportant to the 
labour theory, since both good and bad faith adverse possessors are able to acquire ownership 
in an object through mixing labour with it. 
 
 
4.4.3 The personality theory 
The second liberal theory that can justify prescription is the property and personhood theory 
(“personality theory”) of Radin.271 The following passage captures the essence of this theory: 
 
“The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-development 
– to be a person – an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment. 
The necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights.”272 (Original emphasis.) 
 
The personality theory entails that certain objects (property) are bound up with one’s 
personhood because they become part of the way we constitute ourselves as humans.273 
Although these objects differ from person to person, Radin identifies four examples, namely 
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a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom and a house.274 The essence of her theory is that 
ownership of objects is needed to help constitute healthy self-constitution or human 
flourishing.275 The strength of a person’s relationship with an object is measured by taking 
into account the kind of “pain”276 he will suffer should the object be lost in some way.277 
Consequently, an object is closely bound up with someone’s personhood if its loss causes 
pain that cannot be relieved by replacing that object with its monetary value.278 An example 
analogous to one provided by Radin is where a valuable watch was stolen from a 
watchmaker. The insurer can simply reimburse the watchmaker, but if the same watch was 
stolen from a sentimental owner, simple monetary reimbursement will not provide adequate 
satisfaction.279 The reimbursement of the watchmaker by the insurer is viewed as possession 
of an object that is replaceable with something of equal worth.280 Such objects are held for 
instrumental reasons, examples being money, watches held by a watchmaker and land in the 
hands of a developer.281 Radin refers to these two types of property (relationships) as (i) 
“personal property”,282 which involves property that individuals are attached to as persons, 
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and (ii) “fungible property”, which entails property that individuals are not bound up with.283 
Yet, the fact that persons can become bound up with certain things does not imply that such 
property deserves recognition or protection, since there is both a good and bad way of being 
bound up with objects.284 In this sense “object-fetishism” – which implies a wrong or 
unhealthy way of being bound up with objects – will not be recognised as personal property 
because such property it is not constitutive of one’s personhood.285 The “shoe fetishist’s” 
relationship with his shoe does not deserve the same recognition or respect as the relationship 
between a sentimental watch owner and his watch, since a shoe cannot be constitutive of 
someone’s personhood.286 To ascertain whether a person’s relationship with an object is 
“good” or “bad” (fetishistic), one has to establish whether an “objective moral consensus” 
determines that to be bound up with that category of thing is consistent with personhood or 
healthy self-constitution.287 However, refusing to classify fetishist or fungible property as 
personal property does not mean that such objects are not regarded as property.288 The shoe 
fetishist will still hold or own his shoe as property, albeit with a weaker right than had it 
qualified as personal property.289  
 
Radin’s theory is built on the Hegelian personality theory, since it supports her theory of 
“property for personhood”.290 According to Hegel, a “person must translate his freedom into 
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192 
an external sphere in order to exist as [an] Idea.”291 This means that before a person can truly 
exist, it is necessary for such person to invest his will into “the sphere capable of embodying 
his freedom”.292 As to what precisely this “external sphere” entails, one only has to look to 
the following passage to find the answer:  
 
“A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any and every thing and 
thereby making it his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its determination and soul 
from his will. This is the absolute right of appropriation which human beings have over all 
‘things.’”293 (Own emphasis.) 
 
It follows that “property is the first existence of freedom and so is in itself a substantive 
end.”294 Consequently, “property” is the external sphere into which a person must invest his 
will in order to exist. Hegel’s personality theory can be classified as an occupancy theory, 
since the owner must “invest” his will into a thing together with possessing it before 
ownership can be obtained.295 Hegel’s occupancy theory – as opposed to the labour theory – 
does not result in an entitlement that is then fixed “forever”.296 To maintain ownership, a 
person’s will must remain present in the object, otherwise “the thing becomes ownerless, 
because it has been deprived of the actuality of the will and possession.”297 It follows that as 
this will to possess property “comes and goes” over time, so property must also “come and 
go”.298 Consequently, the essence of the personality theory entails that property for 
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personhood, namely personal property, gives rise to a stronger moral claim than other 
(fungible) property. Put differently, personal property is more worthy of protection than 
fungible property in terms of Radin’s theory. Nonetheless, this does not entail that fungible 
property does not constitute property at all, as seen earlier. It merely denotes that personal 
property is ranked higher than fungible property in the hierarchy of property that is worthy of 
protection or recognition because it is essential to constituting personhood. A similar 
approach to Radin’s distinction between personal and fungible property is reflected in 
German constitutional law, where the state’s power to regulate the limits of property rights 
depends on how far a property right is located from the personal autonomy of an owner.299 
Accordingly, a person’s home (personal property) in German law is more strongly protected 
against state regulation than property rights in commercial property (fungible property).300 
 
The personhood dichotomy of personal and fungible property is located on a continuum that 
ranges from personal property at the one end to fungible property at the other.301 Radin states 
that such a dichotomy is useful because “within a given social context certain types of 
person-thing relationships are understood to fall close to one end or the other of the 
continuum.”302 This entails that if rights lie nearer to the fungible end of the continuum, they 
can be overridden in some cases where those nearer the personal end cannot be.303 This is 
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how one can use Radin’s theory to justify prescription, especially in situations where the 
squatter values the property more than an owner by using and cultivating it, as long as it is 
constitutive to such squatter’s personhood.304 This is affected by the fact that the dichotomy 
of personal and fungible property within the personality theory creates a “hierarchy of 
entitlements”, which means that personal property will receive stronger protection than 
property that is merely fungible.305 In such a scenario the entitlement obtained by the 
possessor of the property vis-à-vis the neglectful owner can allow his claim to trump the 
claim of such owner. The reason for this is that the squatter will probably be treating the 
property as personal property, whereas in relation to the owner it can be classified as fungible 
property. However, one will have to determine in each case where the property falls on the 
continuum to establish which party holds the property as personal property and who is thus 
entitled to greater protection. If it is assumed that a house that is owned and inhabited by 
someone lies nearer the personal end of the continuum,306 one can argue that this will also be 
the case when a squatter inhabits unused property as a home.307 It seems that Gray’s theory of 
moral excludability supports such a finding, especially if the purpose of limiting the owner’s 
ownership is in line with public morality.308 In this sense, “claims to ‘property’ may 
sometimes be overridden by the need to attain or further more highly rated social goals”,309 
such as protecting people’s homes. Indeed, an occupier’s relationship with his home is a 
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prime example used by Radin, as according to “social consensus” this relationship is likely to 
be constitutive of one’s personhood.310 In this context Radin says the following: 
 
“[I]n our social context a house that is owned by someone who resides there is generally 
understood to be towards the personal end of the continuum. There is both a positive sense that 
people are bound up with their homes and a normative sense that this is not fetishistic.”311 
 
In this context Radin’s personality theory provides an interesting view regarding the claims 
of urban squatters toward occupied property vis-à-vis owners that neglect it.312 This line of 
argument is likely to also be applicable in the context of squatters who occupy rural land as 
their home.  
 
Against this background one can argue that the personal relationship that develops between 
the squatter and the land is more worthy of protection than an absent owner’s (probably) 
fungible relationship with his property. However, such a conclusion will only be justified if it 
can be shown that the squatter’s personal interest in the land is “stronger” than the owner’s 
interest. Yet, for purposes of this argument the owner must come to regard the property as 
“fungible”, something that – according to Stake – cannot be assumed merely because the 
owner is out of possession.313 Yet, even if the property is of greater personal importance to 
the squatter than to the owner, it will have to be shown that the owner no longer “believes” in 
his ownership.314 A solution here is to equate the owner’s (long-term) non-use with 
abandonment, an argument made by Cobb and Fox and supported (from an economic 
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perspective) by Posner.315 Yet, this argument is harder to justify when owners who are out of 
possession still value their ownership but are unaware of the fact that their property is being 
adversely possessed.316 In such a scenario it will not be easy to show that the owner has come 
to regard the land as mere “fungible property”. Despite this difficulty, a powerful argument is 
to be made in situations where the property is truly constitutive of the squatter’s personality, 
even if the owner is merely absent due to his inactivity regarding the property. Another 
solution is to determine which party – either the squatter or owner – is in direct, physical 
possession of the land, together with who is investing time and labour in it. The person who 
satisfies these two criteria is likely to have a more “personal” interest in the land than one 
who does not perform these positive and direct acts on the property. Hegel’s theory – which 
requires an owner to invest his will into a thing and to possess it to maintain ownership – 
contributes to such a conclusion.  
 
Other authors (such as Holmes,317 Singer318 and Alexander319) also provide justifications for 
adverse possession that are analogous to Radin’s personality theory. The following passage 
from Holmes clearly justifies adverse possession in terms of a personality-theory approach:  
 
“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an 
opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and 
trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.”320 
 
Thus, Holmes acknowledges that property becomes bound up with a person if it has been 
enjoyed for a long time. This is similar to a squatter who comes to regard occupied land as 
personal property.  
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The second theory that is related to the personality theory – which can also be used to justify 
prescription – is Singer’s theory of the “reliance interest in property”.321 Singer describes the 
effect of the reliance interest as follows: 
 
“The legal system sometimes protects the more vulnerable party to the relationship by 
recognizing and protecting her reliance interest in property and limiting protection of the 
stronger party’s interests.”322   
 
Singer explicitly states that the reliance interest of a squatter can be used to justify adverse 
possession.323 By “allowing” the squatter to possess his land, the owner condones the 
occupation of the squatter through conveying “a message to the [squatter] that the owner has 
abandoned the property.”324 The squatter then begins to rely more and more on the 
“legitimacy” of his occupation, which causes the squatter’s interest in the property to grow 
stronger as time passes.325 Conversely, the owner’s interest in the property diminishes with 
the squatter’s length of occupation of the property.326 Singer concludes – through relying on 
Holmes – that it would be “morally wrong for the true owner to allow a relationship of 
dependence to be established and then to cut off the dependant party.”327 To protect the 
reliance interest of the squatter (the vulnerable party), adverse possession then enters the 
picture by awarding ownership to the squatter.328 I argue that the same result is reached in 
Radin’s terms by treating the squatter’s interest in the property as personal, while the owner’s 
interest becomes more and more fungible as time passes.329 
 
The third trend that bears resemblance to Radin’s personality theory is the social-obligation 
theory of Alexander. I analyse Alexander’s theory in more detail than the two previous ones 
                                                             
321 This theory was developed by Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 
611-751. Interestingly, this theory is analogous to one of the justifications provided for extinctive prescription, 
namely that it protects the reasonable reliance of debtors: See Loubser MM Extinctive Prescription (1996) 8-9. 
Nonetheless, a discussion of the justifications of extinctive prescription falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
322 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 664. See also Merrill 
TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 
1122-1154 1131, where he states that adverse possession protects “the reliance interests that the possessor may 
have developed through long standing possession of the property.” 
323 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 666. 
324 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 666. 
325 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 666-668. 
326 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 667-668. 
327 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 667. 
328 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 668-669. 
329 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 669 footnote 183 
shares this view. 
198 
(of Holmes and Singer) because of the intricate nature of this theory as well as the fact that it 
offers an interesting alternative perspective on the moral obligations of owners. Alexander 
argues that American property law contains an implicit social-obligation norm, although it 
has not yet been explicitly recognised in this field of law. According to him, the social-
obligation norm promotes human flourishing (in the Aristotelian sense of the term), which 
“enables individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity.”330 In this context, people need 
access to both community life and property to foster their human flourishing.331 Radin also 
requires (personal) property – which is constitutive of one’s personality – to attain human 
flourishing, although she does not focus on the social element as such. However, it must be 
emphasised that Alexander and Radin draw on different conceptions of human flourishing, 
since Alexander uses the Aristotelian notion of human flourishing332 while Radin relies on 
Hegel.  
 
Alexander develops his theory by stating that the traditional perspective of ownership is that 
it merely entails rights, with little or no obligations toward others. He criticises this rights-
based view of ownership and claims that owners have inherent obligations towards other 
people, which obligations he identifies as embodying the social-obligation norm. The 
following passage sketches the background of this theory:  
 
“Property rights and their correlative obligations are cognizable as social goods, worthy of 
vindication by the state, only insofar as they are consistent with community and human 
flourishing more generally. In the interest of human flourishing, the community, or more 
colloquially, the state, affords legal recognition to asserted claims to resources. Accordingly, the 
state does not take away when it abstains from legally vindicating asserted claims to resources 
that are inconsistent with human flourishing or with community itself.”333 
 
According to Alexander, humans – as social and political animals – must develop their 
capabilities (through virtues) to attain human flourishing.334 Alexander borrows from the 
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“capabilities” approach of Nussbaum and Sen to develop his notion of human flourishing 
through advancing one’s capabilities.335 To cultivate human flourishing, persons must be able 
to develop their capabilities to live a well-lived life, which must include the capability to 
choose between alternative life horizons.336  
 
People depend on others (the community) to flourish as humans, since no-one can “acquire 
these capabilities or secure the resources to acquire them by one’s self.”337 This approach 
illustrates another difference between the theories of Alexander and Radin, since for 
Alexander the community (and not only property) is the main requirement for constituting 
human flourishing.338 To this end, every person in a community is equally entitled to the 
necessary capabilities to help promote flourishing. However, mere virtues are not enough for 
human beings to develop their capabilities; they also need material resources to foster these 
capabilities. Because humans are social animals and dependent on each other, it follows that 
“human flourishing requires distributive justice, the ultimate objective of which is to give 
people what they need in order to develop the capabilities necessary for living the well-lived 
life”.339 This notion of distributive justice (which is required for every person to flourish) 
forms one of the roots of the social-obligation norm. Another basis for this norm is the idea 
that the well-being of the community, which aids the flourishing of individuals, depends on 
each individual’s assistance to the community.340 Furthermore, if a person – as a rational 
being – values his own flourishing, it follows that he must also value the flourishing of 
others. The core of this third source of the social-obligation norm can be captured as follows:   
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“Our affirmation of the moral value of the requisite capabilities means that we recognize that 
capabilities [to attain human flourishing] have a special moral status and that we acknowledge 
as a good that those capabilities develop both in ourselves and in others. [Therefore], we must 
make the same normative commitment to developing them in others as we have committed to 
developing them in ourselves.”341 (Own emphasis.) 
 
Since persons unavoidably rely on other people to develop their capabilities to flourish, there 
rests a social obligation on individuals in the community to help others to foster their 
capabilities for attaining human flourishing. Alexander describes the content of the social-
obligation norm as entailing that owners have a moral obligation to contribute to the society 
or community – of which he forms part – those benefits “that the society reasonably regards 
as necessary for human flourishing.”342 These benefits encompass things that are necessary 
for members of the community to develop their capabilities to flourish, which includes 
resources like land. Alexander then illustrates that his social-obligation norm underlies 
important legal institutions such as expropriation (eminent domain in US law), which 
requires individuals to sacrifice property for legitimate government initiatives that benefit the 
flourishing of the community.343 Take, for example, a scenario where the state wishes to 
acquire property situated in a specific area that is the only viable location where it can build a 
crucial new highway. In such a case the state must use its power of expropriation to acquire 
the properties at a reasonable price, otherwise the owners may hold out in an attempt to extort 
absurd offers from the government. Although the affected owners will receive compensation, 
compensation cannot always make good the personal and sentimental losses some owners 
experience when their property is expropriated, especially when considering Michelman’s 
notion of demoralisation costs.344 Nonetheless, this burden that the state places on some 
individual owners is justified – according to Alexander – in terms of the social-obligation 
norm, since the flourishing of the community is greatly enhanced by the construction of 
important infrastructure, namely a highway that will lead to reduced traffic congestion.345 It 
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follows that the social-obligation norm requires the affected owners to sacrifice their property 
for purposes of fostering the human flourishing of the community. The state recognises the 
social obligation of the owners through expropriating their land against payment of 
compensation and by building the important new highway over those properties. 
 
Against this background, I argue that the social-obligation norm also underlies the acquisition 
of ownership through prescription.346 Prescription normally involves a situation where an 
owner has “allowed” a squatter to possess his land for a long period of time. Such squatters 
are often poor and/or landless,347 although this may not always be the case. What is certain, 
however, is that the property must be sufficiently unimportant to the owner for him to be 
unaware of the presence of the squatter during the running of prescription. In this sense it is 
clear that the longer the squatter possesses the land, the more it will contribute to his human 
flourishing, a position that is similar to Radin’s personality theory as well as the approach of 
Holmes. On the flipside, the property will become more unimportant to the owner, as one can 
deduce from his neglect or inattention. This conclusion is based on the observation that the 
land will steadily become essential to the squatter’s development of his capabilities to 
flourish, as he will be investing time and energy into the property. At the same time the 
property will probably become less constitutive to the flourishing of the owner because of his 
neglect of the land. Under these circumstances, the social-obligation norm obliges the owner 
to help the squatter – as a member of the community – to develop his capabilities to attain 
human flourishing by “giving” the land to him, since the land is no longer constitutive of the 
owner’s flourishing. Consequently, the law recognises the social obligation of the owner (as 
with expropriation in US law)348 by awarding ownership to the squatter through prescription 
for purposes of fostering his capabilities to lead a well-lived life. This position is analogous to 
Singer’s reliance-interest theory, which entails that the settled expectations of squatters (and 
third parties) must be protected if they have existed for long periods of time. Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
with that of the social-obligation norm in this specific instance, the two theories are not the same: See Alexander 
GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-820 777. See 
section 4.4.4 below for the economic analysis of prescription. 
346 I am indebted to Prof Alexander for discussions that helped me formulate my arguments in this context. 
347 This observation was made by Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse 
Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1081. 
348 The enforcement of social-obligation norm through prescription differs from cases concerning expropriation, 
which requires the payment of compensation. The reason that the rules of prescription do not require the 
squatter to compensate the owner is because the property is unlikely to be constitutive of the flourishing of the 
owner. This position differs from that of expropriation, where the state must compensate owners who lose 
property that most of them will regard as essential for leading a well-lived life. Since the property is likely to be 
unimportant to the flourishing of the owner in the context of prescription, no compensation is needed to offset 
this negative impact, namely the loss of ownership. 
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Alexander acknowledges his theory’s “family resemblance” to that of Singer.349 If one views 
prescription from this angle, it is clear that the social-obligation norm justifies prescription, 
since this legal institution entails that the state “abstains from legally vindicating [absent 
owners’] claims to resources that are inconsistent with [their] human flourishing or with 
community itself.”350 
 
Another way of interpreting the social-obligation norm is through recognising – as Cobb and 
Fox advocate – that each owner has an obligation or “duty of stewardship”351 to look after his 
property, although such an obligation does not compel owners to make use of their 
property.352 To use the language of Rose, this obligation or duty merely requires an owner to 
“assert [his] right publicly”353 by evicting persons who may be trespassing on his land. 
Should an owner not adhere to this obligation, the land is likely to be less important to him 
for attaining the capabilities to flourish. In this context the land is capable of becoming a vital 
resource for the squatter to develop his capabilities to lead a well-lived life, as argued in the 
previous paragraph. It follows that the social-obligation norm dictates that the owner must 
then “give” the land to the squatter – as a member of the community – to help him attain 
human flourishing. However, it may be problematic to determine at what point in time the 
property has become sufficiently unimportant to the flourishing of the owner, as well as 
sufficiently important to the possessor, to justify the shifting of ownership to the squatter.354 
This problem can be solved, in my view, by having a long prescription period, which will be 
indicative of how the land contributes to the flourishing of the two parties. In this sense the 
land will probably be more essential to the capabilities of the squatter to achieve the well-
lived life if he possessed the land for a long period of time. This will be even more so if the 
squatter occupies the property as a home,355 which resembles Radin’s personality theory. If 
so, it can be argued that prescription in South African law, which has a 30-year prescription 
period, properly internalises the social obligation of owners in this regard. 
                                                             
349 Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745-820 748 footnote 7. 
350 Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745-820 749. 
351 I borrow this term from Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting 
after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 254. 
352 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253-256. 
353 Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 79. 
354 This is also a problem for Radin’s personality theory, as mentioned earlier. 
355 Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745-820 816. 
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The fides of the squatter seems irrelevant for the social-obligation theory, since land can 
become essential to developing one’s capabilities even when you know (mala fide) that it 
does not belong to you. This will especially be the case where the squatter is poor and/or 
landless and has no viable means to acquire property necessary to attain human flourishing. 
This argument finds further support in the fallacious arguments for distinguishing between 
good and bad faith possessors, which are addressed below.356 I now return to Radin’s 
personality theory.   
 
With the interplay between personal and fungible property, together with Hegel’s personality 
theory, it is clear that the temporal dimension is important to the personality theory.357 It was 
seen that ownership in terms of the Hegelian theory is acquired by placing one’s will into the 
object together with possessing it.358 According to Radin, this idea suggests that a squatter’s 
interest in land grows stronger as the squatter becomes “bound up” with it over time.359 On 
the other hand, the “claim to an object grows weaker as the will (or personhood) is 
withdrawn.”360 It follows that – in terms of Radin’s theory – the strength of property claims is 
dynamic, since the relationship between persons and objects can increase or diminish as time 
passes.361 Furthermore, the personality theory does not have the same problems that rule-
utilitarianism has regarding the temporal dimension, since it concerns itself with the 
relationship between persons and property and not general happiness or utility.362 The 
personality theory also circumvents one of the labour theory’s problems by focusing on the 
relationship that develops between persons and objects rather than on some “aboriginal 
                                                             
356 See the discussion of the anomaly of the mala fide possessor in section 4.5 below. 
357 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64; Radin MJ “Time, 
Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741.  
358 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 51; Radin MJ “Property 
and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 973. 
359 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64; Radin MJ “Property 
and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 974; Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” 
(1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741.  
360 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741; 
Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64; Radin MJ “Property and 
Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 974. 
361 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64; Radin MJ “Property 
and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 974; Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” 
(1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741. 
362 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 742. 
This issue is elaborated upon in section 4.4.4 below, which focuses on utilitarianism and law and economics 
theory.  
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appropriation”.363 Instead, the personality theory must establish how to define personhood 
and how to determine whether a person-thing relationship is either personal or fungible.364  
 
The personality theory entails that – if it takes time for a person to invest his will into 
property – a (neglectful) owner’s initial personal interest becomes more fungible as time 
passes.365 Consequently, a squatter’s interest in property is likely to become more personal as 
time passes,366 as long as it does not become one that is fetishistic in nature. In this context 
the problem lies in determining at what moment in time the owner’s interest is sufficiently 
fungible for a squatter, who maintains a personal interest, to be entitled to acquire that 
property through prescription. Since the personality theory entails a moral judgment, it may 
be best to have a formal rule – such as a mechanical entitlement determination rule367 with a 
fixed time period – if such an approach entails less risk of moral error.368 I believe that this 
                                                             
363 Radin MJ “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 961 footnote 7; Radin MJ 
“Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 742. 
364 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 742. 
It is clear that Radin focuses on the relationship between persons and objects, instead of the relationship 
between persons regarding an object. Schnably SJ “Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of 
Property and Personhood” (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 347-407 352, 379 critiques Radin in this context and 
points out that her theory contains “an implicit conservative bias”. According to him (352), Radin’s theory “both 
hides and glorifies power” by using “social consensus” to determine the type of relationships that exist between 
persons and property. By separating moral issues from legal ones (in allowing personal property interests to 
trump fungible interests), Schnably (353) emphasises that Radin ignores the role of power in informing the 
consensual norm she uses to distinguish between personal and fungible property relationships. This is indeed a 
problem for Radin, especially against the background of the rights as relationships theory developed by 
Nedelsky J “Reconceiving Rights as Relationships” (1993) 1 Review of Constitutional Studies 1-26 7-8, 13-14. 
In this context Nedelsky (13) states that “property rights are not primarily about things, but about people’s 
relation to each other as they affect and are affected by things.” The focus on the relationship between people 
and objects is less of a problem for Hegel, though, since for him the will theory is a matter of power towards 
other people. Windscheid also refers to this will in property as constituting a power relationship between people 
regarding property, although he regards it as negative in nature: See Van der Walt AJ “Ownership and Personal 
Freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s Theory of Ownership” (1993) 56 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 569-589 573 and Van der Walt AJ “Unity and Pluralism in Property Theory – A 
Review of Property Theories and Debates in Recent Literature: Part I” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg 15-42 22-24. Yet, this shortcoming in Radin’s theory can be overcome if one has regard to Alexander’s 
social-obligation norm, which incorporates elements of community and property: See Alexander GS “The 
Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-820 761-768.   
365 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64; Radin MJ “Time, 
Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 748-749.  
366 Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2464-
2466 warns that this could present a problem concerning the aggregation of periods of adverse possession if one 
attempts to justify adverse possession under Radin’s personality theory. It seems that this anomaly cannot be 
adequately explained by the personality theory. Accordingly, the principle of coniunctio temporum is better 
accommodated in the legal certainty argument, since it rests on the impression of ownership being transferred 
from one person to another. 
367 As developed by Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 
Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1137-1145. The advantages of having prescription operate as a 
mechanical entitlement determination rule is discussed in section 4.4.4 below. 
368 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 749. 
Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law 
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approach is preferable to one decided on a case-by-case basis, especially since Radin’s theory 
does not prescribe definitive rules for making a moral judgment call under these 
circumstances. A moral judgment could lead to diverging results based on similar sets of 
facts, which can result in legal uncertainty. If the formal-rule route is followed, there is no 
simple answer as to what time period will be sufficient to deem an owner’s property interest 
as fungible. In this setting English law now requires 12 years for adverse possession of 
unregistered land, while South African law operates with a 30-year period.369 Radin evades a 
direct answer in this regard by suggesting that the period chosen must be based on a “socially 
acceptable” or “right” time that it takes to become attached to or detached from objects.370  
 
From this discussion it is clear that it is possible to use the personality theory to justify 
adverse possession.371 It follows that ownership is dependent on the presence of someone’s 
will (or personhood) in the property, coupled with possession of the thing.372 For instance, if 
the original owner withdraws his will and abandons possession, another person is then able to 
acquire a right in that property by investing his own will into it together with taking 
possession. This provides a moral ground for justifying the acquisition of property by the 
adverse possessor, since he will regard the property as personal while the owner probably 
treats it as fungible property. The question of whether the personality theory justifies bad 
faith prescription is addressed below.373 
 
 
4.4.4 Utilitarianism and law and economics theory 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Review 1122-1154 1141 thinks that “an arbitrary number of years” will be the best in this context, although he 
writes against the background of bona fide adverse possession. 
369 See section 3.2.2.1 of chapter three and section 2.3.1 of chapter two respectively above. 
370 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 749.  
371 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64; Radin MJ “Time, 
Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 745. In the words of 
Radin at 745, the personality theory “eas[ily]” accommodates adverse possession. See further Cobb N & Fox L 
“Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 
27 Legal Studies 236-260 250-251; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown 
Law Journal 2419-2474 2420, 2456; Merrill TW (ed) “Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law – Round 
Table Discussion” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 793-865 814; Merrill TW “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1127, 
1131; Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 477. 
372 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64; Radin MJ “Time, 
Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 745; Radin MJ “Property 
and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 974. 
373 See section 4.5 below. 
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Finally, I turn to the justifications for prescription in utilitarianism and law and economics 
theory. Bentham is the father of the utilitarian school of thought, yet it was Mill who coined 
the term “utilitarianism”.374 Utilitarianism attempts to maximise “the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number” and regards this as “the measure of right and wrong”.375 Therefore, the 
aim of utilitarianism is to arrange legal rules to maximise happiness (or utility), which is 
achieved through maximising happiness for the greatest number of people.376 Law and 
economics theory – on the other hand – aims to structure law to maximise another form of 
utility, namely economic efficiency.377 Since both these theories aim to maximise utility, 
which is viewed as either happiness of the greatest number or economic efficiency, it is clear 
that law and economics theory has its roots in utilitarianism.378 This is why these two theories 
are discussed together in this section. 
 
Unfortunately, Benthamite utilitarianism falls prey to criticism, namely that it can be (ab)used 
to justify laws that provide happiness for the majority, while those laws cause the minority to 
endure pain.379 Nonetheless, one can overcome this problem by focusing on the work of Mill, 
the most famous utilitarian after Bentham.380 Mill’s theory of utilitarianism attempts to 
establish a relationship between utility and justice,381 which eliminates the mentioned 
injustice. Although the content of justice is elusive, Mill thinks that the answer to this 
conundrum is found in the resentment caused by injustice.382 By identifying injustice, 
utilitarianism is then able to maximise happiness by eliminating it. Against this background, 
Mill states that possession ought to be recognised as ownership if it has not been challenged 
within a “moderate number of years”:  
 
“Even when the acquisition was wrongful, the dispossession, after a generation has elapsed, of 
the probably bona fide possessors, by the revival of a claim which had been long dormant, 
                                                             
374 Kelly JM A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1992) 317. 
375 Bentham J A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1776, Harrison W ed 1948) 3 para 2.  
376 Kelly JM A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1992) 315. See also Kroeze IJ “Legal Positivism” in 
Roederer C & Moellendorf D (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 62-83 66.  
377 Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-
260 246; Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 27-28. 
378 Kelly JM A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1992) 436-437. 
379 Ross D “Law and Economics” in Roederer C & Moellendorf D (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 186-213 190-191. 
380 Ross D “Law and Economics” in Roederer C & Moellendorf D (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 186-213 189; 
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would generally be a greater injustice, and almost always [cause] a greater private and public 
mischief, than leaving the original wrong without atonement.”383 (Emphasis added.) 
 
This approach is similar to the one adopted in Cholmondeley v Clinton,384 where the Court 
assumed that the squatter will suffer greater hardship if the owner is allowed to reclaim 
possession after the expiration of the limitation period.385 As was seen in the discussion of 
English law above,386 Dockray criticises this argument for oversimplifying matters.387 
However, adverse possession could be justified under Mill’s theory if injustice entails that 
(neglectful) owners can never lose ownership in property possessed by a squatter. 
Furthermore, one can also argue in favour of Mill if the “hardship”388 he refers to includes 
elements of Radin’s personality theory, the social-obligation norm389 of Alexander as well as 
the “reliance interest”390 of the adverse possessor.391 Without specifying a time period, Mill 
mentions that the acquisition of ownership through wrongful occupation is justified “after a 
generation has elapsed”. It seems that Mill had a longer period in mind than the mere 12 
years required for adverse possession in English law before the 2002 Act came into 
operation.392 Indeed, Mill’s argument provides an even stronger justification in systems with 
longer periods, such as South Africa, where the prescription period is 30 years.393  
 
                                                             
383 Mill JS Principles of Political Economy (1902) 134-135 § 2, quoted with approval by Clarke A “Use, Time, 
and Entitlement” (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 239-275 272-273. 
384 (1820) 2 Jac & W 1.  
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There are two types of utilitarianism, namely consequentialism (act-utilitarianism) and rule-
morality (rule-utilitarianism).394 Act-utilitarianism takes the consequences of an act into 
account to determine whether that act can maximise utility, while the consequences of an act 
are irrelevant for rule-utilitarianism.395 Instead, rule-utilitarianism attempts to ascertain which 
(moral) rules – as opposed to acts – are able to maximise utility.396  
 
It must be emphasised that the role of time is vital for discovering whether utilitarianism can 
justify prescription. In this sense, act-utilitarianism attempts to maximise utility now.397 
Radin criticises act-utilitarianism in this regard, since “human interactions and our 
environment are dynamic, so as time moves on the preferred or justified course of action 
changes.”398 Accordingly, act-utilitarianism must look to the future to decide whether an act 
is able to maximise utility, which is an undesirable approach because of its uncertainty.399 To 
the contrary is rule-utilitarianism, which seeks to maximise utility in “the long run”.400 In 
order to maximise utility, rule-utilitarianism focuses on how a certain rule affects a property 
regime over time.401 It follows that time is central to rule-utilitarianism.402 Unfortunately, this 
approach involves problematic questions. For instance, how long is “the long run”? Does it 
include people who are no longer alive?403 These questions are – unfortunately – not easily 
answered by rule-utilitarianism. 
 
Epstein justifies adverse possession in this context through the doctrine of relative title, which 
provides a “clear and expeditious temporal rule to resolve conflicting claims”.404 This is 
because first possession – in the Lockean sense – is not always “best”, since “what comes last 
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is more reliable and certain.”405 Accordingly, utility is maximised in a legal system by having 
a rule, namely the acquisition of property through adverse possession, which resolves 
conflicting claims and promotes legal certainty. Though Epstein advances his justification for 
prescription from a transaction-cost point of view, Radin – to my mind – correctly states that 
this approach constitutes a species of rule-utilitarianism.406 I agree that utility is maximised 
through rule-utilitarianism when it allows adverse possession to decide disputes and to clear 
titles, as Epstein mentions.407 Indeed, for him the issue is not whether adverse possession 
should be allowed or not, but rather how its rules can be structured to maximise utility.408 
This conclusion finds further support if adverse possession operates as a mechanical 
entitlement determination rule, since its aims are clearly analogous to those of rule-
utilitarianism.409 Even Mill is in favour of justifying adverse possession in this context, for he 
states that “title, after a certain period, should be given by prescription.”410  
 
Since rule-utilitarianism maximises utility through clearing titles and by facilitating 
transactions in the long run, this type of utilitarianism seems to regard a squatter’s subjective 
mindset as irrelevant.411 Indeed, Radin is of the opinion that utilitarianism can justify both 
good and bad faith adverse possession.412 Furthermore, Mill413 does not seem to exclude the 
mala fide squatter from his scheme of prescription, which ties in with Fennell’s argument that 
it is fallacious to only allow “already-landed” bona fide squatters to succeed with adverse 
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possession claims.414 Nonetheless, Epstein argues that bad faith adverse possessors must be 
subjected to a longer prescription period before acquiring title.415 The utilitarian ground for 
this argument is that “[p]arties who engage in deliberate wrongs constitute a greater threat 
than those who make innocent errors or are simply negligent: there is a greater danger that 
intentional wrongdoers will do it all again.”416 However, is it truly “wrong” to accommodate 
bad faith adverse possession in a utilitarian framework if such possessors use the land 
productively in the absence of a neglecting owner?417 Epstein’s approach418 – which 
differentiates between good and bad faith adverse possession – is unattractive because bad 
faith will then have to be proved in court, which will increase litigation costs.419  
 
Since a squatter may have a greater need for property than the owner, one can argue that 
adverse possession is also justified in a utilitarian scheme that aims to maximise utility for 
both squatter and owner.420 This argument is even more convincing in the context of a 
                                                             
414 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1081; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of 
Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253. 
415 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 685-689. For a similar suggestion, see Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1143-1153. 
416 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 686. 
417 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 747 
footnote 21; Netter JM, Hersch PL & Manson WD “An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” 
(1986) 6 International Review of Law and Economics 217-227 219.  
418 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 685-689. For a similar suggestion, see Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1143-1153. 
419 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 747 
footnote 21; Singer JW Introduction to Property (2nd ed 2005) 162; Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) 
The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-260 249; Bouckaert B & Depoorter BWF 
“Adverse Possession: Title Systems” in Bouckaert B & De Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 
(1999) http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ (accessed 7 October 2010) 1200: 18-31 25. 
420 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 252; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and 
Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University 
Law Quarterly 723-737 724-725, 725-734. To the same effect are Sprankling JG “An Environmental Critique of 
Adverse Possession” (1994) 79 Cornell Law Review 816-884 819; Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal 
Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722 674-675, 680; 
Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 743. 
For criticism of the utilitarian justification for adverse possession in general, see the objections with reference to 
the loss aversion theory raised by Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown 
Law Journal 2419-2474 2458-2463. According to Stake at 2459, in the theory of loss aversion “losses have 
greater subjective impact than objectively commensurate gains.” However, Stake at 2463-2471 acknowledges 
that the theory of loss aversion can be used to justify both good faith and bad faith adverse possession regarding 
land, if the adverse possessor is able to prove that he was more attached to the land than the owner. 
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homeless adverse possessor who occupies land that is of no present use to the owner.421 
Consequently, a squatter occupying property as a home will have a greater “need” for such 
property than an owner who does not use it.422 Interestingly, the English Law Commission 
acknowledged the relevance of use-value to urban squatters by not classifying all squatters as 
“land thieves”.423 The Law Commission expressed “understandable sympathy” for homeless 
squatters occupying empty properties, since it recognised that unlawful occupation may arise 
from a housing shortage.424 Nonetheless, the Law Commission circumvented this matter by 
stating that “the much more typical case in practice is the landowner with an eye to the main 
chance, who encroaches on his neighbour’s land.”425 It seems that the Commission’s 
sympathy was limited, with bad faith squatters labelled as “land thieves” in comparison to the 
tolerance shown towards persons making mistakes concerning boundaries.426 In this context 
Fennell makes an important distinction between good faith or inadvertent squatters and bad 
faith or advertent squatters: 
 
“The prototypical squatter is poor and landless. People who own no land cannot mistakenly 
believe that the land they are occupying is their own. In this regard, a good faith requirement is 
distributively conservative, designed to benefit only the already-landed.”427   
                                                             
421 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 252. To the same effect is Auchmuty R “Not Just a 
Good Children’s Story: A Tribute to Adverse Possession” 2004 Conveyancer 293-307 307. 
422 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 252; Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for 
‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1080-1083. Stake 
JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2458 challenges 
this model for apparently condoning theft on grounds of an individual’s relative poverty, together with the 
increase in monitoring costs and protection of property. Yet, Stake at 2458 acknowledges that there is a 
difference between the usual cases of theft and acquiring land through adverse possession. For an argument 
contrary to his objection, see Green K “Citizens and Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law” in Bright S & 
Dewar JK (eds) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (1998) 229-256 241. 
423 This is clear from Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 
271 (July 2001) para 2.70; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting 
after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 252-253. 
424 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 
2.70; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 252-253. 
425 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 
2.70; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253. This position is contested by Clarke A “Use, 
Time, and Entitlement” (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 239-275 250, who reviewed 44 adverse possession 
cases decided since 2000 and found that only six of these concerned “landowner[s] with an eye to the main 
chance” that encroached onto their neighbours’ land. 
426 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 
2.72; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 
1998) para 10.5; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the 
Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253. 
427 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1081, quoted with approval in Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? 
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Fennell prefers to refer to squatters as either “advertent” (knowing) or “inadvertent”, as 
opposed to labelling them as being in “good” or “bad faith”.428 She then argues that adverse 
possession helps to reallocate property to advertent squatters when markets cannot achieve 
this purpose, since advertent squatters – knowing that they do not own the land – qualify as 
“higher-valuing users” of the land.429 This approach counters the argument made by the Law 
Commission and suggests that adverse possession can provide a medium for property 
redistribution to advance social welfare.430 As a result, Fennell thinks that the presence of bad 
faith should not prevent the possibility of acquiring land through adverse possession, since 
land occupied by the squatter may be more important to him than to the absent owner.431 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 
253. 
428 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1037 footnote 1. 
429 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1077, 1080-1083; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The 
(Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253; 
Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot het Debat over 
het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1582-1597 1585; Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property 
Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186 1169. Peñalver and Katyal at 1169 
refer to this instance as rather constituting “efficient theft”. See further Cooter R & Ulen T Law and Economics 
(4th ed 2004) 155; Dixon M “The Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Risk 
Assessment” 2003 Conveyancer 136-156 151-152; Baker M, Miceli T, Sirmans CF & Turnbull GK “Property 
Rights by Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse Possession Statutes” (2001) 77 Land Economics 360-
370 360; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1122-1154 1130-1131; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 
University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 79, all of whom argue that adverse possession encourages efficient 
land use. However, this point is contentious: See Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar 
Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-260 255; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse 
Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2433; Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “An Economic 
Theory of Adverse Possession” (1995) 15 International Review of Law and Economics 161-173 161; Netter JM, 
Hersch PL & Manson WD “An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” (1986) 6 International 
Review of Law and Economics 217-227 219, all stating that owners know best how to use their property 
efficiently, which includes letting it lie unused. Of the same mind is Sprankling JG “An Environmental Critique 
of Adverse Possession” (1994) 79 Cornell Law Review 816-884 875, although he addresses adverse possession 
against the background of wild and undeveloped lands. Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1130-1131 counters these 
objections – to my mind – correctly by saying that the critics overstate what is required of an owner to prevent 
loss of ownership through adverse possession, which is simply to assert one’s ownership from time to time. 
430 Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-
1186 1153-1154; Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 
Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1080-1083; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? 
The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-
260 253.  
431 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1081-1082; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality 
of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253. The value that 
the land represents may not only be higher for the squatter in utilitarian or economic terms, but also in terms of 
Radin’s personality theory, together with Singer’s analysis of the reliance interest of the squatter: See Radin MJ 
“Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 974; Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and 
Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741, 748-750; Singer JW Introduction to 
Property (2nd ed 2005) 159-161; Singer JW Entitlement – The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 45-46; Singer JW 
213 
 
Utilitarian explanations are discernable in the economic justifications Fennell presents in her 
approach.432 Her reference to squatters as “higher-valuing users” makes a moral judgment of 
who deserves the property more,433 a dichotomy that is analogous to Radin’s distinction 
between “personal” and “fungible” property.434 Ellickson strengthens the utilitarian 
justification for adverse possession by focusing – like Radin – on the relationship that 
develops between a person and an object over time.435 According to him 
 
“[a] utilitarian should see value in protecting people’s territorial roots. The notion of 
territoriality is extremely important in biology. The sociobiologists who have ventured to apply 
biological theory to humans have understandably created controversy. Yet it is plausible that 
humans are to some degree territorial, and that this tendency has helped shape adverse 
possession law. Someone who resides or works on a particular piece of land has, in Peggy 
Radin’s terms, invested his personhood in it, or, in my terms, is vulnerable to suffering 
demoralization costs upon being dispossessed from the property. ... I therefore treat damage 
from uprooting as a demoralization cost. During the early stages of adverse possession, I assume 
demoralization considerations favor the original owners, but as time passes the adverse 
possessor can lay claim to deeper roots.”436 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
“The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 666-668 footnote 174. For the 
view that adverse possession qualifies as a medium to advance social welfare, see Peñalver EM & Katyal SK 
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432 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253; Miceli TJ, Sirmans CF & Turnbull GK “Title 
Assurance and Incentives for Efficient Land Use” (1998) 6 European Journal of Law and Economics 305-323 
310. 
433 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253. 
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University Law Review 1037-1096 1080-1083; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality 
of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253; Radin MJ 
“Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 974; Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and 
Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741, 748-750. To the same effect is 
Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot het Debat over 
het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1582-1597 1585. For an economic argument along these 
lines, see Netter JM, Hersch PL & Manson WD “An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” (1986) 
6 International Review of Law and Economics 217-227 219.  
435 Merrill TW (ed) “Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law – Round Table Discussion” (1986) 64 
Washington University Law Quarterly 793-865 814; Clarke A “Use, Time, and Entitlement” (2004) 57 Current 
Legal Problems 239-275 274; Radin MJ “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 
986; Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 477. 
436 Merrill TW (ed) “Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law – Round Table Discussion” (1986) 64 
Washington University Law Quarterly 793-865 814, quoted with approval by Clarke A “Use, Time, and 
Entitlement” (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 239-275 274. Here Ellickson refers to his findings made in 
Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property 
Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737, where he (at 727) borrowed the term 
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Merrill emphasises that the reliance interest of third parties – as developed by Singer – must 
also be protected in this context, especially in a negative registration system.437 
 
Against this background the English Law Commission’s assumption that squatters are mostly 
blameworthy is indeed an oversimplification. The same goes for the Law Commission’s 
assumption that owners are mostly “blameless” and, thus, “deserve” better protection. As 
mentioned, some academics criticise this argument because the Law Commission did not 
distinguish between owners who cannot and those who do not look after their property.438 
Cobb and Fox argue that owners have an obligation to look after their property, based on the 
landowner’s “duty of stewardship” over property.439 In this setting one can say that “a 
landowner who does not adequately fulfil the duty of stewardship [has] a morally weaker 
claim to that property compared to [a] squatter who occupies it as a home.”440 As indicated 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
are Singer JW Introduction to Property (2nd ed 2005) 159-161; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse 
Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2040; Singer JW Entitlement – The Paradoxes of 
Property (2000) 45-46; Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 
666-668 footnote 174; Radin MJ “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 974; 
Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741, 
748-750; Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 477. This approach by 
Ellickson is analogous to the theory advanced in Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 
Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2469, which entails that human beings become attached to property – 
especially land – through evolutionary biology. 
437 Merrill TW (ed) “Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law – Round Table Discussion” (1986) 64 
Washington University Law Quarterly 793-865 813, referred to with approval by Clarke A “Use, Time, and 
Entitlement” (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 239-275 275. See also Singer JW Introduction to Property (2nd 
ed 2005) 159-161; Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78; Singer JW Entitlement – The 
Paradoxes of Property (2000) 45-46; Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law 
Review 611-751 666-668 footnote 174; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in 
the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 726, 730-
731; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1131-1132; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of 
Chicago Law Review 73-88 79-80. However, Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion 
to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-260 255 warns that “modern land records are ordinarily easily 
accessible to would-be buyers.” To the same effect are Netter JM, Hersch PL & Manson WD “An Economic 
Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” (1986) 6 International Review of Law and Economics 217-227 219, 
where the authors state that this justification by Merrill carried more weight in an era when record keeping was 
less efficient. Yet, the correctness of the register is not guaranteed in a jurisdiction with a negative registration 
system, which affords strength to Merrill’s argument. 
438 See section 4.3.2 above. 
439 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253-256 and sources cited. See also Auchmuty R “Not 
Just a Good Children’s Story: A Tribute to Adverse Possession” 2004 Conveyancer 293-307 307; Rose CM 
“Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 79. 
440 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 254. See further Fox L Conceptualising Home: 
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earlier, this approach is analogous to Alexander’s social-obligation norm.441 Nonetheless, the 
reforms affected by the LRA make it unnecessary for owners to protect their land against 
squatters, since registered land can no longer be acquired through the mere passage of 
time.442 However, certain utilitarian and economic considerations do provide support for such 
a duty of stewardship. For instance, owners need not develop or even occupy their land to 
prevent prescription from running; all that is required of them is to periodically assert their 
right to exclude others from their property.443 Furthermore, if such an obligation is placed on 
the owner it will be easier to locate him for purposes of purchasing the land, which will 
increase overall utility and efficiency.444 In this sense adverse possession encourages 
productive land use, ensures the marketability of land, protects the reliance interests of parties 
and lowers transaction costs.445 This leads us to the second trend for justifying prescription in 
this section, namely law and economics theory. 
 
Law and economics theory views man as a “rational maximiser of his ends in life”, which 
ends are referred to as a person’s satisfactions or “self-interest”.446 To avoid confusion with 
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446 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 3.   
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the notion of selfishness, economists use the word “utility” instead of self-interest.447 Posner 
sketches the background of law and economics theory as follows: 
 
“The concept of man as a rational maximizer of his self-interest implies that people respond to 
incentive – that if a person’s surroundings change in such a way that he could increase his 
satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so.”448  
 
Law and economics theory regards rationality as an objective rather than a subjective 
standard, which means that rationality is seen as the ability to use reasoning for purposes of 
everyday life.449 However, one of the problems with law and economics theory is that it is 
sometimes seen as ignoring “justice”, since the aim of it is to structure law in such a way as 
to maximise economic efficiency and to prevent conduct that wastes resources.450 Stated 
differently, the main aim of law and economics theory is to structure legal rules to promote 
efficiency (or utility) through awarding resources to those who value them the most and will 
thus use them optimally.451 Interestingly, even law and economics theory thinks that it is 
immoral to allow limited resources to be wasted.452 Consequently, the protection of private 
property rights is imperative to law and economics theory, since the legal protection of such 
rights promotes the efficient use of resources.453 Nevertheless, law and economics theory 
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217 
acknowledges that absolute property rights are impossible in the framework of an efficient 
economic setting.454 This is where law and economics theory – by aiming to promote 
efficiency through the (re)allocation of resources – can be used to justify prescription.  
 
There is a fundamental distinction in law and economics theory between scenarios involving 
low transaction costs and those with high transaction costs. In settings where transaction costs 
are low, the Coase theorem dictates that a present owner’s property right must be made 
“absolute”, which then obliges a party – who attaches a higher value to the owner’s property 
– to negotiate with that owner for voluntarily exchange to occur.455 On the other hand, the 
law must provide ways through which resources can be shifted to the more valuable user in 
situations where transaction costs are high, since the market is then – due to these 
circumstances – unable to realise this function.456 It follows that one can justify prescription 
under this theory if it can be illustrated that prescription effectively reduces transaction costs 
in situations that would otherwise prevent voluntary exchange due to high transaction 
costs.457  
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This chapter analyses the economic effects of prescription in four categories to determine 
whether it is able to sufficiently reduce transaction cost, namely (i) owners, (ii) possessors, 
(iii) third parties and (iv) litigation. Concerning the costs of the owner, it is imperative to 
have regard to what Michelman describes as “demoralization costs”.458 According to this 
concept, the more wrongful an owner perceives the loss of property through legal 
mechanisms such as prescription, the more severely such an owner is demoralised.459 Owners 
unaware of the risk of losing property through prescription will mostly bear no uncertainty or 
monitoring costs during the prescription period and can experience severe demoralisation 
when ownership is lost to an adverse possessor.460 The following graph illustrates the 
relationship between the costs of the owner in relation to the length of the prescription 
period:461  
                                                       
According to Figure 1, the costs suffered by the owner increase with the shortening of the 
prescription period. The owner’s uncertainty costs increase as the period becomes shorter, 
which – in turn – leads to increased monitoring costs, together with causing the 
demoralisation costs to be higher on the side of an owner not expecting to lose property 
through prescription.462 This also contributes to the dangerous possibility that an owner can 
                                                             
458 Michelman FI “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just 
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lose ownership by accident or through negligent inattention.463 On the flipside, the longer the 
prescription period, the more secure ownership will be, since the owner then has more time to 
discover a squatter possessing his land.464 In this context the costs of monitoring the land 
decrease, along with the negative effects demoralisation can potentially have.465 This reduces 
the necessity for the owner to “police” his property, but it also reduces the security of 
ownership by increasing the likelihood that an adverse possessor may have taken possession 
of the owner’s land.466 Accordingly, one can argue that the longer the prescription period, the 
more likely it is that the owner has abandoned the land or that the register was incorrect from 
the start, which increases the intensity of the “Holmes effect”.467 To address this issue, longer 
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prescription periods are required in scenarios where an owner’s monitoring costs are high.468 
Against this background it seems that the overall costs an owner suffers will be even less in a 
system with a 30-year period for both good faith and bad faith possessors, such as South 
African law, as opposed to a regime with shorter periods.469   
 
One of the economic grounds for justifying adverse possession is provided by Holmes, who 
states that property possessed for a long time “takes root in your being and cannot be torn 
away without [such person] resenting the act”.470 According to Posner, the deprivation of 
property under these circumstances would be “wrenching”,471 which feeling he describes as 
the “Holmes effect”.472 Bentham is of the same mind as Holmes in this regard: 
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“Everything about [my property] represents to my eye that part of myself which I have put into 
it – those cares, that industry, that economy which denied itself present pleasures to make 
provision for the future. Thus our property becomes part of our being, and cannot be torn from 
us without rending us to the quick.”473  
 
This approach by Bentham is related to Radin’s personality theory, which entails that objects 
possessed as personal property becomes constitutive of one’s personhood.474 If this analogy 
holds true, it entails that an absent owner will become “detached” from property over time, 
resulting in a situation where the returning of that property to the owner will only provide 
“moderate pleasure”.475 Posner describes this as the “diminishing marginal utility of income”, 
since the squatter will experience the owner’s repossessing of the land as a diminution in his 
wealth, while the owner will experience the restitution of the land as an increase in his 
wealth.476 The combined utility of these parties – should they be of the same wealth – will be 
greater if the law awards the land to the possessor, since he will be putting the land to higher-
valued use.477 According to Stake, the combined utility will be even greater if the possessor is 
less well-off than the owner at the time before prescription is completed.478  
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Against this background it is possible to determine the economic impact of prescription on 
the possessor. The following graph demonstrates how the squatter’s costs can fluctuate with 
the length of the prescription period:479  
                                                      
In Figure 2, “preying” represents the legally informed squatter’s attempts to obtain evidence 
to succeed with a prescription claim; uncertainty costs involve the levels of anxiety the 
informed squatter faces; while demoralisation costs represent the suffering such a squatter 
experiences if he is evicted before the prescription period expires.480 This graph illustrates 
that the costs the squatter suffers are lowest in the time slot between five and 10 years and 
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that these costs, including the squatter’s demoralisation costs, increase with the lengthening 
of the prescription period.481 This conforms to Radin’s personality theory that the squatter 
becomes bound up with property over time, while the owner probably begins to regard it as 
fungible property the longer he is out of possession.482  
 
Another theory that can be used to justify adverse possession in the law and economics 
context – alongside those of Holmes and Radin – is the fact that adverse possession protects 
the “reliance interest”483 or settled expectations of possessors.484 Although it is important that 
the protection of a possessor’s settled expectations should not result in overreliance, this 
problem is countered by the possibility that the owner will reclaim the land before the 
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approach does not take into account the possibility that the mala fide possessor is not always morally 
reprehensible, as discussed in section 4.5 below. 
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expiration of the limitation period, which then eliminates the squatter’s reliance.485 These 
factors provide powerful justifications for shifting the property to the higher-valuing squatter 
through prescription or adverse possession. 
 
It is worth emphasising that Figure 2 combines both good faith and bad faith possessors. 
Ellickson opines that the graphs for good and bad faith squatters differ because bad faith 
possessors do not suffer the same demoralisation costs as good faith possessors and that only 
bad faith possessors are – because of their knowledge – capable of incurring preying costs.486 
I have chosen not to distinguish between these two types of possessors, since this chapter 
argues that the distinction between them is based on incorrect reasoning and is thus 
incoherent.487 The best prescription model seems to be the one that does not distinguish 
between good or bad faith possessors, as found in South African law.488 Nonetheless, Posner 
believes that the “Holmes effect” implies that the adverse possessor possesses in good 
faith.489 Interestingly, certain studies predict that good faith squatters are likely to fare better 
in US adverse possession cases than their bad faith counterparts, despite the irrelevance of a 
squatter’s subjective mindset in black letter US adverse possession law.490 I doubt whether 
this favouring of good faith claims is a preferable approach, since it is clear that by simply 
                                                             
485 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78 footnote 3. 
486 Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property 
Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 734. 
487 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban 
Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260; Peñalver EM & Katyal SK 
“Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186. See the discussion of the 
anomaly of the bad faith possessor in section 4.5 below. 
488 Goodman MJ “Adverse Possession of Land – Morality and Motive” (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 281-288 
is of the same mind. Furthermore, litigation costs are reduced if one does not take into account the subjective 
intent of the adverse possession: See Singer JW Introduction to Property (2nd ed 2005) 162; Bouckaert B & 
Depoorter BWF “Adverse Possession: Title Systems” in Bouckaert B & De Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of Law 
and Economics (1999) http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ (accessed 7 October 2010) 1200: 18-31 25. 
489 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78 footnote 3. 
490 See especially Helmholz RH “Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent” (1984) 61 Washington University 
Law Quarterly 331-358; Helmholz RH “More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham” 
(1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 65-106. Helmholz analysed 850 US appellate opinions 
concerning adverse possession decided since 1966 and concluded that not only did many decisions favour good 
faith adverse possessors above their bad faith counterparts, the courts in some cases even re-interpreted the 
possession requirement to prevent bad faith claims from succeeding. See Helmholz RH “Adverse Possession 
and Subjective Intent” (1984) 61 Washington University Law Quarterly 331-358, especially 341-349. 
Nonetheless, the subjective intent of the adverse possessor is considered irrelevant in black letter US adverse 
possession law, see Dukeminier J & Krier JE et al Property (6th ed 2006) 126-127; Helmholz RH “Adverse 
Possession and Subjective Intent” (1984) 61 Washington University Law Quarterly 331-358 331-332; Merrill 
TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 
1122-1154 1123-1125. 
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classifying mala fide possession as immoral amounts to an oversimplification491 because of 
the fact that bad faith adverse possession does not always denote squatters who are morally 
reprehensible.492  
 
When considering the economic impact of prescription, it is important not to lose sight of the 
effects it can have on third parties.493 In this sense prescription lowers costs incurred through 
investigating the register (search costs), since parties can – due to the corrective function of 
prescription – disregard errors in the register that predate the prescription period.494 However, 
because of this corrective function the register will not always show who the actual owner is, 
since registration is not a prerequisite for acquiring ownership through prescription.495 To 
ascertain the identity of the actual owner under these circumstances requires an inspection of 
the land to verify who occupies it (inspection costs). These two costs must then be weighed 
up to determine what the nett impact of prescription will be on third parties.496 According to 
                                                             
491 See generally Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the 
Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260; Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for 
‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096; Peñalver EM & 
Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186.  
492 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1081; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of 
Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253. See also Peñalver 
EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186 and the 
discussion in section 4.5 below. 
493 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities 
Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 
723-737 726, 730-731; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law 
Review 73-88 79-80; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 
Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1131-1132. According to Ellickson at 726, there are four 
interested parties in this regard, namely owners, possessors, transferees and the courts. 
494 Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-
260 254-255; Cooter R & Ulen T Law and Economics (4th ed 2004) 155; Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law 
(6th ed 2003) 78; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 
73-88 79-82. Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-
2474 2441-2444 argues against having adverse possession in this context, since third parties are able to discover 
the identity of an owner by investigating the land register, should acquisition of ownership by adverse 
possession not be possible. However, this argument is founded on the assumption that the register will always 
be correct, which is not the case in a negative registration system. This possibility of incorrectness can even 
arise in a positive registration – as pointed out by Clarke A “Use, Time, and Entitlement” (2004) 57 Current 
Legal Problems 239-275 252-258 – namely when adverse possessors choose never to lodge a claim out of fear 
of failure, which can lead to developments “off the register”. According to Clarke (at 252-258), if there is no 
way of affording de iure status to long-existing de facto situations, the same problems can arise as those that the 
abolition of adverse possession was supposedly meant to overcome. Furthermore, Singer JW Introduction to 
Property (2nd ed 2005) 159-160 believes that even if adverse possession should be abolished, adverse possessors 
“will invent new theories to justify recognizing these rights, and the courts are likely to respond to these 
demands.” 
495 This is the position in South African law: See section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
496 Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property 
Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 730-731; Posner RA Economic Analysis of 
Law (6th ed 2003) 78; Janczyk JT “An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for Transferring Real 
Property” (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 213-233 213. To the same effect are Singer JW Introduction to 
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Netter, Hersch and Manson, there is empirical support for the claim that prescription 
eliminates mistakes in the land register after a certain period of time has elapsed, thereby 
reducing information costs.497 They assume that a purchaser’s certainty is increased through 
shortening the prescription period and, furthermore, that increased certainty is preferable 
when land values are higher.498 The following graph illustrates how changes to the 
prescription period can affect the administration costs of land transfers:499  
                          
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Property (2nd ed 2005) 164-165; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of 
Chicago Law Review 73-88 79-82. However, Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse 
Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1062-1064 and Stake JE “The Uneasy 
Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2442-2443 mention the 
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497 Netter JM, Hersch PL & Manson WD “An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” (1986) 6 
International Review of Law and Economics 217-227 219-220. See also Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG 
(ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-260 254-255; Posner RA Economic 
Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78; Bouckaert B & Depoorter BWF “Adverse Possession: Title Systems” in 
Bouckaert B & De Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999) http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 
(accessed 7 October 2010) 1200: 18-31 20; Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law 
of Property” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722 674-680; Rose CM “Possession as the 
Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 81-82; Merrill TW “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1128. 
498 Netter JM, Hersch PL & Manson WD “An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” (1986) 6 
International Review of Law and Economics 217-227 217, 119-222, 224. See also Baker M, Miceli T, Sirmans 
CF & Turnbull GK “Property Rights by Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse Possession Statutes” 
(2001) 77 Land Economics 360-370 365; Bouckaert B & Depoorter BWF “Adverse Possession: Title Systems” 
in Bouckaert B & De Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999) http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 
(accessed 7 October 2010) 1200: 18-31 22-23; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two 
Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 
730-731; Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 
Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722 674-680. To the contrary are Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus 
JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-260 255; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case 
for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2442-2443. 
499 Based on Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of 
Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 730. Ellickson at 730 states that 
adverse possession is a mixed blessing for third parties. Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” 
(2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2442 is of the same mind as Ellickson in this regard.  
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In terms of Figure 3, prescription reduces costs through eliminating errors that can only be 
found by investigating the register.500 Moreover, prescription entitles possessors to acquire 
ownership in land without requiring registration.501 A transferee has three ways – according 
to Ellickson – of dealing with unrecorded ownership, namely   
 
i) to bear the risk (which increases uncertainty costs);  
ii) to insure against it502 (which increases insurance costs); or  
iii) to physically inspect the land to ascertain the identity of the possessor (which 
increases inspection costs).503  
 
Figure 3 predicts that the costs pertaining to inspection, uncertainty and searching the register 
will be higher the shorter the prescription period. The costs are lower the longer the period, 
though they even out around a five-year period, after which they start to climb steadily with 
the lengthening of the prescription period.504 It follows that prescription is in the economic 
interest of third parties, a fact captured by Epstein: “As a matter of principle, what comes first 
is best; as a matter of proof, however, what comes last is more reliable and certain.”505 This 
                                                             
500 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78; Baker M, Miceli T, Sirmans CF & Turnbull GK 
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501 This is the position in South African law: See section 2.3.1 of chapter two above. 
502 Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2441-
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University Law Review 1037-1096 1080-1081; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 
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view is in line with the conclusions drawn above, namely that greater certainty reduces 
transaction costs. 
 
Whether a country employs a negative or positive registration system is important for 
purposes of the economic analysis of prescription and thus deserves attention.506 From 
chapter three it was seen that legislation guarantees the correctness of the land register in 
countries with a positive registration system, such as England and Germany.507 In these 
jurisdictions the register fulfils the role of possession, since one only has to look at the 
register – which legislation deems as providing conclusive proof of ownership – to ascertain 
the identity of the landowner. This entails that uncertainty and inspection costs are lower in a 
positive registration system, since a prospective purchaser of land need only investigate the 
register, thereby incurring search costs, to conclusively determine who the true owner of the 
land is.  
 
To the contrary are jurisdictions with a negative registration system, such as South Africa,508 
The Netherlands and France, where the correctness of the register is not guaranteed.509 The 
main problem in a negative registration system is that the register will inevitably be defective 
in some instances, in which case prescription steps in to promote legal certainty.510 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
164-165. Baird D & Jackson T “Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property” (1984) 13 Journal of 
Legal Studies 299-320 300 emphasise the fundamental problem that a registration system must solve, namely 
that “[i]n a world where information is not perfect, we can protect a later owner’s interest fully, or we can 
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TJ, Sirmans CF & Turnbull GK “Title Assurance and Incentives for Efficient Land Use” (1998) 6 European 
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Land Transfer and Title Insurance” (1995) 10 Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 81-88 82. 
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“Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property” (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 299-320. 
507 See sections 3.2.4 and 3.5 respectively of chapter three above. 
508 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 229-
238; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 341-345.  
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registration system, as such a study falls outside the scope of this dissertation. For an evaluation of which of 
these two systems is more efficient, see Miceli TJ, Munneke HJ, Sirmans CF & Turnbull GK “Title Systems 
and Land Values” (2002) 45 Journal of Law and Economics 565-582; Miceli TJ, Sirmans CF & Turnbull GK 
“Title Assurance and Incentives for Efficient Land Use” (1998) 6 European Journal of Law and Economics 
305-323; Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “The Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance” (1995) 10 Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics 81-88; Janczyk JT “An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for 
Transferring Real Property” (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 213-233. 
510 Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-
260 254-255; Cooter R & Ulen T Law and Economics (4th ed 2004) 155; Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law 
(6th ed 2003) 78-80; Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet 
tot het Debat over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1582-1597 1586-1587; Rose CM 
“Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 81-82. Sagaert at 
1587 correctly states that this justification for prescription carries less weight in jurisdictions with a positive 
registration system, such as Germany and Austria. Nonetheless, the difficulty of finding a balance between the 
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Netter, Hersch and Manson opine that the greater a country’s population density, the higher 
the number of transfers, thereby increasing the possibility of errors in the register.511 
Therefore, costs pertaining to uncertainty and searching the register are higher in a negative 
registration system, since it can be inconclusive to merely consult the register when 
determining who owns certain land. This means that prescription indeed plays a role in 
clearing up titles and lowering transaction costs in South African law.  
 
The following graph illustrates how litigation costs in the context of prescription vary with 
the length of the prescription period:512 
                               
Litigation costs are made up of (i) the number of litigated cases and (ii) the costs of erroneous 
judicial decisions.513 Law and economics theory – which purports to enhance efficiency – 
aims to keep the sum of these two costs as low as possible. From this graph it is clear that the 
number of litigated cases (or outlays) decreases with the lengthening of the prescription 
period, although this increases their complexity (possibility of erroneous decisions) due to 
loss of evidence and witnesses. In the short run, litigation costs are saved by a longer 
prescription period, since it reduces the number of cases coming to court.514 Yet, over a 
longer prescription period the costs of incorrectly decided decisions start to outweigh the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
formal indicators (registers) and informal indicators (possession) of ownership is pointed out by Singer JW 
Entitlement – The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 46. 
511 Netter JM, Hersch PL & Manson WD “An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” (1986) 6 
International Review of Law and Economics 217-227 223. 
512 Based on Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of 
Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 731. 
513 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 563-571; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and 
Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University 
Law Quarterly 723-737 731. 
514 Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property 
Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 732; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1128. To the 
contrary is Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 
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reduction in litigation costs. 
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costs saved from hearing fewer cases, since evidence will be lost over time, which can result 
in incorrect judgments.515 This is where prescription reduces litigation costs through 
awarding ownership – after a certain period of time – to the squatter to prevent the problems 
that involve stale claims and loss of evidence.516  
 
If one combines the findings from the four figures above, the result can be as follows:517 
                              
Figure 5 shows that the optimal period for prescription falls between five and 15 years, since 
it is undesirable to have periods that are either too short or too long.518 This is because too 
short or too long periods will fall outside the cost-minimising range, together with the fact 
                                                             
515 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
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that too short periods can encourage people to wilfully commit trespass.519 Bouckaert and 
Depoorter capture the conclusion reached from the results contained in this graph: 
 
“Although there are costs associated with adverse possession[,] ... sufficient economic 
arguments can be forwarded to uphold the assumption that the concept of adverse possession is 
called-for and economically justified within a property order.”520 
 
Thus far, the economic analysis provides strong support for the claim that prescription indeed 
reduces transaction costs in jurisdictions with a negative registration system. Consequently, 
law and economics theory clearly regards prescription as a mechanism that clears titles and – 
more importantly – helps to reallocate resources from low-valuing owners to higher-valuing 
possessors when voluntary exchange is prevented due to the presence of high transaction 
costs. Consequently, prescription fulfils an important economic role in South African law. As 
to the period, Ellickson acknowledges that he drew these graphs from intuition, with the 
“short” US adverse possession periods of between five and 15 years possibly having 
influenced him. Nonetheless, I argue that these economic predictions justify the presence of a 
30-year prescription period in South African law. 
 
Another economic (and utilitarian) theory – apart from those addressed above – that helps 
justify adverse possession is based on entitlement determination rules.521 In his theory, 
Merrill distinguishes between mechanical or formalistic entitlement determination rules and 
judgmental entitlement determination rules. Mechanical rules give little discretion to courts to 
establish substantive and remedial rights.522 This rule is inexpensive to apply because the 
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absence of a discretion removes the uncertainty factor, which results in legal certainty and 
reduced litigation.523 As a result, efficiency is maximised due to the fact that mechanical rules 
reduce litigation and information costs. On the other hand, judgmental rules afford broad 
discretion to courts when they determine entitlements or remedial rights.524 Since judgmental 
rules involve a discretion, it follows that they are unpredictable and thus more expensive to 
apply.525 It follows that the application of a mechanical rule can result in an arbitrary 
allocation of resources in situations where transactions costs are high and the social 
desirability of the result is uncertain.526 Judgmental rules can achieve more efficient 
outcomes in such a situation.527 For purposes of promoting economic efficiency in the 
framework of utilitarianism and law and economics theory, one has to determine whether 
adverse possession operates optimally as a mechanical or a judgmental rule. Merrill – to my 
mind – correctly states that it is best if adverse possession operates as a mechanical rule, as 
long as it adheres to the following two requirements: 
 
i) the passage of a sufficient period of time between the dispossession and the 
extinguishment of ownership; and 
ii) adequate notice of the adverse possession to the owner and third parties.528 
 
Under this model (the mechanical rule), courts do not investigate whether the owner truly 
sleeps on his rights, nor do they take into account whether evidence was actually lost. 
Consequently, litigation costs are lowered because the limitation period (first requirement), 
coupled with the requirements of open possession (second requirement), are deemed to 
conclusively answer these questions. As a result, this rule is similar to rule-utilitarianism, 
which aims to maximise utility in the long run through laying down certain moral or 
                                                             
523 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137. 
524 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137. 
525 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137. 
526 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137-1138. 
527 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1138. 
528 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1140. See also Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78; Ellickson RC 
“Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 
Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 725-734; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” 
(1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 79-80; Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 
Harvard Law Review 457-478 477. These two requirements correspond to the conclusions reached in the 
economic analysis at Figures 1 and 3 above. 
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utilitarian rules.529 The mechanical-rule approach – as well as rule-utilitarianism – overrules 
the objections made by Dockray against allowing adverse possession in cases where an 
owner did not really sleep on his rights and where evidence as to ownership is available.530 In 
this sense Dockray seems rather to support a regime where adverse possession operates as a 
judgmental rule. According to this rule, the courts will have to determine in every case 
whether the owner has truly slept on his rights, whether evidence was lost and whether the 
adverse possessor and third parties have indeed developed a reliance interest in the 
property.531 To decide these questions increases litigation costs and the uncertainty of 
outcomes, which impacts negatively on the marketability of the land due to the increase in 
transaction costs. Thus, it is preferable for adverse possession to operate, as it currently does, 
as a mechanical entitlement determination rule.532 It follows that even though an owner did 
not “sleep” on his rights and evidence concerning ownership is readily available, the law lays 
down conclusive presumptions or rules for purposes of maximising efficiency. However, 
Merrill is doubtful whether a mechanical rule serves the best purpose in situations involving 
mala fide possessors, since he prefers a (more expensive) judgmental rule under these 
circumstances to prevent “coerced transfers”.533 I argue – from an efficiency point of view – 
that it is best to use a mechanical rule for both good faith and bad faith adverse possessors, 
since one derives the same economic benefits from such a model as one where it would only 
be applicable to good faith adverse possessors.534 Such a conclusion finds further support in 
                                                             
529 Rule-utilitarianism is discussed in greater detail at the beginning of this section. 
530 See the discussion in section 4.3.2 above. 
531 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1140-1143. See also Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78 footnote 3; 
Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession” (1995) 15 International Review of Law 
and Economics 161-173 161; Sprankling JG “An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession” (1994) 79 
Cornell Law Review 816-884 819-820; Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law 
Review 611-751 666-669; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the 
Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 726, 730-731; 
Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1122-1154 1131-1132; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of 
Chicago Law Review 73-88 79-80.  
532 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1140-1143. 
533 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1143-1144. Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of 
Property” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722 685-687 also opts for a model of adverse 
possession that differentiates between good and bad faith adverse possessors. 
534 I extrapolate this from the economic analysis of adverse possession in Figures 1 to 5 above. Further support 
for this point is found in Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting 
after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260; Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property 
Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186; Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The 
Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096. These 
sources are discussed in section 4.5 below.  
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the unhelpful – and fallacious – distinction between good and bad faith possessors, which is 
discussed in the next section.535 
 
Another suggestion by Merrill is that an adverse possessor should indemnify an owner who 
loses ownership through adverse possession by converting such owner’s entitlement from one 
protected by a property rule to one protected by a liability rule.536 This will require the 
adverse possessor to pay the fair market value to the owner to be able to retain possession of 
the acquired property.537 However, this solution subverts many of the objectives of adverse 
possession, namely the quieting of titles, elimination of old claims, the protection of the 
reliance interests of squatters and third parties and the reduction of transaction costs, 
especially if the adverse possessor is unable to pay.538 Indeed, even the California Supreme 
                                                             
535 Section 4.5 below. 
536 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1145-1153, relying on Calabresi G & Melamed AD “Property Rules, Liability Rules 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128. The difference 
between these two rules are set out by Calabresi G & Melamed AD “Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1092. Calabresi and 
Melamed explain at 1902 that an entitlement (such as property) is protected by a property rule if a person who 
wants to acquire it from its owner has to buy it from such owner in a voluntary transaction where the value of 
the entitlement is determined by the seller. On the other hand, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule when 
someone is allowed to “destroy” that entitlement (such as through adverse possession), provided that he is 
willing to pay an “objectively determined value” for it. This value could be equal to what the original owner 
would have sold the entitlement for, but this need not necessarily be the case, since the value of the entitlement 
will be determined objectively by the state. For a concise discussion in this regard, see Miceli TJ “Property” in 
Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-260 249. This suggestion by 
Merrill is criticised by Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession” (1995) 15 
International Review of Law and Economics 161-173 165-166. 
537 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1145, relying on Calabresi G & Melamed AD “Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1092. Merrill at 1145-
1149 further refines such an approach by introducing the possibility of indemnification, which he divides into 
“universal indemnification” (where the subjective intent of the adverse possessor is irrelevant) and “limited 
indemnification” (where the subjective intent of the adverse possessor has to be determined). This refined 
approach of Merrill falls outside the scope of my dissertation and is therefore not discussed here. 
538 Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2466; 
Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession” (1995) 15 International Review of Law 
and Economics 161-173 161, 165-166; Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law 
Review 611-751 666-669; Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” 
(1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722 689. Epstein at 689 and Miceli and Sirmans at 166 
criticise this approach by stating that liability rules are costly to administer and that requiring the adverse 
possessor to indemnify the owner will – according to Epstein – “undercut the security of transactions concern 
that lies at the base of [adverse possession].” Furthermore, the fact that the adverse possessor won’t be able to 
pay is a very real consequence, especially if one has regard to the fact that “[t]he prototypical squatter is poor 
and landless”, as pointed out by Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” 
(2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1081; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the 
System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 
236-260 253. In this regard Stake at 2466 fears that if the adverse possessor is forced to sell the land to satisfy 
the liability rule, he will suffer the very subjective losses that adverse possession tries to avoid, which will result 
in a nett decrease in utility. Furthermore, Singer in footnote 183 at 669 states that it would be “immoral” to 
allow the owner to claim an interest – in the form of a liability rule – after the adverse possessor has acquired 
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Court voices its opposition to such an approach in Warsaw v Chicago Metallic Ceilings 
Inc,539 where it held that “[t]o exact such a charge would entirely defeat the legitimate 
policies underlying the doctrines of adverse possession and prescription ...”540 The argument 
for excluding the bad faith adverse possessor from the mechanical rule is also based on the 
premise that mala fide possessors are morally reprehensible,541 which I argue is not always 
the case.542  
 
To summarise, utilitarianism and law and economics theory provide powerful grounds for 
justifying adverse possession or prescription. Utilitarianism achieves this purpose by 
recognising prescription (through rule-utilitarianism) as a permissible method of acquisition 
of ownership, since prescription maximises utility by deciding disputes and promoting legal 
certainty. It has been established that law and economics theory can also accommodate 
prescription. The reasons for this conclusion are, inter alia, that prescription recognises and 
protects the “reliance interest” of the squatter and third parties by affording legal status to 
long-existing factual scenarios and by reducing transaction costs in jurisdictions with a 
negative registration system. Through connecting the potential demoralisation costs a squatter 
may suffer to the “Holmes effect” and Radin’s personality theory – should the squatter not be 
able to acquire ownership through adverse possession – law and economics theory indicates 
that economic efficiency is maximised by shifting the property to the more efficient user of it. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the land through his reliance interest. It can also be argued that the adverse possessor has by this time become so 
bound up with the property that having to part with it, in a situation where he cannot pay, would be detrimental 
to his personhood, according to Radin MJ “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 
959-960; Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-
758 748-750. Indeed, I argue that Alexander’s social-obligation norm obliges an owner to “give” his (neglected) 
property to the squatter if it has become essential for such squatter to lead a well-lived life: See generally 
Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-
820 769. See further the discussion of the social-obligation theory in section 4.4.3 above. 
539 676 P.2d 584 (Cal 1984). 
540 676 P.2d 584 (Cal 1984) 590. Despite this criticism, Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1150-1151 thinks that a 
stronger argument can be made for adopting a limited indemnification rule to prevent coerced transfers in cases 
concerning mala fide possessors, so that they cannot be “rewarded” for their unlawful conduct. 
541 Merrill’s approach is similar to the one adopted by the English Law Commission in Land Registration for the 
Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) para 2.72; Land Registration for 
the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) para 10.5. 
542 See the discussion in section 4.5 below. See further Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ 
Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1081; Cobb N & Fox L 
“Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 
27 Legal Studies 236-260 253; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 2419-2474 2466. By requiring the adverse possessor to indemnify the owner will also reduce efficiency, 
according to Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession” (1995) 15 International 
Review of Law and Economics 161-173 166; Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law 
of Property” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722 689. 
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4.5 The “anomaly” of the bad faith possessor 
It was seen that most of the three liberal theories discussed above are able to accommodate 
not only adverse possession, but also bad faith adverse possession. Nevertheless, acquisition 
of ownership through bad faith adverse possession seems to present a “significant 
qualification of the rights paradigm in the sense that the security of ownership is reduced or 
undermined”.543 For this reason it is necessary to investigate whether bad faith adverse 
possession truly undermines ownership and whether it is, perhaps, founded on fallacious 
assumptions. 
   
Many authors view the acquisition of property through bad faith adverse possession as 
constituting an anomaly in the law, such a possessor normally being labelled a “land-thief” 
who (ab)uses the law to “steal” property from owners.544 Epstein describes them as “both bad 
people in the individual cases and a menace in the future”,545 while Merrill invokes “our 
shared sense of the greater moral culpability of the bad faith possessor.”546 According to 
Helmholz  
 
“[t]here is something wrong in claiming land when one has known all along that it belonged to 
someone else. It is impossible not to feel differently about such bad faith possessors than one 
does about claimants who have made an honest mistake and relied upon it.”547 (Original 
emphasis.) 
                                                             
543 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 187. 
544 Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-
1186 1097-1098; Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot 
het Debat over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1582-1597 1585, 1594; Fennell LA 
“Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1037-1096 1037-1040; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 2419-2474 2454-2455; Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession” (1995) 
15 International Review of Law and Economics 161-173 161-162; Sprankling JG “An Environmental Critique 
of Adverse Possession” (1994) 79 Cornell Law Review 816-884 881-884; Netter JM, Hersch PL & Manson WD 
“An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes” (1986) 6 International Review of Law and Economics 
217-227 217, 219; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 
Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1135. However, Peñalver and Katyal are of the opinion that 
intentional lawbreakers play an important role in the evolution of property law: See Peñalver EM & Katyal SK 
“Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186 1105-1131. See also 
Goodman MJ “Adverse Possession of Land – Morality and Motive” (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 281-288 
288, who thinks that adverse possession is not immoral because it influences social policy and that it grants 
security to long possession of land.   
545 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 686, 685-689. 
546 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1126. 
547 Helmholz RH “More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 65-106 75. See also Helmholz RH “Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent” (1984) 
61 Washington University Law Quarterly 331-358 343. 
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Radin argues that her personality theory is more likely to accommodate good faith adverse 
possessors than bad faith ones,548 whereas Posner also thinks that adverse possession ought 
only to be allowed in cases involving good faith possessors.549 These sentiments toward the 
bad faith possessor are also reflected in the proposals for reform to the law of adverse 
possession, with Merrill suggesting that bad faith possessors should indemnify owners for 
property acquired through adverse possession.550 Furthermore, Epstein advocates instituting 
an adverse possession regime that requires longer periods in cases involving bad faith, similar 
to what is found in some civil law jurisdictions.551 One can also observe the anomaly of the 
bad faith adverse possessor in US law, where some academics predict that good faith adverse 
possessors tend to fare better in cases based on adverse possession than their bad faith 
counterparts, despite the fact that the subjective intent of the possessor is irrelevant in the 
adverse possession law of most US states.552  
 
Despite the criticism directed against the bad faith possessor, there are authors who think that 
bad faith adverse possession is justified.553 Fennel – amongst them – argues that the terms 
“bad faith”554 and “good faith”555 are insufficient labels for situations that involve adverse 
possessors, as she prefers to refer to these persons as “knowing” (or advertent) and 
                                                             
548 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 749. 
549 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78 footnote 3.  
550 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1126. 
551 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 685-689. See similarly Bouckaert B & Depoorter BWF “Adverse 
Possession: Title Systems” in Bouckaert B & De Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999) 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ (accessed 7 October 2010) 1200: 18-31 25-26; Miceli TJ & Sirmans CF “An 
Economic Theory of Adverse Possession” (1995) 15 International Review of Law and Economics 161-173 167. 
Both Dutch and French prescription law have longer prescription periods if the possessor is in bad faith, see 
sections 3.3.2.2.3 and 3.4.2.2 respectively of chapter three above. 
552 Helmholz RH “Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent” (1984) 61 Washington University Law Quarterly 
331-358 331-332. For authority that the subjective intent of the possessor is irrelevant in black letter US adverse 
possession law, see Dukeminier J & Krier JE et al Property (6th ed 2006) 126-127. The discussion of the 
substantive requirements for US adverse possession falls outside the scope of this dissertation and are not 
addressed here. For discussions of the requirements for adverse possession in US law, see Dukeminier J & Krier 
JE et al Property (6th ed 2006) 112-157; Singer JW Introduction to Property (2nd ed 2005) 145-158. 
553 Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-
1186; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260; Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad 
Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096.  
554 Helmholz RH “More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 65-106 69-70 defines “bad faith” adverse possession as “continuing trespass the 
claimant knows to be without right”, explaining that it has “no necessary connection to hardness of heart or 
design to appropriate wrongfully, although of course it may involve both.” 
555 Helmholz RH “More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 65-106 69 describes “good faith” as to “mean[.] that the claimant believed the land 
belonged to him.” 
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“inadvertent” adverse possessors.556 This stands in contrast to other authors who argue that 
good faith adverse possessors should be favoured above their bad faith counterparts.557 In this 
sense Fennell states that “[i]nstead of triggering moral condemnation and legal disadvantage, 
[an adverse possessor’s] knowledge of the encroachment should be a prerequisite for 
obtaining title under a properly formulated doctrine of adverse possession.”558 The following 
argument reinforces this approach: 
 
“It is inconsistent to view someone as a thief or a bad faith actor for doing nothing more than 
knowingly employing the law’s own process for acquiring land.”559 
 
Fennell maintains that it is best to view adverse possession as a “doctrine of efficient 
trespass”.560 Interestingly, she argues that adverse possession concerning land should only be 
justified if two conditions are met, namely (i) when there is a substantial difference in the 
parties’ valuations of the land and (ii) when a market transaction is unavailable.561 Indeed, 
one of the main justifications for adverse possession is that it moves land to higher-valuing 
users when the market is unable to achieve this goal.562  
                                                             
556 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1037 footnote 1. 
557 See generally Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 
Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse 
Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154; Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law 
(6th ed 2003) 78 footnote 3; Bouckaert B & Depoorter BWF “Adverse Possession: Title Systems” in Bouckaert 
B & De Geest G (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999) http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ (accessed 7 
October 2010) 1200: 18-31 25-26. 
558 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1038 (Own emphasis). Goodman MJ “Adverse Possession of Land – 
Morality and Motive” (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 281-288 supports a system of adverse possession that 
does not distinguish between good faith and bad faith possessors. 
559 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1044. See also Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186 1098-1104. 
560 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1038. Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186 1169 are of the opinion that the term “efficient theft” is more fitting in 
this context.  
561 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1040-1041. See also Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 83 
and Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1129-1131, although both authors require good faith under these circumstances. For the 
relevance of these two requirements from a perspective of law and economics theory, see the discussion in 
section 4.4.4 above. 
562 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1040 is of the opinion that this is the “niche goal” of adverse possession. See 
also Sagaert V “De Verkrijgende Verjaring van Onroerende Goederen Herbezocht. Een Aanzet tot het Debat 
over het Verjaringsrecht” (2007) 39 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1582-1597 1585; Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus 
JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-260 246-248, 254-255; Cooter R & 
Ulen T Law and Economics (4th ed 2004) 155; Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 55, 83; 
Dixon M “The Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Risk Assessment” 2003 
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Fennell disagrees with the literature directed against bad faith adverse possessors and 
advances an argument favouring such possessors. She indicates that the apparently 
uncomplicated distinction between good faith and bad faith adverse possession is an 
oversimplification,563 which is illustrated in the following table:564 
 
Table 1: Belief, fact and knowledge 
                 Objective fact 
 
 
Subjective belief 
 
Possessor actually 
owns the land 
 
Possessor does not 
actually own the land 
Possessor believes he owns 
the land 
I. Secure owner II. Inadvertent encroacher 
[“good faith”] 
Possessor believes he does 
not own the land 
III. Insecure owner IV. Knowing trespasser 
[“bad faith”] 
Possessor is unsure of 
whether he owns the land 
V. Doubting owner VI. Doubting possessor 
 
This table demonstrates that the possessor’s knowledge depends on the interaction between 
the possessor’s subjective belief and the objective facts, while cells II and IV illustrate the 
distinction between good faith and bad faith possessors. Fennell correctly argues that the line 
between these two mental states is less clear than it prima facie seems. According to her it is 
difficult to establish whether the possessor’s entry was either knowing (bad faith) or 
inadvertent (good faith), unless the possessor makes an overt move (such as an offer to buy 
the land) that reveals his mental state towards the land.565 Furthermore, possessors can choose 
whether or not to inform themselves of their position, which makes knowledge an unstable 
criterion to determine whether good faith or bad faith is present.566 In this sense a “false 
belief in ownership may be based on the most extensive efforts available, minimally 
reasonable efforts, ... no efforts at all, or wilful ignorance stubbornly maintained against all 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Conveyancer 136-156 151-152; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the 
Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 724-725. 
563 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1049. 
564 I borrow this table from Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” 
(2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1049. 
565 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1050. 
566 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1050. 
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signs to the contrary.”567 From this argument it appears that the “obvious” distinction 
between good and bad faith is not so simple in reality, since it is possible to be in good faith 
even though a possessor did the absolute minimum to inform himself as to the objective facts 
of a situation. The distinction between good and bad faith involves the further complication 
of evidence, which problem applies to the possessor who is unsure of whether he owns the 
land and which is illustrated by cells V and VI. How is an owner to prove that an adverse 
possessor who claims ownership to his property was indeed in bad faith? A possible solution 
to this conundrum is the approach adopted by Dutch and French law where good faith 
possession is presumed, which has the effect that the owner then has to prove the presence of 
mala fides.568 
 
The problem with distinguishing between good and bad faith is further complicated if one 
takes into account the difference between knowledge and intent.569 These two categories can 
produce a multiplicity of mental states if they are combined, as the following table 
illustrates:570 
Table 2: Adding intent to knowledge 
                    Intent 
 
 
Knowledge  
(from table 1) 
 
Possessor intends to 
claim even if it is not 
his 
 
Possessor does not intend 
to claim anything that is 
not his 
Inadvertent (“good faith”) 
encroacher (table 1, cell II) 
Aggressive innocent 
(hypothetical intent) 
Deferential innocent 
(hypothetical intent) 
Knowing (“bad faith”)  
trespasser  
(table 1, cell IV) 
Aggressive trespasser Deferential trespasser 
Doubting possessor  
(table 1, cell VI) 
Passive-aggressive 
trespasser 
Deferential doubter 
 
                                                             
567 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1050. 
568 See section 3.3.2.2.2 for Dutch law and section 3.4.2.2 for French law in chapter three above. This was also 
the position under Roman law, see section 2.2.2 of chapter two above. 
569 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1051; Stake JE “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 
Georgetown Law Journal 2419-2474 2427-2428. 
570 I borrow this table from Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” 
(2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1051. 
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This table highlights the problems one can encounter with the seemingly unproblematic 
distinction between good faith and bad faith adverse possession. If the adverse possessor is 
inadvertent, will he necessarily have the requisite intention to claim land through adverse 
possession even if such possessor is convinced that he already owns the land? What will 
happen to the inadvertent possessor who believes himself to be the owner, but who is then 
confronted by the owner and decides not to claim the property through adverse possession 
(even though ownership was already acquired ex lege)? These difficulties emphasise the 
following question: “Is the passive-aggressive trespasser who chooses not to resolve her 
doubts really morally superior to the aggressive trespasser[,] [or] [s]hould the aggressive 
innocent be preferred over the deferential but aware trespasser?”571 Fennell states that it is not 
clear whether a moral distinction exists, even if all innocent possessors are viewed as 
deferential and all knowing trespassers are regarded as aggressors.572 
 
Against this background one may rightly ask why the academic stance is so weighed against 
bad faith possession, labelling it as constituting “land theft”. Fennell argues that by 
disentangling the way law and morality are conflated in the word “thief”, one is able to 
discover why the law opposes bad faith adverse possession.573 Firstly, it is clear that acts that 
violate the law are classified as crimes. However, it cannot be a crime if someone follows a 
legally recognised method to acquire ownership in an object.574 Yet, one may object to such a 
notion by claiming that no legal rule can change a moral wrong into a right because even 
though the state sanctions or legalises something like adverse possession (or abortion), it 
could possibly still amount to an immoral state of affairs.575 In this sense Fennell argues – if 
one leaves aside the adversity of possession – that the mere desire to obtain property through 
possession cannot truly create moral difficulties, since no rights or interests of others are 
infringed through this desire alone.576 If such an infringement indeed exists, the “moral fault 
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would appear to lie with the party responsible for it.”577 In this context a possessor’s mere 
desire to acquire property does not infringe an owner’s property rights purely because the 
government allows for the shift of ownership in favour of the possessor.578 Consequently, it is 
governmental power that takes ownership away from the owner, not the acquisitive thoughts 
of the possessor.579 This argument needs to be further analysed, since adverse possession 
requires the possessor to be in physical possession before the property can be acquired 
through prescription. In this instance the possessor is responsible for the occupation of the 
property, while the government awards ownership to that possessor at the expiration of a 
certain period of time, which results in the loss of ownership on the side of the owner.580 In 
other words, the fault for the loss of ownership resides not with the possessor but with the 
state, since it is the state that awards ownership to the possessor if he was in possession for 
the duration of the prescription period. Yet, even if one accepts this line of argument, it seems 
that it only “shifts the blame” from the possessor to the government, which still necessitates 
an inquiry as to whether the notion of adverse possession should be allowed at all.  
 
It is clear that trespassing on the property of another is both morally and legally wrong. The 
law provides remedies to owners to regain possession from such adverse possessors, causing 
the legal position of the adverse possessor to be relatively weak. The law protects owners by 
requiring an adverse possessor to be in possession of the property for a substantial period of 
time before he can acquire ownership. Furthermore, the owner can stop this possession at any 
time through intervening and evicting the possessor. By relying on these two grounds, 
Fennell concludes that owners who fail to reclaim possession from the trespasser are unlikely 
to be pained581 by the trespass itself.582 The loss of ownership through prescription is a 
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separate issue that may pain the owner, but this pain will be felt despite the subjective intent 
of the possessor.583 It follows that if we believe that ownership should never – either morally 
or legally – be extinguished in favour of possessors, it will require the abolition of adverse 
possession and not merely limiting it to cases involving good faith possessors.584 If Fennell is 
correct in her reasoning, it follows that no true benefit is gained by distinguishing between 
good and bad faith possessors. Accordingly, I agree that it serves no useful purpose to 
distinguish between good and bad faith prescription, which is in line with the current position 
in South African law.585 
 
Another take on bad faith adverse possession is the approach of Peñalver and Katyal,586 who 
divide these so-called “property outlaws”587 or lawbreakers into two categories, namely 
“acquisitive outlaws” and “expressive outlaws”.588 The difference between them is that the 
former group seeks to acquire ownership in the property of others, while the latter group – 
rather than seeking ownership – attempts to influence the ways owners use or enjoy their 
property.589 For purposes of justifying bad faith adverse possession it is only necessary to 
consider the category of acquisitive outlaws. In this sense the focus of Peñalver and Katyal’s 
analysis falls on the European settlers who settled on land in the American West that mostly 
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belonged to either the Native Americans or the federal government.590 As to these lands the 
settlers argued that “[e]very citizen ... is entitled to own land, and the claims of those who 
actually work the land should take precedence over the fungible interests of absentee land 
speculators.”591 Interestingly, this argument for justifying the “taking” of Western lands 
contains elements of both the labour theory and Radin’s personality theory.592 Yet, these 
settlers – who squatted on public land – were a major concern to the federal government in 
the East, since the government viewed them as taking land without paying for it. The fact that 
many owners of western land were absent and thus let their property lie unused, coupled with 
the difficulty of regulating squatting in the vast areas of the West, ultimately forced the 
federal government to relax the laws pertaining to unlawful occupation of federal land and 
through this the “shameless lawbreakers and usurpers reviled by the eastern elite [were 
transformed] into the revered pioneers of American mythology”.593 Peñalver and Katyal 
capture the influence of these squatters on US land law as follows: 
 
“Their persistent and acquisitive lawbreaking raised the political profile of conflicts over how to 
dispose of the massive quantities of public land acquired by the United States government 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, and it ultimately led to the resolution of the 
conflict in their favor.”594 
 
Peñalver and Katyal agree with Radin that property is important to individual identity, as 
controlling property extends our capacity to live as humans.595 This significance of property 
to people emphasises two points, namely the importance of protecting existing property 
rights,596 and that existing property rules should be challenged in situations where persons are 
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excluded from participating in the ownership system.597 For example, people excluded from 
access to ownership – such as the poor – find themselves isolated from the social and 
commercial activity many take for granted.598 This is where the “ambiguous role of the 
property outlaw ... sets the stage for productive disobedience.”599  
 
In this sense adverse possession plays an important role in situations where a squatter places 
a greater value on property than the owner and where certain factors – such as high 
transaction costs and/or the poverty of the squatter – prevents voluntary exchange.600 This is 
an ideal setting to reallocate the property from a neglecting owner to an adverse possessor 
who actually uses the property. However, like the problem with Radin’s personality theory, it 
is difficult to identify cases where the squatter truly attaches greater value on the property 
than the owner for such an involuntary transfer to be permitted.601 Yet, the adverse 
possessor’s long-term use of the property can provide evidence of the high value such 
possessor places on the property, especially because the owner can simply reclaim possession 
at any time before the limitation period expires.602 These factors – when combined – indicate 
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that the adverse possessor indeed values the property more than the absent owner.603 This 
state of affairs is even more justified in circumstances where the access to property by the 
adverse possessor and owner is out of balance, the owner being wealthy while the adverse 
possessor is poor and perhaps socially marginalised.604 Adverse possession performs a dual 
function in this context by (i) generating informational value as to the inefficient distribution 
of property rights in society, together with (ii) promoting redistributive value through 
affecting transactions that would otherwise not be able to occur due to high transaction 
costs.605 Consequently, if certain involuntary transfers sufficiently maximise utility for the 
greatest number of people, property reallocating mechanisms – such as adverse possession – 
become an advantageous solution.606  
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Nonetheless, the main problem of attempting to justify acquisitive outlaws is in justifying 
those situations where the adverse possessor knows that he is occupying the land of another 
because the possessor either does not or cannot acquire it through voluntary transfer. Under 
these circumstances it is indeed hard to argue that the behaviour of the squatter is of 
informational or any other social value.607 In this sense Peñalver and Katyal state that, even 
though a squatter may act out of greed and self-interest (mala fides), it would be justified to 
award ownership to him through prescription in terms of “objective distributive justice” if the 
squatter had real need of the land.608 Nevertheless, this justification in cases of “need” should 
not be interpreted as only including squatters who would otherwise starve or suffer harm. It 
can also encompass broader needs, such as that property is needed to “facilitate a minimally 
acceptable degree of participation in social life”, as well as the advancement of human 
flourishing in accordance with Radin’s personality theory.609 
 
Adverse possession can also be justified by other non-utilitarian means, according to 
Peñalver and Katyal. For instance, the adverse possessor is normally a poor person, but 
someone who is willing to invest labour to improve the property of a neglecting owner.610 
The squatter then puts the property to efficient use, while the property must be sufficiently 
unimportant to the owner for him to “allow” this state of affairs to continue for the entire 
limitation period.611 Another consideration – even in cases involving the mala fide adverse 
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possessor – is the view that it is “not wrong to appropriate someone else’s surplus property in 
order to provide for one’s own need when viable legal alternatives are not available.”612 
These grounds Peñalver and Katyal advance indeed provide persuasive reasons for allowing 
the mala fide possessor in the framework of prescription. 
 
Finally, I turn to the assessment of bad faith prescription according to the personality theory. 
Radin thinks that the personality theory cannot accommodate bad faith prescription. 
According to her, it is unclear how property possessed in bad faith can become constitutive of 
someone’s personhood if the possessor does not bona fide believe that he is the owner of it.613 
In other words, she casts doubt as to how a bad faith squatter can become strongly enough 
bound up with property to justify the squatter’s personal interest trumping the owner’s 
fungible interest. However, Hegel seems to deem the subjective intent of the possessor as 
irrelevant, since the Hegelian personality theory – on which Radin built her theory – merely 
requires an investment of the will into an object, coupled with possession.614 In this context 
Hegel’s view can justify acquisition of ownership through bad faith prescription. Still, even if 
one assumes that this point is insufficient to include the mala fide possessor in Radin’s 
personality theory, regard must be had to the arguments that Cobb and Fox, Peñalver and 
Katyal and Fennell put forward, as discussed above. All these authors provide convincing 
reasons as to why mala fide possessors should be permitted in the framework of prescription, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Miceli T, Sirmans CF & Turnbull GK “Property Rights by Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse 
Possession Statutes” (2001) 77 Land Economics 360-370 360; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1130-1131; Rose CM 
“Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 79-82, all of whom 
argue that adverse possession encourages productive and efficient land use. Peñalver and Katyal at 1170 use this 
example in US law to justify adverse possession with seven or 10-year limitation periods.  
612 Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-
1186 1170. See also Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 
Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1080-1083. Although acknowledging criticism pertaining to 
adverse possession, Peñalver and Katyal think that the stringent requirements of this legal institution help 
adverse possession to “get around” these problems. Indeed, they are of the opinion (at 1170-1171) that the 
period and requirements for adverse possession should be relaxed in our modern era of technology concerning 
property monitoring, so that this legal rule can better fulfil its redistributive function. This statement is 
remarkable, as sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter three above illustrate that some of the requirements for 
adverse possession – such as the animus possidendi requirement and the length of the limitation period – are less 
stringent that those of prescription in the civil law systems. 
613 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 749. 
Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 78 footnote 3 – relying on Holmes OW “The Path of the 
Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 477 – is also of the opinion that only good faith adverse 
possession will be accommodated in this sense. 
614 Hegel GWF Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821, Houlgate S ed 1952) para 64, read with paras 51-52; 
Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 749. 
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which is also applicable in the context of the personality theory.615 For instance, an urban 
squatter will always be aware of the fact that the property he occupies is the property of 
another and hence such a squatter will always be in bad faith.616 Yet, despite the mala fides of 
these squatters, an argument is to be made that urban – and even rural – squatters indeed 
become as attached to occupied property as legal owners of homes become to their houses.617 
In this context it is possible that the occupied property starts to be constitutive of the 
squatter’s personhood, despite him being in bad faith. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the traditional justifications behind prescription in Roman-Dutch, 
South African, Dutch and French law. Although these systems mainly provide two grounds 
for justifying prescription, namely the promotion of legal certainty and the punishment of 
neglectful owners, these rationales seem to fall short when compared to the justifications that 
English law provides for adverse possession. This shortcoming is illustrated by the number of 
justifications taken into consideration in the recent re-evaluation and reform of English 
adverse possession law. Although certain English law justifications are similar to those found 
in the four civil-law jurisdictions618 mentioned, Dockray advances persuasive reasons as to 
why the effects of adverse possession ought to be limited. Although Dockray identifies the 
strongest reason for adverse possession as that is helps to ascertain ownership in unregistered 
land, which is analogous to the legal certainty argument in South Africa, the English Law 
Commission reasons that this rationale does not carry weight when the register provides 
conclusive proof of ownership. Therefore, it decided to “abolish” adverse possession 
regarding registered land.  
 
                                                             
615 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260; Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 
155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-1186; Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad 
Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096.  
616 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1081; Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of 
Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 253. 
617 See especially Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the 
Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 and Fox L Conceptualising Home: Theories, Law 
and Policies (2007) 300-303 in this regard. 
618 South African law has a mixed legal system and not a civil law system in the formal context of the term. Yet, 
South African property law – of which prescription law forms part – is much nearer to the civil law tradition 
than to the common law. 
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I indicate that this approach by the Law Commission is flawed because it failed to take into 
account certain key moral and economic arguments. Consequently, this chapter relies on 
Locke’s labour theory, Radin’s personality theory, and utilitarianism and law and economics 
theory to show that adverse possession still plays an important role in a modern legal system, 
even regarding registered land. Although it is more difficult to justify having prescription in 
countries with a positive registration system, prescription clearly fulfils an important 
corrective and economic function in jurisdictions with a negative registration system, since it 
promotes legal certainty and lowers transaction costs. 
 
In terms of the labour theory, chapter four establishes that an adverse possessor can obtain a 
labour theory claim in occupied property if he invests labour and effort in land that would 
otherwise lie abandoned. Although the labour theory prima facie seems to prevent non-
consensual redistribution of ownership, one overcomes this problem by treating the owner’s 
neglect of the property as quasi-abandonment. In this sense the property reverts to or remains 
in the commons from where an adverse possessor is able to obtain a labour theory claim in it 
through mixing labour with the land. Such an approach gains further support through certain 
qualifications Locke builds into his theory, such as that it will only be a permissible method 
of acquiring ownership as long as there remain enough unowned things in the commons. 
Furthermore, Locke strongly disapproves of the waste or non-use of property and mentions 
that property – under these circumstances – will remain in the commons from where others 
will then be able to appropriate it. Furthermore, the labour theory seems to regard the 
subjective mindset of the adverse possessor as irrelevant, since even a bad faith possessor is 
capable of mixing labour with an object. Accordingly, the labour theory justifies both good 
and bad faith adverse possession. 
 
The second theory used to justify prescription is Radin’s personality theory, which regards 
ownership of property as essential for human flourishing. She bases her theory on the 
Hegelian personality theory, which entails that a person must invest his will into an object – 
together with possessing it – before such person can obtain ownership. Radin develops her 
theory through acknowledging that certain property is more important to the way we 
constitute ourselves as humans (personal property) than property that does not serve this 
purpose (fungible property). These two kinds of property relationships are located on a 
continuum ranging from personal property at the one end to fungible property on the other. It 
follows that if a person has a personal property interest in a thing it will trump the mere 
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fungible interest another person may have in that same object. This is how the personality 
theory can justify prescription, since a possessor will normally treat possessed property as 
personal property while the absent owner probably regards it only as fungible property. 
Although it may not be simple to judge whether a possessor truly has a personal interest in 
occupied property, certain factors – such as the investment of time and labour into the 
property – serve as indications that the property is more constitutive to the possessor’s 
personality than to that of the neglectful owner. Such a scenario justifies protecting the rights 
of the long-term possessor over those of the absent owner. Singer’s “reliance interest” theory 
strengthens this conclusion, since it entails that the settled interests or expectations of 
squatters and third parties regarding property should enjoy protection if they existed for a 
long time. The personality theory finds further support in Alexander’s social-obligation norm, 
which obliges owners to help others in their community to develop their capabilities for 
attaining human flourishing. 
 
Finally, I employ utilitarianism and law and economics theory to justify prescription. These 
two theories are discussed together, since both aim to maximise utility, albeit in different 
contexts. Classic utilitarianism – according to Bentham – attempts to maximise utility or 
happiness for the greatest number of people. Although this approach can lead to instances 
that justify minorities to suffer pain or injustice, one overcomes this problem through using 
Mill’s suggestion of coupling utility with justice, which is achieved through identifying – and 
then eliminating – instances of injustice. One can use Mill’s theory of utilitarianism to justify 
the transfer of ownership to a long-term possessor if it would cause greater justice to permit 
the absent owner to reclaim the property after having left it idle for long periods of time. 
Rule-utilitarianism embodies this approach, since it attempts to maximise utility in the long 
run through laying down certain rules (like prescription).  
 
The second leg of the utilitarian justification is law and economics theory, which aims to 
structure the law to promote economic efficiency. The Coase theorem is central to law and 
economics theory and entails that voluntary exchange occurs in settings where transaction 
costs are low. Conversely, the law must provide ways to help reallocate scarce resources 
when high transaction costs prevent the occurrence of voluntary exchange. It follows that 
prescription will be economically justified if it promotes the shifting of resources to higher-
valuing users by sufficiently lowering transaction costs. For this purpose I investigate the 
costs of prescription pertaining to the owner, the possessor, third parties and litigation. This 
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chapter concludes that prescription reduces transaction costs with the lengthening of the 
prescription period in all four these contexts. Prescription especially reduces search and 
inspection costs in a negative registration system that does not guarantee the correctness of 
the register. In this regard prescription clears titles and promotes legal certainty, since one can 
disregard (incorrect) information contained in the register that predate the period of 
prescription. However, this justification carries less weight in a positive registration system, 
which explains the presence of the strict requirements for prescription and adverse possession 
in German and English law. Consequently, prescription succeeds to shift property to higher-
valuing users that would otherwise be prevented due to high transaction costs, especially if it 
operates as a mechanical entitlement determination rule – as suggested by Merrill. 
 
Finally, chapter four indicates that the arguments against bad faith adverse possession are 
founded on incorrect reasoning, for it shows that sound reasons exist to disregard the 
distinction between bona fides and mala fides. To establish this point, I rely on the conclusion 
that the apparently simple distinction between good faith and bad faith is based on the fallacy 
that all adverse possessors who knowingly or advertently possess the property of others are 
“morally reprehensible”. This assumption is incorrect, as seen in the cases where urban 
squatters – who have no alternative accommodation – occupy unused property out of 
necessity. Fennell points out the misleading distinction between good and bad faith through 
focusing on the difficulty to determine whether someone is truly an advertent or inadvertent 
possessor. She furthers her argument through disentangling the way law and morality is 
conflated in the word “thief”. Fennell concludes that it is not the mere acquisitive thoughts of 
the possessor that pains or dispossesses the owner, but rather governmental action – in the 
form of prescription – that takes ownership away. In this sense Fennell indicates that if we 
want to prevent owners from experiencing this pain, then we have to completely abolish 
adverse possession and not merely limit it to cases of bona fide possession. 
 
Peñalver and Katyal also provide convincing reasons for allowing bad faith prescription by 
focusing on the role that “acquisitive [property] outlaws” play in shaping US property law. 
These authors acknowledge – like Radin – that property is important to our individual 
identity, since it extends our capacity to live as human beings. In this sense mala fide 
possessors fulfil an important role, since they generate information as to the inefficient 
distribution of property rights in society. Accordingly, (bad faith) prescription qualifies as a 
medium to affect social welfare if the law allows the (bad faith) possessor – who is normally 
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poor and marginalised – to obtain ownership over property from the abundance of a (wealthy) 
owner. Peñalver and Katyal require that the law must protect long-existing property 
relationships if it contributes to a person’s participation in the ownership system and in 
society, which participation will be detrimentally affected if such person cannot acquire 
ownership through prescription. Consequently, these authors acknowledge that prescription 
helps to reallocate resources to higher-valuing users when high transaction costs would 
otherwise prevent it. In this context one of the stronger justifications for adverse possession is 
that it affects social welfare through the redistribution of property.  
 
The next chapter focuses on the constitutionality of prescription in the context of South 
African constitutional law. The conclusions drawn in this chapter play in integral role in my 
arguments to establish that prescription does not infringe the South African property clause. 
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CHAPTER 5: ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IN VIEW OF THE PROPERTY 
CLAUSE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that there are valid moral and economic reasons to have 
acquisitive prescription (“prescription”) in a legal system, especially in countries with a 
negative registration system.1 Nonetheless, arguments to the contrary also exist, as was seen 
with the English Law Commission’s Reports2 and the litigation surrounding the Pye case in 
the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.3 Indeed, it 
cannot be denied that prescription has drastic effects, considering it extinguishes ownership 
on the side of the owner.4  
 
In previous chapters I discuss the requirements for prescription in South African law,5 as well 
as Dutch, French and German law.6 The requirements for prescription in Dutch and French 
law have interesting similarities with those of South African law, particularly since all these 
systems require possessors to possess property animo domini.7 This is contrary to English 
adverse possession law, where the possessor merely has to possess the property animo 
possidendi.8 As shown earlier, this is a vital difference between prescription and adverse 
possession.9  
 
Chapter four highlights the objections to adverse possession in English law, which led to the 
enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 (“LRA” or “2002 Act”).10 This Act effectively 
abolished adverse possession in English law concerning registered land, as it was found that 
                                                             
1 See especially section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
2 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001); Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998). 
3 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2001] Ch 804; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. These cases are discussed in section 3.2.3 of 
chapter two above. The two decisions by the European Court of Human Rights are reported as JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 
(GC), both of which are discussed in section 5.3.2.4.2 below. 
4 For the requirements in South African law, see sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two above. For the requirements 
of this legal institution in English, Dutch, French and German law, see sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 respectively 
in chapter three above. 
5 See sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two above. 
6 See sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 respectively of chapter three above. 
7 With the intention of an owner: See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two (South African law) and sections 3.3.2.2.1 
and 3.4.2.1 of chapter three (Dutch and French law) above. 
8 With the intention to possess: See section 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter three above. 
9 See sections 3.2.2.3.2.1 and 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter three above. 
10 See section 4.3.2 of chapter four above.  
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the traditional justifications for adverse possession do not carry weight if the register provides 
conclusive proof of title.11 This position is similar to German law, which also has a positive 
registration system.12 Nonetheless, three liberal property theories were considered to justify 
having adverse possession – or prescription – in modern legal systems.13 These theories are 
Locke’s labour theory, Radin’s personality theory and utilitarianism and law and economics 
theory, which theories play a vital role in justifying prescription in view of section 25 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (“the Constitution”).14 
 
Since prescription results in the extinguishment of ownership on the side of the owner, its 
implications in terms of the property clause must be considered, as section 25 provides for 
legitimate state interference with property. In view of this section, prescription may either 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1) or an uncompensated 
expropriation under section 25(2)-(3), both of which would be unconstitutional. First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB”)15 
provides a framework within which this chapter assesses the effects of prescription. I also 
consider the possibility that prescription may – possibly – amount to constructive 
expropriation. 
 
Some legal systems, such as Dutch and French – and perhaps also United States (“US”) law16 
– distinguish between good and bad faith possessors in the context of prescription. It was 
indicated in chapter four that this distinction is based on incoherent reasoning and false 
preconceptions of the differences between bona and mala fide possessors.17 Accordingly, it is 
irrelevant to distinguish between these two kinds of possessors for purposes of the section 25 
analysis.  
 
                                                             
11 See sections 4.3.2-4.3.3 of chapter four above.  
12 See section 3.5 of chapter three above. 
13 See section 4.4 of chapter four above. For the application of these theories in this chapter, see section 
5.3.2.4.1 below. 
14 See section 5.3.2.4 below. 
15 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
16 For the position in Dutch and French law, see sections 3.3.2.2.2-3.3.2.2.3 (for Dutch law) and section 3.4.2.2 
(for French law) of chapter three above. This issue is not clear-cut in US law: See Helmholz RH “Adverse 
Possession and Subjective Intent” (1984) 61 Washington University Law Quarterly 331-358; Helmholz RH 
“More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham” (1986) 64 Washington University Law 
Quarterly 65-106, together with the discussions in sections 4.4.4 and 4.5 of chapter four above. 
17 See section 4.5 of chapter four above. 
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5.2 Analysis of the effects of acquisitive prescription 
The section 25 analysis of prescription requires a brief overview of the functioning of this 
rule in South African law.18 Two pieces of legislation regulate prescription in South African 
law, namely the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 (“1943 Act”) and the Prescription Act 68 of 
1969 (“1969 Act”). Both of these acts provide that a possessor acquires ownership ex lege 
over someone else’s property if she has been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession 
animo domini of that property for 30 years.19  
 
Pienaar v Rabie20 is a classic example that illustrates the harsh effects prescription can have 
in practice. I use the facts of this case for two reasons. Firstly, it serves as the factual situation 
to investigate prescription in terms of section 25. Secondly, this case has notable similarities 
with the facts of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom.21  
 
The litigants in Pienaar v Rabie22 were the owners of two neighbouring farms in the district 
of Windhoek in Namibia. Although the boundaries of the farms were fenced, it appeared that 
a certain part of the appellant’s farm – consisting of 179 hectares – was fenced in as part of 
the respondent’s land by mistake. Neither party had knowledge of this error. The Court a quo 
found that the respondent indeed acquired ownership through prescription. The fact that the 
respondent satisfied the requirements for prescription was not challenged on appeal.23 
However, on appeal the appellant averred that a claim based on prescription could not 
succeed if there was no negligence on the side of the owner. The Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court, as it then was, conducted an extensive analysis of the sources and 
justifications for prescription in Roman-Dutch and South African law. It concluded that the 
absence of negligence does not constitute a defence against a prescription claim because 
                                                             
18 See chapter two above for a more comprehensive discussion pertaining to prescription in South African law. 
19 Section 2(1)-(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. The 
requirements for prescription in South African law are discussed in greater detail in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of 
chapter two above. 
20 1983 (3) SA 126 (A). 
21 (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). The facts of this case are discussed in section 3.2.3.2 of chapter three above and 
are therefore not repeated here.   
22 1983 (3) SA 126 (A). 
23 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 134. The respondent was found to have possessed the property with the 
necessary possessio civilis, which possession was also nec vi, nec clam and nec precario, as required by section 
2(1) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. 
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negligence is not a requirement for prescription.24 Accordingly, the Appellate Division 
confirmed that the respondent had acquired the land through prescription. 
 
This case emphasises the impact prescription can have in practice, since the appellant in this 
context lost a substantial 179 hectares of farmland. This, coupled with the fact that 
prescription can run even in the absence of negligence, emphasises the necessity to analyse 
this legal institution in terms of the property clause.  
 
 
5.3 Constitutional analysis of the effects of acquisitive prescription in terms of the 
FNB methodology 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The South African property clause – section 25 of the Constitution – can be divided into two 
main parts, namely protective provisions (section 25(1)-(3), read with section 25(4)) and 
reform provisions (section 25(5)-(9), read with section 25(4)).25 This division illustrates a 
tension within section 25, which aims to both protect existing property rights and to achieve 
transformation in the form of land and other reforms. Yet, it is possible to read section 25 as a 
coherent whole and to view it as constituting a “creative tension”, without falling prey to 
conflicting interpretations.26 To this end it is necessary to interpret the property clause 
purposively.27 This much is clear, as the Constitutional Court states that section 25 must be 
viewed “as part of a comprehensive and coherent Bill of Rights in a comprehensive and 
coherent constitution.”28 
 
Section 39 of the Constitution determines how courts should interpret the Bill of Rights as 
well as legislation. It provides as follows: 
                                                             
24 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 138-139. 
25 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 12-13. Van der Walt at 12 further divides these two 
parts into four clusters of provisions, namely deprivation (section 25(1)), expropriation (section 25(2)-(3)), 
interpretation (section 25(4)) and land and other reforms (section 25(5)-(9)). 
26 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 17-18. 
27 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 17, 22-42. The Constitutional Court has indicated that it 
will interpret the Constitution purposively; see for instance Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14-23; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 
768 (CC) paras 63-64; Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 48. See also Ex parte Chairperson of 
the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 
(4) SA 744 (CC) paras 47-50. 
28 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 63.  
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   “1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –  
a) Must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
b) Must consider international law; and 
c) May consider foreign law. 
2. When interpreting any legislation ... every court ... must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.” 
 
Section 8(2) of the Constitution provides that a provision in the Bill of Rights binds both 
natural and juristic persons. Section 8(4) states that juristic persons are entitled to rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights “to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the 
nature of that juristic person.” In terms of section 8(4) the Constitutional Court held in FNB 
that juristic persons – such as public companies – are entitled to the property rights under 
section 25.29 Therefore, both private individuals and juristic persons are beneficiaries of the 
property rights in section 25. 
 
This raises the issue of the vertical and horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, since 
prescription occurs almost exclusively through the actions of private parties. Vertical 
application of the Bill of Rights relates to the “vertical” relationship between an individual 
and the state, which imposes a duty on all state branches to respect the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights.30 Direct horizontal application entails that individuals can rely directly on a 
provision in the Bill of Rights to protect themselves against abuses of their rights through the 
conduct of others.31 This distinction may prima facie seem to denote horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights in the context of prescription, since prescription cases invariably relate to 
the actions (possession) of a possessor over the property of an owner. The owner loses 
ownership the moment the possessor satisfies all the requirements for prescription, while 
ownership is protected by section 25. However, closer analysis indicates that prescription 
does not, in fact, entail horizontal application of section 25 but rather direct vertical 
application. According to section 8(1) of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights “applies to all 
law, and binds the legislature”. Furthermore, section 39(2) of the Constitution stipulates that 
“[w]hen interpreting any legislation … every court … must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.” Therefore, legislation enacted by Parliament – such as the 
                                                             
29 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 45. See also Ex 
parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 57. 
30 Currie I & De Waal J Bill of Rights Handbook (5th ed 2005) 43. 
31 Currie I & De Waal J Bill of Rights Handbook (5th ed 2005) 43. 
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prescription acts – must comply with the Bill of Rights.32 The prescription acts provide that a 
possessor acquires ownership over immovable property possessed for a period of 30 years.33 
It is not through the actions of the possessor alone that she acquires ownership, but through 
the empowering legislation, namely the prescription acts. Although the state seems to play no 
direct role in the context of prescription cases, it does so indirectly through its enactment of 
the two prescription acts that provide for the acquisition of ownership in this regard.34 
Through the prescription acts the state “awards” ownership to the possessor once all the 
requirements are met, while “taking ownership away” from the owner. Thus, a section 25 
attack on prescription will not target the actions of the possessor, but rather the legislation 
that allows for the extinguishment of ownership on the side of the owner. Accordingly, 
prescription is an instance of vertical and not horizontal application of section 25. 
 
 
5.3.2 FNB methodology 
5.3.2.1  Introduction 
In the leading Constitutional Court judgment on the property clause to date,35 namely the 
FNB decision, the Court set out a seven-stage methodology for adjudicating section 25 
disputes. Ackermann J set out these seven stages as follows:  
 
“(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by the operation of [the law in 
question] amount to property for purpose of s 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the [organ of state concerned]? 
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of s 25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under s 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation for purpose of s 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the [expropriation] comply with the requirements of s 25(2)(a) and (b)? 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under s 36?”36 
 
                                                             
32 Currie I & De Waal J Bill of Rights Handbook (5th ed 2005) 44. 
33 Subject to the other requirements also being met; see sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two above. 
34 The European Court of Human Rights in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 
56 and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 57 reached an interesting 
conclusion in this regard. It found that although the state does directly interfere with property rights through 
adverse possession (or prescription), the actions of the possessor – through obtaining ownership – are ascribed 
to the state, which triggers Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950.  
35 Nkabinde J describes this decision as “the leading judgment regarding the property clause” in Reflect-All 1025 
CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another 
2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
36 I formulate the questions of the FNB case as set out by Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop 
M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-3 (footnotes omitted). 
These questions were originally set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 
(4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
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In what follows, this chapter analyses prescription in the framework of the FNB methodology 
to determine whether it is in line with section 25.37 
 
 
5.3.2.2  Does that which is taken away amount to “property” for purpose of  
section 25? 
The first question that concerns the constitutionality of prescription is whether the affected 
interest amounts to “property” that should enjoy constitutional protection. The Constitutional 
Court in FNB only briefly touched on this issue, since Ackermann J declined to provide “a 
comprehensive definition of property for purposes of s[ection] 25”, for he claimed that such 
an endeavour would be “judicially unwise” and “practically impossible”.38 Yet, the Court 
acknowledged that ownership of corporeal movables, together with land ownership, “must ... 
lie at the heart of our constitutional concept of property”.39 This dictum, read with section 
25(4)(b)40 of the Constitution, makes it clear that section 25 must apply to cases that involve 
ownership of land. In the context of prescription, an owner loses her land – a corporeal 
immovable – to a possessor who has been in possession of that land for 30 years and who has 
also satisfied all the requirements as set out by the prescription acts.41 It follows that the 
affected interest is ownership in land, since the owner loses such ownership in its totality 
should a possessor satisfy the requirements for prescription. 
 
Since this dissertation only focuses on prescription pertaining to land, it is unnecessary to 
consider whether “property” also encompasses other property interests such as incorporeal 
property. Nonetheless, Van der Walt convincingly argues that this latter form of property 
                                                             
37 This methodology was followed in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v COEGA Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public 
Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC); Mkontwana 
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and 
Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, and 
Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) and 
Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). Regarding the interesting application of this 
methodology in Mkontwana, see Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 155-160. For a case 
where the FNB methodology was not followed, see Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
38 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. 
39 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. 
40 “For purposes of [section 25] – property is not limited to land.” 
41 The requirements for prescription in South African law are discussed in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two 
above. 
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interests ought to be regarded as constitutional property and should thus also enjoy 
constitutional protection.42 This is clear from the following passage: 
 
“For purposes of section 25 ‘property’ can therefore relate to a wide range of objects both 
corporeal and incorporeal, a wide range of traditional property rights and interests both real and 
personal, and a wide range of other rights and interests which (in the civil-law tradition) have 
never been considered in terms of property before.”43 
 
Furthermore, in FNB the Court found that it is irrelevant whether an owner makes limited or 
no use of an object for purposes of categorising that thing as constitutional property.44 This is 
especially relevant in the context of prescription, where an owner may have “allowed” a 
possessor to possess her land for 30 years. Even in such a case the ownership in land will 
qualify as constitutional property, no matter how the owner used (or did not use) the property. 
From this discussion it is plain that the property interest in the context of prescription, namely 
ownership in land, amounts to “property” for purposes of section 25. 
 
 
5.3.2.3  Has there been a deprivation of property? 
In FNB, Ackermann J attached a wide meaning to deprivation by describing it as “any 
interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property”.45 The Court went 
further and found that “[d]ispossessing an owner of all rights, use and benefit to and of 
corporeal movable goods, is a prime example of deprivation in both its grammatical and 
contextual sense.”46 In this situation the Constitutional Court distinguished between 
deprivation and expropriation and held that all interferences with property qualify as 
deprivation, while only some deprivations amount to expropriation.47 Against this 
background expropriation is seen as a sub-species of deprivation. Consequently, should an 
                                                             
42 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 72-78. 
43 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 77. 
44 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 54. Yet, this fact 
may be taken into consideration during the stage where one has to decide whether the deprivation is arbitrary or 
possibly justifiable under section 36(1). I return to this issue in section 5.3.2.4 below. 
45 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
46 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 61. 
47 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. This 
interpretation of the difference between deprivation and expropriation does not contradict Harksen v Lane NO 
and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), although it is more nuanced: See Van der Walt AJ “Striving for the Better 
Interpretation – A Critical Reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen and FNB Decisions on the Property 
Clause” (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 854-878 867-869. 
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interference not pass the scrutiny of section 25(1) and such interference is not capable of 
being justified under section 36(1), then that is the end of the matter and the impugned law 
will be declared unconstitutional.48 The question of whether the interference could possibly 
be in line with section 25(2)-(3) then never arises. Thus, the starting point for any 
constitutional inquiry as to whether there was an infringement of section 25 rights must 
always start with section 25(1).49 This methodology makes it unnecessary to initially 
distinguish between deprivation and expropriation regarding a section 25 dispute. It only 
becomes necessary to consider whether prescription amounts to expropriation in terms of 
section 25(2)-(3) under two circumstances, namely if 
 
i) the deprivation is found to be in line with section 25(1); or 
ii) should it not be in line with section 25(1), if it is capable of being justified under 
section 36(1).50 
 
This initial wide meaning given to deprivation in FNB appears, however, to have been altered 
in subsequent decisions of the Constitutional Court.51 In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and 
Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as 
Amici Curiae) (“Mkontwana”),52 the Constitutional Court seemed at first to follow the 
approach in FNB of what constitutes a deprivation, as it confirmed that the taking away of 
property is not required for a valid deprivation.53 However, after this initial approach, Yacoob 
                                                             
48 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 58. 
49 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 60. 
50 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. The possibility 
that prescription can amount to expropriation is discussed in section 5.3.2.6 below. 
51 See Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v COEGA Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 
(1) SA 293 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) and Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action 
Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law 
Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
52 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
53 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 32; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 57. 
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J stated that whether or not there has been a deprivation “depends on the extent of the 
interference with or limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation” and that “at the very least, 
substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use 
or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society would amount to deprivation.”54 This 
description of deprivation is problematic, especially because the use of the words “normal 
restrictions” and “substantial interference” appear to limit the ambit of interferences that may 
constitute deprivation. For the sake of clarity this definition should preferably be regarded as 
a non-binding obiter dictum, as Yacoob J mentioned that the case before him did not require 
him to determine what precisely constitutes deprivation.55 Van der Walt argues that “it serves 
no useful purpose to restrict the concept of deprivation to substantive or abnormal ... 
regulatory deprivation”.56 I agree with Van der Walt that this qualification in Mkontwana 
should probably “just be ignored”57 and that it is preferable to opt for the wider definition in 
FNB.58  
 
However, the question as to what constitutes deprivation was further complicated by two later 
Constitutional Court judgments concerning section 25, namely Reflect-All 1025 CC and 
Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and 
Another (“Reflect-All”)59 and Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v COEGA Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others (“Offit”).60 In its analysis of the deprivation issue the 
Constitutional Court in Offit referred to the definitions in both FNB and Mkontwana and held 
that Mkontwana expanded on the FNB approach.61 The Constitutional Court in Offit thus 
unfortunately approved the interpretation adopted in Mkontwana. In Reflect-All, Nkabinde J 
                                                             
54 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 32. 
55 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 32, where Yacoob J stated that “[i]t is not necessary in this case to determine precisely 
what constitutes deprivation.” Despite this apparently stricter approach, Yacoob J proceeded to find that the 
limitation placed on the alienation of property in this case did indeed amount to deprivation: See para 33.  
56 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 127. 
57 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 127. 
58 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. See also Van 
der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 126-128. 
59 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
60 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC). 
61 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v COEGA Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (1) 
SA 293 (CC) paras 38-39. 
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also referred to FNB, after which she stated that that definition was expanded upon in 
Mkontwana.62 Fortunately, the Constitutional Court also emphasised – seemingly with 
approval – the minority judgment by O’Regan J in Mkontwana, where she stated that “[i]f 
one of the purposes of section 25(1) is to recognise both the material and non-material value 
of property to owners, it would defeat that purpose were ‘deprivation’ to be read narrowly.”63 
This position is in line with Van der Walt’s argument, namely that it would be unwise to 
unnecessarily restrict the meaning of deprivation for purposes of constitutional property 
law.64 
 
Prescription clearly does not result in the loss of only one or two instances of ownership, but 
affects ownership in its entirety. Should the wide approach towards deprivation – as 
formulated in FNB – be applied to prescription, it must clearly constitute deprivation. This 
finding remains the same even if one applies the narrower definition set out in Mkontwana. 
The reason for this conclusion is that an interference that causes the loss of full ownership 
must surely amount to a “substantial interference ... that goes beyond the normal restrictions 
on property use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society”.65 Chapter five bases 
this assumption on the fact that the Constitutional Court in both Mkontwana66 and Reflect-
All67 dealt with provisions that merely limited the owners’ entitlements and did not deprive 
them of their ownership. In Mkontwana, the relevant entitlement was the right to alienate the 
property while Reflect-All concerned the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property. Neither 
of these cases concerned the loss of ownership as was the case in FNB. In light of this 
approach prescription must amount to a deprivation in terms of the definition set out in 
                                                             
62 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
63 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 36, quoted from Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-
Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 89. 
64 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 127; Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” 
(2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2. 
65 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 32. 
66 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 33 
67 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 37-38.  
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Mkontwana. A finding to the contrary would “defeat the purpose”68 of section 25(1), since it 
“serves no useful purpose to restrict the concept of deprivation to substantive or abnormal ... 
regulatory deprivation”.69 
 
 
5.3.2.4  Is the deprivation in line with section 25(1)? 
5.3.2.4.1 The position in South African constitutional law 
As the previous section establishes that prescription constitutes deprivation, the next stage of 
the inquiry concerns the question whether it is in accordance with section 25(1). Section 
25(1) stipulates that a valid deprivation needs to comply with two requirements, namely that 
(i) it must take place in terms of law of general application and that (ii) such law may not 
permit arbitrary deprivation.  
 
The first requirement entails that the deprivation must be in terms of law of general 
application. Prescription in South African law is governed by the two prescription acts, more 
specifically section 2(1)-(2) of the 1948 Act and section 1 of the 1969 Act. These sections 
clearly amount to law of general application, especially since FNB provides authority that 
legislative provisions such as section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 
constitute law of general application.70 The prescription acts are also specific and accessible, 
as is required by the constitutional provision.71 As this satisfies the first requirement in 
section 25(1), it now has to be determined whether the deprivation is arbitrary.  
 
Ackermann J found in FNB that the word “arbitrary” in section 25(1) refers to a situation 
where the law of general application “does not provide sufficient reason for the particular 
                                                             
68 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 89. 
69 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 127. 
70 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 61. See further 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 143-144 and Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T 
& Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-21. 
71 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 93; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 143; 
Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 
original service Dec 2003) 46-21. 
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deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair.”72 In other words, a deprivation is arbitrary 
if there is not sufficient reason for it or if it is procedurally unfair.  
 
FNB did not elaborate as to the meaning of procedural fairness in the context of section 
25(1), but this aspect did enjoy attention in both Mkontwana and Reflect-All. In Mkontwana 
the applicants challenged the constitutional validity of section 118(1) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 for being in conflict with section 25(1). 
Section 118(1) limits an owner’s right of alienation by stipulating that the Registrar of Deeds 
may not register the transfer of property except on the production by the owner of a 
prescribed certificate issued by the municipality.73 This certificate certifies that all 
consumption charges in connection with the property – also those ran up by occupiers other 
than the owner – have been paid in full during the two years preceding the certificate’s date 
of issue.74 The applicants contended that section 118(1) was procedurally unfair as it did not 
impose an obligation upon municipalities to keep owners informed of the amounts owing by 
occupiers at reasonable intervals when requested by the owners in writing.75 Yacoob J stated 
in his judgment that procedural fairness in the context of section 25(1) is a flexible concept 
and that the question whether a deprivation is procedurally fair depends on all the 
circumstances.76 The Constitutional Court found that the municipality need not furnish 
owners with information on a continuous basis for the law to be procedurally fair, as this 
would be costly and impractical.77 Furthermore, it held that owners are in a position to take 
care of their property and to monitor the occupation and use of their property by themselves 
                                                             
72 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100; Reflect-All 
1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and 
Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 39.  
73 Section 118(1)(a) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
74 Section 118(1)(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
75 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 65. 
76 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 65. 
77 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 66. 
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as well as other occupiers.78 Consequently, section 118(1) was found not to be procedurally 
unfair because municipalities are under no obligation to keep owners informed as to amounts 
owing by them or occupiers of their property. 
 
In Reflect-All the applicants averred that section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport 
Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 arbitrarily deprived them of land contrary to section 25(1). These 
provisions pertain to the planning of provincial roads and were challenged for imposing 
restrictions on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property owned by the applicants.79 
Nkabinde J held that the answer to this question is determined by one of two aspects, namely 
whether there exists sufficient reason for the deprivation and whether it is procedurally fair.80 
As to the procedural fairness aspect, Reflect-All confirmed the approach adopted in 
Mkontwana that it is a flexible concept that depends on all the circumstances.81 Regarding the 
procedural fairness issue, the applicants based their case on two grounds. Firstly, they 
complained that the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 allowed the relevant 
authorities to proclaim route determinations without providing for any process by which the 
applicants’ interests as landowners could be considered. Secondly, they claimed that the 
relevant authorities should individually consider each preliminary design before deciding 
whether it should be published or not. By making this claim they argued that failure to 
reconsider the designs is procedurally unfair in that owners were not consulted regarding the 
designs. The Constitutional Court ruled against them and decided that it would be 
“unrealistic, impractical and not in the public interest” to adhere to the expectations of the 
applicants.82   
 
From the discussion of these two cases it follows that procedural fairness is always context- 
and fact-specific. It is a flexible notion and its content is determined by the circumstances of 
each case. In light of this it has to be decided whether the legal processes surrounding 
                                                             
78 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 66. 
79 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 3. 
80 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 39. 
81 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 40. 
82 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 46. 
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prescription are procedurally fair. This depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, 
but it is clear that the majority of prescription cases involve a situation where a possessor 
possessed the land of another for 30 years without the knowledge of the owner.83 The 
possessor obtains ownership over the land ipso iure the moment all the requirements for 
prescription are satisfied, while the owner loses her ownership over the land.84 However, 
nothing prevents the owner from instituting court proceedings to contest the claim by the 
possessor that she acquired ownership over the land. The owner is also granted a time frame 
of 30 years to approach a court for an order to protect her ownership and evict the possessor 
from her land. Apart from this, the owner need merely grant express or tacit permission to the 
possessor to stop the running of prescription.85 Furthermore, a person must possess the land 
animo domini for the whole duration of the prescription period, which is more difficult to 
satisfy than the animus possidendi requirement in adverse possession law.86 In other words, 
the law grants an opportunity to the owner to contest the claim by the possessor in court, 
namely to prove that such possessor did not satisfy all the requirements for prescription. In 
this sense it seems that the process by which prescription functions is procedurally fair.87 
Apart from this the owner can still challenge the relevant provisions of the prescription acts 
that allow prescription as being in conflict with section 25. Furthermore, an owner can also 
lodge a case in terms of section 33, which concerns administrative justice. In terms of the 
latter, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) has been promulgated 
to give effect to the constitutional mandate contained in section 33. However, an attempt to 
have prescription reviewed in terms of section 6 of PAJA will be to no avail, since 
prescription does not constitute administrative action. This is because prescription occurs ipso 
iure; no discretion is exercised and hence no decision is taken.88 Thus, the only route open to 
                                                             
83 For purposes of this discussion it is assumed that the possessor satisfied all the requirements for prescription 
as set out by the two prescription acts. The requirements for prescription are discussed in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of 
chapter two above. 
84 According to section 2(1)-(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 
1969. 
85 See section 2.3.2.4 of chapter two above for a more detailed discussion in this regard. 
86 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two (for South African law) and compare it to section 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter 
three (for English law) above. 
87 This conclusion is analogous to the Grand Chamber’s decision in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom 
(2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 80, where adverse possession was also found to be procedurally fair. This 
finding was confirmed by the first minority in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) 
paras O-I22 – O-I23. However, the Fourth Chamber in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 
3 (IV) paras 73-76 found that adverse possession does not provide adequate procedural protection. These 
decisions are discussed in greater detail in section 5.3.2.4.2 below. 
88 Section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 defines administrative action as “any 
decision taken, or any failure to take a decision”. 
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a person wishing to challenge the constitutional validity of prescription is through attacking 
the relevant provisions of the prescription acts via section 25.  
 
The second leg of the test for arbitrariness involves the question of whether the deprivation is 
substantively arbitrary. In this regard the Constitutional Court has indicated that the 
substantive arbitrariness test is contextual in nature and depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.89 Accordingly, the test is context-specific. The term “arbitrary” 
in section 25(1) is not limited to a mere rationality inquiry, but neither does it encompass a 
fully fledged proportionality analysis as found in section 36(1).90 This is because the words 
“reasonable and justifiable”, which denote a proportionality-based inquiry, are only found in 
section 36(1) and do not appear in section 25(1). The severity or scope of the deprivation 
determines whether the test for substantive arbitrariness will encompass a rationality- or 
proportionality-like inquiry, these two concepts being located on two ends of a continuum.91 
If a deprivation is found not to be substantively arbitrary, then it is constitutional and the 
issue of whether it is justifiable under section 36(1) does not arise.92  
 
According to FNB, a deprivation is substantively arbitrary if it “does not provide sufficient 
reason for the particular deprivation in question”.93 Central to this inquiry is the relationship 
between the deprivation in question, the purpose it seeks to achieve and the impact the 
deprivation has on the use and enjoyment of property.94 It follows that there must be a 
sufficient nexus between the reason(s) for the deprivation and the deprivation itself for it to 
be non-arbitrary. Regarding the application of the arbitrariness test, FNB also found that the 
validity of a deprivation depends on “an appropriate relationship between means and ends, 
                                                             
89 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 63; Reflect-All 
1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and 
Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 49. 
90 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 65. 
91 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 66, 100; Reflect-
All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and 
Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 49. 
92 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 70. 
93 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
94 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100; Reflect-All 
1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and 
Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 49.  
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between the sacrifice the individual is asked to make and the public purpose this is intended 
to serve.”95 In paragraph 100 of his judgment, Ackermann J provides a list of factors that 
should be considered when establishing whether sufficient reason is present. I now apply 
these factors in the context of prescription. 
 
According to the first factor, one has to evaluate the relationship between the means 
employed and the ends or purpose sought to be achieved by prescription. Prescription entails 
the acquisition of ownership on the side of the possessor – together with the loss of 
ownership on the side of the owner – if such possessor has continuously been in possession of 
the owner’s property for 30 years.96 In this sense it has long been accepted in South African 
law that prescription promotes legal certainty, since it affords de iure status to long-existing 
de facto situations.97 However, are the means employed in this context, namely the loss of 
ownership, proportionate to the ends sought to be achieved, namely the promotion of legal 
certainty? Chapter four indicates that prescription fulfils an important corrective function by 
lowering transaction costs in systems with a negative registration system, where the law does 
not guarantee the correctness of the register.98 Indeed, the Constitutional Court has indicated 
that economic considerations do play a role in the adjudication of constitutional property 
cases,99 which supports this justification for prescription in terms of utilitarianism and law 
and economics theory.100 Though the means employed may seem harsh when compared to 
the ends sought, one must remember that the grounds for succeeding with a claim based on 
prescription in South African law are narrow and difficult to satisfy, especially in terms of the 
animus domini requirement.101 This, coupled with the fact that an owner is granted up to 30 
                                                             
95 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 98. 
96 According to section 2(1)-(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 
1969. For purposes of this discussion it is assumed that the possessor also satisfied the other requirements set 
out by the prescription acts for prescription. These requirements are discussed more fully in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 
of chapter two above. 
97 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137-138. This issue is discussed in more detail in section 4.2.3 of 
chapter four above. 
98 This theme is discussed in greater detail in section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
99 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 45, where 
Ackermann J found that if the property interests of juristic persons did not enjoy protection under section 25, 
that it would have “a disastrous impact on the business world”. This approach clearly has undertones of 
utilitarianism and law and economics theory. 
100 The justifications for prescription in terms of utilitarianism and law and economics theory are discussed in 
greater detail in section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
101 This is largely due to the requirement that possession must be possessio civilis: See section 2.3.2.1 of chapter 
two and compare it to the English law position in section 3.2.2.3.2 of chapter three above. 
271 
years to protect her property and to evict the possessor or grant permission,102 seems to create 
a balance between the loss of ownership and the promotion of legal certainty. This position is 
strengthened if one takes into consideration that owners need not develop or even occupy 
their land to prevent the running of prescription; they merely have to periodically assert their 
right to exclude others to prevent loss of ownership through prescription.103 
 
The second factor requires a consideration of the complexity of relationships.104 In FNB the 
relationships between the parties were quite complex. According to section 114 of the 
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, the South African Revenue Services could detain and 
sell the appellant’s motor vehicles that were located on the premises of a tax debtor to satisfy 
the debt of that tax debtor. As there was no relationship between the appellant and the tax 
debtor regarding the debt the latter owed to the South African Revenue Services, Ackermann 
J found section 114 to be substantively arbitrary, as it did not provide sufficient reason for the 
loss of the appellant’s ownership to satisfy the debt owed by the tax debtor.105 In this context 
the Court found that section 114 “cast the net far too wide.”106 The relationships that exist in 
cases involving prescription are not nearly as complex as those in FNB, since prescription 
involves a possessor in possession of the land of another. Even though the owner may not be 
aware of the presence of the possessor, there is a direct link between the owner, the possessor 
and the land lost and acquired, since the possessor is in possession of the owner’s property. In 
this sense the link is the fact that the property lost is the property acquired, since the person 
who acts “as if owner” (the possessor) replaces the one not acting “as if owner” (the 
owner).107 Consequently, the owner loses the property through prescription because of her 
inaction. Yet, it is true that owners – in most prescription cases – are not even aware of the 
                                                             
102 This will immediately cause prescription to stop running in favour of the possessor: See sections 2.3.2.4 and 
2.3.3 of chapter two above. 
103 This is in line with the duty of stewardship (as described by Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? 
The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 
253-256), as well as the social-obligation theory of Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-820. The similarities between the duty of stewardship and 
the social-obligation norm are addressed in section 4.4.3 of chapter four above. See further Fennell LA 
“Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1037-1096 1077; Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 
Northwestern University Law Review 1122-1154 1130-1131; Rose CM “Possession as the Origin of Property” 
(1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 73-88 79. See also section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
104 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
105 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 108. 
106 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 108. 
107 For a discussion of the “as if owner” requirement, see section 2.3.2.4 of chapter two above. 
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presence of the possessor. This factor may be taken into consideration when the Court 
performs the balancing of interests to determine whether the deprivation is justified or not. 
Accordingly, one can conclude that there is a sufficient link between the owner and the 
possessor in prescription cases. 
 
The third factor requires the Court to focus on the relationship between the purpose for the 
deprivation and the owner whose property is affected.108 This means that a court must 
evaluate the relationship between the reasons for prescription and the owner who loses 
ownership. Chapter four shows that the purpose of prescription is to promote legal certainty 
by affording de iure status to long-existing de facto situations.109 This purpose mainly finds 
support in utilitarianism and law and economics theory, which indicates that prescription 
lowers transaction costs and maximises utility in countries with a negative registration 
system.110 The negative value of the possibility that an owner may lose her property 
inadvertently through prescription is balanced out by the long prescription period, which is 30 
years in South African law.111 According to utilitarianism and law and economics theory, the 
longer the prescription period, the more secure the ownership of the owner, since the owner 
then has more time to discover the presence of a possessor in whose favour prescription may 
be running.112 Michelman’s concept of demoralisation costs strengthens this conclusion,113 
since a possessor is likely to suffer increased demoralisation if she is evicted after being in 
possession of the property for a long time.114 On the flipside, an owner is likely to suffer 
decreased demoralisation the longer she is out of possession, which justifies a shifting of 
ownership to the possessor after a sufficient period of time has elapsed.115 Nonetheless, the 
price paid for achieving lower transaction costs and legal certainty is indeed substantial, since 
                                                             
108 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
109 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 137-138. For a more detailed discussion in this regard, see section 
4.2.3 of chapter four above. 
110 See section 4.4.4 of chapter four above for a more detailed discussion. 
111 See section 4.4.4 of chapter four above for a more detailed discussion. 
112 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 80; Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” 
(1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 667; Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two 
Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 
727-728. See further section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
113 Michelman FI “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just 
Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 1165-1258 1214. This connection was made by Ellickson 
RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 
64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-737 727-728. 
114 This concept is discussed in terms of Radin’s personality theory together with utilitarianism and law and 
economics theory: See sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 respectively of chapter four above. 
115 This is drawn from the conclusions in section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
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the owner loses full ownership in the property possessed by the possessor. Yet, if a possessor 
possessed land belonging to another for a period of 30 years, it creates the impression that the 
possessor and not the owner is the true owner of that property. After such a long time of 
undisturbed possession, third parties – together with the possessor – are induced to believe 
that the possessor is the actual owner and, accordingly, the law should protect the “reliance 
interest” of these parties.116 One achieves this object if prescription awards ownership to the 
possessor after she satisfies the requisite period of possession.117 In this sense prescription is 
analogous to estoppel, which prevents an owner from vindicating her property in the hands of 
another when such owner induces parties to believe, to their detriment, that such other person 
is in fact the true owner.118 The fact that the possessor possessed the property animo domini 
for 30 years without any interference from the owner, coupled with the negative registration 
system in South African law, provides a strong nexus between the purpose of prescription and 
the owner who loses her property.  
 
Concerning the question whether the deprivation is substantively arbitrary, the Court must 
look at all the factors/interests to arrive at a conclusion that is both just and equitable under 
the circumstances. Factors that can be taken into account are the long period required before a 
possessor can acquire ownership through prescription, the fact that the possessor actively 
uses the property and the possibility that the owner has forgotten about or neglected the 
property over a long time.119 Although this point is contested, this chapter establishes that 
prescription encourages productive land use, ensures the marketability of land and lowers 
transaction costs.120 This provides adequate justification for the effect that prescription has on 
the deprived owner. 
  
The fourth factor stipulates that regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of 
prescription and the nature of the property, together with the extent of the deprivation in 
                                                             
116 Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751. See further sections 
4.4.3-4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
117 See section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
118 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 255. 
The requirements for estoppel are not discussed here; see Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 255-260 for a more complete discussion in this regard. 
119 These factors are discussed in more detail in section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
120 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1129-1131; Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of 
Property” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 667-722 678. See further section 4.4.4 of chapter 
four above. 
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respect of such property.121 As this dissertation only focuses on prescription in the context of 
land, the purpose of this legal institution is to promote legal certainty and reduce transaction 
costs regarding the ownership of land as a limited resource, which is vital for purposes of 
agriculture and housing.122 This rationale must be balanced against the effect of prescription, 
which results in the extinguishment of ownership in land.  
 
The fifth factor states that where the property in question is ownership of land, a more 
compelling purpose has to be established to constitute sufficient reason than would be 
necessary if the deprivation is less intrusive.123 Since prescription extinguishes ownership in 
land, it is clear that one has to advance more compelling reasons to establish sufficient reason 
for the deprivation caused by this rule. Given that the affected entitlement was also 
ownership in FNB, a similar approach to that decision is to be expected. The arguments that 
this chapter advances under the first three factors also pertain to this factor. 
 
According to the sixth factor, more compelling reasons have to be advanced for a deprivation 
that embraces all the incidents of ownership than for a deprivation which only affects some 
incidents of ownership.124 Prescription results in the loss of all the incidents of ownership on 
the side of the owner. This confirms the conclusions under the previous factors that more 
compelling reasons must be advanced to justify this legal institution in South African law. 
These reasons are discussed under the first three factors and are, therefore, not repeated here. 
 
The seventh factor determines that whether “sufficient reason” is established by either a 
rationality- or proportionality-like inquiry depends on the interplay between variable means 
and ends, such as the nature of the property in question and the extent of the deprivation.125 
Prescription extinguishes ownership in land, which is a very drastic consequence. It follows 
that sufficient reason in this context has to be established through a proportionality-like 
inquiry between the means employed (loss of ownership) and ends or purposes achieved by 
prescription. The Court in FNB reached the same conclusion, where the deprivation resulted 
                                                             
121 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
122 See section 4.2.3 of chapter four above. 
123 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
124 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
125 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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in the loss of corporeal movables. Accordingly, a proportionality-like inquiry is required to 
justify prescription under section 25(1). 
 
Finally, the eighth factor contextualises the substantive arbitrariness test, for it states that 
sufficient reason has to be decided on all the relevant facts of a particular case.126 As a result, 
regard must be had to all the relevant facts, circumstances and factors of a prescription case if 
the Court is to decide whether sufficient reason exists for depriving the owner of ownership 
to achieve the objectives of prescription, as discussed above. 
 
There is another factor a court can take into consideration to determine whether the 
deprivation was substantively arbitrary or not, although the Constitutional Court did not 
directly refer to it in FNB. This entails the importance of policy values such as personal 
autonomy of an owner and sanctity of the home in constitutional property law.127 In this 
context, a deprivation is justified more easily if the affected property interest is located 
further from the personal sphere of the owner and less easily when it is located closer to it.128 
German constitutional law follows this approach, where the state’s power to regulate the 
limits of property rights depends on how far a property right is located from the personal 
autonomy of an owner.129 Accordingly, property rights concerning a person’s home in 
German law are protected more strongly against deprivation than property rights pertaining to 
investment or commercial property.130 Furthermore, since land – a finite resource of social 
importance – is subject to stricter social control and regulation,131 one can argue that 
prescription is justified in that it constitutes “stricter social control” over unused or neglected 
land. This approach is similar to Radin’s personality theory, a link already identified in 
                                                             
126 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
127 This observation is made by Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 153 footnote 115.  
128 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 153 footnote 115. According to the author, a similar 
approach is followed in German constitutional law: See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 135-141. This approach is analogous to Radin’s personality theory, which is 
addressed in section 4.4.3 of chapter four above. 
129 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 135; Van der Walt AJ 
“Unity and Pluralism in Property Theory – A Review of Property Theories and Debates in Recent Literature: 
Part I” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 15-42 27-28; Van der Walt AJ “Subject and Society in 
Property Theory – A Review of Property Theories and Debates in Recent Literature: Part II” 1995 Tydskrif vir 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 322-345 327-328. 
130 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 135-136. 
131 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 136. This is analogous to 
what the Court said in FNB, where Ackermann J states that “property should serve the public good”: See First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 52. 
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chapter four,132 where she differentiates between personal property and fungible property, 
claiming that the former should enjoy stronger protection than the latter.133 It seems that the 
Constitutional Court approves of this line of thinking, since it acknowledged in FNB that this 
factor (whether an owner makes limited or no use of property) can play an important role to 
determine whether the deprivation is substantively arbitrary.134 This dictum by Ackermann J 
opens the door to the possibility of including the factor whether an owner regards property as 
personal or fungible property – as identified by Van der Walt – in the substantive 
arbitrariness test. Such a conclusion is not in conflict with the position that an owner’s use (or 
non-use) of an object is irrelevant for classifying ownership in that object as constitutional 
property.135 This approach by FNB illustrates that the Constitutional Court thinks along lines 
that are similar to those of Radin’s theory, since the personality theory also entails that even a 
fungible interest in property is recognised as property.136  
 
Alexander’s social-obligation norm, which is analogous to Radin’s personality theory, also 
provides a powerful moral justification for prescription under this extra factor for establishing 
whether prescription amounts to an arbitrary deprivation. I only present a brief discussion of 
this theory here, as it was already addressed in the previous chapter.137 According to 
Alexander, humans must develop their capabilities to achieve human flourishing.138 Since 
people unavoidably depend on others to attain these capabilities,139 the social-obligation norm 
entails that owners have an inherent obligation to help others in their community to foster 
their capabilities to lead a well-lived life.140 Chapter four argues that prescription recognises 
this social-obligation norm by forcing owners to “give” property, which is not constitutive of 
their capabilities due to their neglect of it, to squatters who regard it as essential to attain 
human flourishing and who occupy the land in a way that satisfies the strict requirements for 
                                                             
132 See section 4.4.3 of chapter four above. 
133 Radin MJ “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015 960, 986. See further 
section 4.4.3 of chapter four above. 
134 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 54. 
135 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 54. 
136 See section 4.4.3 of chapter four above. 
137 See section 4.4.3 of chapter four above for a more comprehensive discussion in this regard. 
138 Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745-820 761. 
139 Resources, such as land, are essential to developing one’s capabilities: See Alexander GS “The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-820 768. 
140 Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745-820 774. See further Alexander GS & Peñalver EM “Properties of Community” (2008) 10 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 127-160 140-141. 
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prescription. Although it is still has to be seen whether the social-obligation norm underlies 
South African constitutional property law, such a possibility finds support in the fact that the 
Constitution aims to promote “an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom” for all South Africans.141   
 
If a court takes this extra factor into account, it appears that the possessor – who actively uses 
the property – regards it as personal property and that the owner, by “allowing” the possessor 
to use it, views it as mere commercial or fungible property. This entitles the possessor to 
receive stronger protection of her interest in the property, which protection is granted through 
prescription.  
 
 
5.3.2.4.2 The position in foreign constitutional law 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which is foreign law, can be 
helpful in determining whether a deprivation is substantively arbitrary.142 However, 
Ackermann J warned that caution should be had for the way the Court interprets and applies 
the “margin of appreciation” requirement of Article 1 of the First Protocol (“Article 1”) to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
(“the Convention”).143 According to him, the “margin of appreciation” must not be regarded 
as being synonymous with “deference” in South African law.144 This means that the outcome 
in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (“Pye”),145 as decided by the Grand Chamber, can 
be informative but not conclusive to determine whether the loss of ownership through 
prescription in South African law is in line with section 25(1). Nonetheless, the minority 
judgment by O’Regan J in Reflect-All puts an interesting slant on the warning by Ackermann 
J. O’Regan J is of the opinion that a proportionality-like inquiry as to whether a deprivation is 
arbitrary is comparable to the approach the European Court of Human Rights adopted to 
                                                             
141 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. I make this point by relying on Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation 
Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-820 767 footnote 86.  
142 According to section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution, a court may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights. 
143 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 107. 
144 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 107. 
145 (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). The implications of this case are discussed in the next few paragraphs. 
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adjudicate Article 1 cases.146 In this context she specifically equates it to the “fair balance” 
that needs to be struck between the demands of the general interests of the community and 
the protection of a person’s fundamental rights.147 Yet, despite the apparent rigidness of the 
“fair balance” test, the European Court of Human Rights actually defers to the authority of a 
member state by allowing a margin of appreciation.148 This makes it clear that the so-called 
proportionality inquiry envisaged by Article 1 is in reality closer to a rationality inquiry. 
Accordingly, one should be careful of O’Regan’s J approach, which equates the “fair 
balance” test of Article 1 with a proportionality-like inquiry in South African law. 
Nonetheless, section 39(1)(c) of the South African Constitution provides that courts may 
consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, which opens the door to an 
investigation in the manner in which the European Court of Human Rights adjudicates cases 
concerning the infringement of property rights.  
 
Article 1 of the Convention provides as follows: 
 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
 
According to Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden,149Article 1 consists of three distinct rules.150 
The first rule – in the first sentence – guarantees the peaceful enjoyment of property.151  The 
second sentence contains the second rule, which subjects the deprivation – or expropriation in 
the South African context – of possessions to certain conditions.152 The third rule, in the 
                                                             
146 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 99-100. 
147 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 100, referring to Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 
5 EHRR 35 para 69. 
148 This is clear from JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 45 and James v 
United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 51. 
149 (1983) 5 EHRR 35. 
150 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 61. I do not discuss these three rules extensively 
here. See Allen T Property Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 101-122 for a more complete 
discussion in this regard. 
151 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 61; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 
46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 52; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36 para 62; James v United 
Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 37. 
152 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 61; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 
46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 52; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36 para 62; James v United 
Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 37.  
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second paragraph, allows member states to regulate the use of property in terms of 
legislation, which legislation must be in accordance with the general interest.153 This analysis 
of the structure of Article 1 was refined in James v United Kingdom,154 where the Grand 
Chamber held that “[t]he second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of 
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be 
construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.”155 To avoid 
confusion, I use the South African law equivalents when referring to the types of interference 
mentioned in the second and third rules of Article 1.156  
 
An interference with property must strike a “fair balance”157 between “the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's 
fundamental rights”158 for it to be in line with the first rule. Accordingly, an expropriation of 
property under the second rule that does not provide for compensation that is “reasonably 
related” to the value of the expropriated property will normally be in conflict with Article 
1.159 However, full or reasonable compensation is neither expressly nor tacitly guaranteed 
under the second rule, which means that an expropriation without compensation can – in 
certain circumstances – be compatible with Article 1.160 For deprivations under the third rule 
to be in line with Article 1, there must exist a “reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.”161 Member states enjoy a 
                                                             
153 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 61; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 
46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 52; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36 para 62; James v United 
Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 37.  
154 (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
155 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 37. 
156 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 110-111; Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 122. Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 122 points 
out the possibility of confusion when using Article 1 for comparative purposes. According to him, the term 
“deprive” in the second rule does not refer to state regulation in terms of the police power but rather to 
expropriation. Accordingly, cases of the European Court of Human Rights that pertain to deprivation in terms of 
the second rule must not be confused with deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the South African 
Constitution. Therefore, I use the term “expropriation” when referring to the second rule while I use 
“deprivation” in the context of the third rule.   
157 This notion is discussed comprehensively by Allen T Property Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 
123-166 
158 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 69; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 
46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 53; Beyeler v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 52 para 107.   
159 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 54; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United 
Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 47. See further Allen T Property Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 
(2005) 112. 
160 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 47. See also Allen T Property Rights 
and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 118. 
161 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 55. 
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wide “margin of appreciation” concerning the means employed and purpose of a deprivation 
to determine this “reasonable relationship”.162  
 
When Pye first brought its case to the European Court of Human Rights, the Fourth Chamber 
found that adverse possession amounts to expropriation under the second rule instead of 
deprivation of property under the third rule.163 The Fourth Chamber explicitly rejected the 
traditional justifications for adverse possession, since it required “factors over and above 
those which explain the law on limitation.”164 In this sense the Fourth Chamber decided that 
the legal certainty argument that adverse possession affords de iure status to de facto 
situations carries less weight in a system were land is registered.165 The Fourth Chamber 
found adverse possession to be in conflict with Article 1, since it did not provide for 
compensation to the owner and that there was no adequate procedural protection for such 
owner either.166 For these reasons the majority167 held that adverse possession imposed an 
individual and excessive burden on the applicants (Pye) that upset the fair balance between 
the demands of the public interest and their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, 
which violated Article 1.168 
 
After this decision the United Kingdom government appealed to the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The Grand Chamber held that adverse possession in the 
context of registered land amounts to a deprivation under the third rule rather than 
expropriation under the second rule.169 The Grand Chamber advanced the following reasons 
for this finding: 
                                                             
162 Allgemeine Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt v United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 1 para 52; JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 55. 
163 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 62. The minority agrees with this 
finding in paras O-I1 and O-I4. 
164 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) paras 63-64.  
165 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 65.  
166 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) paras 73-76. The minority in paras O-I1 and 
O-I4 disagrees with the finding that the absence of compensation causes adverse possession to be in conflict 
with Article 1. 
167 The Fourth Chamber was split by four votes to three, the majority consisting of judges Pellonpää, Bratza, 
Stráznická and Pavlovschi, while judges Maruste, Garlicki and Borrego Borrego delivered the minority 
judgment. 
168 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 75. The minority disagrees with the 
majority on this point in paras O-I1 – O-I4 and finds that adverse possession is compatible with Article 1. 
169 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) paras 65-66. The first minority in para O-
I7 agrees with the majority on this point. The opposite conclusion was reached by the majority of the Fourth 
Chamber in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) paras 58-62. The second minority 
in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) paras O-II1, O-II9 also finds that adverse 
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“The applicant companies did not lose their land because of a legislative provision which 
permitted the State to transfer ownership in particular circumstances (as in the cases of AGOSI, 
Air Canada, Gasus), or because of a social policy of transfer of ownership (as in the case of 
James), but rather as the result of the operation of the generally applicable rules on limitation 
periods for actions for recovery of land.”170  
 
The Grand Chamber reinforced this position by arguing that the statutory provisions that 
resulted in the loss of ownership through adverse possession “were ... not intended to 
[expropriate] paper owners of their ownership, but rather to regulate questions of title”.171 
Furthermore, it held that adverse possession was part of the general land law and intended to 
regulate “limitation periods in the context of the use and ownership of land as between 
individuals.”172 Although the distinction between the three rules is by no means self-evident 
in the jurisprudence surrounding Article 1,173 I argue below that prescription does not amount 
to expropriation.174 According to Allen, it makes little difference whether an interference is 
incorrectly classified under a certain rule, as the application of the “fair balance” principle – 
which applies to all three rules – should produce the same result on a specific set of facts.175 
 
When the Grand Chamber decided whether adverse possession pursued a legitimate aim in 
the public interest, it had regard to justifications provided for limitation periods in personal 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
possession amounts to expropriation. For a discussion of the Pye decisions, see Waring EJL Aspects of 
Property: The Impact of Private Takings (2009) 164-168.  
170 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 65. 
171 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 66. 
172 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 66. 
173 I extrapolate this from the conflicting findings by the Grand and Fourth Chambers pointed out above, 
together with Allen T Property Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 103-106 and Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 96-120. According to Allen at 103 and 121-
122, the absence of a compensation guarantee under the second rule mostly avoids the issue of having to 
distinguish between the first, second and third rules. This position is reinforced by Johnston D “JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd v United Kingdom: Deprivation of Property Rights and Prescription” (2006) 10 Edinburgh Law Review 277-
282 279-280. I am indebted to Prof Reid for bringing this article under my attention. 
174 See section 5.3.2.6 below, though my opinion was formed from a South African law perspective. Waring 
EJL Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings (2009) 169-170 and Gretton GL “Private Law and 
Human Rights” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 109-114 110-112 criticise the Grand Chamber for 
categorising adverse possession under the third rule. I am indebted to Prof Reid for bringing Gretton’s article 
under my attention. 
175 Allen T Property Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 103-104, 118, 121-122. According to Allen, 
the classification of an interference under one of the rules is relevant but not conclusive to the outcome of a case 
because compensation is not guaranteed under the second rule. Of the same mind are Gretton GL “Private Law 
and Human Rights” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 109-114 112 and Johnston D “JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
United Kingdom: Deprivation of Property Rights and Prescription” (2006) 10 Edinburgh Law Review 277-
282 279-280. The irrelevance of the classification between expropriation and deprivation under Article 1 is 
analogous to the “telescoping” effect of the arbitrariness test in the context of section 25, as pointed out by Roux 
T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original 
service Dec 2003) 46-2 – 46-3, 46-19 – 46-20, 46-32. However, Allen does provide a caveat at 112 where he 
states that the differentiation between expropriation and deprivation “is one area where the tactical possibilities 
should not be ignored.”  
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injury cases in Stubbings and Others v United Kingdom.176 According to that case, limitation 
periods promote legal certainty, protect defendants from stale claims and prevent injustice.177 
The latter objective is achieved by preventing the adjudication of cases based on evidence 
that may have become lost over time. The Grand Chamber found that these justifications also 
hold water in the context of limitation periods for recovery of land.178 It further confirmed 
that states enjoy a wide “margin of appreciation” when determining what is in the public 
interest.179 Consequently, it held that adverse possession is not “manifestly without 
reasonable foundation”, as there existed a general interest in both the limitation period itself 
and the extinguishment of ownership after the expiration of the limitation period.180 
 
The Grand Chamber regarded the “relatively long” 12-year limitation period – together with 
the fact that “very little action” on the side of an owner is able to stop time running – as 
central arguments to justify adverse possession.181 As to procedural protection or fairness, the 
Grand Chamber found that not only was the option open to an owner to apply for 
repossession of the land during the limitation period, but that the owner could also contest a 
claim made by an adverse possession in the domestic courts.182 It follows that the Grand 
Chamber found that adverse possession did not upset the fair balance required by Article 1.183 
The reasons advanced for justifying adverse possession in Pye are analogous with the 
application of the substantive arbitrariness test discussed above. It follows that I arrive at the 
                                                             
176 (1997) 23 EHRR 213 para 49. JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) referred to 
this case in para 68. The majority in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) expressly 
rejected these reasons for justifying adverse possession in paras 63-64. 
177 Stubbings and Others v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 213 para 49. 
178 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 69. Johnston D “JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
v United Kingdom: Deprivation of Property Rights and Prescription” (2006) 10 Edinburgh Law Review 277-
282 280-281 criticises JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) for not taking these 
factors into consideration when it found adverse possession to be in conflict with Article 1. The second minority 
in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) paras O-II4, O-II7 finds that these 
justifications do not hold water if one is able to determine who the owner is by investigating the register. 
179 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 71, citing Jahn v Germany (2006) 42 
EHRR 49 para 91. 
180 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 74. The first minority in para O-I9 
agrees with the majority on this point. 
181 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 78. 
182 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 80. The first minority in paras O-I22 
– O-I23 agrees with the majority that adverse possession does afford sufficient procedural protection for the 
owner. To the contrary is the majority in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) paras 
73-76, where it was held that adverse possession does not provide adequate procedural protection for an owner. 
183 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 85. The first minority disagreed with 
the majority on this point in para O-I1 and holds that adverse possession does violate Article 1. According to the 
first minority in paras O-I23 – O-I28, adverse possession does not strike a fair balance between the rights of the 
owners and the general interest served. The second minority also disagreed with the majority and found in paras 
O-II1, O-II10 and O-II13 that adverse possession does violate Article 1, since it amounts to an uncompensated 
expropriation. 
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same conclusion as the majority184 in the Grand Chamber judgment, namely that the 
deprivation affected by prescription in South African law is neither arbitrary nor “manifestly 
without reasonable foundation”. The fact that the Grand Chamber held adverse possession 
(which merely requires a person to possess land animo possidendi) complies with Article 1 of 
the First Protocol strengthens the possibility that the South African Constitutional Court will 
find that prescription is in line with the property clause. 
 
 
5.3.2.5  Can the deprivation be justified in terms of section 36(1)? 
Should a deprivation not satisfy the requirements of section 25(1), either because it is not 
authorised by law of general application or because it is arbitrary, such deprivation could 
theoretically be justified in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.185 Section 36(1) 
provides that rights in the Bill of Rights may only be limited if such limitation is “reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society”.  
 
Roux, supported by Van der Walt, indicates that – if one strictly follows the methodology set 
out in FNB – section 36(1) is unlikely to play any meaningful role in a constitutional property 
challenge.186 This is because the proportionality test in section 36(1) “is probably similar in 
spirit but stronger in force than the (variable) non-arbitrariness test laid down in the FNB 
decision.”187 Roux bases his observation on two reasons. Firstly, if the deprivation is not 
authorised by law of general application, it is impossible to survive section 36(1) scrutiny, as 
section 36(1) also requires the infringement to take place in terms of law of general 
application.188 Secondly, if the deprivation is found to be substantively or procedurally 
                                                             
184 The Grand Chamber split with 10 votes to seven, the majority consisting of judges Costa, Zupancic, 
Lorenzen, Cabral Barreto, Butkevych, Baka, Zagrebelsky, Mularoni, Jaeger and Ziemele, while judges Rozakis, 
Bratza, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Gyulumyan and Šikuta constituted the first minority. The second minority was 
delivered by judges Loucaides and Kovler. 
185 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 
2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-26 – 46-28. The Court acknowledged this possibility in Nhlabathi and 
Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) para 34. However, Van der Walt says that although section 25 is not 
explicitly excluded from limitation under section 36(1), it would be highly unlikely to justify an interference that 
is in conflict with section 25 under section 36(1): See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 56-
57. To the same effect is Ackermann J in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 
(4) SA 768 (CC) para 110.  
186 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 
2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-26 – 46-28; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 53-57. 
187 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 53. 
188 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 
2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-26; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 55. 
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arbitrary, it is highly unlikely to be “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society”, as required by section 36(1).189 Even if the deprivation is found to be arbitrary due 
to the fact that it extinguishes all instances of ownership without sufficient reason (which 
entails an inquiry on the proportionality side of the spectrum), a section 36(1) analysis will at 
best merely confirm the conclusion already reached under the arbitrariness test inquiry.190 In 
light of the above-mentioned position, it seems that section 36(1) will play an extremely 
limited, if any, role in cases where a deprivation is found to contravene the requirements of 
section 25(1). It is worth emphasising that the limitation issue under section 36(1) does not 
arise if a deprivation is found to comply with section 25.191 Due to the standard of the 
arbitrariness inquiry – which is a contextual test that varies between “thin” rationality and 
“thick” proportionality analysis – the matter of the limitation clause seems to have “receded 
into the background.”192 
 
Should prescription be found to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of 
section 25(1) and should the predictions by Roux and Van der Walt prove to be correct, it is 
highly improbable that such a deprivation will be justifiable in terms of section 36(1). Should 
this be the case, prescription will be unconstitutional and the matter will end there. However, 
in the unlikely event that the arbitrary deprivation in this context is found to be justifiable in 
terms of section 36(1),193 the next stage in the FNB methodology necessitates an inquiry as to 
whether prescription amounts to an expropriation in terms of section 25(2). One must also 
follow this route even if prescription constitutes – as I argue – a non-arbitrary deprivation.  
 
 
5.3.2.6  Has there been an expropriation in terms of section 25(2)? 
                                                             
189 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 
2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-26; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 55. 
190 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 
2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-27; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 55-57. For an 
example to the contrary, see Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) paras 34-35. In this case 
the Land Claims Court held that the appropriation of a grave by an occupier on someone else’s land in terms of 
section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (“ESTA”) would be justifiable in terms 
of section 36(1), even if it was regarded as an expropriation of land and even though ESTA does not provide for 
compensation as required by section 25(2) of the Constitution. However, the Court in this instance did not 
decide whether there was an expropriation. 
191 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 70. 
192 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 
2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-3. 
193 As was the case in Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
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The next stage in the FNB methodology, as applied here, involves ascertaining whether 
prescription amounts to expropriation in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution. In this 
regard Ackermann J stated that deprivation encompasses all forms of interference with 
property while expropriation applies only to a narrower species of such interference.194 
Consequently, if prescription does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation, it has to satisfy the 
requirements in section 25(2) if it amounts to expropriation.  
 
In light of certain findings by our courts, it is necessary to provide clarity regarding the nature 
of expropriation before I can focus on the requirements for this kind of interference. In the 
first constitutional case regarding expropriation Goldstone J stated that expropriation 
“involves acquisition of rights in property by a public authority”.195 The recent Constitutional 
Court judgment of Reflect-All196 followed this approach. In that decision Nkabinde J stated 
that courts should be “cautious” to extend the meaning of expropriation to situations where 
the deprivation does not result in the state acquiring the property involved.197 This approach 
tends to oversimplify matters, since it is clear that expropriated rights need not be acquired by 
the state to constitute expropriation.198 It follows that expropriated property can also be 
acquired by (or transferred to) parties other than the state – for example third parties – where 
the transfer is in the public interest or serves a public purpose, such as legitimate land reform 
initiatives.199 It is a pity that the Constitutional Court in Reflect-All confirmed this position 
adopted in Harksen v Lane NO and Others200 to determine whether a certain interference 
amounts to expropriation. Nonetheless, this chapter assumes that expropriation in favour of 
private third parties is constitutionally possible.  
                                                             
194 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
195 Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 32. 
196 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 63. 
197 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 64. 
198 See generally the objections by Van der Walt AJ & Botha H “Coming to Grips with the New Constitutional 
Order: Critical Comments on Harksen v Lane NO” (1998) 13 South African Public Law 17-41; Van der Walt AJ 
“Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2, Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (2005) 180, 182-183, 189 and Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 8-9. 
199 Section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA might be of such a nature, since it allows occupiers to bury deceased members of 
their family on the owner’s farm: See Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). Van der Walt 
AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2 cites section 25(4)(a) of the 
Constitution as an example that allows the state to expropriate property in the interest of private beneficiaries to 
promote land reform. See further Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-31; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law (2005) 182-183, 189; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 8-9. 
200 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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Expropriation refers to the situation where the state extinguishes a person’s rights in property, 
which rights are in turn usually acquired by the state or by a third party against payment of 
compensation to the expropriated party.201 Yet, it is not strictly required that the state or a 
third party acquire the expropriated rights, as mere extinguishment of rights by the state can 
also amount to expropriation.202 Furthermore, expropriation in South African law must be in 
the public interest or for a public purpose to be constitutionally valid.203 Expropriation is a 
state action carried out in terms of authorising legislation.204 In this regard expropriation is an 
administrative action, which means that the state has to exercise a discretion when it decides 
to expropriate a party.205  
 
It was seen in the previous paragraph that expropriation must take place in accordance with 
empowering legislation.206 Any attempted expropriation that is not based on legislation that 
allows expropriation is void.207 Expropriation must be exercised in terms of legislation, which 
legislation must determine the circumstances, procedures and conditions under which 
expropriation may be executed.208 Consequently, expropriation in terms of the common law 
is not possible in South African law, since an act of expropriation “must rest upon a 
legislative foundation.”209 The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 fulfils this role in South African 
law. It follows that the power to expropriate must be explicitly granted by legislation to 
government institutions for specific purposes.210 In the recent decision of Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO and Others,211 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed the principle that our courts do not have the inherent power to order a forced sale – 
                                                             
201 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 188-189; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 
8.  
202 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 188-189. 
203 Section 25(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
204 Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671. See also Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (2005) 239; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 49, 93.  
205 Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4; Gildenhuys A 
Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 10-11, 14-15, 77. 
206 Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671. See also Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (2005) 239 and Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 49, 93. 
207 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 49. 
208 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 9-10: “Die reg moet ingevolge wetgewing uitgeoefen word, wat 
die omstandighede, prosedures en voorwaardes waaronder onteiening mag plaasvind, vaslê.” (“The right of 
expropriation must be exercised in terms of legislation, which must set out the circumstances, procedures and 
conditions under which expropriation may take place.”) 
209 Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671. To the same effect is Harvey v 
Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 81. See also Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg 
(2nd ed 2001) 10, 49. 
210 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 81. 
211 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA). 
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or expropriation – of property.212 This decision is in line with the view that the power to 
expropriate must be authorised by specific legislation, which power is a public right that only 
accrues to the state.213 This means that courts are only allowed to order expropriation if such 
power is granted by legislation, which legislation must specifically empower the court to 
make such an order.214  
 
In light of the above it is difficult to see how prescription can amount to expropriation. 
Firstly, neither of the prescription acts grants the state the power to expropriate property. In 
this sense they do not set out the circumstances, procedures or conditions in any way as 
required by law to facilitate a valid expropriation.215 It was seen in the preceding paragraph 
that common law expropriation is not possible in South African law, since the power to 
expropriate must be granted to the state by legislation. It follows that when a court confirms 
that the requirements for prescription have been met, which a party has to plead in curiam,216 
the Court does not order expropriation but merely confirms the rights in property that are 
regulated in terms of legislation. Indeed, the “[c]ourts only have the power to order 
expropriation if that power is granted to them specifically, and that would be by way of 
exception.”217 Furthermore, the prescription acts do not provide for compensation either, 
which serves as yet another indication that prescription does not amount to expropriation. 
This conclusion finds support in the presumption that legislation does not authorise 
expropriation if it contains no explicit or tacit provision that provides for the payment of 
compensation.218 Finally, both the prescription acts determine that the possessor acquires 
ownership over property ex lege the moment all the requirements for prescription are met.219 
                                                             
212 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO and Others 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA) para 14. Although 
section 38 of the Constitution empowers courts to grant “appropriate relief”, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated 
in this paragraph that this notion does not grant the Court authority to order a municipality to purchase property.  
213 Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 (3) SA 250 (A) 258: “Die reg van onteiening is ‘n publieke reg want 
dit kom die Staat alleen toe.” (“The right of expropriation is a public right because it only accrues to the State.”) 
See also Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 9, 49-59; Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” 
(2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4 and Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review para 2.2. 
214 Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4. 
215 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 9-10: “Die reg moet ingevolge wetgewing uitgeoefen word, wat 
die omstandighede, prosedures en voorwaardes waaronder onteiening mag plaasvind, vaslê.” (“The right of 
expropriation must be exercised in terms of legislation, which must set out the circumstances, procedures and 
conditions under which expropriation may take place.”) 
216 See section 14 of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 17(1)-(2) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
Section 17(1) of the latter Act clearly provides that courts may not take mero motu notice of prescription. 
217 Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4. 
218 Belinco (Pty) Ltd v Bellville Municipality and Another 1970 (4) SA 589 (A) 597. See also Gildenhuys A 
Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 13, 18 and sources cited. 
219 Section 2(1)-(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.  
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Since no discretion is exercised to determine whether a person has acquired ownership 
through prescription, as it is purely affected by operation of law, it is clear that no decision is 
taken. This also negates the possibility that prescription amounts to expropriation, since 
expropriation takes place as a result of administrative action. In the absence of a discretion, 
which is the main requirement necessary to constitute administrative action, it follows that 
prescription does not amount to administrative action and – therefore – it is highly unlikely to 
constitute expropriation.220  
 
Even if prescription does not amount to a formal expropriation, one has to determine whether 
this legal institution perhaps amounts to what is known as constructive expropriation. To 
answer this question, it needs to be considered what this notion entails as well as whether it 
forms part of South African law.  
 
In addition to expropriation, some legal systems221 acknowledge the doctrine of constructive 
expropriation.222 This doctrine caters for the situation where certain state interference results 
in a serious loss or limitation of property for an owner. Such interference is then viewed as a 
de facto expropriation that requires compensation, even though the state – through the 
regulation – may not intend to expropriate the property.223 Since prescription results in the 
total loss of ownership on the side of the owner, there is the possibility that it could amount to 
constructive expropriation.  
 
Although this issue has not yet been definitively decided in South African law, two of our 
highest courts have had the opportunity to deal with this notion. In Steinberg v South 
Peninsula Municipality224 the Supreme Court of Appeal described constructive expropriation 
as a situation where “a public body utilises a regulatory power in a manner which, taken in 
isolation, can be categorised as a deprivation of property rights and not an expropriation, but 
                                                             
220 According to section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, “administrative action” 
means “any decision taken, or failure to take a decision”. 
221 Such as Swiss and US law. For a discussion of constructive expropriation in these systems, see Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 359-376 (Swiss law) and 398-458 (US 
law). 
222 This doctrine is also known as “material expropriation” in Swiss law and as “inverse condemnation” or 
“regulatory taking” in US law: See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 209. I do not provide 
an in-depth discussion of this doctrine in my dissertation. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 359-376 (Swiss law) and 398-458 (US law), Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (2005) 209-237 and Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 15, 137-149 for a 
more comprehensive discussion of the topic. 
223 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 209; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 15. 
224 2001 (4) SA 1243 (SCA). 
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which has the effect, albeit indirectly, of transferring those rights to the public body”.225 
Although the Court in that instance entertained the possibility of importing constructive 
expropriation into South African law, it decided against it for fear that it may frustrate land 
reform, together with introducing confusion into the law.226 Furthermore, in Reflect-All the 
Constitutional Court voiced its doubts as to the appropriateness of incorporating constructive 
expropriation into South African law.227 Moreover, if one strictly follows the methodology in 
the FNB decision for purposes of a section 25 dispute, it is difficult to see where constructive 
expropriation will fit into the picture.228 This is because of the way FNB differentiated 
between expropriation and deprivation by setting up the former as a narrower category falling 
within the wider category of deprivation. This complicates the question where a third 
category, namely constructive expropriation, may be situated.229 This differentiation between 
deprivation and expropriation – together with Roux’s “telescoping” effect of the arbitrariness 
test – makes it unlikely that the South African courts will recognise constructive 
expropriation as long as they adhere to the FNB logic.230 For instance, should a deprivation 
amount to a de facto expropriation of property without providing for compensation, it will 
already be struck down as an arbitrary deprivation under the section 25(1) inquiry in that it 
does not provide for compensation as required by section 25(2). As seen above, it is highly 
unlikely that such a deprivation will be justified in terms of section 36. Therefore, the 
possibility to treat the deprivation as a constructive expropriation will never arise, for the 
inquiry as to the constitutionality of a deprivation will either end with the finding that it is 
arbitrary under section 25(1)231 or that it is not justifiable under section 36. In view of this 
                                                             
225 Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA 1243 (SCA) para 8. 
226 Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA 1243 (SCA) para 8. Both these reasons for not 
importing the doctrine of constructive expropriation into South African law are criticised by Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (2005) 231-234. 
227 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 65. This scepticism is shared by Van der Walt AJ 
“Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2, where he states that the “doctrine of 
constructive expropriation probably does not and should not find application in South African law.” 
228 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 236; Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-32 and sources 
cited. 
229 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 236; Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-32 and sources 
cited. 
230 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 236-237; Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-2 – 46-3, 46-19 – 
46-20, 46-32.  
231 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 
2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-32. 
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“telescoping” effect, the question whether an interference with property amounts to a 
(constructive) expropriation will never be reached.232 
 
Still, some authors are of the opinion that the doctrine of constructive expropriation should be 
recognised in South African law.233 Gildenhuys is one of the advocates that favour the 
adoption of this doctrine into South African law.234 Even so, it is worth emphasising that 
Gildenhuys published his book Onteieningsreg one year prior to the handing down of FNB by 
the Constitutional Court. After this decision it seems very unlikely – as already indicated – 
that the doctrine of constructive expropriation will be recognised in South African law, 
especially if one strictly follows the FNB methodology.235 Consequently, I agree with Van 
der Walt that this doctrine “should not find application in South African law.”236 In light of 
the above one can safely conclude that this doctrine does not form part of South African law, 
which means that prescription cannot amount to constructive expropriation. This conclusion 
makes it unnecessary to consider the final two stages of the FNB analysis, namely whether 
the deprivation complies with section 25(2)(a)-(b), or whether it is justified under section 36. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates the effects of prescription in practice, together with the infringement it 
may cause in terms of section 25. However, it argues that prescription is likely to amount to a 
non-arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1).237 Such a conclusion is strengthened by 
using utilitarianism and law and economics theory, which chapter four discusses in greater 
detail.238 Another important factor in this regard is the German approach towards the personal 
autonomy and sanctity of the home, which is analogous to Radin’s personality theory.239 This 
                                                             
232 As was also the case in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), 
where the Court found that section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 amounted to an arbitrary 
deprivation. Thus, the question of whether that section amounted to expropriation was never reached. 
233 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 15, 137-149. Van der Walt withdrew from a similar position in 
Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2, after initially being 
in favour of recognising constructive expropriation in South African law: See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (2005) 236-237. 
234 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 15, 137-149. 
235 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 236; Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 46-32 and sources 
cited. 
236 Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2. 
237 See section 5.3.2.4.1 above. 
238 See section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
239 See section 5.3.2.4.1 above. 
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approach provides a strong justification for prescription where the possessor may be using the 
property as a home, especially when the owner merely regards it as commercial or fungible 
property.  
 
The findings of the Grand Chamber in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom240 further 
contribute to classifying prescription as a non-arbitrary deprivation. In that case the Grand 
Chamber found that adverse possession strikes a “fair balance” in the context of the third rule 
(deprivation) of Article 1. This is significant, as the animus possidendi requirement of 
adverse possession is not as strict as the animus domini element of prescription.241 In light of 
this conclusion, Pye provides authority from a comparative law viewpoint that prescription is 
likely to constitute a non-arbitrary deprivation that complies with section 25(1). 
 
In South African law, prescription is unlikely to amount to an expropriation due to the 
absence of legislation that authorises expropriation.242 The prescription acts neither authorise 
the state (or the courts) to order expropriation nor do they provide from compensation. These 
factors indicate that prescription does not constitute expropriation. This chapter also 
addresses the possibility that prescription could constitute constructive expropriation. The 
chapter argues that prescription cannot amount to constructive expropriation, since the logic 
set out in FNB makes it unlikely for this doctrine to form part of South African law.243 
Because prescription constitutes a non-arbitrary deprivation in the framework of section 
25(1), I conclude that this legal rule is in line with the property clause and, thus, 
constitutionally compliant.  
                                                             
240 (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). 
241 For the differences between animus domini and animus possidendi, see section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two 
together with sections 3.2.2.3.2.1 and 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter three above. 
242 See section 5.3.2.6 above. 
243 See section 5.3.2.6 above. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Acquisitive prescription (“prescription”), an original method of acquisition of ownership,1 is 
an area of South African property law that is generally unproblematic and legally certain.2 
The two prescription acts, namely the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 (“1943 Act”) and the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (“1969 Act”), regulate prescription in South African law. Yet, 
these acts do not codify prescription law in South Africa.3 The two prescription acts 
determine that a person acquires ownership ex lege if such person continuously possessed 
property openly and “as if owner” for an uninterrupted period of 30 years.4  
 
The requirements for prescription in Dutch and French law are similar to those in South 
African law, since these systems also require a possessor to possess property with the 
intention of an owner (animus domini) for a certain period of time before he can acquire 
ownership. Pre-2003 English law5 is to much the same effect, although adverse possession – 
the common law equivalent of prescription – merely requires a person to possess land with 
the animus possidendi (intention to possess) in order to acquire title or ownership.  
  
On the face of it, these three jurisdictions also appear to regard prescription or adverse 
possession as an area of law that is unproblematic and reasonably clear. However, the 
constitutionality of this seemingly uncomplicated legal institution was recently challenged 
before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United 
Kingdom (“Pye”).6 In this case the Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
held that adverse possession is in conflict with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (“Article 1”) to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (“the 
Convention”). Article 1, which guarantees the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and 
                                                             
1 Section 2(2) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 and section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
2 Prescription in the context of modern South African law is discussed in section 2.3 of chapter two above. 
3 See for instance Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) 135; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 7; Morkels 
Transport (Pty) Ltd v Melrose Foods (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (2) SA 464 (W) 467. 
4 Section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. These requirements are similar to those set out in section 2(1)-(2) 
of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943, as indicated in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two above. 
5 The Land Registration Act 2002, which fundamentally altered English adverse possession law, only came into 
operation on 13 October 2003 and is prospective in nature: See Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 and JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
6 (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) and (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). A brief exposition of the facts of this case appears in 
section 1.1.1 of chapter one above and are therefore not repeated here. For a more detailed discussion of the 
facts of this case, see section 3.2.3.2 of chapter three above. 
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provides for legitimate state interference with private property, is similar but not identical to 
section 25 (the property clause) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
(“the Constitution”). According to the Fourth Chamber, adverse possession amounts to an 
uncompensated deprivation – or expropriation for purposes of South African constitutional 
law – of property, which upset the “fair balance” required by the Convention. The Fourth 
Chamber’s main objection is that the traditional justifications for adverse possession do not 
carry the same weight in jurisdictions where land is registered.7 However, on appeal the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights overturned the Fourth Chamber’s 
decision and found that adverse possession is in line with Article 1 of the First Protocol.8 The 
Grand Chamber found that adverse possession constitutes regulation – or deprivation in the 
South African sense – of property rather than expropriation and concluded that it strikes a 
“fair balance” between the interests of the individual and the public interest. The Grand 
Chamber reached this conclusion by establishing that adverse possession fulfils a legitimate 
purpose in that it promotes legal certainty, protects defendants from stale claims and prevents 
injustice, even in the context of registered land.9 Consequently, it held that adverse 
possession complies with Article 1, at least as far as it operated prior to the enactment of the 
English Land Registration Act 2002 (“LRA” or “2002 Act”). This is an interesting result, 
since it was “easier” to succeed with an adverse possession claim at the time of Pye than it 
would have been had this case occurred in a civil law country.10 This is due to the fact that 
adverse possession merely requires a possessor to possess animo possidendi, as opposed to 
the more onerous animus domini requirement for prescription in the civil law systems.11 
 
Despite the judgment by the Grand Chamber, the Fourth Chamber’s decision in Pye is 
significant for purposes of South African constitutional property law, since prescription – like 
adverse possession – also results in the loss of ownership on the side of an owner. In this 
sense a possessor acquires ownership through prescription without the co-operation or 
permission of the original owner the moment such possessor satisfies the requirements for 
prescription, since it is an original method of acquisition of ownership. Accordingly, the 
focus of this dissertation falls on whether this “uncomplicated” legal institution complies with 
                                                             
7 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 3 (IV) para 65. 
8 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC). 
9 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 69, citing Stubbings and Others v 
United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 213 para 49. 
10 This topic is discussed in chapter three above. 
11 See section 3.2.2.3.2.3 for English law and compare it to sections 2.3.2.1.1 (South African law), 3.3.2.2.1 
(Dutch law) and 3.4.2.1 (French law) in chapters two and three above. 
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section 25 of the Constitution. The reason for this study is that prescription could possibly be 
in conflict with the property clause, as it may amount to either an arbitrary deprivation or an 
uncompensated expropriation, both of which would be unconstitutional. The Fourth 
Chamber’s judgment especially highlights the possibility that prescription could constitute an 
uncompensated expropriation. As a result, the very existence of prescription – the so-called 
“unproblematic” rule – was suddenly brought into question for the first time. Since the 
potential unconstitutionality of prescription will hold serious repercussions for South African 
prescription law, and possibly also for the other methods of original acquisition of 
ownership,12 it was imperative to undertake a study in this field. 
 
To establish whether prescription is in line with section 25, it has to be determined whether 
there are sufficient justifications for this legal institution today. For this purpose the 
dissertation focuses on two questions, namely (i) whether adequate grounds exist for 
prescription and (ii) whether this rule complies with the property clause. To this end it was 
necessary to evaluate the roots of prescription, together with its requirements in South 
African law. This is done in chapter two, which focuses on the Roman and Roman-Dutch 
legal heritage of prescription and analyses its requirements in contemporary South African 
law. Chapter two establishes that the requirements for prescription under the two prescription 
acts are similar and reasonably clear, since both acts require a person to possess property 
openly and continuously with the intention of an owner for an uninterrupted period of 30 
years.13 In this sense it is rather difficult to succeed with a prescription claim in South African 
law. 
 
After the discussion of South African law, chapter three establishes how prescription operates 
in a number of foreign jurisdictions, namely English, Dutch, French and German law.14 The 
requirements for prescription in Dutch and French law – both having negative registration 
systems – are remarkably similar to those in South African law. Both these jurisdictions also 
require a person to possess property with the animus domini before such person can acquire it 
through prescription. However, these systems draw a sharp distinction between bona and 
mala fide prescription, since they require bad faith possessors to possess property for longer 
periods than their good faith counterparts before they can acquire ownership. German law 
                                                             
12 Such as accessio, specificatio and commixtio et confusio. 
13 The similarities between these two acts are discussed in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two above. 
14 My reasons for focusing on these systems are discussed in section 1.2 of chapter one above. 
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also requires a person to possess property with the intention of an owner, but it has extra 
requirements for Ersitzung15 due to the positive registration system in German law. Thus, a 
possessor of land must also be (erroneously) registered in the land register or Grundbuch for 
a period of 30 years before he can acquire ownership through Ersitzung. It follows that it is 
extremely difficult to acquire land through prescription in German law.  
 
Chapter three also specifically focuses on English adverse possession law, since it was 
challenged under Article 1 of the First Protocol before the European Court of Human Rights. 
However, this chapter investigates the rules of adverse possession both before and after the 
enactment of the LRA, since the Pye case was instituted before this Act came into force. 
Although the 2002 Act now provides comprehensive safeguards for owners of registered 
land, chapter three indicates that the LRA did not alter the substantive requirements of 
adverse possession. It follows that, but for the amendments by the 2002 Act, adverse 
possession law before and after 2003 largely remains the same. This Act was the result of 
suggestions by the English Law Commission, which concluded that the traditional 
justifications for adverse possession do not carry weight when the register provides 
conclusive proof of ownership. 
 
Chapter three discovers that adverse possession merely requires a person to possess property 
with the animus possidendi (intention to possess) in order to acquire title. This is a “lower” 
requirement than animus domini, since the animus possidendi can, for instance, even co-exist 
with an offer to pay rent to the owner.16 An offer to this effect will immediately negate the 
animus domini in a civil law system, since it is inconsistent with the intention of possessing 
property as an owner.17 Despite the fact that it is “easier” to acquire ownership through 
adverse possession, the LRA effectively prevents the extinguishment of title in registered 
land through mere adverse possession. It follows that post-2003 English law is now similar to 
German law, since both these legal systems have stricter requirements pertaining to adverse 
possession and prescription due to their positive registration systems. Consequently, it is clear 
that prescription or adverse possession has a more important purpose in systems where the 
law does not guarantee the correctness of the register. 
 
                                                             
15  Ersitzung is the German law equivalent of acquisitive prescription in South African law. 
16 This was the case in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2000] Ch 676. See further 
section 3.2.2.3.2.3 of chapter three above. 
17 See section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above for the position in South African law.  
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Chapter four focuses on the rationale for prescription and starts with a brief overview of the 
justifications that Roman-Dutch, South African, Dutch and French law provide for this rule.18 
These systems advance two main grounds in favour of this legal institution, namely that it 
promotes legal certainty and punishes neglectful owners. The English Law Commission,19 
which relied on an article by Dockray, criticised these justifications and reasoned that adverse 
possession does not fulfil the same purpose in a positive registration system.20 This led to the 
enactment of the LRA, which effectively abolished traditional adverse possession in English 
law. Accordingly, it is no longer possible to acquire title in registered land in English law 
through adverse possession. 
 
Despite the Law Commission’s abolition of adverse possession in its traditional sense, I argue 
that the Law Commission failed to take into account certain moral and economic 
justifications. These justifications provide strong support for having prescription in a legal 
system, especially in jurisdictions with a negative registration system – such as South Africa 
– where the correctness of the register is not guaranteed. Chapter four illustrates this point 
with reference to three liberal property theories, namely the Lockean labour theory, the 
personality theory, as developed by Radin, and finally utilitarianism and law and economics 
theory. These theories were chosen because they demonstrate interesting similarities with the 
traditional justifications for prescription or adverse possession. When read together, these 
theories indeed provide powerful justification for prescription in the context of a negative 
registration system. Two factors in this context are that possessors – in Radin’s terms – 
become attached to long-possessed property while law and economics theory predicts that 
prescription helps to shift property to higher valuing-users (possessors) when the market 
cannot perform this function due to high transaction costs. 
 
These justifications are used in chapter five to determine whether prescription is in line with 
section 25 of the South African Constitution. In this sense chapter five employs the 
methodology set out by Ackermann J in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd 
                                                             
18 The reasons for omitting German law from this discussion are discussed in section 1.2 of chapter one above. 
19 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001); Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998). 
20 Section 58(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002 stipulates that the English register provides conclusive proof 
of ownership.  
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t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB”)21 for adjudicating section 25 disputes. According 
to this methodology, chapter five first determines whether prescription complies with section 
25(1). In this sense the main issue is whether prescription amounts to arbitrary deprivation, 
which would be in conflict with section 25(1). The chapter incorporates the moral and 
economic conclusions drawn in chapter four and argues that prescription constitutes non-
arbitrary deprivation. This argument finds further support in the Grand Chamber’s decision in 
Pye, where it held (the less onerous) adverse possession to be in line with Article 1 of the 
First Protocol. In this sense the Grand Chamber’s decision provides authority from a 
comparative law perspective that prescription – with its stricter requirements – ought to 
comply with section 25(1). The next stage involves the question whether prescription 
amounts to uncompensated expropriation contrary to section 25(2), a possibility that the 
Fourth Chamber highlighted in the Pye case. In this regard chapter five also considers the 
possibility that prescription could amount to constructive expropriation. I rule out both these 
possibilities, namely expropriation and constructive expropriation, through an analysis of 
South African expropriation law in terms of the FNB methodology. Consequently, chapter 
five concludes that prescription amounts to non-arbitrary deprivation, which is in line with 
the South African property clause. 
 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
6.2.1 The law pertaining to acquisitive prescription in South Africa and foreign 
jurisdictions 
Chapter two investigates the Roman and Roman-Dutch roots of prescription in modern South 
African law. From its earliest days prescription had two main requirements, namely the 
possession of property belonging to another for a certain period of time.22 A possessor 
acquired ownership by way of original acquisition of ownership the moment he satisfied 
these requirements. Furthermore, prescription seems to always have been regarded as a 
mechanism through which de iure status was awarded to long-existing de facto situations. It 
also served as punishment of those owners who introduced uncertainty into the law by 
“allowing” others to possess their property for long periods of time. Roman-Dutch and South 
African law received these grounds without question, since both systems regard them as still 
providing valid justification for this rule.  
                                                             
21 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
22 See section 2.2.2 of chapter two above. 
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Although the prescription acts only formalised South African prescription law fairly recently, 
neither of them intends to codify the law of prescription and thus the common law remains an 
important source in this regard.23 Chapter two establishes that the requirements for 
prescription under the two prescription acts are similar, despite the difference in their 
terminology.24 This proposition is supported by the fact that the animus domini25 element of 
possessio civilis clearly corresponds to the openness and “as if owner” requirements under 
the 1969 Act. In short – to succeed with a prescription claim – a possessor has to 
continuously possess land openly and factually with the animus domini for an uninterrupted 
period of 30 years without acknowledging the rights of the owner. Ownership vests in the 
possessor ex lege the moment he satisfies all these requirements.  
 
Chapter three – which comprises a comparative analysis – examines the requirements of 
prescription or adverse possession in English, Dutch, French and German law. Although 
English adverse possession law underwent alterations with the enactment of the LRA, it was 
necessary to investigate how adverse possession operated both before and after the 2002 Act 
came into operation. This is because the Pye case originated before the LRA came into effect, 
while that Act now provides comprehensive protection to owners of registered land against 
the extinguishing effect of adverse possession. Despite the extra protection afforded to 
owners of registered land, chapter three establishes that the substantive requirements of 
adverse possession before and after 2003 remain the same. In this sense the chapter 
recognises that adverse possession differs from prescription, since a person must merely 
intend to possess land (animo possidendi) to acquire title to it through adverse possession. 
This stands in contrast to prescription in the civil law systems, where the required intention is 
always animus domini. Accordingly, it is “easier” to succeed with an adverse possession 
claim under these circumstances than it would be in a jurisdiction that requires animus domini 
for purposes of prescription. This can lead to instances of hardship, as was observed in the 
Pye case where the Grahams succeeded with an adverse possession claim pertaining to the 
registered land of Pye. The animus possidendi can even co-exist with a willingness to pay 
rent to the owner, which was indeed the case in Pye, where the Grahams were prepared to 
rent the land. Such a willingness negates the animus domini in civil law systems, which then 
                                                             
23 See section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943, together with the discussion in section 2.3.1 of chapter 
two above. 
24 This is discussed in greater detail in sections 2.3.1-2.3.2 of chapter two above. 
25 Intention of an owner. 
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interrupts the running of prescription.26 Nonetheless, this possible injustice is now countered 
by the LRA, which prevents the loss of registered title through the mere passage of time. In 
this sense adverse possessors must now first apply to the registrar of the Land Registry after 
having been in adverse possession for 10 years.27 The registrar – in turn – notifies the 
registered owner, who may then elect to reject the adverse possessor’s claim and institute 
eviction proceedings. These alterations were made in light of the fact that the LRA now 
deems the register to provide conclusive proof of title. Consequently, the Law Commission 
found that the traditional justifications for adverse possession in relation to unregistered land 
do not apply in the context of registered land when the law guarantees the correctness of the 
register. This stands in contrast to countries, such as South Africa, where land is also 
registered, but where the register does not provide conclusive proof of ownership. Against 
this background the Law Commission decided to introduce mechanisms – through enacting 
the 2002 Act – that protect registered owners against losing title according to the “old” rules 
of adverse possession. German law follows a similar approach, since the Grundbuch also 
provides conclusive proof of ownership.28 Consequently, in German law a possessor must not 
only possess the land animo domini for a period of 30 years, but he must also (erroneously) 
have been registered as the owner of that piece of land in the Grundbuch for the duration of 
the 30-year period.29 These two jurisdictions illustrate that the requirements for adverse 
possession and prescription are much stricter when the correctness of the register is 
guaranteed. 
 
The requirements for prescription in Dutch and French law are found to be remarkably 
similar to those in South African law. Both Dutch and French law also require the possessor 
to factually possess the land animo domini for an uninterrupted period of time without 
acknowledging the rights of the owner.30 The length of the period required for prescription 
depends on whether the possessor was bona or mala fide, a distinction that is less relevant in 
South African law, where the period is set at 30 years for both good and bad faith possessors. 
Dutch and French law both have a 10-year period for good faith possessors, while 20- and 
                                                             
26 For the position in South African law, see the discussion in section 2.3.2.1.1 of chapter two above. 
27 The alterations by the Land Registration Act 2002 are discussed in greater detail in section 3.2.4 of chapter 
three above. 
28 BGB § 891 I. 
29 Säcker FJ & Rixecker R (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 6 Sachenrecht (5th 
ed 2009) § 900 RdNr 5. 
30 The requirements for prescription in Dutch and French law are discussed in sections 3.3.2.2 and 3.4.2 
respectively of chapter three above.  
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30-year periods are required in Dutch and French law respectively for bad faith possessors. 
Chapter three establishes that the protective mechanisms of English and German law are 
absent in South African, Dutch and French law. The reason for this phenomenon is the fact 
that the latter three jurisdictions each employ a negative registration system, which does not 
provide conclusive proof of ownership. Therefore, chapter three establishes that possession 
plays a more important role in countries with a negative registration system to ensure that 
ownership and possession coincide, especially in situations where there may be defects as to 
ownership in the register.  
 
The comparative analysis shows that special safeguards exist in systems with a positive 
registration system, where the correctness of the register is guaranteed. This is because the 
register supplanted the role of possession to ensure that ownership and possession 
correspond. Accordingly, English and German law do not regard the traditional justifications 
for adverse possession or prescription as applying to situations where the identity of the 
owner may be conclusively determined by investigating the register.   
 
 
6.2.2 The justification for acquisitive prescription 
Chapter three establishes that certain safeguards exist to protect registered owners from 
losing ownership through mere adverse possession or prescription in jurisdictions with a 
positive registration system, such as modern English and German law. These protective 
mechanisms are absent in countries with a negative registration system, as is the case with 
South African, Dutch and French law. However, these systems require animus domini for 
purposes of prescription, which prevents the “easy” acquisition of ownership when one 
compares it to the animus possidendi requirement in adverse possession law. In this sense 
chapter four analyses the justifications for prescription in an attempt to explain the presence 
of the protective mechanisms in a positive registration system. Therefore, this chapter sets out 
to establish what the traditional justifications for prescription within a legal system are and 
whether they are still valid today.  
 
Chapter four discovers that two main justifications are advanced in favour of prescription in 
Roman-Dutch, South African, Dutch and French law, namely that (i) it fulfils a corrective 
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function and (ii) that it punishes neglectful owners.31 The first justification is found in all four 
systems and is premised on the argument that de iure status should be given to long-standing 
factual realities to prevent situations where possession and ownership may come to be “out of 
kilter”. This is because possession provides the strongest proof of ownership in jurisdictions 
where the information in the register may be defective. This justification also encompasses 
the fact that prescription prevents the so-called probatio diabolica (devil’s burden) one faces 
if prescription is not available to help prove ownership. The second justification, which 
carries more weight in Roman-Dutch and South African law than in Dutch and French law, is 
that an owner who causes legal uncertainty by “allowing” another to possess his land for a 
long period of time should be “punished” by losing ownership of that land. This justification 
is sometimes expressed positively, namely that it encourages owners to make active use of 
their land. Little or no criticism concerning these justifications exists in the four legal systems 
under discussion, which indicates that these jurisdictions still regard them as able to justify 
prescription. English law stands in contrast to this seemingly uncritical approach, where the 
English Law Commission recently re-evaluated the rationale behind adverse possession. 
 
Although English law also recognises the legal certainty and punishment justifications in the 
context of adverse possession, the Law Commission rejected these grounds in the context of 
registered land when the identity of the owner may be discovered by investigating the 
register. In this regard the Law Commission relied on an article by Dockray,32 who criticises 
the traditional justifications pertaining to adverse possession. This criticism, coupled with the 
fact that English law was to adopt a positive registration system under the LRA, was 
sufficient for the Law Commission to abolish adverse possession in its traditional form. Yet, 
some authors – such as Dixon, Clarke, Cobb and Fox – criticise the Law Commission for not 
considering moral and economic justifications when it decided to amend the rules of adverse 
possession concerning registered land.33 These developments in English law necessitated an 
evaluation of the justifications provided for prescription in South African law. Chapter four 
considers the labour theory, personality theory and utilitarianism and law and economics 
theory as sources of possible justifications for this legal institution, especially because these 
                                                             
31 German law is omitted from this discussion for reasons set out in section 1.2 of chapter one above. 
32 Dockray M “Why do we Need Adverse Possession?” 1985 Conveyancer 272-284. 
33 Dixon M “The Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Risk Assessment” 2003 
Conveyancer 136-156; Clarke A “Use, Time, and Entitlement” (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 239-275; 
Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration 
Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260. 
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theories are analogous to the traditional justifications provided for prescription in South 
African law. 
 
The first theory one can consider to justify prescription is the Lockean labour theory. 
According to Locke, man has property in his own person and is able to acquire ownership in 
things by taking it out of the commons and through mixing labour with it.34 Against this 
background it will be of no use for someone else to mix labour with it ex post. It follows that 
the labour theory – apparently – prohibits the non-contractual redistribution of ownership.35 
This characteristic prima facie seems to prevent the labour theory from allowing prescription, 
since prescription by its very nature results in a form of redistribution of ownership by taking 
ownership away from the original owner and awarding it to the possessor. However, Cobb 
and Fox argue that a squatter who occupies land and invests labour in it can obtain a labour 
theory claim in that property if the owner’s non-use or neglect of land amounts to quasi-
abandonment.36 This argument is strengthened in a setting such as South Africa, where the 
dire need for housing can undermine an entitlement to neglect land that – in turn – “allows” 
people to occupy vacant land for long periods of time. The quasi-abandonment argument also 
finds support in certain qualifications put forward by Locke himself as to the applicability of 
his theory. According to Locke, his theory will only be permitted as a method of acquisition 
of ownership “at least where there is enough, and is good left in common for others.”37 This 
means that Locke only regards his theory as a justifiable method of acquisition of ownership 
as long as there remain enough unowned things in the commons for other people to 
appropriate. Therefore, chapter four proposes that the labour theory should permit 
prescription in a modern world with scarce resources when some owners “allow” their 
property to be used for long periods of time by others.  
 
Although Cobb and Fox specifically structure their quasi-abandonment argument in the 
context of urban squatters, through analogy it can also be made applicable to squatters of 
unused rural land. Such an interpretation finds support in a further qualification of Locke, 
namely that no one may appropriate more from the commons than he is able to use or enjoy. 
Should a person take more from the commons than he is able to use, such property will spoil, 
                                                             
34 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) §§ 26-28, 44. 
35 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 744. 
36 Cobb N & Fox L “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236-260 250. 
37 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) §§ 27, 33.  
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which causes it to “belong to others”.38 An argument to this effect is strengthened by Locke’s 
disapproval of owners that do not use their land, which causes it to spoil. Since such spoilt 
land reverts to or remains in the commons, possessors are able to obtain a labour theory claim 
in that property through mixing labour with it. This is similar to situations where owners have 
more land than they are able or willing to look after, which can cause a squatter to take 
possession of that land and start investing energy and labour in it.  
 
Another complication in justifying prescription under the labour theory is the role of time in 
this framework, as Epstein points out.39 Once a person acquires ownership in an object by 
taking it out of the commons and mixing his labour with it, it appears that the owner’s 
entitlement in that object is then fixed “forever”. This seems to once again disallow 
prescription under the labour theory, since prescription entails that a person acquires 
ownership in an object through continuous and undisturbed possession over time. If time 
plays no role, then acquisition through prescription will be impossible. Nonetheless, Epstein 
overcomes this problem through his doctrine of relative title, which doctrine recognises the 
role of the temporal dimension in the context of competing claims. According to this 
doctrine, prescription resolves conflicting claims to ownership – since time eradicates 
evidence of ownership – by awarding ownership not to the first possessor (owner), but to the 
prior possessor (squatter).40 Consequently, this chapter establishes that it is possible to justify 
prescription under the labour theory if one incorporates this temporal dimension into Locke’s 
theory. 
 
For these reasons I argue that the labour theory – due to the qualifications built into it by 
Locke and the interpretation supplied by Epstein, Cobb and Fox – is able to justify the 
acquisition of ownership by a purposeful possessor through prescription. It seems that the 
subjective intent of the possessor – in terms of mala fide prescription – plays no meaningful 
role in the labour theory, as the central question is merely whether someone mixed his labour 
with an object. Since it is possible that even a mala fide person can mix labour with 
something, it appears that the labour theory is also able to justify bad faith prescription.  
 
                                                             
38 Locke J Two Treatises of Government (1690, Laslet P ed 1963) §§ 31, 46.  
39 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722. 
40 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 675.  
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The second liberal theory that can justify prescription is Radin’s personality theory,41 which 
entails that people require ownership of objects to facilitate healthy self-constitution. Radin 
relies on Hegel’s personality theory to establish her theory. The strength of the relationship 
that forms between a human and property is assessed by determining the “pain”42 a person 
suffers should he lose property in some way. Consequently, if property was constitutive of 
someone’s personhood it will be impossible to relieve the “pain” caused by the loss of such 
property through simply receiving its monetary equivalent. In this regard Radin distinguishes 
between “personal” and “fungible” property, the former type encompassing property to which 
someone is attached as a person, while the latter kind entails property that is perfectly 
replaceable with the monetary value of the object. However, not all instances of “personal 
property” will always be constitutive of someone’s personhood, as there are also unhealthy 
ways through which persons may become bound up with property. In this instance Radin 
states that property relationships that are “fetishistic” in nature should not receive the same 
protection afforded to relationships that are truly personal. In this context personal and 
fungible property form two ends of a continuum. Accordingly, relationships located closer to 
the personal side of the continuum must enjoy more protection than those nearer the fungible 
end.    
 
It is through the dichotomy between personal and fungible property that Radin’s personality 
theory can justify prescription. In a typical prescription case, the possessor will be in direct 
contact with the property and it is likely that he will regard it as personal property, especially 
if the possessor occupies the property as a home. In contrast, the owner – through his absence 
– is likely to view the property as fungible, which entails that the possessor’s interest in the 
property should receive preference over those of the owner. Such a conclusion also finds 
support in Gray’s theory of moral excludability, especially when the limitation of the owner’s 
ownership – through prescription – is in line with public morality.43 It follows that “claims to 
‘property’ may sometimes be overridden by the need to attain or further more highly rated 
social goals”,44 such as protecting people’s homes. This line of thinking is analogous to the 
                                                             
41 Radin MJ “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015. 
42 This pain can be equated to what Michelman FI “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 1165-1258 1214 describes as 
“demoralization costs”, a connection already made by Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: 
Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723-
737 727-728. 
43 Gray K “Property in Thin Air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307 280-292. 
44 Gray K “Property in Thin Air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307 281. 
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position in German constitutional law, where it is held that the further a property interest is 
located outside the sphere of personal autonomy of the owner, the greater the extent to which 
the state may regulate the limits of that property right. In other words, if an absent owner 
attaches purely commercial value to property, it will be justifiable to protect the interests of 
the possessor (and to limit the property right of the owner) through prescription if he occupies 
it as a home for a long period of time. The theories of Holmes, Singer and Alexander also 
support such a prediction. Holmes states that property that has been possessed for a long time 
by a possessor – even though such possessor may not be the owner – becomes bound up with 
him and cannot be taken away from the possessor “without [him] resenting the act”.45 
Holmes thinks that long instances of undisturbed possession should be left untouched, since 
the property becomes part of the being of the possessor through continuous possession. 
According to Singer’s theory of the “reliance interest in property”,46 a possessor’s interest in 
property grows stronger the longer the owner “allows” the possessor to be in possession 
through his neglect of the property. The owner induces the possessor to rely on the fact that 
his possession will not be disturbed, since such owner creates the impression that the 
possessor’s possession of the property is “legitimate”. Indeed, the longer the possessor is in 
possession, the more the owner’s interest in the property diminishes. This also induces the 
possessor (as well as third parties) to believe that the he – and not the owner – is the true 
owner of the land. Prescription thus enters the picture, as it allows the possessor to acquire 
ownership to protect his interests in the property.  
 
Alexander’s social-obligation theory provides a unique perspective on the moral obligations 
of owners vis-à-vis the community. According to him, a person must develop his capabilities 
in order to live a well-lived life (or to flourish as a human being).47 However, individuals 
depend on others (the community) to attain human flourishing, since no-one can “acquire 
these capabilities or secure the resources to acquire them by one’s self.”48 It follows that 
Alexander requires two elements for purposes of developing one’s capabilities to flourish, 
namely community life and property (such as land). In this sense Alexander states that 
                                                             
45 Holmes OW “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478 477. 
46 This theory was developed by Singer JW “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 
611-751. 
47 Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-
820 761. 
48 Alexander GS “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-
820 765. See further Alexander GS & Peñalver EM “Properties of Community” (2008) 10 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 127-160 134-135. 
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owners – who unavoidably depend on people in the community to develop their capabilities 
to achieve human flourishing – are socially obliged to help others to nurture their capabilities 
to flourish. This obligation forms the crux of Alexander’s social-obligation norm. For 
example, if an owner has “allowed” a squatter to possess his land for a long period of time, it 
is clear that the owner must view the land as unimportant for fostering his capabilities. Yet, 
the same land may – with the effluxion of time – become essential to the squatter for 
purposes of attaining human flourishing, especially if he occupies it as a home (ie personal 
property). Under these circumstances, the social-obligation norm obliges the owner, for 
whom the land is insignificant, to “give” it to the squatter to help develop his capabilities to 
lead a well-lived life. In this regard prescription recognises the social-obligation norm by 
awarding ownership of the land to the squatter at the expiration of the prescription period.       
 
Time plays a more direct role in the personality theory than in the labour theory, since a 
person’s relationship with an object can intensify or diminish with the passing of time. 
Accordingly, over time a possessor may come to regard property as personal while an owner 
may start to treat it as fungible the longer he is out of possession. The only problem in this 
context is to determine at what point in time the possessor’s relationship is sufficiently 
personal – as opposed to the fungible interest of the owner – to justify the acquisition of 
ownership by the possessor through prescription. While Radin does not provide clear 
guidelines for making this call, I propose that it may be best to adopt a fixed time period as 
opposed to one established on a case-by-case basis. This solution is similar to Merrill’s 
suggestion that prescription ought to operate as a mechanical entitlement determination 
rule.49 Although a comparative legal analysis does not assist in discerning which period of 
time is “sufficient”, chapter four indicates that the 30-year period in South African law – 
which is the longest period in comparison to English, Dutch, French and German law – may 
be long enough, from an economic perspective, to justify the acquisition of ownership 
through prescription. Although Radin does not expressly exclude bad faith prescription, she 
does mention that bona fide possessors are more likely to succeed under her theory than mala 
fide possessors.50  
 
                                                             
49 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137-1145. 
50 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 749. 
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Utilitarianism and law and economics theory provide the third ground for justifying 
prescription. These two theories are discussed together, since both aim to maximise utility, 
albeit in different contexts. Utilitarianism attempts to maximise overall happiness for the 
greatest number of people,51 while law and economics theory seeks to enhance economic 
efficiency by lowering transaction costs.52 Chapter four recognises that Mill’s theory of 
utilitarianism provides greater justification for prescription than Bentham’s theory, since Mill 
tries to establish a relationship between utility and justice.53 According to Mill, one can 
maximise happiness through identifying and then eliminating instances of injustice, which – 
in the context of prescription – is the protection of long-term possession. Under these 
circumstances Mill argues that it will be a “greater injustice” if the law allows the owner to 
reclaim the property than if it permitted the possessor to keep it.54 This argument provides a 
powerful justification for prescription in the context of neglectful or absent landowners, 
especially against the background of the theories of Radin, Holmes, Singer and Alexander. 
Since time is important in the context of prescription, it seems that rule-utilitarianism – one of 
the two forms of utilitarianism – better suits a regime that allows prescription than act-
utilitarianism. This is because rule-utilitarianism attempts to maximise utility or happiness in 
“the long run” by laying down certain (moral) rules, while act-utilitarianism aims to 
maximise utility right now.55 Furthermore, rule-utilitarianism is able to clear titles and to 
resolve disputes about ownership, especially in the context of Epstein’s doctrine of relative 
title.56 These effects are similar to Merrill’s proposition that prescription must operate as a 
mechanical entitlement determination rule, which increases utility from an economic 
perspective.57 Since rule-utilitarianism aims to maximise happiness by clearing titles and 
resolving disputes over ownership in the long run, it appears to disregard the subjective intent 
of the possessor. Therefore, chapter four regards rule-utilitarianism as being able to justify 
both good and bad faith prescription.  
 
                                                             
51 Kelly JM A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1992) 315. 
52 Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd ed 2005) 246-
260 246. 
53 Kelly JM A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1992) 318. 
54 Mill JS Principles of Political Economy (1902) 134-135 § 2. 
55 Radin MJ “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 739-758 741. 
56 Epstein RA “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property” (1986) 64 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 667-722 674-675. 
57 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137-1145. 
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The main objective of law and economics theory is to structure the law in such a way as to 
promote economic efficiency. To achieve this end law and economics theory distinguishes 
between scenarios involving low transaction costs and those with high transaction costs. 
According to the Coase theorem, property rights must receive greater protection in settings 
where transaction costs are low. 58 Under these circumstances, voluntary exchange will occur 
in the market when non-owners attach greater value to the property of others. However, if 
transaction costs are high, the law must provide mechanisms through which property may be 
shifted to the higher-valuing party, since the market will then be unable to perform this 
function.59 To determine whether prescription qualifies as such a mechanism, I investigate the 
costs pertaining to prescription in the context of (i) owners, (ii) possessors, (iii) third parties 
and (iv) litigation.60 
 
Chapter four recognises the importance of “demoralization costs”61 for purposes of the 
economic analysis of prescription. According to Michelman, a person suffers greater 
demoralisation if he regards the loss of property through mechanisms – like prescription – as 
wrongful. For instance, chances are better that an owner may lose ownership through 
innocence or mere inattention in a regime with a shorter prescription period. Owners are 
likely to suffer severe demoralisation under these circumstances, as they normally do not 
expect to lose ownership in this manner. However, if the prescription period is long, an owner 
has more time to monitor his property and to evict possessors that may be “clocking up” time. 
Should an owner lose land under these circumstances, the negative effects of demoralisation 
seem to decrease. This is because an owner’s relationship towards property – in Radin’s 
terms – may become more fungible the longer he is out of possession. It follows that the 
longer the period for prescription, the lower the costs an owner suffers in terms of 
demoralisation. The same applies to an owner’s costs pertaining to the monitoring of the 
property and uncertainty as to ownership. 
 
                                                             
58 The Coase theorem was developed by Coase R “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law & 
Economics 1-44. 
59 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed 2003) 55. 
60 The costs of prescription in these four contexts are discussed in section 4.4.4 of chapter four above. 
61 Michelman FI “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ 
Law” (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 1165-1258 1214. Ellickson RC “Adverse Possession and Perpetuities 
Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 
723-737 728 made the connection by using “demoralization costs” in the context of prescription. 
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Three types of costs are of interest in the context of the possessor, namely “preying”, 
uncertainty and demoralisation costs. “Preying” involves the possessor’s attempts to obtain 
legal advice regarding his prescription claim; uncertainty entails the anxiety a possessor 
experiences before the prescription period is complete; while demoralisation illustrates how 
attached a possessor becomes to the property. The shorter the prescription period, the lower 
these costs, since a possessor then has less time to obtain legal advice, become anxious 
because of settled expectations (in terms of Singer’s “reliance interest”) or to become 
attached to the property. However, the longer the period, the higher these costs become, 
especially since a possessor may come to regard the property as personal after possessing it 
for a long time. This latter point also finds support in the theories of Radin, Holmes, Singer 
and Alexander. When viewed together, these factors provide strong economic justification for 
the acquisition of ownership by the higher-valuing possessor through prescription if the 
possessor has been in possession for a sufficient length of time, especially if the presence of 
high transaction costs prevents a voluntary transfer in this regard.  
 
Prescription not only reduces transaction costs in the context of the owner and possessor, but 
also for third parties. Since the law does not guarantee the correctness of the register in a 
negative registration system, the costs of investigating the (possibly incorrect) register must 
be weighed up against the costs pertaining to a physical inspection of the land to determine 
who owns it. This chapter predicts that prescription with longer periods reduces transaction 
costs relating to inspection, uncertainty of ownership and searching of the records, since third 
parties may simply disregard (erroneous) information in the register that predates the 
prescription period. This proposition is in line with Epstein’s doctrine of relative title, which 
states that prescription aids the process of clearing titles and resolving disputes as to 
ownership. However, the economic conclusions drawn in relation to third parties are limited 
to a negative registration system, since possession fulfils a more important role in such a 
system than in jurisdictions with a positive registration system, as seen in modern English 
and German law. 
 
The fourth category of costs pertains to litigation, which consists of (i) the outlays on 
litigation and (ii) the costs of erroneous legal decisions. The sum of these costs must be kept 
as low as possible in order to maximise economic efficiency. The costs pertaining to 
litigation increase with the number or outlays and the complexity of cases coming to court. In 
this sense prescription with longer periods reduces litigation costs because it awards 
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ownership to possessors over time, which in turn decreases the number of cases coming to 
court. Although this does not adequately address the issue of complexity, this problem is 
circumvented in that prescription “simplifies” the process of proving ownership because it 
vests ownership in the person who has been in possession for a substantial period of time. 
This eliminates the problems pertaining to stale claims and loss of evidence that normally 
contribute to the average complexity of cases, which causes litigation costs to increase. 
 
When the costs from these four categories are viewed together, chapter four establishes that 
prescription indeed shifts valuable resources – through original acquisition of ownership – to 
higher-valuing possessors in settings where transaction costs are high, since it lowers 
transaction costs in this context. Under these circumstances the Coase theorem regards 
prescription as a mechanism to affect exchange in situations involving high transaction costs. 
Merrill is also of the opinion that prescription achieves this reduction in transaction costs, 
especially if it operates as a mechanical entitlement determination rule where courts have 
little or no discretion to establish substantive and remedial rights.62 Finally, I argue that the 
fides of the possessor is irrelevant in terms of an economic analysis, since it will increase 
costs if one has to ascertain the subjective intent of a possessor. Thus, chapter four regards 
the distinction between good and bad faith prescription as irrelevant in the framework of law 
and economics theory. 
  
Not only do these three liberal theories seem to justify prescription, they also appear to 
accommodate bad faith prescription to a large degree. Nonetheless, this chapter investigates 
this topic separately, since the acquisition of ownership through bad faith possession 
represents a “significant qualification of the rights paradigm”.63 Although many authors 
oppose bad faith acquisition of ownership through prescription, some provide strong 
arguments in favour of this phenomenon, such as Fennell, Peñalver and Katyal. In this sense 
Fennell states that bona fides and mala fides are unsuitable labels for purposes of 
prescription.64 Instead, she divides these two instances of possession into possessors who are 
“advertent” and those who are “inadvertent”. Through her doctrine of “efficient trespass”, 
coupled with two economic requirements that need to be satisfied before prescription may be 
                                                             
62 Merrill TW “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1122-1154 1137. 
63 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 187. 
64 Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1037-1096 1037 footnote 1. 
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allowed,65 Fennell indicates that the supposedly simple distinction between good and bad 
faith possession is not as clear-cut as it initially seems. She focuses on the attempts of 
possessors to obtain knowledge as to whether their possession qualifies as advertent or 
inadvertent, and mentions that some parties may employ the absolute minimum effort to 
obtain information regarding the legitimacy of their occupation. Against this background 
Fennell concludes that knowledge is an unstable criterion to determine whether a possessor is 
in good or bad faith. Another aspect of her theory entails an inquiry into the conflation of law 
and morality in the word “thief”, as bad faith possessors are usually regarded as “land 
thieves”. Fennell argues that the bad faith possessor cannot be legally blamed for using the 
law to obtain ownership, since it is actually governmental power – instead of possession – 
that extinguishes ownership on the side of the owner. She counters possible criticism from a 
moral viewpoint on two grounds, namely that (i) prescription requires a substantial period of 
time, together with the fact that (ii) an owner merely has to assert his ownership to prevent 
prescription from running. On the basis of these two grounds she argues that it is unlikely that 
the mere presence of the possessor on someone’s land will pain the owner. Instead, it is the 
loss of ownership through prescription that pains the owner, not the possession of the person 
who occupies the land. According to Fennell, this pain will occur despite the fides of the 
possessor, which suggests that both good and bad faith prescription must be abolished if one 
wants to prevent this state of affairs.  
 
Peñalver and Katyal also illustrate the positive role bad faith prescription plays through 
focusing their attention on so-called “acquisitive [property] outlaws”. These authors state that 
bad faith possessors (ab)use property law rules to bring about necessary changes in a legal 
system. For example, prescription “moves” fungible property out of the hands of owners and 
awards it to non-owners who are normally isolated from social and commercial activity.66 
Peñalver and Katyal acknowledge that property is important for individual autonomy and 
recognise the role of Radin’s theory in their theoretical framework. Economic justifications 
for prescription are also prevalent in their work, since Peñalver and Katyal admit that 
prescription operates as a tool to transfer property to higher-valuing possessors when high 
transaction costs prevent voluntary exchange. Although it may not always be simple to 
                                                             
65 These are that (i) there must be a substantial difference in the parties’ valuation of the land and (ii) a market 
transaction must be unavailable: See Fennell LA “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse 
Possession” (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 1037-1096 1040-1041. 
66 Peñalver EM & Katyal SK “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095-
1186 1132. 
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determine whether the possessor values the property more highly than the absent owner, 
factors such as the length of the prescription period and the wealth of the possessor vis-à-vis 
the owner may contribute to a result that favours the possessor. Furthermore, Peñalver and 
Katyal argue that bad faith acquisition of ownership is permissible in terms of “objective 
distributive justice” if the possessor had real need of the land from the owner.  
 
Finally, chapter four considers whether Radin’s personality theory applies in the context of 
bad faith possessors. Radin thinks that her theory is unable to accommodate these persons, 
since it is – apparently – unclear how a mala fide person can become bound up with property. 
I argue that her theory can include this seemingly anomalous instance, especially if one 
focuses on the foundation of Radin’s theory, namely Hegel. According to Hegel, a person 
must invest his will into a thing together with possessing it before he can acquire ownership. 
The fides of that person seems to be irrelevant for Hegel, since even someone in bad faith can 
have the will to acquire ownership in an object. The arguments put forward by Fennell, 
Peñalver and Katyal strengthen such a proposition, since these authors are of the opinion that 
the subjective intent of the possessor is irrelevant for the purposes served by prescription. 
This is especially true in the context of homeless persons who occupy the property of others 
as a home, as Cobb and Fox emphasise. Therefore, chapter four establishes that there is no 
true benefit in distinguishing between good and bad faith possessors, which position is in 
accordance with prescription law in South Africa.  
 
 
6.2.3 Acquisitive prescription in view of the property clause 
Chapter five considers whether prescription is in line with section 25 of the South African 
Constitution. Since the law – through prescription – affects the loss of ownership by vesting it 
in the possessor, the issue is whether such loss amounts to a constitutional infringement of the 
property right concerned, namely ownership. To this end I employ the methodology set out in 
FNB, since any deprivation of property or property rights must be in line with section 25 to 
be constitutionally compliant. 
 
When a possessor acquires ownership in land through prescription, the landowner is deprived 
of his ownership in that land. The first stage in terms of the FNB methodology is to establish 
whether that which is taken away from the owner amounts to “property”. This question is 
easily answered when considering prescription of land, since the Constitutional Court held in 
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FNB that ownership of movables (and thereby also immovables) is central to the concept of 
property in South African constitutional law.67 As to the second stage of the inquiry, namely 
whether prescription amounts to deprivation of property, chapter five indicates that 
prescription of land does qualify as a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1). It follows that 
prescription of land, which entails a deprivation of property, has to comply with the 
requirements set out in section 25(1). The requirements for deprivation under section 25(1) 
are that (i) it must take place in terms of law of general application and (ii) such law may not 
permit arbitrary deprivation. Since the prescription acts clearly constitute law of general 
application, the main issue is whether or not prescription results in arbitrary deprivation. To 
answer this question, the chapter determines whether sufficient reasons exist for the 
deprivation and whether it is procedurally fair.68 Prescription will be procedurally unfair if 
there are insufficient procedural safeguards that protect the rights of owners. This chapter 
establishes that prescription is procedurally fair, since ownership is not easily lost due to 
reasonably strict requirements for prescription in South African law, especially the fact that a 
person must possess property animo domini. Furthermore, the 30-year period within which an 
owner may assert his rights and interrupt the running of prescription reinforces the security of 
ownership.  
 
The second leg of the arbitrariness test, also known as the substantive arbitrariness test, 
entails whether there exists a sufficient nexus between the effects of prescription and the 
purpose it serves. In other words, the chapter had to determine whether the deprivation 
caused by prescription is arbitrary. The Constitutional Court found that the substantive 
arbitrariness test is contextual and will depend on the facts of each case. The scope of the 
deprivation determines whether the substantive arbitrariness test will involve a rationality- or 
proportionality-like investigation, since instances of severe deprivation require stronger 
justification than those that are of a lesser degree. Since prescription results in the loss of 
ownership, it is clear that convincing reasons need to be advanced for it to pass scrutiny 
under section 25(1). To this end I employ the justifications for prescription identified in 
chapter four, namely that it fulfils a corrective function in jurisdictions with negative 
registration systems by lowering transaction costs in terms of utilitarianism and law and 
economics theory. Furthermore, the strict requirements for prescription – coupled with a very 
                                                             
67 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. 
68 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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long 30-year period – are hard to satisfy, which is reinforced by the fact that an owner need 
only take minimal steps to prevent the running of prescription. In addition, the fault for the 
loss of ownership can be laid at the door of the owner, since he – through negligence or 
inactivity – induces the possessor to “rely”, in the words of Singer, on the legitimacy of his 
possession. In this context Alexander’s social-obligation norm obliges the owner to “give” 
the land to the squatter, especially if it becomes essential for such squatter to attain human 
flourishing. Finally, the possessor becomes attached to the property in terms of Radin’s 
personality theory, especially when read together with the theories of Singer, Holmes and 
Alexander. This latter point also finds support in German constitutional law, which holds that 
property located further from the personal autonomy of an owner is subject to greater degrees 
of regulation or deprivation from the state. Consequently, chapter five concludes that 
sufficient reasons exist to declare that prescription amounts to non-arbitrary deprivation of 
property, which is similar to the conclusion reached by the Grand Chamber in Pye. This 
finding by the Grand Chamber is indeed significant, since it found that adverse possession, 
which merely requires possession animo possidendi, is in line with Article 1 of the First 
Protocol. This finding provides authority from a comparative law perspective that 
prescription – with its stricter requirements – is likely to amount to non-arbitrary deprivation 
of property in terms of section 25(1). 
 
The next stage in the FNB methodology concerns the question whether prescription could 
perhaps amount to uncompensated expropriation, which would be in conflict with section 
25(2). This possibility was highlighted by the decision of the Fourth Chamber in Pye, which 
found that adverse possession constituted uncompensated expropriation. Chapter five predicts 
that prescription cannot amount to expropriation, since all expropriations must take place in 
accordance with empowering legislation.69 Since the prescription acts do not empower the 
state to expropriate and, further, make no provision for the payment of compensation to an 
owner losing ownership, it is highly unlikely that prescription could amount to 
expropriation.70 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that common law expropriation is 
unknown in South African law, since an act of expropriation “must rest upon a legislative 
foundation.”71 Therefore, the state can only decide to expropriate if such power is granted 
                                                             
69 Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671. 
70 This issue is discussed in more detail in section 5.3.2.6 of chapter five above. 
71 Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671; Harvey v Umhlatuze 
Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 81.  
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through legislation, which legislation must specifically empower the state for this purpose.72 
Furthermore, there is no common law authority for South African courts to order 
expropriation, as this power must be granted through empowering legislation. The 
prescription acts do not empower a court to order expropriation, which is yet another 
indication that it cannot amount to expropriation. This chapter also considers the possibility 
that prescription may amount to constructive expropriation. In this sense chapter five 
supports the argument that if one adheres to the methodology set out in FNB, together with 
judgments from the highest courts in South Africa,73 it seems as if this doctrine does not form 
part of South African law. Van der Walt advocates this argument, since he states that the 
“doctrine of constructive expropriation probably does not and should not find application in 
South African law.”74 The chapter indicates that it is unnecessary to consider whether 
prescription may be classified under this doctrine, since constructive expropriation does not 
form part of South African law. Consequently, I conclude that prescription complies with 
section 25 of the South African Constitution. 
 
 
6.3 The future of acquisitive prescription in South African law 
In this dissertation I have shown that prescription, in its current form, is in line with the 
property clause of the South African Constitution. This will be the case as long as South 
Africa uses a negative registration system, for prescription will then continue to fulfil the 
corrective function of affording de iure status to long-existing de facto realities through 
clearing titles and resolving conflicting claims pertaining to ownership. Accordingly, 
prescription shifts resources to higher-valuing possessors because it lowers transaction costs 
in instances where the market is unable to facilitate this transaction. From a moral 
perspective, prescription rewards those who invest time and energy into property, since it 
awards ownership to them and protects the settled expectations of possessors through 
recognising their reliance interest. In this sense possessors become attached to property, 
which (personal) attachment must enjoy protection over the fungible interests of neglectful or 
absent landowners.  
 
                                                             
72 Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4. 
73 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC); Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA 1243 
(SCA). 
74 Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional Property Law” (2009) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2. 
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Although chapter four establishes that the distinction between good and bad faith rests on 
fallacious arguments, it could be advantageous to have a future study that investigates 
whether a shorter prescription period needs to be introduced into South African law for bona 
fide possession.75 Such an amendment could be sensible if it is able to rectify defective 
transfers that, but for a certain legal impediment, would constitute valid transfers of 
ownership. This argument is central to why Dutch and French law have shorter periods for 
good faith prescription. However, this dissertation in no way suggests that such an alteration 
be made to South African law, which has a period of 30 years for both good and bad faith 
prescription.  
                                                             
75 I am indebted to Prof van der Walt for discussions that helped me form this opinion. 
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